Fifty-fifth Anniversary Issue

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AMARILLO
COLLEGE
SEP 27 1977
LIBRARY

October 1977 *$3.00 a copy*

ON POWER

William P. Bundy—Stanley Hoffmann—Robert Legvold
Ralf Dahrendorf—John C. Campbell

Visions of Europe from Algiers to Tokyo—*Fritz Stern*
Requiem for the North-South Conference—*Jahangir Amuzegar*
The Ripple Effect in Korea—*Frank Gibney*
Canada's Time of Troubles—*Bruce Hutchison*
Spain's New Democracy—*Stanley Meisler*
The Polish Road to Communism—*Peter Osnos*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OCTOBER 1977

ON POWER

Elements of Power ..... *William P. Bundy* 1
The Uses of American Power ..... *Stanley Hoffmann* 27
The Nature of Soviet Power ..... *Robert Legvold* 49
International Power: A European Perspective *Ralf Dahrendorf* 72
Oil Power in the Middle East ..... *John C. Campbell* 89
The Giant from Afar: Visions of Europe from Algiers to Tokyo *Fritz Stern* 111
A Requiem for the North-South Conference . *Jahangir Amuzegar* 136
The Ripple Effect in Korea ..... *Frank Gibney* 160
Canada's Time of Troubles ..... *Bruce Hutchison* 175
Spain's New Democracy ..... *Stanley Meisler* 190
The Polish Road to Communism ..... *Peter Osnos* 209
Comment and Correspondence ..... *Hubert H. Humphrey/George W. Ball* 221
Recent Books on International Relations 226
Source Material ..... *Janet Rigney* 245

WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Editor

JAMES CHACE
Managing Editor

JENNIFER SEYMOUR WHITAKER
Associate Editor

LUCY EDWARDS DESPARD
Book Editor

GAIL GOERNER KAY
Assistant to the Editor

DOROTHY RUDO
Assistant to the Managing Editor

DORIS ELIZABETH FOREST
Associate Publisher

GRACE DARLING GRIFFIN
Director, Advertising and Promotion

MARY JANE CASSOTTA
Staff Assistant

SHEILA M. ROSENZWEIG
Staff Assistant

Editorial Advisory Board

A. DOAK BARNETT
JAMES H. BILLINGTON
HARVEY BROOKS
CARL KAYSEN
HENRY A. KISSINGER
WILLIAM L. LANGER
JOHN J. MCCLOY
HARRY C. MCPHERSON, JR.
WILLIAM M. ROTH

Vol. 56, No. 1. Copyright 1977, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in the U.S.A.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDITOR'S NOTE

As the cover indicates, this issue marks the 55th anniversary of *Foreign Affairs*—actually the beginning of its 56th year. Reflecting on these last five years, it seemed to us that they had been a period of extraordinarily rapid change in the structure of international affairs. While this could be examined from many standpoints—it may in hindsight be seen as the time when man first became truly global-minded, however tentatively—what struck us most was the degree of change in the distribution and perhaps in the very ingredients of power. So we put together a series on this subject—first, an overall look at those ingredients today, and then the question of power as seen in terms of America, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe, and finally of the Middle East oil-producers. A sixth article, by a Third World representative, should appear very soon. The series, as usual, reflects differences among the authors—doubtless readers too will disagree, on a subject that taxes the imagination.

In addition, the issue contains one modest innovation. Fritz Stern's piece on Europe seen from afar is a little more narrative and personal than most of our articles. We wanted it for its style and perception, and also as counterpoint to the fairly heavy dose of hard thinking in the anniversary series.

It happens that this is also the current Editor's fifth anniversary. He had planned to celebrate it quietly in the wings, but unexpected exigencies (as well as personal interest in the subject) compelled him to go on stage. He does so less in the spirit of punditry than in that of the narrator in *Our Town*. Would that we too could report that "the sky is beginning to show some streaks of light"!

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

Foreign Affairs is published quarterly by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Editorial Office, 58 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. The Editors will consider manuscripts submitted, but assume no responsibility regarding them. Cable address Foraffairs, New York. Payments and inquiries concerning subscriptions and reprints of articles should be sent to *Foreign Affairs*, 428 East Preston Street, Baltimore, Md. 21202. Subscription price U.S./Canada $12.00—Foreign $14.00 per year. Subscription air mail rates are available upon request.

Foreign Affairs is a member of The Leadership Network advertising group located at 230 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. Telephone Robert F. Sennott, Jr., 532-2500 in Suite 321.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

William P. Bundy

ELEMENTS OF POWER

So far, the twentieth century has been an age of nationalism. Nibbled at on the one hand by subgroups within it, and on the other by aspirations, concerns, and organizations transcending it, the nation-state goes on as the main engine of organized human action. For more of the world's population than ever before, the nation-state in which they live is one they regard as their own, however much they may dissent from its policies or even suffer its repressions.

So the affairs of the world—"foreign" affairs in the title of this American journal—revolve overwhelmingly around the relations among nations, their interplay, their capacity to exert influence or control one over another, or one group over another. In the area of security interests, this is self-evident. And even the new agenda of world problems—an economic order, food, population, the environment, the Law of the Sea—is still debated among the representatives of nations. The United Nations, as Mr. Waldheim keeps reminding us, is in the end only a mirror of its members; and behind their discussions of principle lurk, inescapably, perceptions of what might happen in the absence of agreement, perceptions of what nations might then do that would affect other nations for good or ill—perceptions, in short, of power. The day when this may be less true is still far off.

In the last decade, the structure of power relationships among the nations of the world has become far more complicated. Call this a "devolution of power," "political multipolarity," what you will, its essence is generally accepted. In contrast to the relatively simple world structure of 15 years ago—the West and its friends, the communist world, and the nonaligned—individual nations today are far less under the sway of others, more able to throw their own weight around, and groups of nations, regional or economic, stand together as new centers of power.

And the change is more than simply in the distribution of power, more than the normal tendency in history for some societies to advance and for others to stand still or to retreat. It relates to the very nature of power, to what elements or combinations of elements enable a nation or group of nations to exert power. In terms

---

William P. Bundy is the Editor of *Foreign Affairs*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of any statistical measurement of the orthodox instruments of power, it would seem that military strength has become if anything more concentrated in the United States and the Soviet Union, and industrial capacity in these superpowers and in Western Europe, Japan, and a small number of other advanced countries. Yet real power—the ability to affect others—seems in fact more widely dispersed than perhaps at any time in the world's history.

Clearly, elements of power that seemed less important have moved to the fore. And clearly, too, the elements of power have become more separable: a nation or group may have great strength in one respect but be extremely vulnerable in others. Although there have always been such discontinuities, now they seem to have reached new extremes.

How, then, is power distributed today? What elements of power seem to have new importance in the "mix"? The two questions go together.

II

Let us start with the most evident and dramatic new holders of power that have emerged in these last five years, the oil-producing countries grouped in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This is a case of economic power at its purest, based on the capacity to embargo oil shipments to selected consuming countries and more broadly on the ability and willingness to set prices for oil moving in world trade.

Foreshadowed in 1970-71 by the Libyan initiative and the Tehran agreement, this power was fully deployed only in the fall of 1973, with great political and military effect. As the front-line Arab countries took the military offensive against Israel, the threat of embargo caused NATO countries not only to adopt statements in a pro-Arab vein but to deny facilities for the transit of U.S. military aid to Israel (save only for Portugal's Azores). Western Europe and Japan simply could not face the prospect of a cutoff of oil supplies even for a short period, whereas the Arab oil-producers both controlled enough of the supply to make such a cutoff effective and were in a position to accept, collectively, the loss of income that would have gone with it. Like a stroke of lightning, the event laid bare the vulnerability of the major industrialized countries (which comprise both the West and the North) that had evolved in the previous 20 years alongside their tremendous economic progress.

And in the following months the oil-producers—this time with Iran, which had not joined in the embargo, in the lead—raised the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

price of oil fourfold, drastically readjusting the whole world economic structure, adding significantly to a pattern of inflation and recession already under way in the West, putting both advanced and developing oil-consumers into deep external deficit, and straining both private and public financing mechanisms, all in ways far from ended. So serious was the impact that there were a few who argued that the West should have taken military steps aimed at the Persian Gulf, and there were indeed brief official threats in this direction by both Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger. These found little echo in the United States and none in Europe or Japan. And the conclusion might have been drawn that the denial even of economic necessities was not, in the contemporary world, a possible occasion for the use of military force. In the old American game involving scissors, rock and paper, had commodity power become a rock that blunted the scissors even of far greater military power and gave its possessors both political leverage and the means greatly to increase their wealth and strength?

Only for OPEC, at least so far. As events have unfolded, commodity (or resource) power has come to seem much more limited than appeared likely in 1973-74. Third World countries that are the holders of resources moving in world trade have been on the whole disappointed. Except for Jamaica in bauxite and Morocco in phosphates, it has proved impossible to set prices in OPEC fashion, and these two cases are on their face too small for political leverage. In no major commodity other than oil has it turned out that a coherent group of nations control enough of the supply or are sufficiently able to accept the decline in income to replicate OPEC's actions.[1] The breach that OPEC opened has not been widened to admit to significant new power any other group of producing nations.

Yet from the Western standpoint the oil vulnerability remains. OPEC still sets the price of exported oil, and retains the latent capacity to cut off supplies. And the resulting power, along with the undertow of existing prices, is sufficient not only to make Western countries eager competitors for business and suppliers of arms and civilian technology to OPEC countries, but also to keep Western Europe and Japan publicly sympathetic to Arab peace terms.

[1] See Bension Varon and Kenji Takeuchi, "Developing Countries and Non-Fuel Minerals," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1974, p. 497-510. I am indebted also to more recent analyses (in process of publication) by Jacob J. Kaplan and Timothy W. Stanley of the International Economic Studies Institute, Washington, D.C. The recently disclosed uranium cartel may be cited as another exception, but involved only a small group of advanced nations led by Canada and reacting to American policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The impact on American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict is harder to assess. All that this country has done since 1973 to resolve that conflict can be supported on rational grounds, consistent with a continuing moral commitment to Israel, without regard to the oil factor. Indeed, the U.S. failure to mount an effective energy policy—at least up to this point—reflects, more than anything, popular refusal to accept (or inability to grasp) the implications of growing dependence on OPEC, and especially Arab, oil. The resulting possibility of an oil crisis in the early 1980s and beyond—either in connection with some Arab-Israeli development or in terms of price and supply in themselves—is a nightmare shared by Messrs. Carter and Vance with their predecessors, but not yet adequately by the American public or its mirror, the Congress.[2]

Meanwhile, the economic impact of OPEC's oil power continues. Doubtless its members feel they have been restrained in the amount of their price increases. The bellwether governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia need the economic strength of the West and specifically the military support of the United States; short of an Arab-Israeli crisis, these serve, if you will, as paper wrapping rock. But the OPEC members have also pitched their spending habits so that they depend on enormous new revenues. They do not mean to keep the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the poor oil-consumers from returning to reasonable growth levels, but their policies could have the effect of keeping the nostrils of both just out of the water. The transfer of wealth is certainly cutting into the real strength of both other groups, and deepening an emerging tripartite division of the trading world (with the Soviet bloc and China largely outside).

It does not follow of course that this loss of strength means an equal gain for the OPEC countries. Income need not mean wealth, let alone power—the decline of gold-rich Spain in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is the textbook example. Five years ago Nigeria and Indonesia were rising to the status of respected regional powers; oil wealth now seems to have compounded their problems of corruption and governance almost as much as it has profited them. Iran and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, have had not only waste and corruption but what seems to the detached observer a grossly misplaced emphasis on military spending; yet they are undoubtedly much more powerful not only in their immediate

[2] See George W. Ball, "How to Save Israel in Spite of Herself," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1977, p. 466-471; Dankwart A. Rustow, "U.S.-Saudi Relations and the Oil Crises of the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1977, pp. 494-516.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

regions but in the economic councils of the world. And Qaddafi of Libya—unrestrained by any sense of common interest with the West—has shown that "money for mischief" can have a sharp nuisance impact not only in his neighborhood but in trouble spots as far-flung as Mindanao and Northern Ireland.

But if commodity power is real and vivid in this one commodity, oil, and one area, the Middle East, what of the wider pressures mounted by the Third World against the industrialized Western countries? If OPEC power has been the most dramatic single development of these five years, a broader and perhaps more lasting innovation in international affairs has been the holding of a series of serious conferences on environment, population, food, the Law of the Sea, and a "new international economic order." Each of these has indeed found some measure of common interest and need for cooperation, but each too—in roughly ascending order up the list—has been permeated by sharply opposed positions and an adversary atmosphere, overwhelmingly on North-South, or developed-developing lines.

What has emerged to this point is a standoff both in terms of competing ideas and competing power—reflected in the economic negotiations that came to a close in Paris this past June.[3] Whatever political ends Arab-OPEC oil power might at some point be used for, its holders are not prepared to threaten its use on behalf of the economic interests of their colleagues in the Third World; nor are those poor countries which clamored for debt relief prepared to simply stop paying their debts, lest this freeze the flow of loans to them and to others. Similarly, whatever the theoretical capacity of the industrialized countries to refrain from doing business in the Third World without, for example, adequate understandings on fair compensation in the event of nationalization, the private and public interests involved are far too complex to permit such action.

In short, so long as each side calculates rationally the benefits of continued economic intercourse and the effective absence of alternatives, there is a rough North-South balance of economic power, slightly more favorable to the Third World than before (if only because of OPEC's continuing leverage) but still a balance. Five years ago it was argued that the West's multinational corporations might be becoming so powerful that they could dictate terms to smaller countries and even to larger ones; today there is no doubt that the pendulum has swung back near the middle—nations can deny and regulate, companies can refuse to trade or invest, and bargains are

[3] See Jahangir Amuzegar, "A Requiem for the North-South Conference," pp. 136–159 in this issue.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

struck.[4] And so it seems likely to remain in the predominant areas of economic activity, where the assertion of economic self-interest, on one side, can be met by economic action that hurts, from the other.

To this there is an important exception—the assertion of economic self-interest can prevail if it is territorial and can only be countered by physical force. What has happened in the oceans in this decade, especially the de facto establishment of 200-mile offshore resource zones, shows this vividly; when Britain ultimately declined to use its navy to protect its fishing boats off Iceland, it was a landmark simply more striking than the fines the United States quietly paid to Chile for the "encroachment" of its tuna fleet.

But although this shift, or assertion, of power was to some extent a case of small versus large, the spread of 200-mile resource zones has in practice benefited the strong rather more than the weak, at least up to this point. What has happened is that the power of coastal control has scored great gains over the power associated with the wide use of the seas. It is a major change in the ingredients and distribution of power, with implications that are for the time being predominantly economic.[5]

Returning to the economically related conferences, their outcome to date has not been simply a reflection of a balance of economic power as between the OECD nations, on the one hand, and the middle- and low-income nations on the other. Political factors of all sorts enter in, and we shall return to these in a later section. And one can never exclude the underlying element of what might happen in terms of force if the lines were ever to harden to the point where developing countries (or a group of them) simply lashed out, however irrationally, at any representatives or symbols of the industrialized countries that lay to hand.

What stands out, nonetheless, is the strength of the economic bonds that link both (or all three) of the different groups of nations. For all the turmoil of the last 30 years, it has been a time of extraordinary material gain, and the main source of material progress and technology has been in the First World, the West. This

[4] See Raymond Vernon, "Storm over the Multinationals: Problems and Prospects," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1977, pp. 243–262.

[5] The assertion of 12-mile limits for territorial waters (under total control), which had grown up before the spread of 200-mile resource zones, had of course major security implications. And at some future point the struggle between coastal and maritime nations could have greater military impact and could take on more the aspect of a crusade by the small against the powerful. In the continuing Law of the Sea Conference, the right to send ships or aircraft through the much wider 200-mile zones—a right obviously exercised far more extensively by the more powerful nations, and especially the two superpowers—has been preserved only in indirect language with a strong flavor of "O.K.—for now."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fundamental element of power has been trimmed at the edges by the advance of an economic middle group and more substantially by the advent of oil power in OPEC. But it remains central. Soft, dependent on others, often misgoverned, nonetheless the First World of industrialized countries—with the United States in the lead—continues to exert an immense magnetic pull on others. The center-of-gravity countries of the Third World want the system of world trade and exchange to work, much as they want to change its terms to their advantage. The rhetoric of utter frustration two or three years ago (and much longer in UNCTAD) still has echoes today. But in the last two years of serious negotiation, small as the results have been to date, it has been clear that there is much economic self-interest that holds the First and Third Worlds together—though not yet enough to move them more than very slowly to new levels of cooperation.

Within the context of relations between the First and Third Worlds, one other point stands out. A decade ago it seemed entirely possible that the major industrialized nations and subgroups of the North—the United States, Western Europe and Japan—would achieve or expand economic spheres of influence in Third World areas: the United States in Latin America, Western Europe in Africa, and Japan in Southeast Asia. In all three cases there remains a degree of special relationship, and it has had a strong constructive side, for example in the adoption by the European Economic Community (EEC) of the Lomé Convention to assist a group of countries, especially ex-colonies in Africa. Japan too—the preeminent example of a nation whose power is overwhelmingly economic—has passed through the trauma of the Tanaka riots of 1974 and today sends its Prime Minister to discuss major additional assistance projects in Southeast Asia. And the United States remains the largest external factor in the economies of Latin America.

But the threat of spheres of influence, in any sinister or preemptive sense, has receded. All three are active in all these areas. And growing diversification has proved healthy for all concerned, not only in economic terms but in mitigating the psychological and political consequences of excessive dependence. In a free trading system, economic power tends to spread out and thus to be diluted in its political impact.

III

So far we have been looking at the problem of economic power in the North-South context. What about the relevance of economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power to the East-West struggle, which persists as an "old" but still inescapable part of the world power situation?

When Mr. Khrushchev said 20 years ago, "We shall bury you," he presumably meant that in a finite number of years—probably by now—the Soviet Union and its associates would be outproducing the West and generally doing so much better that it would be clear to all which system was superior. To say the least, it has not turned out that way. Relatively efficient in the development and production of military hardware, the Soviet system simply does not produce either the industrial goods or the civilian technology that the rest of the world wants; its role in world trade is marginal and episodic, and its capacity to invest economic resources for the projection of power is limited—even the support of tiny Cuba has apparently been a considerable strain. The Soviet Union's economic programs overseas are dwarfed by the combined private and public efforts of the Western countries. It has great (though uneven) wealth and internal economic strength, but its outreach is much less than that of the United States, or Western Europe, or Japan.

But, it may be argued, this is all to the good for the political purposes of the Soviet Union. The Third World expects little from it—and indeed happily accepts the support of the Soviet bloc in votes concerning the terms of a new economic order. So the Soviet Union is free to go about its business, unencumbered by arguments about multinational corporations, and to put down its chips where they have most promise of political results.

It turns out, however, that the economic chips are not even enough for this kind of selective use on a wide scale, and that they have seldom produced lasting political results. Where the Soviet Union has made a major effort—notably in India—it has gained temporary credit. But the Soviet Union cannot meet India's most crucial need—food—and in the long run the pull of the West is almost certain to reassert itself.

Where the West has competed directly, the results have been one-sided. In 1973-74, Syria and Egypt turned to the United States, and away from the Soviet Union, for reasons that included a generous measure of politics; but economics were also vitally important—the United States, and the economic system of the West, had much more to offer not only in terms of immediate help but in terms of lasting ties.

And the economic factor played a part too little noted in two major cases where the issue was one of communist control of government—Chile in 1973 and Portugal in 1975. Although the Chile story has often been told, it has seldom been stripped down to its essentials.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is, of course, true—and deplorable—that President Nixon used the CIA to support briefly a possible military coup after Allende's election in 1970 (the so-called Track II); true also that the CIA gave support to center and right-wing elements during Allende's tenure, at a time when those elements were threatened by uses of government power that violated any democratic norm. And, true, third, that the Nixon Administration deliberately used its weight in multilateral lending organizations to help block new loans to Chile under Allende, and urged private American banks to cut back their activity.

But suppose none of these governmental actions had been taken. Would private American banks and other private Western interests, acting on their own, have provided Allende with the very large amounts of help he needed, in view of the reckless economic policies he adopted to keep and expand his original minority political support? Surely not; even with no political factors, private business would have pulled back in the face of economic irresponsibility compounded by nationalization. The economic situation, unaided, would surely have deteriorated in any event, and the middle class and army just as surely have been alienated by this and by Allende's growing assumption of dictatorial powers. In the end some sort of coup would have been inevitable.

Second, it is important to note what the Soviet Union did and did not do. Presumably Allende could have been sustained in the economic course he had chosen if he had been able to receive massive help from the Soviet Union and its East European satellites (with some also from China). And in fact, according to the Chilean Finance Minister's report in November 1972, all three did contribute substantial loans.[6] But these were far short of the need. The Soviet Union gave all kinds of political, propaganda and covert support to Allende's Chile; one can only conclude that it simply was not prepared, or able, to underwrite the Chilean economy as it has done for nearly 20 years in Cuba.

One cannot prove either of these conclusions. But one competent and deeply concerned witness accepted both, and they made a profound impression on him. In the late fall of 1973, just after the coup in Chile, Enrico Berlinguer changed the policy of the Italian Communist Party to advocate a *"compromesso storico"* under which the PCI would seek to take power only in a coalition with the Christian Democratic Party. While the new line had roots in earlier

[6] The amounts reported from communist countries were $446 million in long-term loans, roughly equal to what Chile was getting at the same time from West European and Latin American nations. See Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1974, p. 336.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PCI thinking, the decisive factor at that particular time was the Chilean experience. From it Berlinguer concluded that a minority (or even a slight-majority) Communist government in Italy, cut off almost surely from constructive economic ties with the West, at any rate not given outright help, would be in grave difficulties almost at once—and that the Soviet Union could not or would not then come forward in any way that would offer the people of Italy anything like the benefits they were receiving from being part of the Western economic system. As they explain this privately, leaders of the PCI do not mention the CIA, either in Chile or Italy, either as it was in 1970-73 or in its reduced state today. The point is economics, at bottom the relative economic attractions of East and West.

Finally, let us look briefly at Portugal. There were many reasons for the overthrow of the communist-leaning Gonzales government in the late summer of 1975, including the harsh tactics of Alvaro Cunhal, the personal qualities of Mario Soares, and the help the latter received from some European social democratic parties. But there can be little question that the narrowly balanced scales were also tipped by the EEC's public offer of help to a "democratic" Portugal, and by the strong underlying sense, in wide Portuguese circles, that to stick to the West meant far greater economic prospects than were conceivable under communist leadership.

In these cases economic power has surely been relevant to political choices that might have greatly altered the balance between communist and non-communist forces in Latin America and in Europe. The competition in economic power today is less a matter of specific competing offers—as in the Aswan Dam situation in 1956—than of the basic appeal of two trading systems, the broad and diverse one led by the Western countries and the small and cramped one dominated by the Soviet Union. Offers of economic aid still play a part in that competition—Congress willing, the Carter Administration is using them today for purposes that include an East-West element hardly distinguishable from the old cold war. But the main appeal comes from the Western system as a whole, public and private, and from the sense of what it has to offer or withhold (and not necessarily by government decision).

To say this is not for one moment to argue that the East-West competition has suddenly settled exclusively in the economic arena; nothing could be further from the case, as we shall see in the next section. Nor is it to contend that in that competition the worldwide economic involvement of the West is invariably an element of strength. Patently this is not so; the occasional overbearing and corrupt behavior of American corporations (as in the ITT and Lockheed cases) has been no help to American standing in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Third World. Some forms of American activity that seem economically helpful—for example, tourism in the Caribbean, as once in Cuba—may be contributing to political whirlwinds. And, most seriously, the involvement of Western private corporations in southern Africa—as President Nyerere has reminded us—makes it difficult for the West to set its own political course there. Western corporations may also be major engines of change in South Africa, and I am not trying to strike a balance on what should now be done about them. But wherever Western economic interests are deeply involved in a country, they tend inevitably to make it appear that the West supports political arrangements that, on a wider basis of national interest, the United States in particular might wish to disown or oppose. Finally, Western corporations can become sources of controversy, especially over nationalization, and in extreme cases virtual hostages, raising problems of protection that may be almost insoluble.

These are heavy drawbacks. They do not, however, change the conclusion. Western economic strength and worldwide reach are vitally important not only to the West itself and to the working out of North-South problems; they also play a crucial part in the continuing East-West competition.

Finally, there is the impact of the Western economic system on the economies of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The hold of Soviet leaders over their peoples, and that of the U.S.S.R. over Eastern Europe, rest on varying combinations of legitimacy and force. Economic intercourse with the West has not yet affected either hold, nor is the Soviet Union truly dependent on the West for anything economically critical to it (dearly as the Soviets would like to enlist Japanese and American capital for the development of oil resources in Siberia). Even American food is not indispensable, given the capacity to impose a return to old dietary habits.

But indirectly the impact of the West is considerable, constantly reminding the people of Eastern Europe that their system has not produced similar civilian amenities, putting steady pressure on the rulers to do more in this direction. Obviously, the dictatorships of Eastern Europe can control these desires far more than other types of societies; the continued level of military expenditure is evidence enough of that.

But Khrushchev surely thought that by now the Russians and their cohorts would have both military might and an impressive economic machine—that the pull would be toward the East. In economics the opposite is the case, and the trend continues to favor the West.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

What then of military strength, broadly defined as the control of means of destruction and coercion and the ability to bring these to bear? In the East-West arena, this concerns primarily the rivalry of the two great superpowers.

Obviously the military balance *has* changed in the direction of the Soviets, the trends going back now roughly 15 years. And it seems scant consolation that this may be, as George Kennan argues, because the Soviet Union has simply kept on improving its forces, while the West, and above all the United States, has only stayed roughly in the same place (down in some areas, up in others). Why, one must ask, did the Soviet Union feel impelled to keep pressing—and why did the West let down? The plausible answers are not reassuring on either point. The least disturbing is that the Soviets are simply conditioned by Russian history (far more than communist doctrine) to set inordinate store by military power in general, and by mass specifically. The question then is whether their views are sound.

Here it is important to separate out the elements of the change. The strategic nuclear situation calls for vigilance—and careful negotiation; it is not (yet) a cause for deep anxiety. Any political leader, Soviet or American, would prefer to play a crisis with the hole card of strategic superiority.[7] But for almost a decade neither has been in such a position, either actually or in clear prospect. Broad strategic parity, registered really by 1970 and formally by the 1972 SALT agreement, was indeed a boost for the worldwide prestige of the U.S.S.R. But the U.S. lead in technology remains, here and in other military areas, and I doubt that any recent quantitative changes have had much impact on worldwide perceptions of the trend lines of American and Soviet power.

The question of Soviet conventional power is more serious. The steady improvement of Soviet offensive weapons in the NATO area is a cause for concern, although any sense of the Soviets having the upper hand has, I believe, played little part in Europe's economic and political troubles. It is overwhelmingly internal factors that have stimulated the growth of communist and leftist strength in Italy and France, and the situation bears little analogy to the crisis of confidence in the late 1940s, in which fear of a military move by Stalin was widespread and psychologically impor-

[7] Many American participants in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis attached much less weight to the strategic balance than to the conventional naval situation off Cuba. See Maxwell D. Taylor, "The Legitimate Claims of National Security," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1974, p. 582. It seems clear, however, that the Russians read the lesson both ways.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tant. European confidence in America is indeed a critical part of the overall strength of the West, and it can be momentarily shaken even by the "loss" of Angola; but basically that confidence is much restored compared to the dark days of the early 1970s.[8]

It is not in the major areas of direct military confrontation such as NATO or Korea—or Iran if one wishes to include it—that the growth of Soviet conventional military power may be injecting new elements. Rather it is the growth of Soviet outreach—leapfrogging capacity—reflected in a much larger navy and much greater air transport capabilities. As has been widely noted, the Soviets had no capacity to intervene in the Congo crisis of the early 1960s, whereas in the Angola crisis of 1975 they had naval forces on the scene, the airlift and ships to deliver large quantities of weapons very rapidly, and of course the special long-range airlift to bring in the Cuban forces. As I shall argue later, Soviet success in Angola was more than anything due to political factors, but the result would not have been possible without the new forms of Soviet military strength developed in the last decade.

Now, in Ethiopia, we are seeing a test of how these same capabilities (including the Cubans) work out in a politically much more ambiguous situation, with the black Africans uncertain and key Arab nations opposed, and with a weak Ethiopian government to support. On its face the situation has many of the earmarks of a Soviet Vietnam on a much smaller scale—complete with the notion that the existence of capabilities tends to beget their use. It is too early to draw conclusions, but it should not pass unnoticed that Soviet backing of Ethiopia threatens to estrange Somalia and nullify the base privileges there that seemed so alarming only a short time ago. And elsewhere—in the Indian Ocean, Angola, or Vietnam—Soviet aid has not been translated into anything resembling a solid base structure.

This brings us to a main feature in Third World attitudes toward both the superpowers. It was a masterstroke for the Soviets to enlist the Cubans (who surely needed little urging) in the Angolan struggle, thus sheltering themselves behind a military force with Third World credentials (and familiarity with an Iberian language, a unique asset for that area in Africa). The use of Soviet or East European forces would have been quite a different matter. One may even hazard the guess that the Vietnam War was the end of an era in a much broader sense than its impact on American thinking—that, except in a very few special cases (Korea for one), the

[8] See, for example, Flora Lewis, "Europe's (Almost) Upbeat View of America," *The New York Times Magazine*, August 7, 1977, p. 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

principle has been nailed down that the nations of the Third World will go to extraordinary lengths to fight their own wars, with outside support limited to training, equipment and economic aid. For the Soviets to be able to airlift military aid is no small gain even in this limited area; it is still a different thing from the specter of Russian paratroops. No one would say the latter will always stay home; but, if they are used in the Third World, it will be at substantial and lasting political cost. The same would be true, needless to say, of American forces.

In this, one must say at once, there is little consolation in terms of the prospects for world peace. The Arab-Israeli confrontation is simply the most obvious and dangerous case where both superpowers have been involved to the hilt without either deploying its forces directly against the other. And the chance of local wars unrelated to any East-West rivalry may, if anything, be greater now that both small and medium-sized nations are less inhibited by the cold war—Cyprus in 1974 was mishandled by both the American and British governments, but even if both had acted quickly and firmly it is doubtful that American leverage would have been effective, as it had been in 1964 and 1967, in stopping the Greeks and Turks from the steps that successively led to war.

Here one comes to another feature so taken for granted today that it is hard to realize that 20 years ago it was otherwise. Since roughly the mid-1960s, there has existed a worldwide market in conventional arms—often of World War II vintage, but still effective—such that any nation (and any non-national group from political movement to terrorist band) can arm itself up to a very considerable point. Military power for local purposes is as dispersed as long-range military power is concentrated. If you want it badly enough, someone can get it for you wholesale.

The spread of contemporary vintage weapons could still, in theory, be controlled, and is in fact very limited today outside the major oil-rich countries, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia. Their experiment in forced-draft military expansion—at technical levels requiring the continued presence of foreign technicians for perhaps a generation if the equipment is to do its military job—is an extraordinary phenomenon, surely unique for years to come. Its very complexity gives one a ray of hope that other sellers and buyers both may be persuaded to avoid similar situations of dependency, diversion of resources, and domestic transformation in ways that can only lead to political difficulty.

And, finally there is the tremendous issue of nuclear proliferation, which has become much more difficult since 1974 in the face

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the worldwide energy crisis and resulting demand for expanded peaceful nuclear energy uses (and because of the Indian explosion that year). On this issue (as in the Law of the Sea Conference) one sees most vividly the kinds of new alignments, cutting across others, that contemporary problems may create.[9] The Soviet Union and the United States, the nuclear "have" nations par excellence, are joined together by deep concern to avoid the spread of nuclear weapons either to additional nations or to subnational groups such as terrorists. At the other extreme, the "have-not" nations urgently seek nuclear facilities for energy purposes and resent efforts to limit such imports or to control them in new and special ways. And in between is a group of nations that have extensive nuclear capacity and domestic facilities, although many (such as West Germany, Japan and Sweden) have accepted the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and foresworn weapons for themselves; these have a major stake in nuclear exports, in good relationships with important "have-not" nations, and in the freedom to maximize their own domestic nuclear programs.

From the standpoint of power, each of the three groups has substantial leverage over the others. The United States cannot get the intermediate group of nations to cooperate on the weapons problem in "have-not" nations without entering into much fuller cooperation with them across the board, especially in the supply of nuclear fuel. And the Treaty itself both gives the "have-not" nations a strong legal claim to nuclear assistance and obligates the "have" nations to do better than they have done in reducing their own nuclear arsenals. In the last analysis technological developments have been such that, no matter what is done or agreed, many nations are going to be in a position to have a weapons production capacity within months of a decision to go ahead—and the theoretical power to deny nuclear facilities is neither technically invulnerable nor capable of being exercised without drastic repercussions in relationships both specific and general, which neither the intermediate group nor the United States itself can accept.

So the lines are drawn, and at this writing the resolution is far from being worked out. If there is a saving interest common to all three groups, it should lie in the desire to minimize the chances of nuclear weapons falling into non-national hands, but this has not yet become strongly enough felt.

[9] On this subject and others I owe a special debt to Seyom Brown, whose article, "The Changing Essence of Power," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1973, accurately foresaw this development as well as many others that are highlighted in this essay. On the specific subject of nonproliferation, I am also much indebted to Mason Willrich, who has provided many insights but is not, of course, responsible for the use I have made of them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Already the capacity to achieve a nuclear weapons capability is an element in power balances, even if it is not exercised. One can quite plausibly argue that the steady pressure to be rewarded for *not* moving to a weapons capability could be far more valuable to most "have-not" countries than going ahead to have weapons. Actual possession—disastrous as it would be for the world and specific regions—might well be a mixed gain even for new weapons nations. Would it cause others to gang up in fear? What would it mean to the whole character of internal politics? And what, to repeat, of the danger of hostile political movements or terrorists? Once again, as throughout this discussion, one sees the depths of the discontinuities and "negative feedbacks" that affect the relationship between the possession of instruments of destruction and effective power among nations.

V

So far we have been discussing economic and military strength in terms of nations or groups of nations that have a great deal of one or the other, or both. What of those nations whose power is based largely on mass—containing substantial economic and military components but in the end depending heavily on sheer geographical size and numbers of population? One thinks of such nations as the sleeping giants of the world, or at least of a major region. On present trends, what is happening to them? How much does mass count?

China is the nation whose power seems to derive most from this factor—and at the same time the nation hardest to evaluate. After the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War, the belief that China was rapidly becoming immensely powerful was widespread, not only in the neighboring countries of Asia but in the West. Combined with the perception that China was thrusting outward to control other nations, it was this belief more than anything that led America into the Vietnam War, and led nations around the Chinese periphery to support American policy. China, remote and outside the United Nations, took on almost a mystical character.

Then China plunged abruptly in 1966 into the Cultural Revolution, and when she resumed having any foreign policy at all was absorbed in the confrontation with the Soviet Union on her northern borders. As she semi-normalized her relations with the United States and was admitted to the United Nations, a more familiar China ceased to seem so all-powerful. Lacking any strong tie to either superpower, her military strength dropped comparatively,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

although her nuclear capacity may be at a minimum deterrent level vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R., and her conventional strength is still great in Asian terms and would probably confound in the end even a Soviet invasion. Meanwhile the Chinese economy has moved forward, but only slowly and haltingly, so that she remains a poor country—immensely better-off than the old China, but outstripped in this generation not only by Japan but by other Asian neighbors. And, of course, both the Cultural Revolution and the later succession to Chou En-lai and finally to Mao himself have meant a period of intense domestic preoccupation, not yet ended.

China cannot help but be important in the world. The Sino-Soviet hostility is the most totally adversary big-power relationship in the world power structure from the standpoint of security. China ties down Soviet strength, preoccupies Soviet leaders, and dictates Soviet policies to a degree we never fully take into account.[10] China the competing center of communist power, China the center of a vast social experiment that other nations admire even though they have neither the cohesion nor will to emulate it, China with her history and immense reservoir of human talent—all these elements still add up to a weight that is as hard to quantify as ever.

However, in key international events of the last five years—the Middle East, southern Africa, the North-South dialogue, the oil crisis—what is striking is how little China has figured, although she has been at one time or another involved in all four. This is in part because her outreach is extremely limited—although China gave initial small-scale help to the FNLA in Angola, she would surely have been hard pressed in any event to match the Soviet aid to the opposing side as the stakes went up. (The same thing may now be happening in Mozambique, where both are on the same side.) Similarly, China could make gestures to the PLO, but had little to give. And in the wider economic confrontations of recent years, China's economic limitations would tend in any event to limit her role; she is simply not a world economic power or in control of crucial resources not needed at home.

But China's limited weight in world councils derives also from her isolated stance. She is with the Third World in rhetoric (but with her own variations, in which it is the superpowers who are grouped as the First World, with Europe in the Second—obviously because China regards Europe as a counterweight to the U.S.S.R.) but too big to be accepted as a member of the Group of 77 (in con-

[10] See, for example, Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1976, pp. 745–762.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trast to a brief period in 1964–65 when China was both accepted and powerful in Third World councils). So China remains outside any broad grouping, whether global, regional, or economic.

This leads to a general point: that power today is in much greater part—or at least much more widely—"group power." Those that do not belong to a "club" are missing something important.

The point is underscored if one looks at the weight in the world of the nations sometimes identified as a largely new category of "middle powers." India, for example, is impregnable in South Asia and by sheer mass qualifies for top-rank importance; once these factors were magnified by a leading role in the nonaligned group of nations, but today India seems somehow to stand apart, to say less and count less. On the other hand, the growing overall strength of others in this category is multiplied and reinforced, in terms of real power, by their leading role in important regional and economic groups—for example, Iran in OPEC, Saudi Arabia in OPEC and in the Arab world, Brazil in Latin America and in the Group of 77, Mexico the same (with the possibility of joining OPEC), and Algeria in OPEC and in the Group of 77.

In part, of course, these groups have evolved in response to the mass of the superpowers. In part they reflect the practical needs of negotiation and action. But whatever its roots, "group power" of this much more widespread sort seems here to stay. Its role in the East-West arena is obvious—although the Warsaw Pact and the Western alliance structure are both smaller than their predecessor structures 20 years ago. And in the economic arena, the OECD, OPEC and Group of 77 are central, along with the European Economic Community. And these are supplemented by such smaller subregional economic groups as the Andean Common Market, the Central American Common Market, and ASEAN in Southeast Asia.

But it is the power of regional political groups—formal and informal—that seems to have increased most clearly in the past few years. It is only since 1972 that the Arab and black African countries have been allied in the United Nations to put pressure on Israel and South Africa in a classic reciprocal-advantage pattern only barely rationalized by its participants.[11] When one adds the frequent agreement of the bulk of the Latin American countries, especially on the "economic order" family of issues, the large votes run up in the United Nations would be taking place even without the opportunistic help of the Soviets and their allies.

And it is the regional political power of these groupings, far

[11] See Ali A. Mazrui, "Black Africa and the Arabs," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1975, pp. 725–742.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more than the arithmetic, that determines whether these U.N. votes are important or mere window dressing. A condemnation of the U.S. position on the Panama Canal has weight because it represents the united view of all the Latin American countries, which have in the end the capacity to make that position exceedingly uncomfortable (by guerrilla warfare at the extreme, or at least by general hostility). Resolutions attacking Israel, on the other hand, have only a broad and not especially significant impact; they merely record an isolation of Israel already accomplished by individual country decisions. Now, it would appear, resolutions concerning southern Africa may be more significant with the growth of black front-line power there.

What these regional groupings can do, above all, is to set ground rules for the actions of outside nations within their regions. The Organization of African Unity tried this by backing Nigeria solidly in the Biafran war, with only mixed results in that the Biafrans did get some outside help right to the end; in Angola eight years later, the support of the MPLA regime by key African nations made a decisive difference, legitimizing the actions of the U.S.S.R. and putting great pressure on South Africa and the United States to withdraw from the scene, as both in fact did. That the Democratic majority in the U.S. Congress is especially sensitive to the weight of domestic black opinion was a factor, as it would be again. But the same regional power to approve or condemn would apply in a Latin American case where the domestic political element is less: that is, the kind of grudging OAS endorsement the Johnson Administration got for its Dominican intervention in 1965 would not today be given for any U.S. intervention in the Caribbean area. Not that one can imagine an Administration wishing today to take the same sort of action. The point is that the patent adverse consequences in the rest of the hemisphere have a real sense reduced U.S. power to act.

VI

We have moved gradually but inevitably into the sphere of politics. In what might be called "the politics of groups," what is it that holds groups together and enables nations to take the lead in them or to attract others to them? And how are these factors of cohesion changing?

To begin with, skill and experience play a role we sometimes ignore. Some nations are better at working in groups than others. In the field of multilateral diplomacy one thinks of the Canadians 20 years ago, or of the Dutch today—nations big enough to weigh

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but not big enough to frighten, and above all having leaders and diplomats with a certain knack for seeing situations as a whole and bringing other nations together. (Today the top executive officers in the IMF, the OECD and NATO are all Dutchmen.) And one must give the British high marks for holding together that extraordinary organization that almost alone bridges the First and Third Worlds, the Commonwealth.

Alliance diplomacy is an overlapping but often different sort of problem. And here I think it is possible to say that Americans have become reasonably good at this, with the occasional aberration such as John Connally. To occupy an acknowledged position of leadership is both a handicap and a help, and our record since the war stands out not only in itself but on any historical comparison. Certainly it contrasts with the Russians. Although they may excel at the third category, adversary diplomacy, their dealings with their ideological bedfellows, from the Chinese down, have been crude and insensitive, and those with their "friends of opportunity" (like the Egyptians) at least as much so. Style matters, and the formal competence of Soviet officials is far outweighed by their general inability to relate to the concerns of others.

And so (turning to the more "objective" factors) it is clearly Soviet force and Soviet self-interest more than common social systems that hold together the Second World groups—the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. These have cohesion and tight discipline, but little attraction for others. Even peripheral communist nations keep them at arm's length, and not just for tactical reasons.

The First World is joined by multiple strands. Although some of its members do not belong to any security group within it, shared concern over the Soviet threat is a common bond for all, though less powerful—taken as a whole—than common fundamental political beliefs and practices and the perceived central importance of the market economic system in which they continue to lead.

Today, these bonds on the Western side are still firm among existing governments. When the oil crisis hit in 1973, the United States and Western Europe were at loggerheads on economic issues; under external and internal pressures they, with Japan, have worked much more closely together since then, both through their governments and through their manifold private ties. The handling of the recycling of petrodollars has confounded prophets of doom, and the coordination of economic policy, while still far short of ideal, is a vast improvement over 1971-72. True, in the face of recession and reduced resources the European Economic Community has had to put aside the new objectives it then set for itself,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the specter of protectionism and beggar-thy-neighbor policies still hovers. But the institution of economic summits among Western leaders does reflect both closer technical cooperation and a stronger sense of shared basic interests. If the OECD countries are still feeling their way on North-South issues, it is partly because these have become acute at a time of economic pinch.

But core Western nations are always vulnerable to domestic troubles, and whatever the ultimate significance of Eurocommunism may turn out to be, the immediate impact on NATO alone of communist participation in the French or Italian governments could be a serious blow to Western cohesion. Whether the resulting situation might then weaken the Soviet hold in the Warsaw Pact area can only be a matter of speculation.[12] Much will also hinge on Yugoslavia's handling of the succession to Tito.

If ideology—the simple fact of totally different social systems—thus divides the first two worlds, what of its role in the Third? Plainly it plays little or no part in the continued cohesion of OPEC itself, which is a straight matter of economic self-interest and increasingly strong Saudi leadership. But there is less economic self-interest in the choice by the OPEC countries to remain closely aligned with the poorer countries in the Group of 77 (at least up to the present point, with the issues still stated in terms of principle) and in the fact that their expanded role in the central international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF has not yet moved them to think or act like the Western nations. Is there here, if not an ideology, at least some binding force in terms of strongly held feelings and attitudes?

It has been said that the economic demands of the Group of 77 derive from many of the member countries having been imbued with British Fabianism.[13] Others would use a more specifically Marxist label. I am myself persuaded that it is more general and much less specifically ideological than either of these.[14] The strongest tie that binds these nations together is a common heritage of colonialism (remote in Latin America, which, however, finds its own substitute in Yankee hegemony). Equally clearly, they largely reject the (often caricatured) capitalism they associate with the West. Given these two basic attitudes, more than a dash of Marx was sure to appear in their rhetoric. His influence on their practices is much more modest.

[12] See Charles Gati, "The 'Europeanization' of Communism?," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1977, pp. 539–553, for a stronger view on the impact in East Europe.

[13] See Daniel P. Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition," *Commentary*, March 1975, pp. 31-44.

[14] See Tom J. Farer, "The United States and the Third World: A Basis for Accommodation," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1975, pp. 79-97.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The nations of the Third World—immensely diverse as they are—are not likely ever to accept in any full sense the ideology or the prevailing social systems of the present First and Second Worlds. Ours is too different in its material assumptions, and the Soviet system is seen for its dispiriting and less effective reality. But this does not exclude the possibility of some homegrown composite ideologies sweeping the Third World in the event of trouble. Today its members are restrained, in part by economic self-interest, from any ideological binge. One could hardly expect this condition to persist, however, if they were to be thwarted by what seemed unreasonable positions on the part of the advanced countries. Indeed, if the present economic difficulties of the industrialized countries were to deepen to the point where the system they lead ceased to function effectively, we might have a broader and more diffuse, but in the end no less menacing, reenactment of the 1930s—a structure coming apart into disorder or even chaos, complete with extremist doctrines of some malign variety. A broad sense of participation is in the end essential to what Henry Kissinger has called "international legitimacy," or to the "world order" that Stanley Hoffmann would make the central guideline of American foreign policy.

Political ideology apart, there are two other potential forces that could unite large areas of the world. A prolonged black-white conflict in southern Africa would not only have incalculable consequences within the United States but would raise the level of race consciousness worldwide. The other possibility is religion, which has already been at the core of some of the most intractable conflicts in the world—between India and Pakistan, between Greece and Turkey, in Northern Ireland, and of course between the Arabs and Israel. Already the spread and growing solidarity of the Muslim faith seem to be changing subtly some key national policies and drawing together disparate nations across regional boundaries. And there is an ugly hint of *jihad* in a few Arab moves and utterances concerning Israel.[15]

Like the adoption of a purely destructive anti-West "ideology," a new dominance of race or religion as factors in world politics would seem a terrible step backward to most at least in the West. But the kind of world that could emerge in the next 25 years—dissatisfied, fed up, unable to find either a social or economic balance within countries or between them—is the kind of world in which, in the past, vast new movements have arisen.

To an objective eye, the barriers do seem substantial. The very

[15] See Bernard Lewis, "The Return of Islam," *Commentary*, January 1976, pp. 32-48.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

structure of worldwide communications—the sheer volume of talk—makes it harder for any truly new ideology to incubate; it also means that areas of deep trouble arouse at least a measure of sympathy in other countries that makes it harder to stamp all with the same label. We are intermingled as never before, and that may ease the tensions and stereotypes that feed on ignorance. But equally, or more, intermingling nourishes envy, and even thinly rationalized envy can have all the emotional impact of a powerful ideology, if not its organizing power.

So there are clear-cut selfish reasons for Western countries like the United States to wish to keep the "politics of groups" from boiling over into new and sinister forms. But there are also affirmative moral reasons for acting constructively, just as there have been in our domestic handling of the problems of a plural society. To seek only to avoid a situation where nations or major groups feel the structure should be kicked over is never going to be satisfactory to consciences schooled in any religious or ethical framework, or in the values we consider characteristic of America.

VII

In the end, of course, the most crucial of all elements of power is its internal political dimension. Whatever the other theoretical assets of a nation, they will count for little unless they can be focused and directed to further national objectives.

"There are few ways in which a man can be more innocently employed than in getting money," said Dr. Johnson. Something like this is what I have been saying about the affairs of groups of nations—that if economic self-interest (as enlightened as possible) is a dominant guideline, and if nations feel at least broadly satisfied with their place in an overall economic system, then the possibilities of bargaining and constructive accommodation are at least far greater than if groups are driven by other motives.

The same is true within individual nations. After a generation devoted to the attainment of self-government and national independence, most of the nations of the world are concentrating on economic progress and believe it attainable; the combination of the two may be unique to this historic period. It is an age of worldwide materialism—not necessarily at all in any invidious sense. What after all is more fundamental than advancing the welfare of peoples? Excesses and neglect must be corrected, but worldwide economic growth in a humane framework is a necessity.

But the primacy of economic concerns does make this an extraordinarily difficult period for leaders of government. The tow-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ering figures who came out of World War II are gone (save only Tito), and we are left with what a personality-minded observer like Cyrus Sulzberger calls "An Age of Mediocrity," of men preoccupied with economics—what Churchill called "those damn dots"—or in a few cases with the kind of intractable quarrels in which reputations for greatness are not made.

And it may be this that accounts more than anything for a worldwide crisis in the "legitimacy" of governments, using that word to mean a government not merely accepted as ruling with some measure of right but able to mobilize its people for the systematic pursuit of some big national objective, whether it be total internal transformation (Mao in China) or some external goal.[16] In the industrialized nations of Western Europe or Japan, government goes on, and often acts sensibly in response to the parallelogram of pressures by which it is surrounded; but that very parallelogram inhibits new or striking action, and in the end governments of whatever complexion—Right, Left, or Center—rapidly use up their credit. Schmidt and Giscard, since the spring of 1974, are examples.

And in the Third World, the crisis runs deeper into the very system of government. Within these past five years, institutions tending in a democratic direction seemed for a time in sharp decline; now there is a modest swing back, notably in India. Yet the common pattern remains a high measure of authoritarianism coupled with denial of human rights, by governments that simply are not satisfying their people's desires.

Nor are the superpowers immune. Obviously the United States today is much more preoccupied than a decade ago with its internal problems, much less prepared to make sacrifices, whether for maintaining a military posture, undertaking commitments abroad, or accepting the full consequences of a basic free trading system; to say there is no foreign policy consensus only covers part of the problem. And the Soviet Union, as depicted by Hedrick Smith and Robert Kaiser, is a state whose people may support limited-risk ventures abroad, far away, but whose internal economic concerns are slowly but steadily putting greater pressure on the rulers for their satisfaction.

True, in the kingdom of the blind the one-eyed may rule. The fact that the Soviet Union is far *more* mobilized for external purposes than any other nation remains an inescapable central fact of

[16] This is surely the sense in which Henry Kissinger meant the word in his too-frank statement that present governments in Europe lacked legitimacy. The two meanings, of course, shade into each other; a usurper who mobilizes the people of a nation can become accepted as a ruler by right. But a government with every credential may simply be unable to lead.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the world picture. But there are no large nations today that are "hard" states—totalitarian or mobilized for external purposes—to anything resembling the degree that Nazi Germany and militarist Japan were "hard" in the late 1930s, and that the Western allies became (in a quite different way) hard during the war. The only such states today, one might say, are both small and acting in self-defense—Israel and the whites of South Africa.

More of that kind of hardness is not what we need today. But Western nations do need to strengthen what is sometimes called their political will—not only to hold a balance with the U.S.S.R. but to permit them to treat with the Third World in a realistic and yet forthcoming way. There is no glowing simple idea that will galvanize that will. In this country, it does require more attention to ideals and principles—the greatest impact of President Carter's human rights policy is surely on our sense of ourselves—but that must be in focus with other objectives.[17] In the end, people unite to support policies that make sense and are explained properly to them.

Finally, there is again the factor of competence. Skill in marshalling all of a nation's or a group's assets, within the constraints of internal politics—what Dean Acheson christened "total diplomacy" a generation ago—still matters enormously. "Pure" diplomacy is both important and a great spectator sport by which national reputations are affected significantly. Style can be a bonus, though in its extreme forms—a de Gaulle, a Kennedy, a Kissinger—it can also be distorting to main lines of policy.

Institutions count too—the balance between professionalism and outside talent in the executive, between executive and legislative, between secrecy and openness, is struck in different ways by different nations, and has changed sharply within the United States in these past five years. I have a hunch that in some respects the pendulum will swing back and the hairshirt be less noticeable, but there can be no doubt that more open processes are both truer to American ideals and a practical imperative to sustain the very legitimacy of government, as well as to enlist popular and congressional support for specific policies. And while the theoretical efficiency of American diplomacy and intelligence may for a time be less than it seemed 10 to 20 years ago, the trade-off is worth it. In the long historical run—from Athens to Britain to postwar America—democratic systems have been at least as effective in foreign policy as other forms of government.

[17] See William P. Bundy, "Dictatorships and American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1975, pp. 51-60.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VIII

Throughout this essay I have dealt primarily in terms of the power of nation-states. They do remain, as I said at the outset, the main engines of organized human action. But, of course, the most important of human actions are not organized, certainly not by governments. It was Dr. Johnson again who wrote: "How small, of all that human hearts endure, / That part which laws or kings may cause or cure!" Although the grasp of the state is greater today than it was then, it still rarely reaches the sparks of invention, creativity and moral imagination that in the end move men most deeply. And history may join with a long tradition of humane thought—especially strong in America—that judges nations by the degree to which they foster the unleashing of the free energies of individuals.

Finally, something beyond nationalism is slowly taking root in the world. With all the discouraging developments of the last five years, the signs of a developing sense of common human destiny *are* present. Such a sense cannot substitute for a careful focus on the present and pressing problems that can only be met through nations. But world affairs will have a very dim future if this universal sentiment fails to show a steady increase from now on.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stanley Hoffmann

THE USES OF AMERICAN POWER

There has been much discussion in the last few years about the decline of American power. While American military capabilities remain enormous thanks largely to persistent technological advance and while the American economy remains the most powerful in the world, many observers have noted the discrepancy between capabilities and achievements. As the fall of Indochina, the rise of OPEC and recent events in Angola attest, the United States has had difficulty shaping the movements and outcomes of world affairs.

American power has been inhibited by several factors. First among these has been the increase in the number of actors on the world's stage. This has led to a greater emphasis on multilateral diplomacy and has allowed many of the new actors, though weak, to form coalitions which have damped the use of American power, particularly in arenas where the resort to force is inapplicable. Second, the exercise of American power has been inhibited by the increased economic interdependence of the world. Measures aimed at hurting others can boomerang, injuring allies or those whose cooperation we might seek in other areas. Our very interest in preserving the open world economy from cartels or an epidemic of protectionist measures induces us to seek compromises even on efforts, such as the exploitation of the seabeds, which we could undertake on our own. Third, our chief adversary has increased his military might. It is difficult to show much of an effect of nuclear parity on U.S. policy, but the ability of the Soviet Union to project its conventional power (or that of Cuba) far away from its borders, has made possible interventions that were once our monopoly: compare Khrushchev's feeble attempts in the Congo in 1960 and Brezhnev's policy in Angola. While it has always been Soviet policy to exploit the weak spots in Western positions, what is new is greater Soviet ability to carry out this policy.

Finally, despite our recovery from Vietnam and Watergate, there are new domestic restraints on the use of American power. Ethnic pressure groups have become more vigorous; economic

---

Stanley Hoffmann is Professor of Government and Chairman of the Center for European Studies at Harvard. This article has been adapted from his book, *The Lure of Primacy and the Logic of World Order: American Foreign Policy since the Cold War,* to be published by McGraw-Hill, © 1978 Stanley Hoffmann.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interests threatened by foreign competition are more powerful, especially since they now include the American labor movement; and Congress has proven unwilling to return to the practice of submissive abnegation characteristic of the cold war era. In addition, the nature of the issues on the "global agenda" and the absence of consensus on the priorities of American foreign policy, put far greater inhibitions on presidential predominance.

There are older restraints as well. The existence of nuclear weapons continues to constrain America to considerable prudence both during crises (such as Cuba in 1962) and in the resort to conventional force in areas of almost assured escalation (such as Eastern Europe). The desire to control the strategic arms race also limits our ability to push the Soviets too hard on issues such as human rights, even though we proclaim there is no linkage. Finally, those of our allies whose security we deem essential to our own, or to whom we have given a commitment that we must sustain lest there be a domino effect (such as Korea) are able to manipulate our policy through bilateral ties, just as economic interdependence allows others to manipulate the United States through collective diplomacy.

Given these restraints, the problem for American foreign policy consists in maximizing our opportunities for influence. The fundamental question is: influence for what? Identifying limits is not enough: we must set goals that correspond both to the imperatives of the world situation and to the desires of the American polity. Given the continuing domestic concern for the creation of an international milieu hospitable to American values and interests, given the dangers inherent in the superpowers' arms race and in the proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons, and given the risks of chaos inherent in the manipulation of all by all presently entailed by interdependence, the only sensible rationale for American foreign policy is contributing to world order.

We should strive for the advent of an international system that goes beyond the past forms of moderation characteristic of balance-of-power eras. The resort to force and the accumulation of weapons will have to be drastically curtailed by a combination of balances of force and of cooperative schemes for arms control and the settlement of disputes. Interdependence will have to be made bearable and beneficial both by collective management and by the reduction of excesses of mutual dependence or of the dependence bred by inequality—so that the actors will be provided with greater autonomy and with a greater sense of security. The preliminary task before defining such a policy is the description of certain guidelines about the proper conduct of American power.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

Some of the needed guidelines emanate from America's strategic choices: what kind of international system do we want to establish? Some refer to our tactical choices; they concern the methods the United States ought to use and the role it ought to play.

A first strategic directive concerns the nature of the exercise itself. We must protect and support the elements of order that exist already. While the conditions for chaos and the ingredients for disaster are present in the international system, there are threads of order that can be woven into a common tapestry. First are the restraints of nuclear and economic interdependence. Second are the fragile flickerings of "universal consciousness." They may not have the moral content of past norms for international behavior whose existence was alleged by those political philosophers who described international relations not as a state of war but as troubled peace. Nevertheless, two of these flickerings could light up a path to world order. One is, quite simply, the desire to survive. Nothing new, except that for the first time it is directly connected to the performance of the international system, not merely in the matter of physical protection from violent annihilation, but also in that of starvation, pollution, and an end of vital resources. Another common imperative, only slightly less global, is the race to welfare. Neither this desire nor this race ensures an orderly world. The will to survive has not abolished the determination to prevail, or to expand, or to free oneself of the chains others have imposed. The desire for development may well, as Robert W. Tucker has reminded us, breed more conflict than consensus, given all the divergences on goals and methods, all the uncertainties about the limits of growth.[1] Our goal must be to prevent state interactions and interdependence from becoming malignant. The existence of collective forces capable of making such transactions benign allows one to work toward this goal with some hope.

The problem of world order policy, thus, is double. On the one hand is the imperative against any regression: the restraints must be preserved, the two slim foundations of commonality must be sustained. On the other hand they must be strengthened. At present, the elements of moderation are partly mechanical, partly organic. Some result from the nuclear stalemate and the various balances of force, some spring from the nature of economic interdependence. But the latter, if pushed too far, can easily lead to reactions that could destroy these organic links. It has happened before. Today's restraints correspond to a recognition of common

[1] See Robert W. Tucker, *The Inequality Of Nations,* New York: Basic Books, 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interests or of necessity: fragile motives for conduct, because calculations of interest can change, and necessity is often resented.

Thus, progress toward world order requires the gradual emergence of a sense of obligation. A sense of common duty often requires a common faith; there is little chance of one emerging from the present cacophony. But such a sense can develop when the restraints and rules based on necessity and reciprocity have lasted sufficiently long, and when the leaders to whom they apply have established sufficient ties among themselves to be able to curb their respective dogmas and to resist the centrifugal pulls of domestic pressures. In other words, in the absence of a worldwide, single ideology, there is a need for some ideological erosion.

The goal would be, not to reproduce the conditions of domestic integration at a higher level, but to translate these conditions: no central power, but effective international institutions; no social or political consensus on a broad range of values, but a dense web of ties signifying the prevalence of mixed interests over adversary relationships and of behavior corresponding to a minimum of common values. Since actors tend to behave according to their beliefs and in response to internal pushes and pulls, the emergence of such a code requires, not merely the ideological erosion already called for, but the observance of minimum standards in domestic affairs. A tall order, and obviously a goal with two peculiarities: it cannot be reached soon, or ever fully realized.

Three policy directives can be derived from this definition. The first one is the imperative of no regression. Top priority must be given to preventing the unraveling of the present incomplete tapestry. In the games of economic interdependence, this entails safeguarding the principles of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and preventing violent monetary fluctuations (i.e., through managed floating) or new crises with the oil-producing nations. In short, policies should be aimed at preventing the breakup of the world economy into separate blocs engaged in the varieties of economic warfare.

In the strategic-diplomatic realm, protecting the present tapestry of world order means, on the one hand, preserving the central balance of deterrence and regional balances (especially in Europe), and on the other hand, preventing the return to an unregulated strategic arms race between the superpowers. A SALT agreement that is not perfect—complete, drastic, or symmetrical—is far better than none at all. Therefore, in the realm of weaponry, the competitive aspects of world policy ought to be clearly subordinated to world order concerns. (I am, of course, aware of two facts: this would constitute a revolution, and it is difficult to pull off.) It

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

means that abstract considerations should prevail over the most concrete of all criteria: the distinction between friends and adversaries. In the realm of conflict par excellence we must seek the cooperation of our rivals, and be ready to oppose our allies and clients when they pursue policies that run counter to the interests of world order.

The imperative of no regression, however, does not require self-destructive self-abnegation. All it requires is that the world order yardstick must be applied first; that the yardstick of "are they for us, are they against us?" not be the decisive one. World order concerns require that alliance relations not be claims for unconditional and total solidarity. But if world order considerations were applied by us as if the contest of the great powers, and the need for balances of force, did not exist, the consequences would be fatal both for world order and for domestic support.

The second and third directives translate the imperative of progress and are both less "angelic" and more controversial. If universal legitimacy is to be based, at first, on the consolidation and psychological internalization of survival and development needs, then those formulating a world order policy must stress what is minimally objectionable. This means that the cutting edge of one's own ideology, of one's own notion of the ideal social order, ought to be smoothed down. We ought to put forward, not the proposals that will certainly arouse the hostility of all those who do not share America's preference for liberal democratic regimes, or her belief in the market system, or her desire to keep the control of common institutions, but those that aim at strengthening the restraints of nuclear interconnection and economic interdependence.

Some will declare that stressing the minimum means avoiding the hard and real issues of politics. In reality, it means separating two political processes: agreements on a framework and arguments on dynamics, controls, and rewards. The former is no guarantee of final success, but if the framework is agreed upon, then—as the example of the Common Market has shown—there is at least some pressure to fill in that framework, lest the whole attempt fall away.

The third suggestion consists of stating that the choices in policy that were offered some years ago and still creep into political rhetoric—the U.S./U.S.S.R./China triangle versus trilateralism, North versus South—are not alternatives.[2]

Equal attention must be given to each of these configurations. The neglect or demotion of any one of these will have bad effects, both because of its intrinsic importance and because of their interrelatedness. In Kissinger's foreign policy, the effect of the first

[2] For further discussion, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Choices," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1973, pp. 3–42.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

triangle on other issues was exaggerated. Balance-of-power diplomacy failed to cope with the global and regional management of force in a world of multiple arms races. The application of balance-of-power methods to the monetary relations with America's allies—once these relations were no longer being subordinated to cold war priorities—proved disastrous.

On the other hand, the downgrading of détente and the new emphasis on the traditional alliances, either for security reasons or because of the role of the industrial powers in the world economy, or because of—often exaggerated—common values, should not mean a victory for the trilateral concept. It has as little to say about the management of force, and especially nuclear proliferation, as triangular diplomacy. Trilateralism also contains an implicit assumption that the U.S.S.R. and China do not create major world order problems because they are absent from the modern arena of world politics, or that they will change their behavior if confronted with a successful "trilateral" organization of the noncommunist industrialized world. This implies that what happens in the traditional arena can somehow be kept separate. In fact, the continuing importance of the strategic-diplomatic chessboard, and the worldwide scope of the triangular contest, argue against an excessive swing of the pendulum. Having overestimated détente, let us not underrate it now.

Originally, neither the strategic triangle nor the trilateralists had much to say about the South. Yesterday's official doctrine had assumed that as the competition between the great powers abated, their interest in the Third World as a possible source of "marginal advantages" would diminish. Consequently, the capacity of the poorer nations to stir up trouble among the great powers by playing one against the other would crumble. "Decoupling" between the great powers and the others was seen as a necessary part of the "stable structure." But the decoupling concept was empirically and normatively unsound. Empirically, it did not take into sufficient account the difference between the strategic-diplomatic chessboard, where decoupling makes sense, and the other arenas. There, although some of the players are private enterprises, all are at least half politicized. The companies of the rich deal with the states of the poor: they play too important a role in the economic strategies of their parent countries for any decoupling between them and their own governments to be carried very far. Many of the problems of the Third World, from population to genocide, from industrialization to pollution, are linked to the world of the rich.[3]

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 18–21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Trilateralism is a process with two uses: "to prevent any one of the poles from doing mischief to either of the others and to consult about problems on which the 'trilateral' countries share identifiable interests."[4] In each of these problems, there are divergences within the trilateral framework and some community of interests with outsiders. Basically the concept remains an American device for ensuring smooth U.S. leadership of the industrial "triangle," which may explain why, after the oil crisis, the shaper of the other triangle, Kissinger, borrowed so heavily from what its creators had designed as a counter-Kissinger strategy.

Normatively, everyone recognizes that the goal for world order must be "creating a global community that is stable and progressive."[5] But neither of the two triangles can effectively mobilize for world order purposes the reservoir of American idealism. It is not only a Machiavellian foreign policy that is "incapable of tapping the moral resources of the American people"; a "trilateral" policy, which appeals only to the skills of the professionals in diplomacy, academia, business, and the media would deepen the gap that, in all of the advanced countries, exists between an indifferent or indignant "next generation," and the managers of what has been called the "established disorder."

None of this suggests that one reject the two North-oriented policies only to follow a predominantly southern strategy. Those who believe in giving priority, at least for the long run, to the concerns of the less advanced nations, have often failed to deal seriously with the problems internal to the two northern triangles.

What we need is an integrated and coherent policy for all three worlds. None of the three is homogeneous; the Third World is undergoing rapid differentiation, and all the issues are interconnected. Even if the North resumes its growth, a new cold war, or an escalating and universally spread arms race would leave few resources for North–South relations. A prolonged economic slump in the trilateral world would have disastrous consequences for the heavily indebted oil-poor developing countries. A failure in the Arab-Israeli process of negotiation could lead to a new oil price increase, which would severely tax the "recycling" facilities of the industrial world, and so on. The drama of world order lies in this interconnection, and in the absence of any simplifying formula whose manipulation would lift all the troubles. There are different, partial ways for coping with some of them: détente is one, trilateral consultations another, the North–South dialogue a third.

[4] Richard H. Ullman, "Trilateralism: 'Partnership' For What?" *Foreign Affairs*, October 1976, p. 12.

[5] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy: The Search For Focus," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1973, p. 724.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But each one is incomplete and imperfect. Any policy that would give priority to one of these ways would find that the frustrations of the neglected realms would spill into the others.

III

A second strategic guideline can be defined in a single word: pluralism. The best chances for world order lie in allowing others to share actively in the management, benefits, and burdens of international agreements or regimes. This allows us to accept their greater share precisely because they too will have a stake in preserving that order.

Pluralism has three implications. The first is flexibility. Structures of order must not be frozen in concrete: an international regime, such as that of Bretton Woods, that can be preserved only at costs that become as obnoxious to the chief reserve currency holder as to its creditors, is a bad precedent. One needs international agreements that will be open to revision. Their absence invites unilateral coups to change the rules or to impose new ones. Moreover, the more rigid a proposed convention, the more it will seem like a *diktat* imposed by a preponderant power or group of powers, like a straitjacket aimed at institutionalizing some explicit or implicit discrimination or inequality (a problem of considerable importance in matters of arms and nuclear proliferation). This would only fuel the determination of the second-class citizens to undermine the structure. We must remember that the function of procedures is two-fold: to strengthen the restraints on a state's capacity for violence, while allowing the actors to pursue safely their internal goals and the external policies necessary to the achievement of these goals.

A second implication of pluralism might be called voluntarism. Not all nations are likely to cooperate in the search for rules and regimes, even if efforts toward world order stress what is common to all or least objectionable to most. As long as we live in a fragmented milieu, Rousseau's logic of the stag hunt may prevail over that of world order: in an uneven contest for scarce material and psychological goods, each hunter may still be concerned only, or primordially, with having his interest prevail over that of his rivals. In the realms of economic interdependence, the absence of some potential actors (such as the U.S.S.R. and China) may persist, and others may be divided by divergences over models of development and different attitudes toward the world economy.

Rather than letting discord prevent the establishment of any rules or regimes, one ought to deal with those who are willing, even when their substantive preferences are far from ours. To get the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other actors closer to where we would like them to be, traditional diplomacy, with its retinue of incentives and disincentives, will remain indispensable. Again, we may borrow from the European Economic Community: it started among those who were willing to accept a certain process; later, attention shifted from the process to substance, and at present, the membership has increased, there is a wide circle of associates and candidates, and the process itself has been modified as a result. Just as Europe *à la carte* is a bit messy, world order *à la carte* may be untidy. But it is our best hope.

A third implication of pluralism is the need for a fallback position. A world order policy must build in the possibility of failure—a lesson from the plight of détente. We shall need, on each issue, an alternative to success. It should be designed to safeguard U.S. interests, yet allow for ulterior progress, rather than perpetual competition. The failure to arrive at explicit rules and formal regimes, as in the case of the oceans, or of arms limitation treaties, should not force one back to the logic of the "state of war." Room should be made for informal understandings or partial agreements that would, to take two examples, save the seabed from becoming a jungle for the technologically advanced, or keep the strategic arms race this side of unilateral or mutual first-strike situations.

A new administration often comes confident that its fresh approach will make breakthroughs possible. When the suspicions, resistance and intractable interests of other actors puncture such confidence, we tend to blame them, rather than our excessive expectations, and to fall back into traditional routines. This vicious circle must be broken, not by any shrinking of our goals, but by greater skepticism about easy achievements, a more long-range approach, and a preparation of second-best positions.

IV

A third strategic imperative follows from the first two. It could be called turning national security into an aspect of world order policy. More specifically, it deals with the conflict of two logics, that of enmity ("us" versus "them") and that of relationships that are only partially adversary and allow for sufficient cooperation to make order possible. The pursuit of the latter logic is plagued by three problems. The first is the absence of any substantive consensus among the actors. In a world where many relations are patterned on the logic of hostility, our very efforts at promoting order are bound to be seen as self-interested by those who do not share our views. Secondly, we run the risk of turning our ties with friends or clients whose search for conventional or nuclear weapons, or whose violations of human rights we dislike, into

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adversary relationships. We also run risks in making concessions to hostile powers (for instance in the Third World) in order to gain their partial cooperation. Such risks entail a weakening of our power position, which is crucial because of the third problem—our relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviets are obviously concerned about confrontations with us and about nuclear proliferation. But they are worried mainly because their own survival or influence could be put in question thereby: their policy may be one of muted hostility toward us—muted by the existence of these threats, by the need to keep watching China's behavior, by the burden of preserving the status quo in Eastern Europe, by the imperative of internal development—but it remains one in which world order is defined as the triumph both of their ideology and of their state.

There is little contradiction between the logic of hostility and the logic of world order in their vision: order will exist when their system has prevailed over ours. There is a contradiction in our case, because we aim—or ought to aim—at a lasting, not merely a transitory coexistence of the two social systems, and at turning hostility into permanent cooperation. We may of course hope that such collaboration would induce extensive change in their system, but this is not our aim. Theirs remains the exploitation of cooperative relationships to the advantage of their cause and country.

How, then, can we overcome the conflict of the two logics? Are we not obliged, in order to survive, to give full priority to the logic of hostility? The answer is no, even if one professes agnosticism about Soviet intentions and looks only at Soviet acts and capabilities. Since our view of world order is different from theirs, our determination to preserve the central strategic balance, and to avoid being pushed, as in Western Europe, into the dilemma of accepting lightning defeat or else provoking a world holocaust, is perfectly compatible with our concern for order—as long as we keep making unilateral and negotiated efforts at preventing a "mad momentum" and at reducing the levels of force. We have the means to thwart any Soviet attempt at strategic superiority, and to prevent the conventional imbalance in Europe from becoming militarily and politically disastrous.

The Soviets' very tendency to play military cards above all in the world game—because of their deficiency in other kinds of cards or of their reluctance to play them—makes it more difficult for them to give up any sizable amount of might. Their remarkable paranoia about the outside world, fed by 60 years of insulation as well as by the existence of formidable foes, contributes to this unwillingness. It also explains their reluctance in regard to multilateral diplo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

macy, which both requires and promotes mixed relationships rather than "us versus them" confrontations—or "we and they" collusion. The Soviets are undoubtedly bothered by the costs and the risks of further escalation, and are aware of our technological advance. A lack of will, on our side, to preserve the balance would deprive them of any reason to strike deals. But if this will exists, so do the chances for agreements.

As for the contest in other parts of the world, it is bound to persist. The Soviet Union cannot let China exploit whatever revolutionary potential exists, and cannot fail to exploit Western weaknesses, lest the West consolidate its power in the contest. But, on the one hand, the most appropriate way for us to respond is not exclusively or even primarily by force, as in Vietnam—or as we tried in Angola. We cannot allow our adversaries to select the battlefields. We have other means to combat their influence. On the other hand, even if our motives differ, our interests converge in a number of instances, such as proliferation and the Law of the Sea. In other cases, such as arms sales, a partial convergence may occur. Thus, world order considerations can be given their due.

A danger for our position in the contest would still arise, if their pursuit weakened our main alliances and estranged us from other powers in ways the Soviets could exploit. But most of the states whose policies would collide with ours because of our drive for world order are totally unwilling to be connected to the Soviet side. They are more likely to pursue a nationalist course, and denounce us for colluding with the Soviets. Only if we decided to pursue relentlessly the logic of hostility against the Soviet Union would we avoid any such risks of estrangement—with, say, Brazil, or South Korea. But the costs of this logic would be unbearable, for us and for the world. Thus, we must keep seeking the cooperation of our chief rival, even if this does not put an end to rivalry, even if it does not solve all problems, and even though we must, in accordance with the principles of voluntarism, proceed without him whenever he refuses. Leading such a quest has a chance of affecting his behavior by fracturing his isolation.

V

How do these general guidelines translate into suggestions for U.S. methods? We shall try to provide the elements of an operational code. A first commandment would be: avoid inconsistency. There are three familiar kinds of inconsistencies we should guard against. The first is the failure to think about the impact abroad of measures taken (or of the failure to take certain measures) for domestic reasons. One can think of President Truman's 1945 deci-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sion to extend U.S. jurisdiction over the resources of the continental shelf and to establish fishery conservation zones, because of the pressure of fishermen's and oilmen's lobbies. More recently, there was the signal contribution made by changes in U.S. food policy around 1972 to the food crisis that followed—the decision to go back to the market mechanism, to let prices fluctuate and food reserves and food aid drop, to use American fertilizers on newly released land to increase home production and exports. We lacked adequate stocks. The fertilizers that could have produced more wealth abroad were not available for export.

But if priority is to be given to world order, not only must a coherent set of external priorities be defined, but the pressures and moods these priorities ignore, reject, or anger must be neutralized. These internal pushes and pulls risk becoming irresistible if they arise, for instance, out of fear of foreign competition in automobiles, or shoes, or textiles, or television sets, at a time when the domestic market suffers from a recession. Indeed, the recent recession provides a prize example: the domestic measures that provoked it failed to take adequate account of their effects abroad. And these measures themselves were aimed at fighting an inflation that had also spread abroad and undermined the monetary system, because of Washington's failure to take domestic measures to reduce the balance-of-payments deficit.

What this suggests is that a world order policy must prevail not only abroad, over the traditional policy of the stag hunt, but also, at home, over the tendency for domestic concerns to become decisive. The barrier between domestic and external affairs has fallen. Our internal energy policy, with its encouragement to the nuclear energy industry, has created powerful domestic obstacles to our foreign antiproliferation policy. Paradoxically, the "primacy of foreign policy," which was almost tautological when the barrier existed, becomes indispensable now that its disappearance creates a real contest between internal and external concerns.

A second kind of inconsistency consists in forgetting or ignoring both the interconnections and the contradictions between the various games. Making nuclear energy (or weapons) more easily available to foreign clients may help one's balance of payments and give one a hope for political leverage; but it also contributes to the danger of proliferation and war. To provide conventional arms to potential regional hegemonic powers may diminish their incentives to become nuclear states, but it also contributes to the danger of classical violence, and it may undermine both their economic development (the Prussian model—building a country around an army—is hardly convincing: we are not in the age of Frederick the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Great, and can form no instant Prussias) and their internal political stability. To provide weapons (as we do in the Middle East) to all sides of existing or latent conflicts may help preserve a balance that will deter violence, but it could also fuel the flames.

Yet if there exists a contagion of bad policies, the contradictions between good ones are no less formidable. Each problem, as technocrats like to believe, may have a solution. But these solutions often turn out to be incompatible. A bigger flow of resources to the countries of the Third World may simply feed their demand for advanced weapons, conventional or nuclear, and their ability to buy or build them. A stringent nonproliferation policy may make its victims, if they are Third World nations, thoroughly uncooperative on North-South issues; or else it may well make the economic development of such nations more difficult by depriving them of the energy that nuclear technologies could produce.

Thus, we return to the need for long-range thinking and integration—not only of foreign policy, but of foreign policy with domestic policy. Without such integration, either bad policies will be pursued for short term or narrow reasons, or else good ones will be initiated in such a way as to cancel each other out. The best is often the enemy of the good, and thus we must try to establish a clear order of priorities.

A third inconsistency concerns the style that could be called neo-Gaullist or the aggressive defense of self-interest. To be sure, this tone has exploited a domestic mood of hostility to outside entanglements. It also helped Washington recover some liberty of maneuver—or resort to the same practices as everyone else, especially those who had used them to increase *their* margin of maneuver at Washington's expense. But such tactics, merely irritating when adopted by a lesser power whose capacity to disrupt world order is feeble, do not suit a great power. In the international jungle, the lion, not the rooster, is the pacesetter. Others are at least as likely to copy his behavior as to cower when he roars. The adoption of a "world order style," however, is not without problems. At home, it is as risky to ignore the strain of xenophobia as to let the pool of idealism evaporate. To try to outfox the champions of toughness by wrapping a world order policy in self-righteousness (a temptation that threatens our antiproliferation policy) could backfire abroad. Many remember that America's often hegemonic policies in the containment era were sold in the loftier wrapping of global idealism.[6]

Thus, a return to an idealistic tone, even on behalf of a true world order policy, could breed sour misunderstandings between

[6] Hoffmann, *loc. cit.*, pp. 27–28.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

our good conscience and other nations: a readiness to suspect in our stance either a clever disguise of crass interests or a way of freezing the distinction between developed countries (entitled to their sophisticated conventional and nuclear weapons) and the developing ones (summoned to restraint on behalf of world order). (The "Gaullist" style has at least the merit of its defects: brutality leaves no dark corners, no ambiguity about motives.) It could also encourage allies and dependents to exploit American meekness-for-world-order, either by playing the familiar blackmail of weakness or to preserve their special advantages. Concerns for world order must be spread wide, and even though the United States may play a special "shaping role," others may use Washington as a huge procrustean bed. But, as in many other areas, the role of American leaders will be to explain at home why a world order policy, even if it does not entail the spreading of American features all over the world, and even if it means concessions aimed at convincing others that we are not just protecting our power and status, is in America's interest. And it will be their duty, abroad, to convince others that they cannot simultaneously leave all the work to us and resent us for trying to do it.[7]

VI

A second commandment is: play the politics of bargaining. Here again are three implications. The first is the need to engage other nations in negotiation. To reject demands outright is the surest way to reinforce ideological solidarity and to provide our chief rival with fine opportunities at our expense. A declared willingness to deal with our challengers on concrete issues would expose the profound conflicts of interests among them and allow us to exploit our greatest advantage: the need of other nations for America's technological know-how and resources. Even in the traditional arena, more can be obtained by appropriate forms of bargaining than by mere threats and sanctions. Both in the case of the Conference on the Law of the Sea, and in that of our dealings with OPEC, we have learned that protracted bargaining brings out the splits among bargaining nations. At the General Assembly session of the fall of 1975, Kissinger's multiple proposals on North-South issues produced a remarkably mellow mood and a moderate consensus. His delegation's greater reticence at the UNCTAD meeting in Nairobi in 1976 resulted in greater intransigence and difficulty in reaching a compromise. At the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris in June 1977, where the new American delegation was a bit more flexible, some agreements were reached.

[7] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To pursue such a course, the United States would not have to give up building its own coalitions for bargaining purposes. And it would still, in each case, have the choice between trying to deal with an issue solely on its merits and within its own arena, or linking it to another set of issues or arenas. What the United States would have to give up is the high-powered tone and the hard-nosed act. The United States would have to learn to react, not as a corporate "free enterprise" society but as a state skillfully maneuvering with other states. The United States should not react as a state whose huge power allows it to crush or ignore others, but as a partner in collective bargaining who aims at entangling his opponents in agreements that it would not pay for them to break.

To keep the balance of influence favorable to the United States at the end of the bargaining, we would have to learn not to interpret every sign of hostility abroad as an act of aggression, to which we react with sanctions, subversion, or sermons. But we should do better than that. A second implication could be called the rule of non-collision. One bargains *effectively* only with the authentic representatives of other states (or non-state actors); and one has a chance of bargaining *successfully* only if one does not put oneself, at the outset, in a losing position. Thus, the rule takes two forms, and both go against much of past U.S. foreign policy. On the one hand, non-collision means refraining from interventions in the domestic affairs of others aimed at overthrowing their governments or at thwarting the free exercise of popular suffrage. (I am leaving aside the problem of intervention on behalf of human rights; and I am not excluding the legitimacy of help given to a democratic government, or to a regime that has taken over after a long dictatorship, if it finds itself threatened by subversion.)

But interventions aimed at "destabilizing" regimes or at fixing electoral outcomes also ought to be avoided. Not only are they morally repugnant, but they are usually inadequate at ensuring control of events. One supports the idea of a generals' coup, and it is the colonels who take over, as in Greece in 1967. Or one "wants to give a chance to democratic opposition forces" in Allende's Chile, and one gets Pinochet. Moreover, one's puppets or protégés, once in power, often want to show that they are authentic nationalists. The Greek colonels objected to the U.S. resupply of Israel in October 1973. The Shah of Iran, restored to power by the CIA in 1953, expressed his gratitude by leading OPEC's oil price increase 20 years later. Even when the client behaves nicely, the result of intervention is usually to make the United States the chief villain in the eyes of domestic opposition and of many other nations—and thus to create opportunities for the U.S.S.R. or Cuba. Also, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

necessary promotion of multiple management in international institutions and regimes will remain fragile as long as the voices that speak for the partners in conferences and agencies are not the true spokesmen of authentic national regimes.

In the Third World, no action taken by any such regime can be so seriously destructive to American interests as to justify U.S. intervention unless it deliberately opens up avenues of strategic and political control to our chief rival. Even this is most likely to result from a U.S. policy of support for weak, corrupt or oppressive regimes. Some governments are more likely than others to provide a favorable milieu for U.S. public interests and private investments. But were this the criterion of U.S. policy, it would commit Washington to permanent entanglement in an unending quest for unachievable control. Moreover, multinationals that find themselves unwanted here or there can always move elsewhere—or return home. Both the United States, in need of domestic investments, and host countries, often more likely to benefit from trade than from import substitution, might find some such "disinvestment" from the South advantageous. Here, some decoupling, some relaxation from extremes of interdependence, is necessary. In Western Europe or Japan, a hostile regime might produce disastrous results for the American power position in the East-West contest. But even there, little can be said to support American manipulation. Where manipulation can be attempted, as in much of the Third World, the stakes are not vital enough. Where the stakes are higher, our reach is shorter: public directives backfire, covert shenanigans easily get uncovered.

A policy of world order need not have, or spread, illusions about the willingness of present states to reserve their beliefs for the home front and to behave on the world stage according to a different set of principles. They *will* try to act out their beliefs, as we do. As always in political affairs, moral considerations and practical considerations are inseparable. I have emphasized often enough the collapse of the distinction between domestic affairs and foreign policy. But the *target* of foreign policy, for world order's sake, should be the external behavior, not the internal makeup, of governments. We can make it difficult for them to act out their principles, if their acts entail the forcible destruction of a vital military balance, or the unilateral repudiation of accepted rules of economic interdependence. If they act within the shrinking rights of sovereignty, we ought to respect them—for instance, if they ask for the renegotiation of our bases on their soil, or if they nationalize their resources or certain industries. "Friendly" regimes have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

done this, too. Eventual erosion of ideological hostility can only follow stoppage. Discouragement, not subversion, ought to be the goal. For years, we have applied this criterion to our relations with Russia, China and Cuba, precisely because *we* are stopped from going beyond. Where we have the means of doing so, we should not.

On the other hand, we should, more generally, avoid any direct collision between the United States and rising nationalisms that provide the irresistible dynamics of world politics. Some of these nationalisms we dislike, because they have been captured by, or have allied themselves with, communism. But when these are authentic nationalisms, as in Indochina, their coming to power amounts to neither an extension of Soviet (or Chinese) power, nor a drastic decline of ours. Should they become expansionist, then the world order criterion would allow, and indeed urge us, to apply the usual methods of deterrence or defense; but not before. Mostly, the nationalisms that are either in power, or struggling to come to power (like the blacks of southern Africa) are not communist. They will, however, be anti-American if the power and policy of the United States stand in their way (as when we divide the governments of an area into moderates and radicals—an artificial and unstable division—and throw our support to the moderates, however flawed) or if the U.S. government chooses to identify the American national interest with private American interests that collide with local nationalisms. Even in an area where the United States has a recognized sphere of influence—Latin America—a confrontation between Washington and a Latin American nation will produce ripples, such that the nationalist victim will become a model in areas where our vulnerability is greater. Such confrontations open the way to Soviet (or Cuban) bridgeheads, as we have seen in Angola—a dangerous development, if one believes that world order requires some dissociation of regional balances from the tensions of the central balance and some moderation of the regional by the central one.

Precisely because the Soviet-American contest is here to stay, any collision between Washington and a rising nationalism that gives a chance for Moscow to intervene restricts thereby the scope for world order politics. It is not only the Soviet Union that has to be contained, it is the irreducibly zero-sum game component of world politics. The multiplicity of nations and of their interests provides opportunities for global peace and possible protection from the spillover or escalation of regional violence. These chances must be preserved. Collisions would also disrupt the conditions of mutual-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ity necessary in the arenas of economic interdependence. The unevenness of interdependence between the United States and most Third World nations makes these collisions possible. But interdependence exists, and a battle could lead to one of two results: the choice, by the nationalist nation, of a path of self-reliance or of complete non-reliance on the United States; or its choice of a policy of antagonistic coalition-building aimed at the collective reduction of dependence. Neither would make world order, or bargaining for it, easier.

A third implication of the politics of bargaining is the need to let others form their own coalitions. As we have just seen, our own behavior will determine in part whether these will be hostile or cooperative. Let us call this imperative the encouragement to grouping. Some years ago, I used the word "devolution," to refer to the need to create, enlarge the scope of, and reinforce the authority of international or regional agencies, and to the need for the middle powers to assume more responsibilities.

Institution building is obviously a collective task: the United States cannot create them alone—in this realm, collective devolution is called for. Moreover, the establishment of world order, issue by issue, is so formidable an enterprise that if Washington alone tried to shoulder all the burdens, it would breed not only irresponsibility and resentment abroad, but a violent domestic desire for disengagement. In many parts of the world, states or groups of states have quite simply acted to increase their power and influence—often, as in the case of India or OPEC, by means that we disapprove of yet that resemble those we have used: sometimes, as in the case of Iran or Brazil, with our help. We have not really "devolved"; they have taken.

In one part of the world, devolution turned out to be meaningless. In a sense, opening American markets to Japanese goods and capital was a devolution, because it allowed Japan to become a major industrial power. But we have nothing to gain by encouraging Japan to become a major military power. It would upset the internal consensus in Japan and revive fears of Japanese domination in Asia. South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Indonesia clearly prefer our presence to Japan's exclusive one. The best way of preventing Japan from seeking to translate economic power into military might, is to organize the world economy so that Japan will have greater economic security: access to the energy and raw materials it needs, outlets for its goods and capital. Moreover, it makes no sense to bolster China's power by providing Peking with weapons it could use in a war against the Soviet Union: the costs, for our relations with Moscow, Tokyo and Delhi, as well as the risks

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of seeing these arms used against Taiwan, far exceed the possible advantages for Chinese-American relations.[8]

Devolution continues to make sense in Western Europe, which we have not encouraged to organize its own system of conventional defense, and which recent American policies have boxed in. We have done so economically, through the creation of agencies such as the International Energy Agency; militarily, by equipping NATO with American weapons whenever we could; and politically, by discouraging European diplomatic initiatives. The European Community, already troubled by internal discrepancies and by a lack of common will that 30 years of dependence on us have bred is caught between two new dangers—losing its identity in larger international institutions or else becoming a mere appendage to the American-German preferential relationship. (One must note that the trilateral formula also puts the formation of a broader coalition, the trilateral one, ahead of any strengthening of the European Community's limp identity.) By the spring of 1977 the members of the Community were looking to Washington for initiatives on all their problems—economic recovery, steadier North-South relations, energy and monetary policies, the fate of European armament industries—a sad reflection on the merging of European issues into global ones and the lack of European autonomy (because of insufficient cohesiveness) in facing these. Here, the failure of devolution has been doubly detrimental to world order: politically centrifugal forces are growing stronger, unconstrained by a distinctively European defense system, and the lack of coherence and substance in Europe has prevented it from picking up monetary leadership once America's started slipping—despite the Community's importance in world trade—or sharing it with the United States.

Our indifference to devolution, and to the process by which middle powers or key coalitions have emerged, is due to our dream of primacy. Kissinger's design emphasized the traditional chessboard, on which bipolarity persisted, and tried to exploit America's provision of the "public good" of security to its allies, to regain lost ground in the economic arenas. We have seen what happened to Kissinger's design after 1973. The trilateral sketch for "common policy planning" greatly favored the one power that has, for 30 years, developed the practices, tools, positions, and lingo of globalism.

The alternative I suggest is based on the conception of a world of many coalitions with a stable central military balance. It is gloomier

[8] A. Doak Barnett, "Military-Security Relations Between China and the United States," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1977, pp. 584–597.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about American skills and the enthusiasm of others for playing our game, yet more optimistic about pluralism and the convergence of essential interests, even (perhaps especially) without American attempts to pull all the strings.

The advantages, of course, are exactly the reverse of the flaws of primacy. We would be relieved from playing Atlas, and others would be rescued from the frustrations, humiliations, narrowing of vision, self-doubts, or petulance that dependence breeds. We would become, in effect, a more responsible player by being less intoxicated by world responsibility, and others would become more responsible by having to deal with world (and not just parochial) issues. Above all, the perils of a centralized system in which every local crisis involves the great powers would be reduced.

The disadvantages have until now appeared to the policymakers far to outweigh the advantages. Dependence is self-fulfilling and self-perpetuating; to let go might create vacuums that rivals would fill; heady displays of immature independence could lead to nuclear proliferation or upset the networks of fragile relationships woven over the past 25 years. For devolution to be smooth, rather than destabilizing, one may need extraordinary psychological skills and diplomatic subtlety. Moreover, all bureaucracies are better at incremental tinkering with instrumentalities such as alliances, whose worth has been sanctified by time, than at the kinds of mutation that a world of coalitions and middle powers implies. Some of these would entail material costs as well: a West European military entity would want to buy less of its weaponry in the United States. Yet, whatever the risks and losses, we cannot stop the process of devolution. It is going on wherever we have had no control. And where we have control, as in Western Europe, our reluctance to encourage a new entity has not prevented its members from competing with us in selling arms abroad or from selling their nuclear technology to third parties, after having received most of their nuclear fuel from us.

The task of tightening the nets and strengthening the restraints of world order requires that the extreme discrepancies of power between actors be reduced. As one wise commentator has put it, there are two difficulties: small countries all too easily become "free riders" who benefit from common rules without contributing to their establishment or to the costs of their maintenance; and excessively mighty and psychologically overburdened big powers wish to remain "the heavy riders" (or raiders).[9] The formation of bargaining coalitions and the rise of middle powers or entities helps in restoring some balance, and ought to be encouraged by us—as long

[9] Peter Katzenstein, in a forthcoming volume edited by him.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as it helps consolidate what I have called "moderation plus." This means that these powers and entities must be carefully placed, with their cooperation, within the constraints of economic interdependence and the imperatives of limiting violence. In turn, they shall accept such restraints only if we behave in the same way.

Our national style and international experience have not prepared us for a world in which our interest lies in disconnecting dominoes, discriminating among challenges, and allying ourselves with foreign nationalisms. Yet we must learn to do so.

VII

This suggests a last tactical guideline: let our policy for world order be political. Let us recognize that we are dealing with a world of states, i.e., interests and dogmas, ambitions and fears made effective and sometimes lethal by state power and by the legitimacy conferred on states by sovereignty. It is at the level of the state that policy is integrated, linkages and trade-offs are made constantly. It is the existence of states, the fact that the rights and duties of individuals are controlled by them, that the common good of mankind is defined by them, that they have at their disposal, however unevenly distributed, formidable weapons of destruction and chaos, which makes "moderation plus" both necessary and difficult.

What we need is an awareness of their perspective and an understanding of their concerns. All too often, our approach has been grandly unpolitical. Sometimes we have looked at their interests only from the viewpoint of our contest with communism, or our quest for stability. Now, we seem to be treating the world as a sum of discrete problems. We seek functional solutions for each of them on its merits, apart from its significance for each state. In both cases, this amounts to our substituting our wisdom for theirs. We "know" for instance that the developing countries do not possess the capital skills, resources and need for nuclear power. We "know" that the satisfaction of many of the Third World countries' economic demands would not improve their condition. We may, of course, be right. But in politics it is consequences that matter. We have to convince them, by providing them with carefully selected incentives and disincentives. A combination of lecturing and strong-arm tactics is likely to lead to conflict, to feed local nationalism and self-righteousness, to increase resistance to our "solution." We have experienced this in our conflict with France under de Gaulle. We may, of course, have to put pressure on countries whose behavior we deem dangerous. But just as we have learned to avoid humiliating foes, we must learn not to antagonize countries

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whose cooperation we need on a variety of issues. If we ask them to give up some course of action, we must at the same time either reward them in a way that serves their interests, or provide them with a substitute. In no realm is this more important than that of weapons proliferation, nuclear or conventional. To brandish sermons and threats first, incentives and alternatives later, is a recipe for serious trouble.

A quest for world order inevitably leads to a preoccupation with the diverse issues that crowd the agenda of states and international agencies and with multilateral rather than bilateral diplomacy. Yet it also feeds on the grand American faith in technical solutions—solutions that result from the mere application of reason and expertise and avoid the passions and prejudices of politics. But reason and expertise prevail only if there is a consensus on the nature of the problem. This is not what we find in most of the cases we shall have to deal with. It is hard for people used to an engineering approach to acknowledge that what we deem instrumentally best may be judged politically unacceptable elsewhere. But we will have to, and therefore while dealing with each problem on its merits, we must also ask what the effect of each proposed solution would be on military, economic and political relations in each part of the world, and on the fortunes of each country.

The strategic and tactical suggestions listed here aim at making possible new understandings, agreements and regimes. But above all, their purpose is to contribute to a change of what might be called the mores of the international milieu. In every society, the effectiveness of the laws, indeed their substance, depends on the customs, on the internalized rules of behavior of the members. It is a truth that has inspired political thinkers from Montesquieu to Rousseau and Tocqueville. It applies to the international society as well. We cannot, by ourselves, shape its mores, even if in our moments of greatest arrogance we see ourselves as the teachers of manners and methods. But we can, by our own behavior, profoundly affect that of others. We regard ourselves as benevolent. Others, even when they seek us out, often fear us as a threat, both because of our dynamism, our impact on their societies, and because of our policies. The guidelines recommended here will not curb the devastating effects which modernization, especially in American garb, can have on traditional society, but they may make us reconsider policies that contribute to turning a heterogeneous world into a very dangerous place. That countless actors contribute to it, nobody denies. But the ability of the main players to influence the tone and quality of the international state remains considerable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Robert Legvold

THE NATURE OF SOVIET POWER

For three decades Soviet power has obsessed American foreign policy. By it we have judged our own; because of it we have committed ourselves far from home and justified our commitment in terms of the menace it represents; around it we have made a world order revolve. For us, Soviet power has been the ultimate measure and the central threat, a seminal idea and a source of orientation.

Should it still be, however, now that international politics are changing so? Or should it still be, because Soviet power is changing so? Is the evolution of the international setting altering the meaning of growing Soviet power? Or is the growth of Soviet power undermining the meaning of an evolving international setting? The ambiguous relationship between the two makes it much harder to know what role the Soviet Union ought to play in our concerns. Judging the significance of larger and more modern Soviet military forces becomes increasingly difficult when traditional frames of reference no longer hold, when the old rules and characteristics of international relations yield to new ones, when the uses to which military power can be put are depreciated, and when the concept of security as such loses its precision, swollen by strange anonymous sources of insecurity, many of them economic in nature. It is a world in which fewer and fewer of our problems are caused by the Soviet Union or can be solved by it, save for the ultimate matter of nuclear war.

Yet, amidst the loosening of the old order—the deteriorating hierarchies and orthodoxies, the growing number of political actors and political axes, the new imperatives of interdependence—there is also the distracting spectacle of ever-expanding Soviet military power. During these years of passage, the Soviet Union has busied itself with a vast buildup of its armed forces, introducing new technologies, enlarging numbers and most significantly venturing into areas far from its historic spheres of concern. The Soviet Union has spent the decade turning itself into an authentic

---

Robert Legvold is Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University, and during 1977–78 Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science and Acting Associate Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

global superpower able to apply military force in the remotest regions of the world. With the capacity has apparently come the vocation.

"Soviet Russia," Henry Kissinger and his closest counselors used to say, "is only just beginning its truly 'imperial' phase." The prospect does not fit comfortably with our image of the other processes reforming world politics. Hard pressed to reconcile these two perceptions—of an increasingly interdependent (and decentralized) world and of an increasingly "imperial" Soviet Union—we have tended not to try. We have responded rhetorically ("The United States seeks to give the Soviet Union a stake in a more stable and humane international order.") rather than conceptually. And having no clear concept of the relationship between the transformation of Soviet power and the transformation of the global political setting, we have concentrated on familiar apprehensions: Where there is instability, what is the Soviet ability to interfere? How do we keep the Soviet Union from intervening in Angola or in Yugoslavia? Or how do we frustrate Soviet intervention when it occurs? (Phrased by the last Administration, the question was: "How do we create a calculus of risks and benefits that will induce the Soviet Union to behave?") What is the political and psychological impact on our NATO allies of strategic parity or the growth of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces? What does the Soviet Union hope to accomplish by adding to its military advantage in Central Europe? How well served are Soviet aims by the tensions between Greece and Turkey, the West's economic dislocations, or the possible entry of French or Italian Communists into their governments?

Like our apprehensions, our perception of the Soviet Union as such tends to be narrowly cast. There is a remarkable consensus in most of what is being said about the Soviet Union and the nature of its changing power. People may disagree over details and over what it all adds up to for us, but on the central characteristics nearly everyone agrees. The common portrait is of a late-arriving military leviathan, in the bloom of military expansion, self-satisfied at last to have matched the power of its great imperialist rival, and fascinated by the potential rewards in the continued accumulation of arms.

But most are also agreed that the Soviet Union is a seriously flawed power: economically disadvantaged, technologically deficient, bureaucratically sclerosed, and threatened by a society that is, in Zbigniew Brzezinski's words, "like a boiling subterranean volcano [straining] against the rigid surface crust of the political system." Something of a deformed giant, Enceladus with 50 with-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ered arms, mighty in military resources and exhilarated by its strength, but backward in other respects and sobered by the need to enlist the West's help in overcoming these problems.

From these two perceptions it is only a short step to another widely shared impression: unable to influence others by the force of its ideology, plagued by an economy that does not measure up, and discredited by its repressive habits at home and among allies, the Soviet Union has but one major trump, its military power. Some argue that this is a historic condition, that all of the regime's expectations have been deceived, save for the accomplishments of force. The failure of the European revolution, capitalism's resilience despite the Great Depression and the constant cycle of lesser economic crises, the collapse of communist unity almost as soon as unity became a practical dream, the unruliness of change in the theoretically revolutionary regions of the Third World, all these are the wreckage of earlier hopes. The Soviet Union's triumphs, they contend—from the conquest of power to the spread of empire, from the early victories in the civil war to the historic defeat of Nazi Germany—have proved to generations of Soviet leaders the trustworthiness of force alone.

Others are simply commenting on what appears to be the Soviet Union's comparative advantage. But either way, because of this perception, our concluding observation takes on greater moment. For, in one form or another, nearly everyone who makes the Soviet Union an interest notes the contrast in what we and they want for the world. Even those who believe the Soviet Union is losing its taste for revolutionary transformations and settling down to traditional power politics nonetheless stress the conflict in the two nations' underlying values. Whether the reasons reach back several centuries, as some insist, or merely back to different political systems, as others suggest, the Soviet Union remains an alienated competitor.

If there is truth in this assessment—and, to a degree, it is utterly true—it is a narrow-minded truth, which does not help us sort out the subtler aspects of the Soviet challenge. I say narrow-minded truth because it bears so little relationship to the Soviet Union's self-image; because it is so thoroughly *our* view of the world. Claiming greater honesty and accuracy on our side is only a partial way out and no service to ourselves, not if the Soviet Union is acting according to its own view. Thus, we have twice handicapped our analyses: first, by not grappling with the interconnection between the evolution of the international order and the evolution of Soviet power and, second, by giving short shrift to the way the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Union views these issues.

We need a broader and richer framework within which to judge the changing nature of Soviet power, one that also incorporates the Soviet understanding of the changing nature of everyone's power. That is what I have tried to sketch here, starting with what seem to me the most conspicuous features of change in the international order, but measured against the lingering and complicating influence of the old order. There follows a brief description of both the new and the faded forms of power and a few comments on Soviet power judged accordingly. My primary concern, however, is the Soviet perspective on these issues. Therefore, I have devoted the second half of the essay to their perceptions of the evolving nature of power within an evolving international setting.

II

Five elements of change strike me as central. The first of these is the transformation of alliances, a specific manifestation of the general erosion of hierarchies. Not that partnerships are ended or that the power to compel loyalty has in all instances dissolved, but the premises of unity are in most cases no longer what they used to be. Among the industrialized countries of the West, the will to subordinate parochial national interests to traditional security concerns and common enterprises thrives less. In the other camp, the core alliance remains intact, but the original socialist alliance long ago disintegrated with Tito's challenge and the Sino-Soviet split. Moreover, the Soviet Union's extended alliance with West European communism is foundering at the moment on the same reluctance to subordinate national concerns.

The second element of change is the exponential growth of interdependence, confronting nations with the peculiar risk of suffering more the more others suffer, and fusing their prospects for prosperity—no longer merely their prospects for tranquility. Gradually and timidly the socialist countries are being drawn into the same process, a process with unfamiliar rules of restraint and mutual concern.

Third, in this increasingly interdependent world, the collapse of the old international economic order and the challenge raised to a new one of, by, and for the industrialized capitalist societies, have rewritten the political agenda, converted economics to a still higher form of politics, and introduced a critical revisionism, sponsored this time not by the East but by the South instead. Together the second and third elements of change have made the issue of national security far more complex than defending the integrity of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one's territory and political values. Increasingly the stake is also in the security of foreign markets and key resources, in the freedom from economically dislocating external price increases, and even in the success of other governments' domestic economic programs.

Fourth, there is growing regionalization of international politics, the particular form taken by the disintegration of a simplistically bipolar world. Ambitious states like Iran and Nigeria exert greater leadership within their own regions, and in the regions of Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia many of the local states make it increasingly plain that the stewardship of outside powers is no longer necessary. In Europe and Asia new or restored power centers have emerged, creating a looser and more complicated geometry underpinning the structure of international politics. And cutting across this new structure, the proliferation of nuclear weapons adds to the complexity and hazards of change.

Finally, at the pinnacle where power was once concentrated, a fundamental shift has occurred in the military balance between the two superpowers. The Soviet Union is no longer the United States' relative inferior in strategic nuclear power. For nearly a decade it has been our rough equal, and, in the minds of many, a self-confident military competitor eager to do still better.

This last development represents in fact a specter from the old order and is the chief reason we have been slow to think our way through the implications of the Soviet Union's altered power in an altered setting. For two things are at work and both stimulate ancient reflexes: one is the evolution of the whole of Soviet military power and the other is our enduring image of the role military power plays in Soviet conceptions.

Seeing the Soviet Union draw abreast in the strategic arms race has been hard enough. But to face in the same short period the realization that the Soviet Union is turning itself into a first-class naval power capable of challenging our mastery of the seas and meanwhile straining to improve its massive power in Europe has been vastly more disconcerting. All at once the Soviet Union has as many, indeed more and larger missiles than we; it has most of the same (though perhaps somewhat retarded) technologies, MIRV, mobile land-based missiles, and rudimentary high-energy lasers; and still it presses on with new generations of weapons systems. Just as suddenly its navy is out on the high seas, sailing oceans where it has never been before, assuming missions it has never had before, and building ships it has never needed before. But even more disturbing, in Europe, where it already had the advantage, the Soviet Union has not only improved the quality of its arms and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the number of its forces on the Central European front, it has radically altered the balance in the Mediterranean and on the northern flank.

Add to this the place that we have long assumed war occupies in Soviet theory, and inevitably our perspective shrinks to a rather traditional set of apprehensions. For the assumption that the Soviet Union accepts the utility of war is deeply ingrained. Because the Soviet leaders have never repudiated Clausewitz's dictum of "war as the extension of policy," we have taken this to mean that they still regard the resort to arms as a legitimate instrument of policy. Hence their apparent conviction that war, even nuclear war, is "winnable," and their unwillingness to accept Western notions of strategic nuclear deterrence. Dedicated to the idea of prevailing in a nuclear conflict, they are, we assume, less intimidated by the prospect of its outbreak and therefore less concerned with doctrines designed to avoid it or, in the event, to limit it. Even granted that they want war no more than we, the way they conceive war and the way they prepare for it prove to us that the Soviet leaders believe in the practical effect of both the threat and the arsenal of war.

For many, the next step in the analysis is obvious: if intellectually the Soviet leaders acknowledge the utility of force and if practically they are dependent on it, then not surprisingly they appear bent on achieving the largest possible margins of military advantage. This is the culminating premise. The Soviet Union is driven—to the limits of its resources and our complacency—to seek superiority over us: to amass still greater forces in Central Europe, that the West Europeans may be properly cowed; to fashion a navy more powerful than ours, that we and our friends may be held hostage to our economic dependencies; to build the capacity for projecting power to the far corners of the globe, that new and volatile nations may be opened to Soviet influence; and, ultimately, to overshadow the American strategic nuclear deterrent, that all these other enterprises may be safely pursued.

Viewed like this, it is no wonder that the Soviet-American relationship is soon largely reduced to its military dimension, our attention fixed on the contingencies and circumstances in which the Soviet Union could exploit its military power, and the solution found in our own military strength. Those who think we find the solution in too much military strength simply reinforce the narrowness of our analysis. Because their arguments usually turn on a more optimistic assessment of the military balance—rather than on any disbelief in our original assumptions about the place of force in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet theory, something they are more likely to regard as irrelevant than as wrong—they confine the issue still further to a great debate over comparative military capabilities. Thus, they reduce the Soviet threat but not our preoccupation with it.

III

How ironic that we should be so easily seduced by our traditional apprehensions and so content to build our analysis around the military-political dimension. Interdependence, the other great theme these days, is supposed to depreciate the value of military power. Theoretically the rules are different in an interdependent world, requiring different means. (Theoretically—goes the response—the Soviet Union is not sufficiently a part of this world.)

Though old habits and a lack of imagination prevent us from adjusting, there is also a growing suspicion that conventional means of influence are not what we once thought. The notion that foreign aid, military assistance, cultural diplomacy or any of the other elements of a nation's presence actually translate into leverage over another nation's decisions convinces us less and less, even when it is our adversary's aid, arms, and propaganda effort. Except in rare instances, power is not something usefully approached as a matter of devising, accumulating, and deftly applying mechanisms of influence. Not primarily at least.

For power, we sense, is increasingly unrefinable; increasingly indistinguishable from the setting in which it exists. Power is the capacity to reshape parts of the international order and for the powerful that is a capacity to compromise—to make concessions. Power is allowing monetary regimes or the law of the sea to take another form, allowing the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), or the Common Market to be changed or supplanted, and allowing other global economic goals, such as income redistribution, to have their day. In this case, there is nothing tangible or portable about it, and by its "application" little chance of imposing change.

Power, however, is also increasingly a matter of managing interdependence and, therefore, increasingly a matter of the structure and range of one's dependencies. To be positioned at the intersection of numerous and different forms of interdependence is power—unless too many of them are seriously unequal. So is opting out of interdependent relationships to the extent that minimizing vulnerabilities enhances power; but by sidelining itself a nation also reduces its power to the extent that the rewards of participation are passed up. That is only the start, however, for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power in an interdependent world also depends on how fungible others' dependencies are (that is, how easily their dependencies in one realm can be converted to offset yours in another) and how serviceable your vulnerabilities are (that is, when interdependence is asymmetrical, how much others hurt themselves by hurting you).

IV

If power is to be measured in terms of a country's ability to ferry material support great distances to friends fighting in settings like Angola in 1975, the Soviet Union is immeasurably stronger than it was 15 years earlier when Patrice Lumumba needed help. But if it is to be measured in terms of a country's ability to intervene over the same distances with its own military forces when it does not have friends or when we move to prevent it, the Soviet Union is not strong enough. If it is to be assessed in terms of a country's ability to obtain the material resources that it needs without fear of outside interference, the Soviet Union is less well-off than it was ten years ago but a good deal better off than we. But if it is to be assessed in terms of a country's ability to influence the economic decisions of others impinging on its interests, the Soviet Union is better off now, but not nearly so well off as we.

The trouble is we do not know how to evaluate the power of the Soviet Union. We do not have a sufficiently comprehensive and systematic set of criteria by which to judge. We do not even have sufficient criteria by which to disagree among ourselves. Of course, if we reduce the task to evaluating Soviet military power, we have the grounds for disagreeing, but not for weighing its share of the many other resources by which nations try to shape world politics. To supplement the calculation of Soviet military power with other traditional indices—such as the strength of its economy, the stability of its alliance(s), or the character of its adversaries—accomplishes little. What is more important, that Khrushchev's precise timetable for exceeding our per capita GNP has been long abandoned along with his accompanying fanfare? Or, that the Soviet economy continues to grow more rapidly than those of the vast majority of the world, including our own? Or is the sharp decline in the growth of Soviet total factor productivity more important than either? What is more striking about the large percentage of Soviet resources devoted to national defense, the dedication that it implies or the burden that it represents? And what is more significant about our discovery that this percentage has been even larger than we originally thought, the still greater dedication that it implies or the inefficiency that it betrays? Were we sure of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

answers to these questions, we would still have to decide how they balance off against, say, the evolving character of the Chinese threat or the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union's East European alliance.

Neither are we much helped by the tendency to substitute for an analysis of the resources serving Soviet foreign policy a summary of the trends favoring Soviet foreign policy, particularly when the summary is only that. In part, the problem is the same as with undifferentiated and unintegrated categories of power. Not only is it difficult to tell which trends matter most: the American failures in Indochina or the Soviet exclusion from the Middle East; the triumph of the MPLA in Angola or the destruction of Allende in Chile; the disruption on NATO's southern flank or the failed rapprochement after Mao's death. But it is still more treacherous discerning grand patterns among these trends, especially when many trends are quickly reversed. Moreover, the implications of any single trend often defy easy categorization. Take, for example, the case of Eurocommunism. Would the Soviet Union be strengthened by having the Italian Communist Party in government? Who knows? How does a leader in Moscow or one in Washington weigh the damage done to Soviet peace of mind in Eastern Europe by the PCI's heterodoxy, against the reinforcement of the U.S.S.R's foreign policy in Western Europe by the Party's lingering orthodoxy? How, when the Soviet leader wants a strong Left to constrain the Italian government but momentarily fears the effect on détente of a government that actually includes the Left?

In part, however, the problem with focusing on trends is in distinguishing their effects. After all, our concern with Soviet power is in what it can accomplish, and this cannot be automatically or easily inferred from what happens.

Given these pitfalls, it makes more sense to put a certain distance between ourselves and the problem of the Soviet Union's evolving (military) power. We need to stand back and contemplate the more basic question of the Soviet Union's ability to shape or alter different parts of its environment. Ultimately this is what determines the importance of the Soviet ability to affect events.

If one starts with interdependence, that complex network of involvements dominating so many of the stakes in international politics, including the structure of the international economic order, the Soviet Union's influence remains marginal. It will not do to dismiss this state of affairs as the Soviet Union's choice, as a game it prefers not to play, and may be the better off thereby. For clearly the Soviet Union *has* chosen to play and would like to play

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more, were the rules more within its control. Increasingly it has a stake in interdependence but little leverage over the governing institutions and rules. The Soviet Union, as the economist says, is a price-taker.

A third of the animal protein in Soviet diets comes from fish mostly caught off other nations' coasts. To fish there, the Soviet Union is increasingly obliged to enter into joint ventures aiding the development of the poorer countries' fishing industries. Since the early 1960s, the annual increase in Soviet food imports has exceeded that of Japan, the world's largest food importer, and the Soviet Union is now contractually bound to buy at least six million metric tons of American wheat and corn every year. The Soviet Union counts, and has for some years, on buying substantial quantities of foreign technology to reverse productivity lags in Soviet industry and agriculture; to pay for it, it exports a growing portion of its petroleum production—but if it is to maintain these levels of export, it must tap its more inaccessible reserves, and for that it needs more Western technology. Together with its friends in Eastern Europe, it now owes $46 billion to outsiders, including $28 billion to foreign commercial banks.[1]

For all that, however, the Soviet Union has precious little voice in shaping the larger system in which it buys, sells, and borrows. It is a member of none of the major international economic institutions, unless the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) be one, and there it is generally disregarded. It has not been much consulted by anyone, including the South, when monetary schemes, balance-of-payment adjustment arrangements, commodity agreements, and regulations of direct foreign investments are discussed. And its own particular pet concerns—such as most-favored-nation agreements, bilateral trade agreements, and a larger role for gold—wait on the goodwill of the capitalist powers and often on their diminished apathy.

Our standard explanation misses the point: the point is not that the organization of the Soviet economy makes the Soviet Union an unsuitable participant, but that the international economic order need not accommodate the national organization the U.S.S.R. prefers. Our notion that this is no comment on Soviet power is plainly wrong; in an interdependent world, self-sufficiency is inefficiency, increasingly so in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet leadership knows it. How much of a world power is a nation without much power in the world economy?

[1] See Richard Portes, "East Europe's Debt to the West: Interdependence Is a Two-way Street," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1977, pp.751-782.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the other hand, not all crucial transactions take place in the economic sphere and not all crucial stakes are material. There is also, for want of a more revealing term, the political order. In theory, the maximum concern is with the Soviet capacity for making the world over in its own image, but few believe any longer in putting the issue so simplistically. Rather, we respond to an incoherent muddle of concerns, beginning with the pace at which the Soviet Union is acquiring footholds or facilities around the world, which jeopardize our power, and finishing with the pace at which change is occurring, which jeopardizes our values. In a place like southern Africa the two become confused—but that is more a matter of our weakness than Soviet strength. Not that we fear for racism, but violent change may give rise to radical regimes and many think there are too many of them already. More immediately, radical regimes may well accord the Soviet Union new facilities for its expanding global military power, which, according to the more pessimistic among us, could be used to shut off the flow of indispensable resources to Western economies. Worried about the fate of our own power and values, we tend to be sloppy about distinguishing between the aggrandizement of Soviet power and the advancement of Soviet values.

Our carelessness arises out of the mistaken apprehension that the growth of Soviet (military) power, and change, like that in Angola, necessarily aid Soviet foreign policy in dealing with its various tasks: that they interact to make it easier for the Soviet Union to sell its Asian collective security scheme or mobilize opposition to Diego Garcia. It also blinds us to the possibility that change may work against the Soviet Union, even in its own camp, quite apart from the growth of Soviet (military) power.

In the military realm, the Soviet Union is unquestionably stronger than it was, but the nature and sweep of its strength is worth exploring. Where arms are an uncontested entrée, the Soviet Union has a growing capacity to influence and, in some rare instances like Angola, to decide events. But sometimes, as in the Horn of Africa, even where order is breaking down and the Soviet access considerable, confusion and crosscutting interests foil effective Soviet influence. In general, the Soviet Union has a conspicuously greater capacity than it did to constrain our use of military force and, to that extent, to influence events. But where it is the shadow of Soviet power that worries us, as in Europe, if Soviet influence grows, it will largely be influence that *we* have created; when the actual resort to force is so implausible, then dangers like that of "Finlandization" are far more a matter of our state of mind

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than of actual Soviet capabilities.

Moreover, the capacity to influence, even to control, events guarantees neither control after the event nor control over the larger patterns of change. By and large the Soviet Union is, as we are, the beneficiary or victim of the processes of change, not their source. Nothing in the evolution of Soviet power is altering that. Some have used the images of gardener and architect to identify the nature and limits of our power: the Soviet Union, like us, remains a gardener.

V

None of what has been said so far addresses the constraints a changing international order does or does not impose on Soviet behavior.[2] This, it seems to me, has a great deal to do with the way the Soviet Union judges these issues. For while in some respects it judges these issues as we do, in other important respects, it does not. Thus, Soviet writers and leaders are as sensitive as our own to the rapid transformation of world politics. Like our own, they recognize the fragmentation of power ("the multiplicity of forces each standing up for its own interests"), the transformation of capitalist and proletarian internationalism, the emergence of other axes, North-South and West-West, to compete with the East-West axis, and the growth of interdependence (in its praiseworthy form, the "international division of labor"). But they superimpose on these common perceptions a fundamentally different conception of the underlying forces at work.

For them, the key to the current transformation resides in the shifting "correlation of forces," the balance between history's progressive and retrograde forces—their sense of linear history, predicated on the eternal advance of the Soviet Union and those with whom it identifies and the equally certain retreat of those with whom it does not. At the moment, they contend, the correlation of forces has been radically altered by the dramatic increase in Soviet

[2] In urging that we cast our evaluation of Soviet power more broadly, I am aware that I have slighted considerations that many others feature. I have made no effort to appraise the impact of change within the socialist world on Soviet power; no effort to judge whether Soviet power is diminished by the continued erosion of "proletarian internationalism" beyond Eastern Europe but enhanced by its preservation within Eastern Europe; or whether it is enhanced by the rising influence of communists and their allies beyond the Soviet sphere but diminished by the cost of maintaining its own influence within this sphere. Or, whether the combinations are the opposite (because I do not know and because the judgment is history's). I have not attempted to explore the impact on Soviet power of the conflict with China and of our China diplomacy (because the impact is obvious). Nor have I commented on the power that the Soviet Union derives from our growing bilateral economic cooperation—from the so-called "hostage capital" it possesses or the ready-made lobbies that it inherits (because the leverage flows both ways and because this is a marginal consideration in the larger scheme of things).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military power, the continued success of the socialist economies, the growth of the national liberation struggle, an unprecedented convergence of crises in the industrialized capitalist countries, and the strengthening of "democratic" and "peace-loving" forces within the other camp.

Whether they really believe the balance of trends has shifted so swiftly and so unambiguously is difficult to tell. But, in a sense, that is not crucial: first, because the Soviets do not underestimate the residual strength of capitalist societies, least of all the United States, nor overestimate their own military strength. On the contrary, they have the deepest regard for the powers of recovery in Western societies, for their economic dynamism even when decelerated, and for the United States' preeminence among and continued dominance over them; they also seem to understand the limitations of their own military power—in fact, in contrast to many in the West, they still tend to see themselves as militarily inferior to the United States in most respects.

Second, the precise level of Soviet optimism is less important than the conceptual framework sustaining it. It is more important that the Soviet Union, however sensitive to specific trends, still ultimately reduces the evolution of international relations to a single contest. It still imposes (a Soviet speaker would say, understands) the juxtaposition between two historic forces, between two social systems and in these terms judges the ultimate significance of global change.

We make a mistake, therefore, to doubt the force of this idea, to consign it to that category of devices by which the Soviet regime finds self-justification, or to repress it in our haste to transform the Soviet Union into a historically recognizable problem. The mistake has three consequences: it obscures a basic asymmetry in our two conceptions of international change; it conceals the trouble a Soviet observer has with our conception of international change; and it makes it more difficult to understand the role that the Soviet Union assigns itself in promoting international change.

In the first instance, Americans have gradually learned to divide their preoccupations. One of the consequences of a changing environment, we think, is the increasingly diffuse quality of the challenges that it raises. Our problems and the solutions, to the extent that our problems have solutions, exist on different planes and in separate contexts. However much these are interwoven, they cannot any longer be forced into one dimension. On the other hand, the Soviet view of this increasingly intricate environment is still refracted through a single dimension.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, for example, we take the contestation over the new international economic order (NIEO) to be a serious new focus of American foreign policy, and, because the challenge comes from the South, distinct from our competition with the Soviet Union. (Indeed, as an acknowledgement of interdependence and a moderated East-West contest, we now invite the Soviet Union to join us in aiding the developing nations.) But for the Soviet Union the North-South emphasis is misconceived, not merely because this tends to feature a "rich-poor" dichotomy, and the Soviet Union does not like its own ranking, but because a rich-poor dichotomy makes the issue income redistribution, and income redistribution has to do with buying off the oppressed, not revolutionizing the system. Properly conceived, the struggle over a new international economic order is between the two social systems, with the socialist countries in the forefront. As a symptom of imperialism's vulnerabilities, the Soviet Union supports the struggle for a more equitable international economic order; but, recognizing how powerful the industrialized capitalist states remain in this sphere, it prefers to emphasize other areas of change, ones better served by the "shifting correlation of forces," ones that have more to do with restructuring East-West relations, or, as Soviet writers put it, ones more directly concerned with reducing the risks of war, strengthening peaceful coexistence, and advancing "extensive and constructive cooperation."

In the second instance, our insensitivity to Soviet conceptions prevents us from seeing how much we remain the Soviet Union's preoccupation. (Too many people who do take Soviet formulas seriously are no exception, because they confound the "struggle between two social systems" with a struggle between two states or two sets of states.) If there is one great impediment to progressive change, one great benefactor of a reactionary order, in Soviet eyes, it is the United States. China may be a more immediate and noxious threat to the Soviet Union, but its larger meaning is as an objective ally of the anti-progressive forces led by us. Thus, when our theorists and leaders speak of adjusting to systemic change, creating new equilibriums, fashioning a sounder balance of power, and building on interdependence, these are not treated by the Soviets as concepts for a safer, more stable, and more humane international order, but as a design for saving as much as possible of the old one.

Because of Vietnam and the growing strength of the Soviet Union, Soviet writers say, the American leaders have a more realistic appreciation of the limits of their power and a more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

constructive approach to relations with the Soviet Union (until the human rights initiatives of the current Administration). No leader more symbolized that change than Henry Kissinger, but Kissinger the theorist, it has often been noted in Soviet analyses, believes in the "balance of power system" and, "however praised or embellished" that concept may be, it is designed to preserve the status quo not only in the international-political but, above all, in the social sphere—"to maintain and strengthen reactionary regimes," to stifle "revolutionary changes in the life of the people."

According to Soviet observers, it is not the imperatives of interdependence, particularly those of reciprocity and mutual restraint, that move American leaders, but rather the opportunities they see in the fragmentation of power. (The concept of interdependence, they say, becomes in our hands a rationalization for Western exploitation of the Third World and an artifice for salvaging imperialist collaboration under American leadership.) By capitalizing on the conflicts among various "power centers," Soviet analysts maintain, the United States hopes to make itself the arbiter of the system, the regulator of the "equilibrium," and the equilibrium that most bothers them is the so-called "pentagonal world" (the U.S.S.R., the United States, China, Western Europe and Japan). It is not restraint that we are attempting to build into the system, according to them, but flexibility for ourselves, the kind that preserves others' dependencies and frees our hands to control adverse change, to "export counter-revolution."

In turn, Soviet commentators make no bones about their own country's large and active role in the evolution of the international order. As they say, the restructuring of international relations "can never be spontaneous or automatic." Marxist-Leninists cannot rely on "spontaneous development" in international affairs. "Any fundamental restructuring of international relations must be duly planned, controlled, and corrected." Since international politics, in contrast to the imperialists' view, are not a social system, subject to endless, directionless mutations—a "system" whose structure cannot be rectified, only manipulated and exploited—but a process, the progressive forces of the world can and must act to protect and foster this process. The process, of course, is the shifting "correlation of forces," and the Soviet Union, according to its spokesmen, has a growing responsibility for its advance.

Ambitious, militarily strengthened, buoyed by the course of events, persuaded that we are the key obstacle to a more preferable international order, this seemingly is not the kind of Soviet Union that we want to live with. Nor is it one much in step with an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

encumbered international environment dominated by mutual dependencies. How much worse that it also, according to many of us, invests military power with a high instrumental value.

This, however, misconceives the problem, and no part of it more than the military dimension. For the instrumentalism we see in the Soviet approach to military power is, in the first instance, the instrumentalism they attribute to *us*. The interplay is not easy to sort out, but it starts with our misrepresentation of their theory. Thus, the Soviet concepts that we consult to prove their instrumentalism are in fact those analyzing ours. Their loyalty to Clausewitz, for example, has nothing to do with rationalizing war as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy; it is a way of explaining the phenomenon of war and imperialism's proclivity to war as a means. In twisting their meaning, Soviet commentators complain, we "deliberately lump together the theoretical proposition characterizing the essence of war and the proposition concerning the expediency, or otherwise, of war as a means of achieving political objectives." (This disclaimer we may believe or not, but we have no business using Clausewitz to prove their commitment to war as an instrument of foreign policy).

Seeing military power as an instrument of foreign policy, of course, is much different from proposing war as an instrument of foreign policy. We, they say, have made military power not only an instrument, but *the* instrument, of our postwar foreign policy. And we have not only made it the instrument of our foreign policy—that is, our frequent and ultimate recourse in controlling international change—but we have turned the threat of (nuclear) war into a prop for our frequent military interventions. That is why, according to them, we seek strategic superiority, why we reject parity, why we resort to the subterfuge of "strategic sufficiency" (the formula of the early Nixon years), why we concoct concepts like the "doctrine of limited nuclear options" (deterrence in the late Nixon and Ford years)—why, in short, we struggle to make nuclear war safe, and why we chase so frantically after technological advantage. Our particular approach to deterrence theory, they think, represents our never-ending struggle to salvage political utility for nuclear arms, to make them a shield for the exploitation of other forms of military power. (Our equivalent is the notion that the Soviet commitment to "winning" a nuclear war represents a commitment to an arms buildup that will permit winning without fighting—not, as Soviet theorists claim, a way of fighting a war that others start and hope to win.)

There is no way of knowing whether some or all within the Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leadership would be willing to try where we "have failed," whether they can imagine a plausible structure to the strategic balance that would profit Soviet foreign policy. But three lesser conclusions are within our reach: first, to the extent that the Soviet leaders are wrestling with the problem of integrating military power and foreign policy—and they are—it is at the lower end of the spectrum, where we have regularly applied military force to foreign policy ends. To judge from their building programs, they have not yet decided how far they want to go in developing an ability to project force, how far they want to go in preventing or duplicating our practices. Second, the areas where foreign policy and military power are the most likely to mingle are those geographically and naturally isolated from the central balances. And, third, we pay an unnecessary price for our original invidious image of the Soviet Union: in truth, the Soviet Union feels better about itself and the course of events than we assume; trusting events, it is more likely to assign its military power the task—beyond defense—of preventing others from interfering with change than of imposing change.

For in fact the Soviet Union does not see itself as only militarily potent and otherwise as economically disadvantaged, technologically deficient, bureaucratically sclerosed and so on. Its leaders admit to a broad range of problems and limitations but, where we constantly view these in terms of fundamental systemic weaknesses, they regard them as normal and corrigible defects. And where we focus on these defects, treating them as a basic disparagement of the Soviet experience, they tend to downplay them, instead emphasizing their accomplishments, and thus retain a genuine faith in the transcendent significance of that experience. (One could exchange "they" and "we" in these two sentences; that is, the same contrast exists in reverse.)

On the other hand, we tend to analyze the effect of Soviet ideology in narrow, utilitarian terms, that is, by the impact that it has on others, by its power to attract, and by this standard we see the Soviet Union still more weakened. While a Soviet leader is also concerned with the force of ideology, as a practical matter he is more likely to focus on trends that correspond with his values than on the precise number of orthodox disciples that his country inspires (outside the critical sphere of Eastern Europe). Rather than judge the issue only by the number of socialist states in the world or genuine Marxist-Leninists, he will take heart from the number that merely reject the other way; even more will his optimism depend on the basic rhythm of change, say, in Indochina or southern Africa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is another side to the story. For the Soviet Union is not only, or even first, the servant of history; it is also a state with mundane interests, like adding Western computers to its economy, securing recognition for the territorial status quo in Eastern Europe, and discouraging the United States from deploying cruise missiles. Its recourse has been the process of détente, which the Soviet leaders say is not only compatible with the process of an evolving correlation of forces, but an essential part of it. Détente is the refinement and restraint that the Soviet Union brings to the basic contest between two social systems. Theoretically, it is the framework within which the Soviet Union bridges the gap between its private needs and the historic vision, but the recriminations of the French Communist Party (against those who would sacrifice social change to détente) and of "some representatives" of national liberation movements indicate that it has not been fully successful.

Were the Soviet participation in détente but a tactical expedient, a kind of winter quartering of the troops, a policy choice to be discarded at the first sign of inconvenience, we might have a right to a more primitive view of the Soviet approach to international change. But it is not. It is a profound and long-term commitment dictated by the Soviet leaders' inability to conceive a better way to pursue their three elemental objectives: (1) nurturing both the processes that restrain the change the Soviet Union fears and those that ease the way to the change it desires; (2) sanctifying the Soviet Union's status as a global power coequal with the United States (that there may be, in Andrei Gromyko's words, "no question of any significance which can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it"); and (3) securing the economic and technological benefits of the "international division of labor." By the last, the Soviet Union engages itself in the interdependent world. This interdependent world, which includes collaboration between socialist and capitalist states, now has the status of a phenomenon determined by "objective realities and laws." And Soviet leaders admit that "no single state is able for long to achieve full development if it cuts itself off from the rest of the world."

VI

I remember those maps from early television programs on the Soviet Union— or on the communist world as it was then. How the color spread like spilled paint across the areas of Soviet control and ambition. Whatever else it may be, 20 years later, the Soviet global thrust is not that. Indeed it is not even a proper "global thrust,"

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

much less an "imperial thrust," if by that we mean the extension of power *and* control, or the attempt to control. The Soviet empire still ends at the Elbe River. And, as far as power is concerned, while the Soviet Union's is clearly enlarged, at least that part of it that is military, we should remember that the portion of military power that is abroad is largely redeployed, not additional, power and remains vastly inferior to our own. That is, while the Soviet Navy is modernizing, it is less its transfiguration that should catch our eye, for this has been slow and ambiguous, than the simple decision to send the old navy out to sea. Moreover, of all the naval-related areas, the one in which the Soviet Union lags farthest behind us is in its ability to project force.

It is entirely possible that the Soviet Union intends to improve its capacity for projecting power, that it is ready to try to influence events more actively in various parts of the world and that it believes the timely application of military power may be a primary means. But, if so, the effort will be made with relatively few illusions about the permanence of change or about the limits of influence or about the permanence of influence yielded by change. The closer to home (and to the central military balances), the less utility military power has for Soviet foreign policy, and the more the Soviet Union must rely primarily on processes like détente to influence the trends of concern to it. In the grey area in between, like Yugoslavia, there is no evidence that the Soviet Union regards its military power as an important part of policy, but neither is there any evidence that it disregards the fear that it may be.

In general, the notion of a Soviet global thrust has less to do with the application of power (toward control) than it does with status and access (derived from power). That is, the key proposition is Gromyko's: namely, the Soviet Union as a participant in decisions of concern to it. This indisputably depends, in the Soviet mind and, in part, in reality, on the growing mass of Soviet military power, strategic nuclear power in particular. But it also depends, in larger part, on the nature of local circumstances and, as events in the Middle East have proved since the 1973 war, these are often more powerful.

Phrasing the problem so basically, of course, does not help much in dealing with specific aspects or applications of Soviet power, but this kind of framework (not necessarily this particular one) is essential if we are to have a perspective in which to fit our specific judgments. Too often these days, we focus on particular dimensions of Soviet power without the broader perspective—and end by inventing implications.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VII

Looked at from a distance, what ultimately is the significance of a changing setting in assessing Soviet power? And where do these considerations intersect with the problem of competing Soviet and American perspectives? The answer to the first question, it seems to me, comes out of the fundamental evolution in our perception of the constraints on Soviet power. At the outset, that is 30 years ago when George Kennan wrote his famous essay on the subject, we viewed these constraints as too frail and so we substituted ourselves. Faced with what we deemed to be a messianic expansionist state, which for whatever reasons—the one Kennan stressed was the regime's failure to consolidate its absolute power at home—was struggling to fill "every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power," our response was fateful and straightforward: we must, Kennan argued and we agreed, "confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."

Since then, however, the international setting has grown constantly more complex, adding powerful new constraints and rendering our own role less obvious. The filled power vacuums in Europe and Asia, the fractured monolith of socialism and most of all the shadow of nuclear war have transformed the context in which we contemplate Soviet ambition. To these commonplaces, we might add the Soviet Union's growing stake in what for it has long been a repugnant international order. The paradox stems not only from the Soviet Union's commitment to economic cooperation with the West and the utility it sees in, say, a stable law of the seas, but also from the disruptions it cannot afford to sponsor if it counts on Western forbearance in the face of its growing global role.[3]

Within this sturdier environment—sturdier because of the obstacles it raises to crude expansionism, not because we have been able to maintain our own mission of checking Soviet power at every point—the Soviet-American rivalry has now evolved into something less intensive and something more extensive. The elusiveness of opportunity and the distractions of multiple international challenges account for the loss of intensity. The broadening of the rivalry reflects the U.S.S.R.'s developing global vocation, or, to extend Kennan's original notion, it reflects the shift in Soviet preoccupation from the struggle to secure Soviet power against the

[3] If after Angola and the 1973 Middle East War this sounds doubtful, we should not lose sight of the relatively narrow limits within which the Soviet Union acted in both instances, neither case ever being the reckless incursion that many in the West imagined.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

external world to a quest for a larger place in it.

Détente has been the process by which we come to terms with both circumstances—with both the changing constraints on Soviet power and the changing nature of the threat it poses. It is also the nearest we have to a replacement for the policy (or process) of containment, now that the extension of Soviet dominion has been essentially contained. The new task is to temper the use of its extended power. (A Soviet speaker would say that détente is the process by which his country capitalizes on its growing power to curb American excesses, or the process by which the United States is led to embrace the principle of peaceful coexistence.)

The contest between us continues—that is the essence of peaceful coexistence—but for us, and presumably for the U.S.S.R., détente introduces the new prospect of managing, not merely maintaining, our rivalry. It is an historic opportunity but one with almost insuperable internal tensions. For, on the one hand, we in our rivalry are challenged to collaborate consciously and explicitly in order to moderate the contest; on the other hand, we in our collaboration must cope with the permanent reality of the contest, a reality constantly underscored by global instabilities and constantly heightened by the evolution of the Soviet Union's military power. The delicate task of designing and perhaps even codifying the "rules of the game," if that is what we set out to do in the Moscow agreements of 1972, is continually interrupted by moments of chaos when in Chile, Angola, Indochina or perhaps Yugoslavia our conflicting interests are reemphasized.

The unhappy consequences of this problem are essentially three, each of which carries its own implicit resolution, though none is within easy reach. The first is the preeminence reserved for the military dimension. It is inevitable and, frankly, desirable that both sides maintain their defenses. Regrettable as it may be, the probable truth is that nuclear weapons, in some rough equilibrium, have kept the peace between us in the past and will be needed to keep it in the future. And the other parts of our military establishment are equally essential, not because the U.S.S.R. is demonstrably eager to sweep across the North German plain at the first opportunity, but because, as the last war in the Middle East demonstrated, events in which the U.S.S.R. has a heavy stake, but over which it has little control, may tempt it to invoke the threat of military intervention.

Still, we both have—or believe we have—an interest in holding these forces to a minimum. Because neither side trusts the other's conviction, however, because the "rules of the game" remain so rudimentary and suspect, and, in these circumstances, because those responsible for national security in both countries demand

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

large margins for error, we move constantly the other way. And the motion becomes our preoccupation: those who see the Soviet side in the arms race in sinister terms judge détente accordingly; those who worry about the dangerous or destablizing aspects of the arms race base the viability of détente primarily on success in controlling arms. In the process, neither group is coming to grips with the instrumentalism the United States and the Soviet Union each sees in the other's approach to military power.

The first group doubts that the Soviet Union could misunderstand the character and purpose of our military forces, and is thus led to a heightened mistrust of Soviet motives; as a consequence, it places its faith instead in further arming—even as the soundest avenue to arms control. The second group, preoccupied with the enormous specific problems of negotiating SALT, MBFR, and now the proposed demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, tends to repress the dilemma of mutual U.S. and Soviet misperceptions about the role of force in each other's foreign policy. For ultimately the dilemma can only be dealt with by relating our defense preparations to our arms control efforts; it can only be addressed by weighing the secondary costs in the other side's distorted perceptions of the significance of the way we choose to defend ourselves, the arms we build and the doctrines we formulate. Until both countries make that effort, arms control—whether SALT, MBFR, or other negotiations to follow—will remain a fragmented and unsystematic enterprise that may produce agreements but only marginal and ambiguous progress toward a moderated contest.

The second consequence flows from the first. Because of the central place accorded the military dimension, key aspects of the U.S.S.R.-U.S. relationship are broken down and split from their context. I have just commented on how much the processes of arming and of negotiating arms control become divorced from the basic problem of military power in both sides' perceptions. Similarly, because of the prominence granted traditional security concerns, the natural effects of processes like interdependence are distorted and in their place we substitute a preoccupation with their manipulation—by us for gain, against us we fear to our disadvantage. Finally, and in the long run, the process of restructuring U.S.S.R.-U.S. relations tends to lose its coherence and we end, as in Kissinger's last days, by focusing on specific tension areas that threaten to accentuate East-West conflict or be accentuated by it or, as in the current instance, by concentrating on disembodied elements of the relationship such as human rights and arms control.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The third consequence—that is, the interruption in the search for more explicit "rules of the game"—follows from the other two. Though we tend to forget it now, relatively concrete patterns of restraint were discussed at the outset of détente. At the time, the two sides consciously set out to reduce the dangerous, extraneous, or unproductive burdens of competition, actually writing some of these restraints into the Basic Principles of United States-Soviet Relations (the document signed at the May 1972 summit). They included the crucial principle of parity—as stated in the Basic Principles neither side would "either directly or indirectly seek unilateral advantage over the other"—an idea most relevant to the *strategic arms race, but in the Soviet mind one sanctioning equality* in all forms of power. There were others such as the notion of substituting economic interdependence for (our) earlier economic warfare against the Soviet Union and (their) economic autarky, which was again, in implication, written into the Basic Principles. There was also the important concession, on each side's part, that the other's claimed dedication to peaceful coexistence, that is, to restraint in its foreign policy, might now have real meaning. Indeed, the idea of peaceful coexistence was written into the Basic Principles.

Others might be added, derived more from the observer's imagination, but the point is that the search in general was long ago disrupted: parity as a principle fell victim to the widespread suspicion on both sides' part that it was for the other only a momentary indulgence for want of a choice. Interdependence as a principle has been eroded and partially discredited by the politics of linkages; and peaceful coexistence as a principle suffers from the effects of Angola and the 1973 Middle East war.

The dialectical quality of détente, with its competitive/cooperative essence, makes it hard to revive the search for "rules," for a more explicit *modus vivendi*, for a moderation of means in lieu of agreement over ends. But the search is ultimately the only hope we have of restoring coherence to the quest for a restructured Soviet-American relationship. It includes new and untried standards of behavior like those suggested by Marshall Shulman some years ago—one, the principle of "noninterference by force in processes of internal change," the other, the "right of free access," permitting nations to "compete, not for the control of territory, but for the establishment of mutually beneficial and nonexploitative relations, and thereby for political influence." These are the decisive "rules of the game," for it is they that will tell us how much either side really trusts a moderated contest and wants its advantages.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ralf Dahrendorf

INTERNATIONAL POWER: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Few would doubt that there have been significant changes in the world power structure since, say, the unilateral declaration of American economic independence on August 15, 1971, or even the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Yet what does such a statement mean? Power may be a relatively clear concept, describing the capacity to assert interest effectively, or more simply, to make others do what one wants them to do; but the reality of power is much less clear. Indeed, the same phenomenon occurs both within societies and between nations: those who feel that things are happening to them believe that somebody must have done them and must therefore have the power to do them; whereas those who are thought to have this power realize that much of the time things simply happen. Circumstances and constellations are more important than intentions and actions. Those who feel constrained suspect the hand of those in power; those who have power sense, above all, the constraints under which they are acting.

It may be as well therefore not to pursue any further the theoretical question of what international power is and how one can describe its shifts and changes—except to say this. It is my thesis in this analysis that we are going through a period in which power is more diffuse in the international community than ever before. It is a period in which a past pattern which we know and a future pattern which we may suspect are intermingled. Such mixtures make for instability, for unexpected explosions and unpleasant surprises. It is at least doubtful whether anybody is prepared for this condition. And this is especially true for Europe, from the perspective of which this analysis is written.

II

Most Americans find it difficult to understand what "Europe" is about, and it would be cant for a European to blame them. After

---

Ralf Dahrendorf has been Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science since 1974. He was a member of the Commission of the European Communities from 1970 to 74, Parliamentary Secretary of State in the West German Foreign Office in 1969-70, and previously Professor of Sociology at various universities. He is the author of *The New Liberty: Survival and Justice in a Changing World,* and other works.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all, what exactly is Europe? Is it the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe? Yes it is; and this shows that there are at least two Europes, and that both are part of alliances which include non-European countries as well as European powers, or at any rate, powers in Europe. Is it the members of the Council of Europe? Yes it is; and thus it becomes apparent that the nations of Northern, Western and Southern Europe share little else than the (important) respect for human rights. Is it the members of the European Community? Yes it is; but what is this European Community to which many of its members stubbornly refer as a Common Market, *Marché Commun, Gemeinsamer Markt*?

The ambiguities of Europe, and of the European Community in particular, have given rise to two conclusions which have informed the foreign policy of powers, including the United States; yet both conclusions are wrong.

One conclusion is that since there is a European Community, however imperfect it may be, it is this Community rather than its individual members which must be regarded as a natural partner. In a pentagonal pattern of world power, "Europe" occupies one of the corners, and Europe as such means Brussels. The President of the United States greets the acting chairman of the Council of Ministers of the European Community not only as the head of his country's government, but also as the "leader of Europe." This not only embarrasses the man, but is also a manifestly incorrect description of somebody who holds an office for six months when it is his turn in the alphabetical order of countries. The leader of Europe may be a Monnet or a Spaak, a Hallstein or a Luns, and even a Churchill or a de Gasperi, but this is entirely a matter of an individual and his moment. There may be rare moments when the institutions of Brussels actually embody "Europe," but by and large such incarnation is a matter of charisma rather than position.

There is, however, another and in some sense the opposite mistake. It is true that the Nine, the members of the European Community, usually find it difficult to reach agreement; it is true also that there are many European countries aside from the Nine. From this it may appear that there is no identifiable entity called "Europe" at all, and that all that exists are individual nations. In some contexts, and for some countries, the inference is not incorrect. France has chosen a peculiar position vis-à-vis NATO; there are still traces of the "special relationship" between Britain and the United States, especially in the nuclear field; Germany has become a natural partner of the United States not only in international economic relations. But while this is so, and while the governments of the day may like to protest their national sovereignty and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

glorious independence, the fact remains that, more often than not, as Europeans they find themselves in the same boat and guided by the same attitudes, whether such community has been organized or not.

This then is the position of Europe as a world power—now you see it, now you don't, but it exists. At times its existence becomes manifest through the institutions of the European Community, at other times through other institutions (e.g., the Council of Europe, the Euro-Group of NATO); but more often its reality is latent, informing the attitudes and actions of governments as well as the general climate in which governments act. And despite the obvious weakness of European institutions, this Europe has become more rather than less real in recent years.

Such statements must sound metaphysical, or at least metapolitical, unless it is possible to say what the invisible Europe stands for. What is the specifically European contribution to the patterns of power in the world and their changes? This is no small question; it is in fact the question of what is the European interest. Perhaps the following five elements may be regarded as relatively widely recognized and clearly important.

1. Europe neither includes a superpower nor is it a superpower itself. While most countries of Europe have had their day as superpowers of past centuries or even decades, few if any serious politicians today entertain such dreams. There are some, to be sure, who like to think of Europe as a superpower; this, in fact, is the Gaullist dream, one which is held by some in Britain as well; but such a view is neither dominant nor particularly plausible. In fact, Europe consists of small and medium-sized powers. If it ever forms a community, it will have to be based on respect for small powers. This has restrictive consequences: in a world of superpower warfare, Europe will not be able to defend itself. It also has useful consequences: in a world of power dissipation, Europe is more likely to understand, and be appreciated by, other small nations than the superpowers, actual or potential.

2. Small and medium-sized nations cannot rely on a free-floating power game; they need institutions and international organizations. Direct relationships between centers of power always presuppose a degree of self-sufficiency. Small powers are not self-sufficient; they are interdependent with others in almost every aspect of their existence. This means that in the end the only guarantee of their survival is in the creation and observance of rules that bind nations. The countries of Europe may find it difficult to build their own community; but in so far as they have succeeded, such constructions were and are based on equality of all members. Europe

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has a natural interest in strengthening all other institutions in the field of economic and political relations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

3. Europe's geographical position gives it a special interest in terms of security (and this applies to Europe in any sense of the term). Not being able to defend itself, it has to be protected by a superpower. Such need for protection, however, remains coupled with the desire for independence. This is why there is, in Europe, a manifest interest in détente both in the specific sense of superpower agreements on disarmament (with mutual and balanced force reductions [MBFR] high on the list), and in the general sense of the creation of a climate that extends the room for maneuver for individuals and for countries. This makes for a tense mixture of interests, and will do so for some time despite the changes in world patterns that are the main subject of this paper.

4. The countries of Europe vary widely not only in their tradition and culture, but also in their social, economic and political condition. This is clearly true in terms of the great divide of systems; but it is true on either side of the great divide as well. West European societies include the market economy of West Germany, the old *étatisme* of France and the new socialism of Britain as well as Scandinavian brands of social democracy, South European conflicts between traditional ruling groups and their subjects, and other variations. Recent economic developments have moved these countries further apart; the exchange rates tell the story. Indeed, it is conceivable that their internal variations will lead to what is sometimes called the balkanization of Europe, with individual arrangements in the absence of a recognized community of interest, a Bonn-Washington axis, an alliance of Latin socialists and communists, a strengthened Northern union, and Britain in self-imposed isolation. There is another, equally likely possibility, and that is that Europe will understand that there are many ways to happiness. Europe will thus provide a model of plurality against the natural inclination of the superpowers to dogmatize their own experience.

5. Europe's colonial past can be and has already been turned to advantage. Perhaps it can be said that the colonial experience of the European nations has now been superseded by an active development policy of the European Community. The agreements—first of Yaoundé, now of Lomé—are clearly on the credit side of European integration; they show that combination of understanding of the requirements and even the idiosyncrasies of developing countries with an insistence on economic viability that is most likely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be successful in a difficult period of North-South relations.

This then is the kind of syndrome that makes up the European interest: recognition of the role of small powers, the need for international organizations and institutions, desire for détente, appreciation of socioeconomic pluralism, and a special contribution to the world problem of development. But before I look at Europe in a wider perspective, a note of caution is in order. Power is more than interest; it is the will and the capacity to make one's interests felt, recognized, and eventually realized. Such will and capacity are still missing in Europe. While Europe was under conditions of continuous economic growth and persistent military threat there were signs of effective integration; détente and the recession of the 1970s have been accompanied by signs of disintegration. Since 1970, and even more so since its enlargement in 1973, the European Community has been stagnant and ineffective, except in protecting special interests. To some extent, the system of political cooperation that emerged from the Hague Summit of December 1969 has taken its place; but even political cooperation remains tenuous and unpredictable. While there is a European interest, it is expressed only sporadically and often in unexpected places. There was such an expression at the first CSCE at Helsinki, but not at the North-South dialogue at Nairobi; Europe makes itself felt at many U.N. occasions, but only rarely in the IMF; and sometimes, as at the recent London economic summit of world leaders, it is present without being allowed to speak. In short, Europe is still no more than a potential force in world politics.

III

But then, the world is not pentagonal, a neat pattern of five powers, which can arrange everything among themselves; nor is it a bipolar system any longer. It is, rather, a fluid field of (at least) two superimposed patterns. Perhaps it might be possible to describe this field as a process, as the gradual replacement of one pattern by another. But while the two exist side by side, the condition of world affairs is not only fluid, but also full of expected and unexpected dangers as well as opportunities. The two patterns that I have in mind are, of course, the familiar ones of the East-West conflict, which may be the war of the past, and the North-South conflict, which is likely to be the war of the future.

Before I pursue the analysis of this phenomenon any further, let me stress that I would not claim any scientific status for my argument; it is no more than one attempt to make sense of a confusing reality. The approach underlying my analysis is this: periods of history are dominated by particular themes and arenas of conflict.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The theme of the last three decades has been military and political rather than economic; the arena was the battlefield of the cold war from Potsdam to the CSCE in Helsinki and now in Belgrade. However, history does not progress by the resolution of conflicts; even wars do not resolve conflicts; nor does "convergence" or any other mechanism. What happens is that a new conflict and a new arena emerge, begin to overshadow the old, and gradually reduce its relevance. While we are still—and rightly—discussing détente, we can already see many signs of a new economic theme of world conflict, and the arena is going to be that which is so misleadingly called North-South. (The geographical terminology betrays the degree to which our thinking is caught up in East-West categories; yet it is the very nature of the new conflict that there are no clear centers of power, quite apart from the fact that the majority of people in underdeveloped countries live North of the equator, and a few of the advanced industrialized [or OECD] countries, as well as most of those on the threshold to development, are in the South.) The period between two dominant patterns of conflict is particularly difficult to describe. There are those who would like to regard the new conflict in the old terms: development as a struggle between East and West for domination. There are those who ignore the old conflict at their peril, although it remains virulent. The attempt to avoid both pitfalls may not succeed.

The process of transition from the military to the economic theme of international relations is familiar, although its precise history has yet to be written. Ironically, it reached its first climax in connection with a military event, the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Whatever this war is remembered for in the Middle East, the rest of the world is more likely to think of the oil embargo, the rise in the price of energy, and the consequent aggravation of the impending recession. But the ascendancy of international economic relations began earlier, perhaps on August 15, 1971, when the United States gave notice to a system that had depended on its readiness to lead the rest of the developed world economically as well as militarily. The first rumblings of the North-South conflict should not be overlooked either: the second U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in 1968, for example, when there was the modest and only moderately convincing offer of generalized preferences to developing countries; the enlargement of the Club of Ten in the IMF into a Club of Twenty; the first skirmishes of the current GATT round of tariff reductions when it soon became clear that it could not be another Kennedy Round.

In the meantime, and in the shadow of such new developments, the old conflict between East and West continues to smolder.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indeed, in many parts of the world, the struggle between different social, political and economic systems is still the main issue. In Europe, the borderline between the systems remains tense and important, as a glance at the map shows: Berlin, dissidents ("Chartists") in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary's relative independence, the future of Yugoslavia, Romania's walk on the tightrope, and Finland's for that matter. More generally, SALT II and MBFR, and even CSCE II, appear and are as important as the next step in UNCTAD, the follow-up of the world meetings on population and on agriculture, or even the North-South dialogue in Paris. And let it not be forgotten that there are overlaps between the patterns, not only because the East tends to vote with the Group of 77 in the United Nations, but also because it often aligns itself with them in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Yet I think that the basic thesis has much to support it. For 25 years, international relations were dominated by the conflict between two ways of getting rich: the (successful) way of offering incentives and trusting the market, and the (less successful) way of relying on force and trusting the plan. The incentive method led to the creation of affluent societies based on individual happiness and the opportunities offered by material prosperity. The force method has led to organized societies in which the good of the whole, as defined by small ruling groups, is put first, and individual welfare is contained by self-inflicted scarcity as well as the cost of bureaucracy and other "public" purposes. Both methods have turned out to be vulnerable, though it can be shown that the vulnerability of communist societies is much greater than that of liberal ones: suppression breeds revolution, democracy allows change. Still, it could be argued that both methods of getting rich carry the seeds of their own destruction within them.

However that may be, and even while the two processes continue, the scene and the theme of action change. Suddenly, the question is no longer how to get rich, but why the poor are poor. This is a familiar question, of course, familiar at least within societies. And it is not irrelevant to look back to the answers that were given in the middle of the nineteenth century: God wanted it this way, said the Calvinists; it is their own fault, said liberal moralists; and the Darwinists added that, after all, society, like nature, is a struggle in which the fittest must prevail. Before the 1880s, there was little indication of any genuine understanding of the problem posed by the poor to the whole of society, and the only instrument used to resolve it was consequently charity—development aid? The analogy may be misleading; most analogies are. But there is a sense in which we are moving from a struggle between

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two types of ruling class to an international class struggle between rich and poor, and that also means, from a struggle concerned with the instruments of power, domestic and external, to one concerning the basis of power, economic and political.

How did this shift of theme and arena of conflict happen, and what are its implications for the international distribution of power? I have already mentioned the oil shock of 1973. However, the roots of the process run much deeper. They lead us to the strange staleness of the nuclear stalemate, and to the explosive nature of economic development.

The United States and the Soviet Union each has the power to destroy mankind, and perhaps the planet on which we are living. This ultimate power will continue to be with us (and it may well fall into less responsible hands). But it has two important limitations. One is that its very ultimate character makes it impossible to use, indeed forces its holders to seek arrangements that will make it unnecessary to use it. The other limitation is that since this power is ultimate, it is a thing apart. The power to destroy the earth does not imply the power to run the earth. The possession of nuclear weapons on the superpower scale does not mean that the war in Vietnam can be won, or Egypt can be controlled, much less does it imply an economic order dominated by the dollar, or indeed the silent obedience of small and apparently powerless nations. The very extraordinary character of destructive weapons opens the ground for other types of international conflict, for example, limited wars, but, above all, for economic struggles.

This is where the explosive nature of economic development comes in. It is a familiar observation that Marx was wrong when he assumed that revolutions happen at the moment of greatest poverty and impotence of the suppressed. In fact, such extreme suppression creates lethargy. Revolutionary energies are released when things begin to improve, and when improvement raises some hope in the minds of those in need. It is, of course, an open question whether such social theories can be applied to the international scene as well; but they seem to account for otherwise surprising phenomena. As the poor countries emerge to some kind of minimal status by being recognized as nation-states and admitted to the United Nations, as the rich countries accept some responsibility for helping them, and as some of them begin to achieve a modicum of economic prosperity, they begin to demand more. To some extent, these demands are phrased in specific terms: a proportion of the GNP of the rich to go into aid, generalized tariff preferences without restriction, a fund to compensate for fluctuating prices for raw materials. Increasingly, however, specific demands are re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

placed by apparently more extravagant, though more serious demands for recognition. The struggle between richer and poorer nations takes on a more absolute character; it becomes a struggle for power.

So far, the results of this incipient struggle are scattered and indecisive. Clearly, the new pattern of international relations has diminished the role of the Soviet Union. In terms of international economic relations, the Soviet Union is almost irrelevant, because while it is counted among the rich by the developing world, it has neither the wealth nor the will to contribute to effective solutions of the problem of development. (In terms of the superimposition of two patterns of conflict, it may be argued that this makes the Soviet Union more incalculable, more likely to employ its means, especially arms, in cases of limited significance but great nuisance value.) In a sense, the new pattern has also diminished the role of the United States. While still the greatest world power, even in economic terms, it differs in degree rather than dimension from some other countries. It could be argued that former Treasury Secretary John Connally's wish of 1971 has come true, and the United States has become a country with the same rights and obligations as others.

However, the main result of the process of a historical change of subject is diffusion, and perhaps confusion. The old conflict is beginning to lose relevance, although it is still there and will be for a long time to come. The new conflict has no clear protagonists. China is too unlikely a leader of the small and the poor. In fact, the position of the poor is rather like that of Europe; sometimes they are represented by Libya's Qaddafi, sometimes by Venezuela's Perez Guérrero, sometimes by Tanzania's Nyerere, and there are many other candidates. Nor is the position of the other side very clear. When the leaders of the Big Seven industrialized countries meet, they discuss their domestic problems first and the North-South dialogue second. With respect to the latter, they have no very clear, and probably several different views. The structure of international power is thus neither bipolar nor pentagonal, but amorphous, although one can discern the forces which are likely to move it into a new pattern.

IV

The only unambiguous conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is almost too trite to state: there will be more conferences. Before it is said that one does not need much analysis to reach this conclusion, let me add one or two considerations to underline the prediction that the style of international relations in the years to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

come is not going to be one of direct diplomacy of an overall character. The number of actors is large, the degree of their cohesion is small, the definition of the situation is imprecise. Under such circumstances two things can happen. One is local or localized wars, "direct diplomacy" of a limited character. Since we are no longer concerned with one overriding military conflict between two superpowers, the repetition of the painful and useless experiences of Europe's history in other parts of the world is by no means unlikely. But this apart (or even included, if one considers some recent examples), multilateral negotiation is likely to be the style responding best to the circumstances described. While a cynical view of international organizations and conferences is spreading, both among those who have a lot to lose and among those who feel that they have not gained enough, this method of dealing with international conflict is in fact becoming more and more important.

To speak of many actors in this context, and indeed of an amorphous field of power, is a useful overstatement, but still an overstatement. Actors can be grouped in certain ways, and the characteristic problems of these groups analyzed notwithstanding the fact that the new distribution of power is not as clear and easy to understand as the old one was. There was the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and its sphere of influence; there was the United States, its military alliances, and its sphere of influence; and there were the non-aligned nations, rarely very influential, largely bent on preserving their independence.

I am going to argue that the emerging pattern of power in an economic era of international conflict also has three main actors. Giving them names is more than a little misleading; I shall nevertheless do so and speak of the OECD countries, the threshold countries (many of which are members of OPEC), and the countries of the Group of 77. Membership of these groups overlaps to some extent; the differences within them are in some cases greater than differences between them; yet they are indicative of three types of positions in international economic relations: that of countries which have made it and achieved a high level of economic development and prosperity; that of those which have started along the road of development and have found resources to continue; and that of countries which still have a long way to go and may not get very far without major changes. Not all OECD countries are rich, nor are all rich countries in OECD, particularly if one includes the socialist countries in this category. Not all OPEC countries are *nouveaux riches,* and not all threshold countries, i.e. countries on or near the threshold to full development, are in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OPEC; but the concept symbolizes a combination of potential and underdevelopment. Finally, the Group of 77 is quite a ragbag of nations, although it includes nearly all the poor countries of the world.

This is not the place to attempt any detailed analysis of the three collective actors of international conflict, or even of the conflict itself. But in order to assess the probable nature of patterns of power, it may be useful to identify one major question with which each of the groups is faced. The various specific issues, as we shall see, are related, and they add up to an alternative, which many are not yet taking seriously but which is probably going to occupy us for many years to come—the alternative of cooperation on the one hand, and confrontation on the other.

The notion of the Group of 77 in this context stands for countries that have not got the resources themselves to advance their economic, social and general development to any great extent; depending on demographic conditions, their socioeconomic situation will either be barely stable or improve very slightly; their relative position is in any case going to deteriorate in the foreseeable future. This group includes many African countries, the whole of South Asia, some Latin American countries, and a few islands. One need but list them to recognize not only the enormity of the problem, but also the differences in tradition, condition and even their prospects. It is clearly not possible to overlook these differences, but if it is permissible to ignore them for the purpose of this analysis, there is one question that all these countries will have to answer individually or collectively: will it be possible for them to find a gradualist way forward to better social and economic conditions, or will they (have to) choose revolutionary, i.e., confrontational and often violent means to assert their claims?

Perhaps this question should have included a third alternative, that of lethargy. On the face of it, it is not impossible that some of the Group of 77 countries, at least, will become a kind of international *lumpenproletariat,* too poor to fight, too hopeless to be of any systematic interest, a disturbing reminder of weaknesses of the system but not a force to be reckoned with. It seems unlikely, however, that this will be the position of many, let alone the majority of the countries in question. The more likely course is that most of them will find a relatively stable basis for growth, with a minimum level as a starting point, by a combination of external influences (on population, in technology), external aid, and internal force. (I have chosen this term deliberately here, as I did when I contrasted incentive and force earlier; whether there are non-socialist ways of creating the stable basis for growth in these coun-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tries must be at least doubtful, although of course there are degrees and mixtures.) From that minimum level, countries can either find opportunities for steady and noticeable improvement, or else they are likely to become a force for unrest and confrontation in international relations, allying themselves with whoever attacks the chosen enemy, and producing a revolutionary situation on a global scale. I realize that some leaders of Western countries take the view that developing countries are too weak and too dependent ever to take such a stance with any degree of conviction; but it may not be wrong to ponder the possibility before one gets too self-assured.

In what I called the old conflict, the third group of the nonaligned was really weak and defensive. In the new conflict (the patterns of which I am extrapolating as much as describing), the third group, or threshold countries, is both assertive and crucial. The threshold countries may hold only limited power today—although OPEC has shown that this has considerable factual and nuisance effects—but their choices will determine more than any other development what the world of tomorrow and the day after looks like. And these choices will revolve around one fundamental question: will the threshold countries gain access to the Club of the Rich and play a leading positive role in developing the world order, or will they find it necessary to form the vanguard of confrontation with the old rich?

The threshold countries have one thing in common apart from their condition of potential development, and that is that they are almost all, though in varying degrees, rather disagreeable in their political attitudes and circumstances. Although there are exceptions such as Venezuela, there is hardly a democracy among them, and there are few that respect the rule of law as we would like to see it respected. They are more likely to be neo-feudal states or military dictatorships accommodating large transnational firms and combining incentives for the chosen few with discipline for the unasked many, than to be either liberal or socialist. They betray in their political order the mixture of potential and actual conditions characteristic of their economic circumstances. Yet they are not only potentially rich, but also potentially powerful, for example, possible future members of the nuclear club as well as owners of petrodollars: Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Indonesia, Brazil, Nigeria, Algeria, to mention but a few.

So far, indications are that the threshold or OPEC countries want to join the Club of the Rich, occasional confrontations notwithstanding. Indeed, rapid growth with large profits in the hands of a few, but some improvement for all, is the order of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

day in many of these countries. Their support for what I called the Group of 77 consists of words and conscience money. But then, the Club of the Rich is ambivalent in its attitude toward these countries; and their domestic social circumstances are in every case tense and fraught with explosive potential. Contrary to the Group of 77, the threshold countries doubtless realize that they have the weapons to make life very unpleasant for the OECD world. Conditions are conceivable under which this would lead some, or all of them, to choose a confrontation course that would be welcomed by the Group of 77, however divergent their objectives may remain. If the threshold countries become members of the Club of the Rich, this is likely to be accompanied by internal changes and to hold out opportunities for development for those who have not yet reached the threshold. If, on the other hand, this path should turn out to be too difficult or even blocked, the ensuing conflict could lead to clashes compared to which the history of industrial relations is child's play.

I have thought for some time that the most important practical task for the OECD countries is to sort out their attitude toward the threshold countries, without hypocrisy but without misplaced moralism as well. This, however, is merely a part of the more general question with which the OECD countries are faced in a new pattern of world power: will they find it possible to accommodate changes even if these detract from their monopoly of wealth and power, or will they turn protectionist and defensive and thus contribute to making a tense situation explosive? Like the other groups, the OECD countries are by no means homogeneous. For one thing, they have themselves crossed the threshold to development at quite different times, and some of the Latin European countries are not that far removed from the more advanced threshold countries. For another thing, a new debate about first principles is raging in the OECD countries, with incentive systems being criticized, while discipline systems are rejected; this is one of the internal problems that is going to contribute to the answer given to the question I have raised here.

At this stage, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the OECD countries behave like most monopolists: they defend their power and give way only under duress or where they feel that this is on balance in their favor. This leads to apparently paradoxical attitudes, such as the demand for rights for transnational companies coupled with a rejection of the transfer of certain technologies, or the insistence on more development aid coupled with resistance against generalized preferences (which, of course, especially benefit the threshold countries). Such inconsistencies cannot last very

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

long, especially if their hidden rationale is to keep the doors to the Club of the Rich closed. In the long term, and even in the medium term, it may be a matter of survival for the OECD countries to apply to the international conflicts of the future the openness for change which they have so effectively used to regulate their internal conflicts.

But these are large and speculative questions. Many of them are, as I have indicated, extrapolations from present conditions. Differences have been ignored, if not overlooked. Above all, this anticipation of the new conflict seems to contradict the main thesis of this paper, i.e., the amorphous and fluid state of international affairs at a time when several areas of conflict overlap, and local and worldwide clashes occur side by side. If conferences are the style of international relations in the years to come, their substance is likely to be confused. Probably the questions raised in this section are going to be an element in them, but so are East-West issues, and several others. Perhaps this is a time in which the world, like Europe, needs people who manage to define the situation in a manner which offers opportunities for development, so that we do not slip into explosions which nobody has desired, but which nobody can control either.

V

The upshot of this analysis must look like an ironic reversal of some of its assumptions. It is that, in all the amorphousness of patterns and confusion of trends, the one power on which responsibility falls to an unusual extent will be the United States of America. The United States is still the only identifiable center of gravity in all respects. America will not dominate the world, but it will color its developments in one way or another. America will not be able to determine the course of things, but the course of things will unfold around its position. The United States will be, in the years to come, a power sine qua non.

To make this conclusion plausible, let me take another look at the position of Europe. At first sight, Europe is a more likely candidate for the crystallization of a new power than the United States, let alone the Soviet Union. Contrary to both of them, it is not tainted by a history as a superpower; it is likely to understand the needs and demands of many small and medium-sized nations; it is bound by interest to trust international rules and arrangements; it has a traditional understanding of the plight of development. The European interest looks almost tailor-made for the condition of the future.

But, as I set out to explain, power is more than interest; it is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interest used. And here, Europe has signally failed to make its mark. More than that, the history of the last decade is one of decreasing rather than increasing integration in Europe. The reasons for this are many. They have to do with the Cartesian quality of the original construction of Europe, which was bound to founder one day on the more Humean qualities of reality. They have to do with the end of a long period of economic growth, and the reawakening of protectionism and nationalism under pressure. They have to do also with a remarkable lack of imagination and will among Europe's leading politicians. But they have to do, above all, with Europe's inability to work out its relationship with the United States—*an inability, to be sure, which is not simply the failure of* individuals but built into the condition of the partners.

This is not the place to recount the tortuous story of events that led—or rather, should have led—from a partnership with an undisputed senior and an equally undisputed junior partner to one of fundamental equality on the basis of complementary strengths. It is a story as rich in dramatic incidents as it is poor in political substance. The more important question in our context is what went wrong in this process. Why is it that Europe and the United States have been unable to develop a mature and firm partnership? There is one fundamental answer to this question: different European countries have interpreted their interest (the European interest?) in relation to the United States differently. But it is important to pursue this answer into the problem areas of the relationship.

There is, first of all, defense. A mature partnership would imply recognition of the fact that an alliance is the basis of European security in which the United States will continue to be the senior partner for a long time to come. Germany has seen and accepted this fact, not least because it is most immediately involved in what I have called the old conflict. France must have seen the facts but has insisted on a dangerous prestige game with the alliance, which gave the appearance at least of a basic doubt of the need for the senior partner. It is not irrelevant in this context that numerous European idealists, including most recently the Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans in his report, have toyed with the old idea of a European defense community, without apparently realizing fully that under modern technological conditions a NATO structure, which recognizes the special interest and contributions made by Europe, is the most one can sensibly hope for.

Then there is the question of the OECD economic order, that is, the politico-economic rules by which the developed countries themselves feel bound. The Kennedy Round was probably the last occasion at which the OECD world displayed a common interest,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the interest was common because of the economic climate of the 1950s and 1960s. Since then, such a community has been hard to bring about, and I would include the unloved Smithsonian monetary agreement in this statement. While Germany and the Netherlands are free traders (within limits and with the certain exception of agriculture), France and Italy are not, and Britain is well under way from the former to the latter position. At times it seems that European countries can agree on international economic matters only if defensive solutions are proposed: the protection of textiles, the demand for restraint by Japanese electronics exporters. The division between members and non-members of the monetary "snake" is deeper than any delimitation of interest between Europe and the United States.

Such differences obviously spill over into issues of development aid, and development policy generally. It is striking to what extent domestic socioeconomic considerations are reflected in this issue, as are straight political interests. Like the United States, Germany insists on the value of the market mechanism for all, including the poor raw material producers. France, on the other hand, finds it easier in terms of its own economic tradition to understand the desire on the part of developing countries to have security rather than the chance of unusual profits in good years. This led to the confusion reflected at Nairobi, and in the North-South dialogue, barely papered over by occasional agreements on formulae or even on funds.

The result of such European divergences is familiar from other analyses: the countries of Europe are moving further apart rather than closer together. Let me leave no doubt about my own view in this matter. I believe that there is not only a genuine European interest, but that it would in fact be in the interest of the countries of Europe if they defined their position toward the United States in defense, international economic matters, and development problems together and jointly. It is not unlikely that such a joint definition would be closer to the present French position than to that of Germany, although I would hope that it would be genuinely mature, that is, free of unnecessary prestige games and irrational hostilities. In theory at least, the United States and Europe could be the two pillars of the free world, pursuing in their different ways goals that are compatible in essentials. But in practice that is not what is happening. With exchange rates, growth rates and inflation rates, the political attitudes of European countries are moving apart. The idea of Europe moves more and more into the realm of fiction, of dreams.

In international terms this means of course that some European

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries, and notably Germany, enter into an even closer relationship with the United States than existed in the past. It is a senior-junior partnership, to be sure, in which the junior partner asks the senior not only to defend him but also to keep the dollar stable. Other European countries drift away into a kind of intermediate socioeconomic condition with only occasional and localized political influence in the world.

There is, as a result, much instability in Europe. Eurocommunism threatens an orthodox Soviet view of communism as much as a traditional Western view of Europe. In some countries, the desire to opt out of alliances altogether begins to grow. I have always understood balkanization to mean that a relatively small geographical area is split up into many parts that find no common denominator and, therefore, tend to go in all directions in unpredictable ways, thus presenting a picture of extreme volatility. This, as I said earlier, is certainly a European possibility today.

The conclusion I anticipated at the beginning of this section will now be understandable. The old conflict, which is no longer dominant but still with us, was military and political and had the United States and the Soviet Union as its main actors. The new conflict, which is not yet dominant, has the OECD countries and the developing countries as its main actors. Neither side is as yet clearly organized, but the disorganization of the OECD countries is such that no mature partner for the United States has emerged, nor is one likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. One may regret or salute this fact, but it means in any case that the United States is in a position of unusual responsibility in both patterns that determine the future of international relations—not perhaps a super-superpower, but an unmistakable power *tous azimuts*. It is therefore a matter of much more than local interest whether that great country will effect the transition from the arrogance of power in the 1960s to the responsibility of power in the 1980s.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

John C. Campbell

OIL POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Iran, in the view of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, has a great imperial past and a greater imperial future. In the next few years it is to assert its dominant role in the Persian Gulf region and the nearby reaches of the Indian Ocean. By 1990 it will attain the status of a Britain or a France in the global hierarchy of powers. Seeing this dream of the future, the Shah is already acting as if it were reality. Meanwhile, his neighbor across the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, talks less of empire but gradually extends its influence through the Arab world. Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Minister of Oil and Industry, can virtually dictate the world price of oil as long as he speaks for his king. He can lead the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or he can break it. He can please the Americans by being "moderate" on the oil price, and at the same time can remind them that he expects them to move Israel toward a settlement acceptable to the Arabs. The United States worries about its rising imports of oil, which increase its vulnerability to the decisions of OPEC, but takes comfort in the fact that it has a friend in Riyadh.

A few years ago, before the oil crisis of 1973–74, Walter Levy wrote in these pages about "oil power."[1] The oil-producing countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, following the initiative of Libya, had demonstrated that they could dictate terms to the great international oil companies, for years the symbols of the power of Western capitalism. Whether the question at hand was the price of oil, the level of royalties and taxes, or the terms of nationalization of company properties, there was no real negotiation because the world oil trade had become a sellers' market and because national sovereignty could not be challenged. As long as the companies and the consumers were willing to pay for the oil, the governments that controlled it could establish the conditions. The governments of the consuming countries might have taken the decision to back the companies in resisting the demands they faced,

[1] Walter J. Levy, "Oil Power," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1971, p. 652–68.

John C. Campbell is Director of Studies and a Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

using their economic and perhaps their military power if it came to a showdown. But such a decision was not seriously considered. The chief concern of the U.S. government, for one, was to maintain the good will of the Shah and of the King of Saudi Arabia, on whom it was counting to maintain the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region against any attempt by the Soviets or their local followers to upset it.

Oil power, then, was the ability not just to dictate to private companies but to influence the governments of important powers. The Arabs learned this lesson and applied it for political purposes, with their oil embargo and cuts in production and export, at the time of the October War in 1973. The members of OPEC, Arab and non-Arab, used the same occasion to quadruple the price of their oil. The governments of the most vulnerable consuming countries, in Western Europe and Japan, reacted in near panic, seeking ways to appease the Arabs on political matters and to obtain economic deals that would assure them continued access to Middle East oil at the new high prices. The less vulnerable United States declared it would not bend the principles of its foreign policy (which in this case meant support of Israel) because of economic pressure and looked for ways to lower the price; meanwhile Secretary of State Kissinger did not disguise his feeling that the Europeans had been pusillanimous in the crisis and had let their NATO ally down. Thus oil power had shown the capacity not only to make the Western nations pay a great deal more, but to make them think new thoughts; and it had caused a major rift between Western Europe and the United States.

Was this a great turning point in history, a shift to a new balance of power in which previously weak countries with national resources essential to others, but not much else, could impose their will on established nations possessing greater military strength and developed modern industries? The new oil price and OPEC were real enough. Would comparable organizations for copper, bauxite and other materials give the Third World the power to bring about a new international economic order instead of just demanding it without much hope of success?

We have now had four years in which to observe and absorb some lessons of the oil revolution. Perhaps the principal one is that it remains just that, a changed relationship between some oil producers and some oil consumers. It has not generated OPECs for other commodities. It has not emancipated the Third World from its poverty, nor has it ushered in a new world order. These matters are being discussed in the United Nations as they were

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

before. The developed countries, including the United States, are prepared to do more about commodity agreements, buffer stocks and special funds to meet Third World needs. The negotiations at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in Paris, which grew out of the oil crisis, have now come to an end without significant agreement and amid controversy on what to do next. There the oil producers lined up with the other Third World countries against the developed, but this was no showdown. Debate and negotiation will go on. OPEC and the industrial countries will both do something to ease the plight of the poor nations, while each side blames the other for not doing more. If the revolutionary change to a new international economic order takes place, it will probably happen so slowly that we shall not recognize it when it is here. By that time oil power may be a relic of the past.

The oil revolution itself, however, is with us now. It has changed relations between producing and consuming countries and it has changed the political map of the Middle East. To be more specific, it has raised to a new status two states that have oil in quantity and have set out to translate it into various tangible and intangible attributes of power.

The practice of independent diplomacy and the knowledge of the relationship of oil to political power did not come overnight to Iran or to Saudi Arabia. Both had traditions that made a policy of self-assertion quite natural once the means were at hand to carry it out. But the experience of the two countries has been different, and each deserves to be considered separately.

II

The memory of the Persian imperial past was never entirely lost during the later centuries of weakness. Though often under pressure from the claims and ambitions of stronger outside powers, the country avoided annexation and partition thanks to the balance between those outside powers and to skillful diplomacy. Its rulers yielded when they had no choice, remaining ever sensitive to the forms of sovereignty and always seeking to assert national rights and interests. Such an instance was the Anglo-Russian occupation of the country in World War II, which forced the abdication of Reza Shah, the founder of the modern Iranian state, in favor of his son, Mohammed Reza, but also brought pledges to respect Iran's sovereignty and to end the occupation after the war, pledges with which the United States was later associated.

Postwar Iran had reason to be grateful to the United States. American diplomatic support made it possible to get rid of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet occupation forces after they had outstayed their welcome and fostered a separatist revolution in Iran's northern province of Azerbaijan. And America's differences with Britain over the handling of the crisis that followed nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by the government of Mohammed Mosaddeq in the early 1950s enabled Iran to come out of the crisis with a new deal on oil, although Mosaddeq himself disappeared from the political scene. The United States was involved in the events that brought the Shah back to the throne he left briefly in those critical days of 1953, and by the mid-1950s was indeed the principal protecting power, providing military, economic and technical assistance and drawing Iran into its worldwide alliance system. Yet Iran was no American satellite state. Those very crises in which it had used the American connection to reduce the pressure from Russia and from Britain had fed the fires of Iranian nationalism, which rejected subordination to any other nation. And the policy of industrialization and modernization, begun by Reza Shah, was carried on with American help by his son with the idea of strengthening Iran against any power, including the United States, which might be tempted to encroach on its independence.

The cold war, which from Iran's standpoint was a replay of the Anglo-Russian rivalry of an earlier time, offered some scope for classic Iranian maneuver. The Shah knew the value of Iran to U.S. strategy as well as Iran's own need for U.S. support. After Stalin's death, he gave a favorable response to Soviet proposals to repair the link between Moscow and Tehran. Before signing a security agreement with the United States in 1959, he negotiated with Moscow on the terms of a new Soviet-Iranian treaty, which was not concluded because Khrushchev would not meet his conditions. But the signal to Washington was clear. A few years later the Shah made a pledge to Moscow that Iran would not grant a strategic base to any foreign power, a move that encouraged Khrushchev's successors to undertake a real rapprochement with Iran in the mid-1960s. The new Soviet-Iranian ties have often been cited to show how the Soviets were carrying out a strategy of moving into the Middle East. But the initiative came also from Iran. The advent of détente in East-West relations was for the Shah an opportunity to return at least partially to the old practice of balancing between the contending powers. But this time he proposed to do so from a stronger base and began to build up his armed forces with large quantities of American, and small quantities of Soviet, equipment.

The remaining element in Iran's postwar outlook was the search for a regional role. At first the motivation was largely defensive. If

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet Union was the major threat, the secondary threat was radical Arab nationalism represented by Nasser's Egypt and, after the revolution of 1958 in Baghdad, by a succession of radical regimes in Iraq. Iran's fear was that as British power declined in the Arabian Peninsula and in the Gulf, the combination of Arab nationalism and social revolution supported by Moscow would compound the dangers threatening the country from several directions. The Shah took what measures he could, making use of the Western connection and even of cooperation *sub rosa* with Israel. He helped keep the Kurdish rebellion going in the northern provinces of Iraq. But what the Shah wanted most of all was the strength and capacity for Iran to rely on itself and to carve out a regional policy of its own. And for this he needed a greater respect and a more influential voice in the councils of world affairs.

These were the main aims of Iranian policy before the oil revolution of 1973: strength, modernization, independence of policy, a regional role, and greater respect from the rest of the world. They are the same lines the Shah has followed since 1973. Let us look at the record of what he has done and what he proposes to do with the new resources that higher oil prices have placed at his disposal.

First, armed strength. There has been a rapid and spectacular expansion of the armed forces and their equipment. The numbers are less important than the volume and the nature of the new equipment. Iran spent huge sums in the United States on military equipment, some $11.8 billion from 1971 through 1976,[2] with smaller purchases elsewhere. The weapons sought were the most modern and sophisticated available, including items only recently or not yet issued to the U.S. armed forces. The Shah disclaimed any ambition to make Iran a nuclear power; but he left little doubt that if other middle powers took that path, Iran would also. Whether and how all these arms might be used, where and when and against whom they might be deployed, were questions that had no clear answer. But there was no doubt of the Shah's view of military strength as a traditional and necessary attribute of power, or of his intent to make Iran a military factor to be taken into account.

Second, transformation of the economy. The plans of the 1950s and 1960s are dwarfed by those of today. Large sums have gone into investment in new basic industries and the infrastructure for further expansion. Iran, which had no steel industry in the mid-1960s, now plans to be producing some 20 million tons in the 1980s,

[2] Department of Defense, *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance*, December 1976, p. 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bringing it to the level of France or Britain today.[3] Large-scale nuclear energy development is to prepare the country to maintain the status of an industrial power when the production of oil begins to decline.

Third, a foreign policy of independence. These attributes of power in the modern world, armed strength and an industrial base, are to make Iran master of its own house and immune to pressure and dictation from outside. The Shah is not drawn to the mystique of nonalignment, but he does seek the respect of the great powers and the freedom to decide what degree of alignment with any of them, in any given situation, Iran in its own interest wants and needs. As he himself has put it, "There is no need for Iran to be a satrap of America...or of any other power....We can share many things with the U.S., but nobody can dictate to us."[4] He wants no outside military presence in the Gulf and applauded the decision of Bahrain to terminate the American naval facility there in July 1977. That gives a sounder basis for opposing the establishment of Soviet naval facilities in Iraq or elsewhere.

Fourth, and related to the policy of independence, the assertion of a regional role. Some might describe it more bluntly as the creation of a sphere of Iranian influence or dominance in the Gulf area. The guiding concepts are the same: Iran as the power to be consulted on any changes in the local balance, as the protector of the vital oil routes through the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, as a factor in the affairs of the Middle East from Egypt to India and even beyond, to the entire expanse of the Indian Ocean and the countries bordering it. This role lies at the heart of the Shah's (and presumably his countrymen's) ambitions, his military buildup, and the active diplomacy he has undertaken.

Iran has healed the breach with Egypt, now that Nasser is gone and with him, at least temporarily, the challenge of Nasserism in the Gulf. Iran has helped to build an informal alignment of moderate states along the axis Tehran-Riyadh-Cairo to checkmate radical forces and to maintain stability. It has sent troops across the Gulf to help the Sultan of Oman put down the rebellion supported by the radical regime in Aden and by the Soviet Union. It has assumed the role of protector of the integrity of Pakistan, presumably against possible danger from India or from Afghanistan, but has also mended fences with India.

Greater power and prestige in its region would seem to imply a

[3] Jahangir Amuzegar, *Iran: An Economic Profile*, Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1977, pp. 90–91.

[4] R. K. Karanjia, *The Mind of a Monarch*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977, p. 253.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wider world role, and Iran has certainly had more to say, and has been listened to with more attention, than was the case before 1973. But what it can do on such world issues as North-South cooperation and changes in the world economic system has little to do with its new weapons and its new industries and much to do with its membership in OPEC and with how OPEC as a group fares in the coming decade. That will depend on many developments, none more important than the way in which Iran's neighbor, Saudi Arabia, uses its own oil power.

III

Saudi Arabia also has a tradition of independence. The central Arabian desert, the Najd, was never really conquered by outsiders. It was the puritan Islam of the Wahhabi sect and the martial and organizing abilities of Abdul Aziz al Saud (Ibn Saud) that brought unity and a primitive state structure to the tribes of this area in the early years of this century, and then through the conquest of the Hejaz he brought under his rule the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and the long coastline on the Red Sea.

Like the Iranians, the people of Saudi Arabia could look back to a golden era, that of the Prophet himself when the Arabs of the peninsular desert had burst forth to establish an empire covering a large part of the known world. But for centuries their society was thrown back on itself with only limited contact with the outside world. Its people avoided the experience of colonialism that befell other Arabs and the many contacts that Iran had with other states and cultures, but if they thereby lost some benefits, they were also spared the psychological burdens. Change came suddenly with the decision of Ibn Saud to grant an oil concession to an American company in 1933. It was a decision to enter the modern world, made advisedly but still with second thoughts, for the king did not want to abandon the principles or to forsake the traditional ways by which his people had lived.

From the start of the oil era Saudi Arabia had a special relationship with the United States. Ibn Saud distrusted Britain, the dominant power in the Middle East, and placed oil operations exclusively in American hands. Fearful of Zionism, he sought assurances from President Roosevelt that Arab rights and interests in Palestine would not be sacrificed. Even after the establishment of Israel with American support the old king continued to look to the United States for security, and so did his successors.

In the first years after Ibn Saud's death in 1953 the Saudi role in Arab politics was limited. For dynastic reasons the House of Saud

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

always lined up against the Hashemites, whom they had ejected from the Hejaz many years before but who still ruled in Iraq and in Jordan. But the prospect that Saudi Arabia could compete with Nasser's Egypt for leadership of the Arab world, an attractive idea for Washington in the 1960s, was at that time beyond the capabilities both of the kingdom and of the then king, Ibn Saud's son Saud. There was even a question whether the Saudi regime would survive Egypt's military intervention in Yemen's civil war, the real target of which was not the mountains and tribes of Yemen but the oil of Saudi Arabia. Certain American military gestures, however, made clear Washington's commitment to Riyadh, and Nasser's adventure ultimately came to grief in the rough terrain of Yemen and in the ashes of defeat on another and more important front, the 1967 war with Israel.

Thus, Saudi Arabia before the oil revolution was not driving for power, industries and a regional role in the way that Iran was, although both its own society and its relations with others were changing under the impact of the growing oil industry. The income from oil under the 50/50 formula for splitting profits with the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) was huge for a country of some five million people, and by the mid-1960s Saudi Arabia had passed Kuwait and Iran to become the leading producer in the Middle East. It was inevitable that Saud's brother Faisal, who took full power and the throne in 1964, would come to use that power for causes he deemed important. He valued the friendship and support of the United States. He was not going to take the lead in the offensive for nationalization that Iraq and others were mounting against the international oil companies. Yet Saudi Arabia had been a member of OPEC since its establishment in 1960. It was not going to line up with the companies against its fellow members.

Two causes close to the heart of King Faisal were anti-communism and the recovery of Palestine, and particularly of Jerusalem, for the Arabs. As the Arab states moved toward a new showdown with Israel, he undertook a more active diplomacy. His efforts gained credibility from the increasing influence and prestige that flowed to Saudi Arabia from its demonstration of power over the oil companies in the negotiations of 1970-71. He could, and did, serve the cause of anti-communism by encouraging Egypt to expel its Soviet military advisers in 1972 and to regain its independence of action. He could serve the Arab cause against Israel by asking the Americans to make Israel come to terms. The United States had long attempted to keep the issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, where it was difficult enough trying to reconcile its search for a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peaceful settlement and its special relationship with Israel, separate from its relations with the oil countries of the Gulf, mainly Saudi Arabia, where common interests in security and in economic cooperation had their own justification. But this was not possible in 1973. Faisal knew he had an "oil weapon." He warned in the spring of 1973 that he might have to use it. And in October, with the other Arab producers, he did.

OPEC's quadrupling of oil prices at the end of 1973 was not tied to the Arab-Israeli war or to the embargo and production cuts decided by the Arab countries in connection with that war, but it was a product of the same atmosphere, of the feeling that this was the time for the nations of the Middle East to assert themselves and to change the terms of their relations with the West. For Saudi Arabia the oil revolution was the combination of these events. The decision for the embargo was a political act of Arab leadership, serving notice of a more active role in the future. The decision to multiply the price of oil meant a vast increase in financial resources for OPEC's biggest producer and exporter. Two figures illustrate the change. In 1970 the Saudi government's "take" from the oil industry was $1.2 billion in taxes and royalties. In 1976, with oil production at about the twice the earlier level, the total received from the sale of government oil, plus income from the 40 percent of Aramco still owned by the American companies, amounted to $31.5 billion.

What has happened since 1973? What have been Saudi Arabia's goals in the use of all that money?

First, like Iran, Saudi Arabia has sought rapid economic development. The current plan, covering the period 1975-80, calls for expenditures of $142 billion, with a growth rate of 13.5 percent annually. The plan is so vast that many outside experts, and probably some Saudi planners, do not think the economy can absorb that much. But no doubt exists that the country is already being transformed by tremendous construction projects—more than half the expenditures go for construction—and imported materials and machinery have choked the available ports. If the planned expansion exceeds the nation's capabilities, it will simply take longer. The important fact is the character of the decision. The Saudi leaders are going ahead, without undue hesitation, with an economic revolution—importing new goods, new people, new ways—that will inevitably bring changes in their traditional society. The situation is unprecedented. Never before has a relatively primitive country had such vast wealth at its disposal. Like Iran, the Saudis are in great haste to use it to turn their oil-producing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economy (the oil industry in 1976 still accounted for 86 percent of the gross national product) into a diversified industrial economy that will outlast the age of oil.

Second, and again like Iran though on a smaller scale, Saudi Arabia is spending large sums on modern weapons. In the past the country has had two armies, a regular army (numbering some 45,000 in the late 1960s) and a smaller "white army" as a check on the former and as personal protection for the king. Now there is to be an expanded army and air force that can wage modern war against potential enemies although it is not clear who those enemies are. Such a force seems to be regarded as a necessary adjunct to a role of Arab leadership and also as a counter to the military power of Iran. Questions may be raised as to how a country of small population, with no pool of technically trained manpower, and with a military tradition of bedouin desert formations only recently supplemented by air power, can create overnight a military establishment handling such items as Chieftain tanks and F-15 aircraft. But the Saudi government is spending the money to buy such items and to pay foreign experts, official and private, to train Saudi soldiers in the arts of war. Arms purchased from the United States totalled $5.8 billion over the 1974-76 period.

The salient factor in Saudi Arabia's position is not its big development plan nor its expanded military force, but the fact that after paying for both it still has a lot of money left over. In 1975 the amount was $20.1 billion, in 1976 $24.2 billion. It is this surplus and the prospect of its continuance that gives Saudi Arabia its extraordinary influence in the Middle East and in the world.

In the region no other state has the same potential to turn oil into power and influence. Egypt and Syria, with their ambitions for political leadership, do not produce enough oil for substantial exports. Iraq and Algeria are exporters, but everything they get from exports is absorbed by their own needs (although Iraq with its large reserves has the potential eventually to join the big exporters in wealth and in influence). Iran is making its oil power felt now, setting aside a portion of its income for loans to other states, but its own demands are so great that it cannot generate a big surplus. Kuwait and Libya earn more than they need with their oil exports, but both are conservation-minded and keep the surplus low. Kuwait's policy is one of buying off trouble by aiding the development of other Arab states. Libya's is one of promoting revolution in numerous countries, Arab and non-Arab, and that is a demonstration of power, as is its use of money to induce African countries to take certain positions on issues of moment to the Arabs or to Libya

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

itself. But Libya has erratic leadership, a population of only 2.44 million, and limited oil reserves. The United Arab Emirates is the classic case of a state with much more oil and money than it needs, but it is too new and too small to exert power by itself, and generally follows the Saudi lead. Saudi Arabia is the only giant. Its production in 1976 was some three billion barrels, four times more than that of Kuwait, one and a half times as much as Iran. And as Saudi production, now at ten million barrels per day, has gone up, the new reserves discovered each year are still greater than the annual production and this may be so for another 60 years. Development of natural gas on an immense scale and of a petrochemical industry will add to the wealth represented by crude oil. These facts by themselves generate influence.

The Saudis have shown that they will use their oil weapon in the Arab cause, and that has given them influence in the Arab world, even if they never use it again. They also have provided money to support the arms purchases of the confrontation states, especially Egypt. Sadat was able to thumb his nose at Moscow largely because he knew that the transition to Western suppliers could be financed by Saudi Arabia. Also, Riyadh is logically the financial motor for the development of the entire Arab world. It has been rather cautious in committing itself—not anxious, for example, to pour money into the bottomless Egyptian economy—but it can hardly avoid the role of investment banker if it wishes to gain influence on and good will rather than resentment from its Arab brethren.

The rewards of financial power are evident in the recent successes scored by Saudi diplomacy in Arab affairs, all the more remarkable in that the experience of the new leadership—Faisal having been assassinated in 1975—is comparatively brief. How they handled the Lebanese affair was one example. The confused struggle of Lebanese factions and Palestinians, with numerous outsiders mixing in, had resulted in Syrian military intervention, fighting between the Syrian army and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), further aggravation of Syrian-Egyptian relations, and a demonstration of the impotence of the Arab League to stop the fighting or to find a solution. The prospect was for bitter inter-Arab strife and the loss of any chance for a negotiated settlement with Israel. Saudi diplomacy, helped by the moderation of Assad and Sadat and by the weakened position of the PLO, came to the rescue. In two meetings in Riyadh and Cairo in October 1976 the Syrian military presence in Lebanon was accepted but given a general Arab League cloak, Arafat's relatively moderate wing of the PLO was saved from Syrian domination, the way was opened

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for a reconciliation of Arafat with King Hussein of Jordan, and all the Arab neighbors of Israel were brought together as a moderate group that was ready, if America and Israel were ready, to face the practical questions of a negotiated settlement. Precisely how Saudi financial power contributed to this result is difficult to say, but it could hardly have been done by diplomatic skill alone.

Another example is the apparent success of the Saudi effort to reduce Soviet and radical influence in the area of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. In 1970, the Saudis succeeded in bringing about a compromise settlement of the civil war in Yemen which put a moderate regime in power in Sana and ended the position of special influence the Soviet Union had enjoyed there. In 1975 they established diplomatic relations with the People's Democratic Republic of [southern] Yemen despite the ideological gulf separating the traditional Saudi monarchy from that country's revolutionary Marxist regime then aligned with Moscow and engaged in supporting a rebellion in the neighboring state of Oman. The P.D.R.Y. has not broken with Moscow or changed its spots, but Saudi Arabia can do more for its economy than the Soviet Union can or will. The combined appeal of money and Arab solidarity against an outside power is not to be underestimated. The Saudis have applied the same means in the Horn of Africa to wean Somalia away from its Soviet connection. There also the outcome is not clear, but in view of the historic and continuing territorial dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia, the warmth of Moscow's embrace of its new friend in Addis Ababa, Colonel Mengistu, seems to indicate that it regards the strong position it had in Somalia as either already lost or worth sacrificing in pursuit of bigger game.

In sum, the Saudi leaders appear to have learned the art of using money as a serviceable instrument of political power, using it in a variety of ways: to help other states' development (with conditions), to enable friends and allies to pay their bills, or simply, in the old tradition of their own country and of the Middle East, to buy the loyalty of other leaders.

IV

The positive side of the picture is easy enough to illustrate. Iran and Saudi Arabia, with their unprecedented oil income, have set ambitious goals and have begun to move toward them. They are speaking with a stronger voice in regional and world affairs, and they are being listened to. But what of the less positive side? The picture is not complete without taking account of limitations and uncertainties.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What, for example, will the heavy expenditures on arms accomplish? In the case of Iran they will not enable that country to cope with an attack from the Soviet Union; and the deterrence to such an attack comes from the global balance and the danger of conflict with the United States, or from Soviet calculation of the political price, rather than from Iran's armed forces. The Shah may hope to overawe his western neighbor Iraq, with which historic disputes now on ice could be revived, or Saudi Arabia, or to take under his wing the small Arab states of the lower Gulf. But his buildup tends to provoke two reactions that could nullify any advantages: further arming of Iraq by the U.S.S.R. to keep the balance, and a broader Arab reaction in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other states would feel the need for greater unity and strength to oppose Iranian imperialism. Even the most recent success of Iranian arms, the sending of forces to help the Sultan of Oman put down the Dhofar rebels, may have a price to be paid in the future, for this was intervention in an essentially Arab quarrel on Arab territory. On the eastern side, the Iranian buildup may provoke India to countermeasures and cause Afghanistan to open its doors to a stronger Soviet influence. The instability of Pakistan is likely to sharpen these possibilities. One can therefore question how much security Iran gains by its great military expansion, and how much power over others.

Saudi Arabia's military buildup is not so far advanced as Iran's but, considering the lower starting base and smaller population, is comparable. It has played virtually no part in the enhancement of the country's international position. Saudi troops have not been used outside the country except in small numbers and in a symbolic political or peacekeeping role. Saudi influence on smaller Arab states on the rim of the Arabian Peninsula stems from political prestige rather than military might. Perhaps it is unrealistic to think that any state thrust so rapidly into a position of great wealth and opportunities for political leadership, in a region containing unresolved conflicts, would not see military power as a necessary attribute. If Riyadh aspires to a major role in bringing about a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, increasing its armed strength seems a natural concomitant even though Saudi Arabia itself might be only marginally involved, as before, in the actual military operations of a new round of war. From the latter standpoint, it is not the Saudi forces themselves that are so important, but rather the prospect that new Saudi weapons such as advanced American-made aircraft may be turned over to other Arab states confronting Israel, or that Saudi Arabian funds will finance the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

purchase of arms for Egypt and for Syria. That is power, but the power of the purse rather than of the new Saudi army.

A second limiting factor in both Iran and Saudi Arabia is the paradox that the assertion of independence and new power in the form of military and industrial strength is taking place through a process that in fact increases dependence on the West and particularly the United States. This is because the equipment and the technology both for new weapons and for new industries must come from outside, subject to outsiders' decisions, and is so complex that hordes of Western experts are needed to help train the local people. The presence of 30,000 American military and civilian personnel in Iran, and 28,000 in Saudi Arabia, without whose advice and training the new weapons could not be used and the new plants would not produce, creates a situation of dependence none the less real for being bought and paid for. It is presumably temporary; if the instruction is successful the instructors are no longer needed. Yet this is a continuing process. Tehran and Riyadh, for example, keep asking for the latest and most sophisticated military equipment, and the Pentagon for its own reasons wants to sell it to them; but each advance in the technology of weapons requires a new set of advisers and instructors.

A third factor of weakness is the strain which grandiose and hastily undertaken military and economic projects put upon the resources, the manpower, and the social fabric. Haste has made a great deal of waste. Plans must be constantly revised and schedules shifted. Iran has overspent and overinvested, needing foreign loans to make ends meet. Saudi Arabia does not have that problem but has plenty of its own. It must educate its own people to new jobs and new habits of mind. It must import large numbers of foreigners, not only engineers and managers from the West but also thousands of semi-skilled and ordinary workers from Pakistan, India and elsewhere in addition to the ever-present Yemenis. For a society that has been tightly bound by religious and tribal tradition these are revolutionary conditions. But Saudi institutions have proved adaptable. When there is so much money around almost everybody can get or hope to get a share of it, and that increases the adaptability. Yet it may be asking too much to expect the pace of industrialization to be matched by a pace of reform that would avoid wrenching social stress.

Finally, political uncertainty and unrest, despite the fabled wealth and prosperity in both countries, lie not far beneath the surface. Iran's system of government rests on the monarchy in the person of the present Shah, who has reserved all power to himself.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

His "white revolution," decreed from above, has made important and needed social changes, and he has engaged the energies of his people in the rush for modernization. But he has not developed stable and permanent political institutions and has not given real political responsibility to the talented and growing professional and managerial class, although he has reduced the pressure by providing good jobs. He has confounded many critics who have predicted at one time or another in the past 20 years that this failure would cost him dearly, perhaps cost him his throne. But it remains a serious question for the time of succession if not before. No one knows when that time will be. And even if the Shah does everything possible to groom his son to take the helm, there is no guarantee that the latter will be able to control and guide the more complex and demanding society Iran will then be.

Saudi Arabia does not even have a regular system of succession, but the more collegial character of the regime, based on a royal house with many princes possessed of influence on the national or local level, has given it surprising strength and adaptability. They may at times vie or feud with one another, but all have a stake in the continuing primacy of the House of Saud. Thus it proved possible to remove a king, Saud, when he was doing a poor job, and to replace him with his more competent brother, Faisal; and when Faisal was killed, the decision to give Khalid the crown and Prince Fahd the opportunity to exercise effective political power has proved, so far, a sound one. The Saudi royal family, like the Shah, has proved more durable than many of its opponents and critics. It has not lost touch with the people, and especially not—in contrast to the situation of Iran— with the new generation of broad national leadership, the youth being educated abroad.

The tendency of present rulers in Tehran or in Riyadh is to see the political problems as manageable for the future as long as things are going well. The tendency in Washington is to conclude that all is for the best as long as the governments appear to be doing something for their people and are friendly and cooperative with the United States. They and we may both be underestimating the political fragility that is at least partially concealed by frenetic activity and undoubted prosperity. There are two areas of danger to the status quo. One is that political structures can hardly be immune to such drastic economic and social change. The other is that the military buildup is putting the means of political change in the hands of officers who, as representatives of the military institution or as ambitious leaders of a faction or an ideology, may feel called to take action not necessarily on the side of the powers that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be. The Shah has pampered his military officers, and also kept watch on them through his security agency, SAVAK, but he cannot be sure. The Saudis are building an army whose officer corps, for all we know, may contain a Colonel Quaddafi. Finally, and especially in the case of Saudi Arabia, the financial rewards of successful revolution are so enormous that the temptation to an ambitious politician or military man to lay violent hands on the pots of gold may be uncommonly strong.

V

These are serious limitations. The total picture of the prospects of the two countries and their rulers is thus one in which their power, though real, is clothed in uncertainty. I have deliberately directed attention to their regional interests and policies, for it is here that their deeply rooted ambitions lie. But we must also look beyond the Middle East at their broader world role because the two are related and because it is the exercise of oil power on a global scale, whatever the motive, that has so alarmed the West and exposed its vulnerability.

The power of Saudi Arabia and Iran in the global balance is simply the power of OPEC to set the price of oil the consuming countries must pay. The latter's vulnerability is evident in the trepidation with which they await the decisions of each ministerial meeting of OPEC and in their hope that Saudi Arabia will be "statesmanlike" and hold the others back. The resulting impression is that the members of OPEC hold the fate of the world in their hands.

Certain elementary facts, however, should be kept in mind. One is that OPEC has no internal unity except on the one matter of setting the price of oil to the advantage of its members—and not always then. It is not an organization dedicated to the creation of a new international economic order. President Boumedienne of Algeria may talk that way because he has built up a vested political interest in doing so, but his main concerns are, first, Algeria itself and, secondly, Arab North Africa. Nigeria, Venezuela and Indonesia have interests that are primarily national and regional. Debates at the United Nations or discussions at CIEC in Paris find OPEC members asserting their solidarity with the have-nots of the Third World against the developed nations of the West. But their interests do not lead them very far in that direction, as is apparent from their decisions on concrete economic questions.

A second fact is that the heaviest and even decisive influence in OPEC is wielded by Saudi Arabia and Iran if they are together, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by Saudi Arabia alone if they are not, because it is the only oil producer that can raise or lower its production by millions of barrels of oil per day without seriously affecting its own economy and polity. Third, although the two countries have differed on price, with Iran pushing for a higher one, neither wishes to subject the West, to use Henry Kissinger's word, to "strangulation." Neither is trying to dominate Western countries through buying control of their key industries. They are in fact caught up with the West (including Japan) in an economic relationship from which neither can, or wants to, escape. The expenditure of their oil money for Western goods and services essential to their plans and their commitments to their own peoples is the counterdependence to the West's dependence on their oil. Too high a price for oil is not in Saudi Arabia's or Iran's interest; even if a growth in demand exceeding supply or a deliberate decision to restrict supply and apportion export quotas made it possible to charge more and more money for less and less oil, they would not gain if they pushed their advantage to the point of throwing the industrial economies into depression or chaos. (In the same way, too low a price is not in the consuming countries' interest, for it would not stimulate the necessary search for alternative sources of energy.)

All these economic factors are fortified by political ones. While Saudi Arabia and Iran wish to assert their independence and their new economic power in dealing with everybody, the global military balance and the relations of the superpowers are as relevant to their own security as they ever were, perhaps more so. Despite what American scholars or journalists may write about the possibility of seizing Persian Gulf oil by force if it is not made available on terms we can afford, such action is out of the question unless there is a total breakdown of the growing partnership of producers and consumers, which both have every reason to avoid. In the new post-1973 conditions, moreover, the Middle East countries may be less able than before to maneuver between the U.S.S.R. and the West. The Soviets have practically nothing to offer them, either as a market for oil (perhaps a decade hence but not now) or as a supplier of goods and technology. The basis for a far-reaching relationship as an alternative to that with the West is not there. On the Soviet side a stronger tendency to use military pressure or force may appear if it is clear that other means of influence will not work. Add to this the continuing concern of the local states for their security. Iran feels threatened by Russia and not by the United States. Saudi Arabia remains anti-communist and anti-Soviet in its basic outlook. Both know that their oil power is ineffective against a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet threat to their security, so they retain their ultimate need for U.S. support.

That is the fixed view of the present governments. If a radical revolution should take place in either country, a not impossible happening, new leaders might turn to Moscow for support. But the economics of the situation would be against such a turn, as disruption of existing ties with the West would make it impossible for a new regime to meet the demands of its own people. Reasons of history, geography and economics would modify or even nullify what might seem to be the imperatives of a change in ideology at the top.

The range of choice for the use of oil power in the context of global balance and alignments is not so wide as one might expect. As we have seen, the oil-producing states of the Middle East do not have a strong interest of their own in joining the Second or the Third World in an all-out struggle with the First in order to change the shape of the world economy. On the contrary, their real interests lie in continuing partnership with the developed states of the First World. What they are asking for is that the partnership reflect a shift of bargaining power in their favor. Considering the pre-1970 situation and the facts of today, that is not unreasonable, and their new status deserves formal recognition in increased voting power in international financial institutions. Debate may be acrimonious, negotiation may be slow, a CIEC may fail, but both sides recognize that the dialogue must go on.

The test for them is how well the relationship with the West serves their national and regional aspirations. So far as Iran is concerned, under the present or any other government it will want growth, security, and a leading role in its region. As long as these aspirations do not mean conflict and war with others, they are reasonable ones. Even with the current fascination for the accumulation of weapons of war, which may not be sustained at the present rate, Iran's energies may well be absorbed in its internal development and in finding a regional equilibrium that satisfies its interests and its ego without war.

Saudi Arabia is in a different situation. If it is a nation-state with its own interests, it is also part of the wider "Arab nation" which exists in the minds and emotions of Arabs and is a reality in politics even if in the realm of political institutions it has nothing more impressive to show than the Arab League. Oil power has provided a key to leadership in Arab affairs, whether Saudi Arabia takes the role itself or provides essential support for someone else's leadership. The Saudis have used that power with great political and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

diplomatic skill, but they in turn are subject to political pressure from others. If the Arab world could unite – an old and recurring dream – and use its oil to assert itself against the rest of the world, it could become a significant world power. But it cannot seem to attain that kind of grand-scale political unity. Saudi Arabia therefore has to make its way amid inter-Arab relations as they are and will be, that is to say with all their instability, rivalries, unions and federations made and unmade, and in the background the pervasive sense of Arab identity that makes any one state's politics the business of all the others.

The Saudi relationship with Egypt is crucial. Egypt has been and, for obvious reasons, will remain a leading country in the Arab world, but it has an exploding population and immense economic problems. Any Egyptian leader is going to be looking across the Red Sea toward Saudi Arabia and Saudi oil either with domination in his eye, as Abdel Nasser did, or with a plea for help, which has been Sadat's approach. It is in the Saudi interest that Egypt be a moderate force in the Arab world, and that means paying attention and paying money. As for Syria, the Saudis have to take account of the pride of the Syrians as the truest representatives of Arab nationalism and their territorial ambition to create a large unit, a greater Syria or a Fertile Crescent union, that would stand menacingly on Saudi Arabia's borders. Iraq, with its radical regime and its Soviet connection, poses an ideological and possibly a military challenge. Hence the oil and wealth that give a country the means for regional leadership also make it a target. There is a fragility about Saudi Arabia, both in its internal order and in its position within the Arab world, that belies the widespread impression of impregnable power.

This perspective, for Western policy, dictates a close attention to the affairs of the Middle East and the Gulf in trying to cope with the consequences of oil power. Reliance on a "twin-pillar" structure for security in the Gulf – Iran and Saudi Arabia being the pillars – does not mean the United States can avoid responsibility. So closely is it involved in the affairs of both, so tied up with commitments express or implied, that it must know how to supplement policies which cater to the aims of those states with policies which help to limit their ambitions, temper their rivalry, and create a relatively stable equilibrium in the region. It is right not to attempt to fill the supposed power vacuum by introducing American forces, but the absence of military instruments puts a premium on effective political action.

That argument also brings us back, as do so many events of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

today's world, to the region's most dangerous threat to world peace, the conflict between the Arab states and Israel. This is the one question over which Saudi Arabia could be impelled to use its oil power against the West in ways that would be disastrous for all concerned, including Israel. It is by no means certain that an oil embargo would be applied exactly as in 1973 or at all.[5] But that it could be applied is one further reason for the United States to persevere in its efforts to bring about an Arab-Israeli settlement. Even without a new round of war, long delay in moving toward peace can bring increasing radicalization and anti-American policies in the Arab world.[6]

The prominence of the American role also has its troubling aspects. The major movers in the consumer-producer relationship, as we have seen, are the United States on the Western side and the major Gulf producers on the OPEC side. This prominence is manifest in the booming expansion of American goods, American arms, and the American presence in the Gulf region, and above all in the continuing special relationship with Saudi Arabia where an exclusively American company, Aramco, has become the Saudi government's partner, or agent, in the whole vast enterprise of the production and disposition of oil and gas. To many in Western Europe and Japan this looks like the building of an American empire, and not because they have been reading Soviet propaganda. Unless these countries, which after all are more dependent on Middle East oil than the United States is, can share in the essential partnership with Saudi Arabia and Iran, the risks will be higher both for the United States and for the future of the Western alliance.

VI

The present vulnerability of the United States and its Western allies, as their oil imports from the Middle East go onward and upward, has to be reduced. President Carter's energy proposals are the barest minimum for a sound American policy. We have at the very least to show that we are serious. That in itself will increase Western bargaining power. And the Saudis should not object, as it will relieve pressure on them to push up production indefinitely. They have the capacity, and even the concrete plan, to increase production to 16 million barrels per day by 1983. But will they?

[5] Joseph Szyliowicz and Bard O'Neill in "The Oil Weapon and American Foreign Policy," *Air University Review*, March–April 1977, pp. 42–52, adduce a number of reasons why it is less likely to be applied.

[6] See Fouad Ajami, "Between Cairo and Damascus, The Arab World and the New Stalemate," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976, pp. 444–61.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

And even if the necessary Western policies are all adopted and effectively followed through, we shall still have before us at least a decade before the results of conservation and the search for new sources of energy will change the fact of dependence on OPEC, and especially its Middle East members, for oil we cannot do without.

Producer-consumer relations, I have argued, rest on a situation of fragility on each side. The economies of the Western nations have no defense against denial of access to Middle East oil or to a crippling rise in its price. The oil producers on their side, are vulnerable internally, regionally, and internationally. There is an obvious conflict of power, but the constraints are real. The oil producers cannot push the industrial countries to the wall without doing great harm to themselves. The latter cannot use force to seize the oil wells, or economic warfare to bludgeon the producers into submission, without upsetting many applecarts including their own.

The key to protection of the Western economy in the coming years is to accept the fact of interdependence with the oil producers of the Middle East and to increase the stake which each side has in the satisfaction of the aspirations of the other. The policies which the U.S. government and American business concerns have followed, or into which they have drifted, have been sound because aimed in that general direction. The central consideration is that of mutual economic interest and interdependence. Protection of human rights is an issue on which American views can and should be made known to the world, whether they are being infringed in Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union or the United States. Piling up of weapons in the Middle East arsenals is another issue bound to concern us, and those who supply weapons in large quantities to Middle East states, which may eventually use them against their neighbors, may have reason to search their consciences. But neither of these issues bears directly on our vital interests, and overconcentration on them may adversely affect those interests.

In the future course of relations between those in the Middle East who have the oil and those in the industrial world who need it, there is a necessary bargaining process in which each side exerts power on the other, and the Western nations should not deceive themselves about the power of the oil producers. We have to plan on the basis of the continuing existence of OPEC. They can charge even more for their oil and probably will. But the challenge for all concerned goes well beyond the simple test of bargaining strength on the price of oil and the price of what the producers want in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exchange for their oil. It goes to the totality of mutual dependence. It goes also to the nature of relations of the oil-consuming nations among themselves, to what they do, for example, to shorten the period of their vulnerability and to share in an equitable way the high cost of energy present and future; and to the nature of relations within OPEC, and of Middle East politics, from which there is no escape.

The period of oil power in the hands of a few oil-exporting nations will not last indefinitely. The industrial nations will try to shorten it by an intensified search for alternative sources of energy. The physical limits of supply will gradually erode the material basis for the exercise of oil power, although raising the price can compensate for reduction of supply if the consumers have not succeeded in finding alternatives. But if this twilight of the oil era is but a brief moment in human history, it is going to seem a long, long time to those of this present generation who have to cope with its problems. There is nothing magic about the year 1985, and we are well on our way to it without having undertaken the drastic policies necessary if we are to think about energy independence, or even reduced dependence, by that date. Lethargy in energy policy puts all the greater burden on diplomacy and international action, on the maintenance of a partnership of producers and consumers that will carry the world through the oil age and beyond.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fritz Stern

THE GIANT FROM AFAR: VISIONS OF EUROPE FROM ALGIERS TO TOKYO

> We must not forget that the boiling heat of modern capitalistic culture is connected with the heedless consumption of natural resources, for which there are no substitutes.
>
> —Max Weber, 1906

That Western Europe is in a state of disarray has become a commonplace. The headlines proclaim it, the capital flight confirms it. After a generation of unprecedented prosperity and progress, the West European nations, though still remarkably strong, are encountering a network of difficulties that threatens them in various realms and that seems to defy known remedies.

As with every major historical change, the present disarray springs from a confluence of events. The economic order, so beneficent for so many years, had eroded even before 1973, but the Arab-Israeli war of that year, together with the oil embargo and the quadrupling of oil prices, brought to the Europeans a sudden realization of their vulnerability: their economic survival required Middle Eastern oil and their military survival American arms. The European nations discovered their double dependency, made worse by domestic enfeeblement and occasional wrangling abroad. Europe's combination of power and dependency is a rare phenomenon in history.

The Europeans are not alone in their new predicaments: all oil-importing countries face similar pressures and have to devise new means of paying for the more expensive fuel. Japan is the prime example of a country that responded to the oil crisis by greatly

---

Fritz Stern is Seth Low Professor of History at Columbia University and the author of *Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire* and other works.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

increasing its already strong exports. But Europe shared with many non-European countries yet another striking, debilitating factor of contemporary politics: the disappearance of the political giants of the postwar period and of the parties or movements that seemed to perpetuate their influence. Of the giants only Tito remains; de Gaulle, Adenauer, de Gasperi, Nehru, Nasser, and Ben-Gurion are dead. And with their disappearance and for many other reasons, the Gaullists have come to quarrel, the Italian Christian Democrats have come to grief, as have the Israeli Labor Party, the Indian Congress Party, and, to some extent, the Liberal Democrats in Japan. The great parties seem to have exhausted themselves or succumbed to the temptations of habitual power. In most parts of the world, economic problems have become sharper as political institutions have become weaker, and the two processes are intimately linked.

Europe's present weakness must be seen in historical perspective. For the better part of this century, Europe's position in the world has shrunk, but the decline has been so gradual and Europe's energy still so remarkable that it has not always been fully realized. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Europe lost its empire but quickly compensated for that loss by unprecedented economic gains—and in the process confounded Marxist critics. Now economic growth has come to falter, and Europe confronts intensified demands for the redistribution of wealth and power—at home and abroad. And with the redistribution of wealth comes a further diminution of European power. The very physiognomy of Europe is changing: in London, the Arab presence is highly visible; at Krupp or Fiat, less visibly, foreign states hold partial ownership.

Weakness has contradictory consequences: it can—and in the case of Europe, did—foster insularity. In the postwar era, even at the time of its great prosperity, the Europeans cherished what Andrew Shonfield so felicitously called "the illusion of privacy." The present disarray could reinforce that insularity and augment it by growing protectionism, but it might also force Europe to become still more involved with the outside world, and not only with the United States. True, European capital has flowed in unprecedented quantities to this country, but exports of the European Economic Community (EEC) to western Asia have jumped by 250 percent in the last three years. Under new conditions, Europe is rediscovering countries that once had claimed its great interest; until 1914, perhaps until 1939, the European countries had appeared in Asia and Africa as imperial masters or at least in a mood of arrogant superiority. The present encounter is taking place

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

under different auspices, indeed in a different world.

The outward thrust of Europe has been its characteristic achievement over the last five centuries. No other civilization has managed to shape the world in its apparent image, burden or bless others with its technology and thought, exploit, murder, nurture, and school other peoples and older civilizations. If we live in a global village, as the cliché has it, that is to a large extent a European achievement, or, put differently, a European creation completed by the North Americans. This partial Europeanization of the world is one of the momentous themes of history; in truth, it shaped Europe as much as it shaped the outside world. What a mixture of motives impelled generations of Europeans, often under horrendous conditions, to seek their destinies or fortunes in torrid and inhospitable places; how much the Europeans must have hidden even from themselves the economic element of their outward thrust, the obvious intent to enrich themselves, in order to have later generations believe that Hobson's and Lenin's narrow emphasis on this one factor could be taken as dogmatic revelation rather than as partial truth. The fact of Europe's expansion is instantly and universally visible; the multifarious causes behind it remain to be fully explored.

In the postwar era, roughly from 1948 to 1973, while the Europeans with more or less dispatch and grace withdrew from empire, the North Atlantic became the great highway for the exchange of people, ideas, innovations and goods. In the shadow of America, Europe receded geographically and recovered economically, but its involvement with the rest of the world had deeper roots and survived the initial shock of decolonization. Under the impact of the oil crisis and the mutual needs of the Europeans and the non-Europeans, the former will again have to become more conscious of the latter—or decline still further.

In the past, Europe's relations with North Africa and Asia have received less attention than its relations with Russia or America. But those relations are likely to assume new importance and their place in the contemporary world must be seen in their historical context. What in fact is left of Europe's presence abroad? What are the ties between ex-imperial and newly independent nations? How strong is the anti-imperialist sentiment among the once colonized peoples? Do these peoples distinguish between European and American influences or do they lump them together as "Western"? What do they want from Europe—and what do they expect? How do they view Europe, its culture and its politics, its present and its future? Or has Europe become irrelevant to them? How great is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the coincidence of views or interests within the Third World, and do they have a common attitude toward the ex-imperial powers? In the historic encounter, or collision, of cultures that marks today's world, what role do the non-Europeans envision for the Europeans? Is there a match between foreign expectations and Europe's outlook and probable performance? Or has the end of the old imperialism brought on a new and unprecedented isolationism, which would allow Europeans to maintain economic links but neglect the possibilities of a larger role?

With these and other questions I left Europe in February and embarked on a trip that lasted 14 weeks and took me from Algiers to Tokyo. I wanted to see Europe from afar, from countries that it had once dominated, from monuments that it had once built to its own glory. In all these countries I interviewed a wide range of people: government leaders, officials, journalists, academics, businessmen, casual acquaintances; and everywhere I found a ready, and for my purposes, gratifying concern with Europe. The history of Europe cut across all these countries.

My net was large, but not excessively fine. I hoped that my knowledge of Europe's past would help me to ferret out and understand contemporary facts that would in turn illuminate Europe's present state. I asked people about Europe, and their answers told me something about themselves and their self-perceptions as well. What follows, then, are first and tentative impressions, echoes of conversations, and occasional digressions, as, for example, about human rights in developing nations. Much of this may prove ephemeral, soon to be overtaken by events; that is the risk of addressing contemporary problems. The very fleetingness of impressions prompted this initial account.[1]

II

Algiers may be the ideal place to begin a journey out of Europe to Africa and Asia: it conjures up the imperial past and represents the militant post-colonial present. The struggle for Algerian independence was the most embittered of all colonial conflicts. In international forums, Algerians often lead the radical chorus of anti-colonial, anti-Western, anti-Israeli sentiment. Having won independence in years of extraordinary anguish, Algerians feel that they have a mission of leadership in the Third World. When the

[1] My travels in North Africa and Asia are part of a larger inquiry: the writing of a book on present-day Europe, with particular emphasis on Europe's destiny abroad. I am grateful to the Ford Foundation not only for supporting this study but for having provided me with all manner of indispensable assistance in the trip here discussed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Egyptians signed the first Sinai disengagement agreement, Boumedienne was angry. An Israeli capture of Cairo, indeed repeated Israeli occupations, would have been preferable to such an agreement. What we need, he said, was "*une guerre dure et qui dure*." The words were French, the thought was French, the stance was French. A high French diplomat and I talked of the Algerians' national arrogance and pride, and to my remark: "You taught them that," he replied after but a momentary annoyance: "You are right; they are now where we were in 1801, when we thought we had the proper prescription for Europe."

The rhetoric remains militant, even in private: the fury at the rich nations, the threat of wholesale terrorism against tourists in Africa if certain long-term demands are not met. But other and more significant themes predominate: in the development of Algeria, both its subterranean riches and its human potential, pragmatism is the order of the day. Expertise and trade are sought from everywhere. It is a pragmatism tempered by nationalism: the road signs, for so long in French, had just been painted over and replaced by Arabic signs, which some Algerians and most foreigners cannot read. A leading law professor explained to me the three stages of independence: political, economic, and cultural—the third, the end of Western tutelage, of the hegemony of Western newspapers and communications generally, would not come until the 1980s, but it was the most cherished goal of all.

Many of the Algerians I talked with alluded to their country's special role vis-à-vis the Third World. But their own potential richness, which is likely to be realized despite distortions and mismanagement, is at variance with the utter poverty of other African peoples. Their own violent quarrel with Morocco over the Sahara belies the notion of the unity of the Third World. The contrasts within the Third World are almost more striking than the differences between North and South; the accident of oil deposits makes one nation rich and its absence further impoverishes another. In the developed countries, wealth bespeaks effort, innovation, denial; not so in the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia, and the contempt with which Algerians and Egyptians talked of the Saudis was for me a new and surprising variation on the old prejudice against rich parvenus. The Third World exists—whenever it confronts the First; otherwise the rivalries and antagonisms within its camp are immense and explosive.

Unlike their neighbors in the Maghreb—to say nothing of the Egyptians—the Algerians had no great history before French colonization. Their history is the war of independence and their pas-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sion their independence. And in that passion they have one foreigner who serves as a heroic model: de Gaulle, who is alive and well and lives in Algiers. Algerians remember de Gaulle as the foe who understood them and who compelled his compatriots to accept the unacceptable, i.e., the independence of Algeria. (On the rest of my trip I was to discover how much of a mythical figure de Gaulle had become for the entire world and how often his example of moral authority is evoked. In death, it would seem, he vanquished Roosevelt and Churchill, who in life had thwarted his presumption.) Algerians have a Gaullist vision of politics: the dream of a certain grandeur mixed with an unsentimental, tough, even amoral, pragmatism. They remember his authoritarian leadership, and they cherish his vision of an independent France in an independent Europe: they see in him—wrongly, I think—a proponent of their nonalignment policy. A Gaullist Europe, they think, would be a Europe free of American predominance, and such a Europe would necessarily cultivate closer ties with the Arab and African world.

The more ideological elements in Algeria see Europe as an American satellite, with America, the military giant and political reactionary, stifling the "progressive," that is to say radically socialist elements in Europe. Their own dream is a free Europe, or at least a Mediterranean belt without any military bases. In short, some Algerians would like the Europeans to free themselves from American tutelage—while they themselves draw closer to America. The American presence in Algiers is steadily growing, often at the expense of the French; an Algerian professor observed that America is at once "so far and too close." At the moment the Algerians are expanding their commercial ties to the United States and to West Germany, not by choice but by necessity, and in part because the French, so I was told, still think of Algeria as a *chasse guardée,* as their own turf, and hence expect the Algerians still to give them preferential terms and treatment. The ties between Algeria and France remain very strong, even if their political relations have deteriorated sharply; the Algerians will continue to accept French preeminence in medicine, for example, or French *coopérants* in Algerian education, but in economic matters they will behave as rationally as any capitalistic country: they will buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market.

The physiognomy of Algiers remains French; at one time, it must have looked and felt like any French city on the Mediterranean. But the population of Algiers has tripled since independence, partly because of the influx from the countryside that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

swarmed into the abandoned French dwellings and partly as the result of a very high birth rate. The population of Algeria is a third that of France; last year the number of births in both countries was the same. To some Algerians, this suggests dynamism as opposed to decadence.

But there is a price to pay. Algiers today is run down, overcrowded and undercleaned, the drab result of individual neglect and state ownership. It is a kind of East European socialism—among palms. After the terrors of war, the Algerians have gone through a decade of belt-tightening in order to build up their industrial base. At the moment there seems some grumbling that after all these years of sacrifices, life is still so difficult. In February, an election had to be postponed because of unanticipated dissatisfactions.

Algeria's natural resources, on the other hand, are so great that it probably can afford its socialism and its wasteful ambitions—but its very resources make it anything but a model for the Third World. Its present difficulties underscore the need for pragmatism: the Algerians are ready to accept aid from all systems and will become less adventuresome in foreign affairs.

One last word about the Algerians: they suffered terrible, tangible hardships under the French; the benefits received were often intangible and indirect. Today's generation is not interested in drawing up a balance sheet of benefits and injuries. There is remarkably little actual resentment against the French. Habits and feelings seem to belie rhetoric. True, political relations with France are clouded right now; the teaching of French recedes. The Algerians complain that their compatriots working in France suffer from all kinds of discrimination and exploitation. Neither de Gaulle's hope that Algeria would become France's bridge to the Third World nor the Algerian hope that France would become its bridge to Europe is very much alive today. But the cultural and scientific links remain: *Le Monde* is read every afternoon; there is widespread hope that a left-wing government in France will show greater understanding of Algeria than Giscard's regime has. A high official of the Algerian Foreign Ministry told me that perhaps no two people know each other as intimately as do the Algerians and the French; they know each other's *pensées et arrière-pensées*. "We fought the system, never the French," he added. There are quarrels galore between the French and the Algerians; what is surprising—especially in light of the anti-imperialist crusade—is the residue of mutual regard and respect. Even each other's weaknesses are recognized as common traits.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III

To go from Algiers to Cairo is to go from an unrealized future to a great, declining past. In Algiers, people are cold but hopeful; in Cairo, I found them warm, hospitable and despondent. I arrived in Cairo a few weeks after the January food riots, riots that had spontaneously erupted after the government had imposed higher prices on essential foodstuffs. The police proved helpless—for whatever reason, perhaps even sneaking sympathy with the strikers; in the end the army had to be called in, and the ensuing violence and the immediate rescinding of the price rise attested to the government's weakness. It was a great shock to President Sadat, which he quickly and deceptively blamed on the communists.

The riots were the backdrop to rampant pessimism. Cairo's faltering services epitomize the difficulties of the Egyptian economy: strained beyond endurance, encumbered by incompetence. Cairo, too, has had its population more than doubled in recent years, while housing and services, far from expanding, deteriorate under neglect and wear. (I was told of a commuter, of below average height, who suddenly realized that he was going to suffocate in the underground train, and bit the hand of the person closest to him—who instantly pulled away; the person then hit the offender, but that was several life-saving breaths later.) The Egyptians need help; and the Saudis are keeping them on a short leash. The United States has also extended aid, and at Sadat's request Bonn has sent a former finance minister to be his personal economic adviser. The Egyptians I talked with saw little hope for improvement; one of them sighed that Alexandria used to be like Nice, Cairo like Paris, and soon the two are going to be like Bombay and Calcutta—and all of Egypt a Bangladesh. Elegiacal evocations of doom? Or a reflection of oppressive reality: 80 percent of a growing population are living on four percent of the land. Many Egyptians emigrate, and the most skilled lead the way to Canada or to the richer Arab states that can employ and reward their services. The rich in Egypt, on the other hand, are very rich—and very new; they have the most elaborate and expensive weddings in the Hilton. The discrepancy between affluent and poor nations is recreated, so to speak, in the life of most undeveloped countries.

The Egyptians are dependent on foreign help, as they have been frequently in their history. And how often one is reminded, physically and rhetorically, that this is indeed a great historic civilization.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asked about their relations with Europe—a subject that is close to their minds—Egyptians often responded with a discourse on Egypt's history. The Egyptians have several identities, and they can move easily from one to another: they can claim their Pharaonic descent, their old civilization that had first established a centralized state; they can identify themselves with the Arab world at large; or they can assert their Mediterranean identity, i.e., their belonging to a Mediterranean culture, linking Europe and North Africa, but especially Egypt, in a cultural entity.

I was in Cairo at the time of the most recent EEC-Arab dialogue; the Arabs wanted to talk politics, i.e., Israel, while the Europeans stuck to economic issues and cultural exchanges, such as the diffusion of European television. And still the Arabs, and most especially the Egyptians, want a European dialogue and feel that in time their relations with Europe will have to become stronger: history and geography dictate it, the present economic conjuncture compels it, and the Arabs *want* it.

In part they want it as a defense against America, the superpower, the pervasive presence, the smothering influence. In a way, Europe is a lesser and hence more acceptable America; technologically and culturally it is considered at once model and enemy, loved and hated, but in some ways it is commensurate with Egyptians or with Arabs generally. Educated Arabs have been to Europe, they know Europeans, their parents dealt with Europeans; the Europeans are a known quantity, in all their cupidity and culture. The Egyptians, like the Algerians, would like to have the Europeans detach themselves to some extent from the Americans, both for immediate tactical reasons, i.e., to enlist their support against Israel, and for more general, long-range purposes. As a leading Egyptian official and self-proclaimed inventor of the oil weapon said to me: "Arab oil is an inducement to the Europeans to pursue closer relations." Inducement is a euphemism for bribery or coercion, but the Arabs know that the Europeans need not only their oil, but their petrodollars, their immense markets, and, perhaps, their cheap labor. How can the Europeans resist?

The anti-American element in this Gaullist dream is unmistakable. It is an odd anti-Americanism that acknowledges American help, Kissinger's successful efforts at serving both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and American amiability as against European remoteness or *hauteur*. But there remains the boundless suspicion of American power, power that can compel the Europeans, power that could coerce the Egyptians in the form of "wheat colonialism," i.e., the imposition for political or retaliatory reasons of an em-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bargo on the export of wheat, which is indispensable to Egyptian survival. Better, then, the predatory powers of the past than the superpower of the present, whatever its beneficent record or pretense. This fear of America and the consequent attentiveness to Europe, which also includes a dash of second-hand European cultural snobbery vis-à-vis America, will survive, I believe, even the Arab-Israeli conflict; it will last as long as America is a superpower and it may become stronger if a left-wing Europe tries to pull closer to the Third World.

IV

Cairo and Jerusalem are 20 minutes direct by air or some eight hours via Athens, but even the longer journey does not prepare one for the difference. Cairo is a swarming, bustling metropolis, in some ways reminiscent of New York; Jerusalem has a haunting serenity, a small city, nurtured as an oasis by Mayor Teddy Kollek's sense of the beautiful and his grasp of the practical. Jerusalem is a city of faiths and conquests, of history that belongs to all the great religions of the world; it tells of change, and its present occupants see themselves in part as caretakers and they wish to excel in that role—which will earn them the further anger, not the approbation, of the dispossessed Arabs.

A beautiful and seemingly prosperous city, but underneath its calm the Israelis are somber. Theirs is a mood derived less, I felt, from the precariousness of Israel's external position, the pressures its people are exposed to, than from an internal malaise, at once tangible and intangible. Israel has pressing economic problems: a vast deficit, an unfavorable balance of trade, a galloping inflation, an unwillingness to accept the burden of austerity reflected in a succession of strikes that the government is unable to control, and a slowdown of the economy. And two danger signals: scandals and mounting emigration, the latter a subject that is perhaps the most painful to Israelis. The revelations of corruption were the equivalent shocks in Israel to the riots of Cairo. Israeli scholars talked of a generational crisis, of a social unrest that would take a long time to overcome.

The Jews of Europe settled Palestine; the Oriental Jews, refugees from neighboring Arab countries, now constitute a majority of the population. But East European Jewry still sets the dominant note in public life, and hence Europe has a special meaning for Israelis—quite aside from the tremendous importance for Israel of the EEC market. European anti-Semitism was the catalyst of Zionism: the dream of a homeland for oneself, of Zion redeemed, was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nurtured by decades of Czarist persecution and finally realized because of Hitler's attempted extermination of European Jewry. In the pre-Hitler period, the Zionist movement lived precariously by the material and political support of Western-assimilated Jewry. The conversion of a partial homeland into the autonomous state of Israel, duly recognized by all the powers of Europe, was made possible, indeed inevitable, by the aftermath of the holocaust; the conscience of the world found Israel a moral convenience, slighting for a moment the fact that from the Arabs' or Palestinians' point of view the easing of European consciences was done at their expense. Were they to expiate the blood that Europeans had so mercilessly spilled?

For some years, the relations between Israel and Europe were exceptionally close. But this changed in the aftermath of 1967, and even more radically during the oil crisis of 1973–1974, and subsequently. The oil embargo had taught the Europeans their vulnerability, and their initial response, led by the French, was to court the Arabs—and blame the Israelis. Europe has been a great disappointment to the Israelis—which they quickly explicated to themselves by a cynical reminder that the Europeans had ever been ready to sacrifice their Jews. The Israelis can understand the exigencies of survival; they can understand amoral selfishness. What pains them is that they think Europe's piecemeal submission to the Arabs is going to harm the Israelis without helping the Europeans. (I was told, for example, that the Dutch pay less for their oil than the overeager French.) And what outrages them is the moral posturing of the Europeans. The Israelis resent European lecturing on the wrongs of annexationism—as if the history of Europe had not been a record of competitive rapacity.

The Israelis, moreover, are astonished at what they deem to be universal hypocrisy at their expense. Thus, the efforts of some socialist parties in Europe to admit Arab socialist parties to the Second International appalled Israeli socialists: Could the Europeans really pretend that the Arab parties were democratic?

But the root of the matter is that the Israelis want unconditional support, while the Europeans have given conditional support to the Arabs. The gap between Israeli expectation and European performance is growing.

The Israelis recognize their isolation—and between present isolation and past persecution they tend to dismiss a little too readily the strictures from abroad as evidence of foreign failings (cravenness, oil expediency, reemergent anti-Semitism) rather than as utterances that may reflect sympathy or historically conditioned

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

apprehensions. Embattled groups easily succumb to thinking: who is not for me is against me, but imperviousness to criticism is probably a luxury that even great powers cannot afford. It is one of the ironies of the Israeli predicament that a people thought dominant in mass communications has in fact been losing the battle for public opinion. The Israelis are quick simultaneously to ignore criticism and to bank on a reservoir of goodwill among the peoples of Europe. But some criticism in Europe springs from the anguish of friends—and hence deserves Israeli scrutiny, not contemptuous dismissal.

But Europe still matters to the Israelis and matters desperately: isolated as they are, it is the only "neighbor" they have. There remains a kinship and there remains a cultural and scientific partnership; Europe is Israel's largest trading partner and the chief ally of Israel's sole ally. For reasons of sentiment and practical survival, Europe must remain a major element in Israel's future.

I asked a well-known Israeli general about his assessment of Europe, and his instant reply was that "Europe's main contribution today would be its own survival." He ended a long interview by calling NATO's defensive strategy a sin—only a superior power can afford such a strategy; inferior forces must plan an offensive defense in case of attack. The two statements together bespeak Israeli concern (which, as we will see, others share) that Europe has succumbed to prosperity, has become unwilling to take risks anymore, politically or militarily. Israelis acknowledge the same exception that other observers make; only the Germans are strong, with a will to defend themselves. It is an ironic acknowledgment, and the counterpart to a remark that Helmut Schmidt made to a Dutch industrialist, to the effect that the German army was the second best in the world—second only to the Israelis.

The Europeans continue to matter, but on the crucial issues of war, peace and security, they are marginal; most Israelis would say they have a negative impact, as nations which encourage Arab ambitions and which put pressure on America to put pressure on the Israelis. The Europeans matter in another way: their history and the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict are deeply and tragically interwoven. Both Arabs and Jews feel themselves to have been perpetual victims of history, exploited and oppressed by their former European masters, and their recollections of past injuries foster suspicions and fears that diminish their willingness to gamble on peace.

Almost my last interview was with a former Israeli general, who believed strongly in the possibilities of peace but wondered

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

whether any Israeli government could convince its people of the need for certain concessions: "Perhaps we need a de Gaulle, but none is in sight."

An Israeli de Gaulle: in some ways an enticing and not a totally improbable vision, nor one devoid of irony. But in the meantime, the mood is bleak—despite and perhaps because of all the optimism generated elsewhere.

v

"East of Suez" the British used to call the legendary region that stretched from the Arabian Peninsula to the eastern shore of the Indian Ocean and beyond. In times past, the British had a paramount role in that region; now it is a cluster of independent states, in the throes of uneven development, jealous of their independence and desirous of foreign know-how.

Most countries are developing, even the advanced ones, but there is a special rhythm and contortion to those countries that seek to make a sudden leap from traditional to industrial ways. Europe suffered the anguish of modernization, the painful adjustment to industrial capitalism. The Luddites in England, the strikes of *Germinal,* the sacrifices of early socialists—all these recall the horrors of dislocation and exploitation. But in our own time the pace is quicker, the trauma and the exhilaration of development even more extraordinary. The East—in our traditional perspective, a realm of mystery and meditation—has sprung to hectic life, and with incredible speed seems bent on erecting islands of modernity in its midst. One has to see Tehran or Singapore to understand the new pace.

Iran epitomizes the possibilities and the strains of change. Iran is rich, perhaps unimaginably rich; it has oil and gas and, recently discovered, vast reserves of copper. It is in the throes of a gold rush, and Tehran is a boom city—with all the attendant excitement, promise, and squalor. The wealth of Iran draws thousands, probably tens of thousands of foreigners to its midst: a motley group of technicians, salesmen, soldiers; most are adventurers after profit, and their restraints weaken as their appetites expand. West Europeans, Americans, Japanese, Russians, Indians and all the rest compete for profitable contracts; corruption is a much-lamented phenomenon of contemporary Iran (and elsewhere) and one that foreigners abet.

There are few regimes in the world that are as detested in Western eyes and especially in the Western press as Iran's. It has become a kind of Chile of the East. Perhaps it is the combination of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wealth and repression, of boundless military spending (strenuously solicited by the arms suppliers of the world) and human wretchedness that arouses such hatred. The most outrageous of all violations of human rights—torture—was once routinely exercised; critics of the regime, both Iranians and Westerners, told me that it had ceased to be an instrument of policy. Still, people think any deviation from the prescribed condemnation of the Shah's regime suspect.[2] Western consciousness seems unable or unwilling to grasp the other side of the Shah's regime, a side that his domestic critics acknowledge: the regime is trying to raise the conditions of the people; its reforms in landholding and its provisions for workers' share in industry have earned it the opprobrium of the Right, further deepened by the regime's disregard of fundamentalist religious objections to modernization. Talk to any foreign diplomat in Tehran or to many American experts who have had dealings with the Shah, and the impression conveyed is that of an enormously hard-working, brilliantly informed, shrewd statesman, perhaps the most serious ruler on a throne today. Some of his critics at home say that despite all his faults, he is indispensable; no better, viable alternative is imaginable. In his ambition to make Iran a modern society—not only in its military posture but in the opportunities supplied to its people—he reminds one of Kemal Atatürk, whose example in fact had inspired the Shah's father.

The Iranians have had a long history of contact with the Europeans, especially with the British and the French; their judgment of European capabilities is informed and consequential. As an economic presence, Germany today is preeminent among the European partners of Iran. Iran has, in fact, acquired a major interest in Krupp, a further tangible stake in European affairs.

I talked with one Iranian leader, whose perception of Europe was reluctantly gloomy. He saw Europe as a sick, permissive society, in which certain interest groups—the British labor unions, for example—had a stranglehold on government. Minorities rule, majorities suffer; is that democracy? Is there not a crisis of legitimacy in European governments? No doubt there is a self-serving aspect to such an observation, but it is a common one in the East, and one at times made more in sorrow than in anger. Europeans still have a tremendous concentration of technological, scientific know-how, but their power is inadequately deployed. Their defense effort is

[2] Is this revulsion perhaps nurtured from far more sinister quarters? A most fair-minded and well-informed British historian recently remarked that an organized press campaign against the Shah had been launched by that most notorious of fanatics and subverters, Colonel Qaddafi of Libya.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

risible. America has suffered great reverses as well; in its present mood would it honor its obligations, would it even defend its most immediate interests if defense implied a nuclear war?

Western weakness, however, was not set off against Soviet strength and aggressiveness. The picture of the U.S.S.R.—with which Iran has a border of 1,300 miles—was remarkably calm: the U.S.S.R. has such difficulties at home that it was unlikely to take military advantage of Western disarray. But the West's naive sentiments could offer the Soviets enticing possibilities. A Palestinian state, for example, as now advocated by some in the West, would be a Frankenstein monster that would bring instability to the entire Middle East. In this perspective, a Palestinian state would be a threat not so much to Israel (it could protect itself) as it would be to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, two countries that are as rich as they are vulnerable to subversion. A communist-infiltrated Kuwait or Saudi Arabia would alter the physiognomy of the Middle East and the oil economy of the world.

VI

I came to India during the electoral campaign—in time to witness that extraordinary tribute to Western forms of legitimacy, an election that would decide whether a British-style democracy could govern a subcontinent. It was a historic moment, and the Indians, their volubility previously curbed by Mrs. Gandhi's Emergency, now discussed politics with the greatest intensity. They saw the elections as a fundamental confrontation between the claims of authority and the elemental rights of the people. Mrs. Gandhi's supporters argued that the Emergency had been necessary to save India from economic collapse; some went further and questioned whether liberal democracy anywhere (including Europe) could cope with inflation and unemployment. Many a comfortable Indian and many a thoughtful Westerner agreed with Mrs. Gandhi's dictatorial response. On the other side, the opposition breathed outrage—at the indignities that the Emergency had brought about, at the corrupt Sanjay Gandhi's rise to power and at the brutality with which he and the government pursued the sterilization program.

Yet there had been little overt resistance to the Emergency—something that seems to have surprised everyone alike. One of my most moving interviews was with Romesh Thapar, the publisher of *Seminar,* who was appalled by the ease with which India had slipped into dictatorship, the rapidity with which friends had shunned him on the street, as he became known as the regime's enemy. The first

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

issue of *Seminar* after the Emergency had been temporarily lifted for the election—and at a time when no one could know whether it would not be reimposed if Mrs. Gandhi were to win—was devoted to European fascism and its ready acceptance in some European countries. The lesson was clear: Indians should harbor no false idea of immunity. Again, the history of Europe provides the political vocabulary of the present.

It would take extreme temerity to attempt even a discussion of the continued presence of Britain in India today. A few remarks must suffice: many Indians suggested that the very outrage against the Emergency attested Indians' attachment to British customs; others smiled at this all-too-intellectual explanation. But in a hundred ways—of which language is but the fundamental element—the British presence lingers on, and a few Indians expressed something akin to regret that the British had formally departed. On the other hand, I was told that when Mrs. Gandhi contemplated the Emergency, she had aides check into the possibility of abandoning the Westminster model and embracing a version of de Gaulle's constitution for the Fifth Republic. (Again the General remains a force and active myth.)

The Indians I talked with were very much aware of Britain's present malady, but without much *Schadenfreude*. They regret its decline, and some Indians blame it on British socialism, on which they themselves were largely nurtured. They are aware of the racial antagonism that Indian immigrants encounter in Britain—and it troubles them. For the rest, they have a remote sense of Europe's economic travails, but are far more impressed by Europe's unfathomable wealth, revealed by its scientific expertise and by its standard of living, especially as compared to India's poverty and mounting unemployment. Many Indians I talked with had a curiously naive faith in technology; as long as Europe had its technological superiority, it could solve all its problems.

The Indians have a— perhaps symptomatic—ambivalence about the modern world. On the one hand, they are immensely proud of their own scientific and technological achievements; in some fields, they successfully compete in export markets with the Europeans and the Americans. A German diplomat told me that Indian nuclear medicine was superior to Germany's. For the rest, they have an amazing adaptive skill that enables them to manufacture improved versions of foreign goods. In the belly of India there is a modern France, it has been said; in other words, about ten percent of the Indian population lives and works in the modern world. The rest live in conditions ranging from primitive privation to the pre-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

modern forms of rural survival. For them older traditions prevail. Seen in that perspective, India is a study in historical geology, with layers reaching into the remote past; India lives simultaneously in many centuries and amidst vast discrepancies.

The Indian elite, even more than the elites of other countries, tends to be educated abroad, and if they are not physically educated abroad, they are spiritually raised in another culture. The English near-monopoly on educating Indians has been broken, especially by America and in the technical and professional fields. Students return with strange reactions; as one journalist put it, from Lumumba University in Moscow they return as conservatives and from Harvard as "flaming radicals." In the old, imperial days, to become, in Macaulay's phrase, a "brown Englishman" was a badge of distinction; now it is the source of deep misgivings. One minister in Mrs. Gandhi's government recalled having been brought up in Indian schools on Shelley and Wordsworth, even though the two were irrelevant to Indian life; their laments about the bleakness of winter meant nothing to people to whom winter is the loveliest season. The theme recurred in many conversations: "The books on my shelf alienate me from my brothers and sisters," said a journalist, and the director of a training institute for administration put it succinctly: "My education is my alienation."

It is probably always galling to be dependent, but to be dependent on a civilization that you adjudge to be inadequate or spiritually inferior may be particularly galling. The Indians are ambivalent about the West and resent its indifference to them. They want to be understood, but "understanding" precludes criticism.[3] The Europeans, they think, understand them better than the Americans, who grate on Indians because of their "ostentatious affluence," their easy manner, their occasional swagger, their often-pretended lack of learning. The Indians still have a reservoir of fashionable Left Bank prejudices against the Americans, who, as one Indian gentleman put it to me, "are a phenomenon beyond our range." An Indian political scientist remarked of his compatriots: "The country they love is England, and the country they hanker after is the United States." Only the Punjabi, the buccaneer element in India, can appreciate the hustling American. Here, too, every American carries the burden of supreme power with him; Europeans invest; Americans dominate. With a moral insouciance that has

[3] At times, they have strange notions about the roots of being misunderstood. One Indian official, a close adviser to Mrs. Gandhi, quite abruptly exclaimed that the Indians had a bad image in the West because of their policy toward Israel (which, he said, had to be understood in light of the 70 million Muslims who live in India). Jews, he added, dominated the Western press and Western politics generally, and hence could calumniate India.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

driven many an American frantic, an Indian minister explained to me: "Anti-communism is boring."

But the Europeans do neglect India. Over the years the Soviet Union and the East European states have sent a steady stream of flattering missions. The West Europeans exude indifference—at the very time when the Indians crave to be recognized as the world's most populous democracy, as the most Western of the Third World countries, as a potential bridge between the First and the Third Worlds, between East and West. Some Indians were appalled by the term "industrial democracies," which Henry Kissinger had coined in order to expand the list of the virtuous beyond the West so as to include Japan—and perhaps inadvertently to exclude India.

I often asked people whether they saw any models of development in the world; the answer was no, but one Indian remarked to me: "Only India, China, and Japan know what problems are." It was in many ways an arrogant and perhaps, unconsciously, a "racist" statement: the white man is too rich, the black man too poor, to know what problems are. But one can readily acknowledge that India's problems and achievements are staggering and portentous.

VII

There is a range of East Asian states in which authoritarian, conservative governments are promoting profound economic and social transformations. These states, and most especially the countries belonging to the ASEAN bloc in Southeast Asia, have dynamic economies and fragile polities. East Asia is the fastest growing region of the world; as such it has intimate and expanding links with the industrial world.

The largest country of the region is Indonesia, and its huge potential wealth is the magnet that draws swarms of foreigners to its shores. Its recent history has been turbulent: the older generation remembers Dutch rule and Japanese occupation, followed by the anti-communist coup of the mid-1960s. The upheavals of the past strengthen the regime's determination to maintain independence and stability at all costs.

A prominent Indonesian statesman, now in retirement, remarked that from Indonesia Europe was remote, "alternately a ghost or an angel." The Dutch presence appears in both guises: the ghost of colonial rule is almost as pervasive as it is in Algeria. It begins of course with the language: "Our thinking is Dutch, even our English is Dutch in the sense that we think first in Dutch and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

then in English." The Dutch had been the funnel through which European ideas had entered Indonesia. Now Dutch is being rapidly replaced by English, and the days when Sukarno would lapse into Dutch at critical points in a Cabinet meeting are long forgotten. The Dutch influence on medicine and on the administrative and educational institutions persists. Nor are the Dutch heedless of their present responsibilities: they are returning some of the archaeological treasures that their scientists and settlers had collected and then shipped home to Holland; these tangible tokens of the spirit are not negligible. Holland's chairmanship of the intergovernmental agency for aid to Indonesia is a still more important contribution in Indonesian eyes. Holland, on the other hand, has been too weak to exert pressure in the EEC or elsewhere on behalf of its ex-colony, as the French and British have done for theirs, notably in the Lomé Convention.

The Indonesians I talked with seemed remarkably free of anti-Dutch sentiment; there was even some nostalgia for the good old days of Dutch rule. A Dutch diplomat praised the Indonesians' lack of resentment against the Dutch, which, he said, could serve as a model for the latter as regards their feelings toward the Germans. Not that relations between Holland and Indonesia have always been smooth since independence; they were embittered by the dispute over West Irian, and at present the fact that the Dutch Left has been critical of aid because of Indonesia's repressive regime has aroused concern. The Indonesians, I was told, are more sensitive to Dutch than to European criticism generally. The hold of former tutelage is peculiarly strong and lasting.

The Dutch are losing and their European partners are gaining ground in Indonesia. The Germans are in first place among the Europeans; the French, however, staged a most elaborate exhibition of their industrial and technological products. Like Iran, Indonesia is a battleground for commercial rivals from all over the world. The struggle for markets will be particularly intense in these few developing islands of wealth, where competition and corruption unfortunately go hand in hand.

Indonesia has a modern veneer, which stirs thoughts about how thin the modern layer is in most developing countries. The Jakarta skyscrapers are an anomaly: they obstruct one's view of what essentially remains a traditional world. One should remember that in the last century in, say, Britain or France the same partial and surface modernization took place; for a long time, the French peasant remained closer to his remote ancestor than to his Parisian or industrial contemporaries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Iranian fears of European enfeeblement were echoed in East Asia—and especially in Singapore—that booming city-state with its multiracial population, with its official ideology of a special brand of socialism and its reality of a special brand of capitalism, i.e., one that works. Singapore is the banking metropolis of the East and thus is exceptionally well versed in European affairs.

Its post-independence face has probably changed more drastically than that of any ex-colonial city in the world. Once a bastion of the Empire, it witnessed the ignominy of Britain's sudden collapse. Like the Shah of Iran, the long-time Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, has some fervent admirers among Western statesmen—and his fierce detractors. The Singapore leaders, keen observers of the world with which they trade, are also apprehensive about a Europe in disarray and an America in its post-Vietnam mood of retrenchment and withdrawal. In East Asia, too, Eurocommunism is regarded as a grave danger, even if few leaders would quite accept the Chinese position that the Italian or the French Communist Parties represent but a new form of Soviet expansionism and revisionism. Concerned Asians argue that Western defenses are precarious enough without having communists—with whatever ambiguity they must feel about a conflict between the superpowers—in seats of power.

There is a fierce and, no doubt, partially self-serving anti-communism among some developing nations; leaders there see liberal reformers as potential (or, as the Stalinists would say, "objective") communists; on the other hand, they have seen the reality of communist subversion. And the more they are afraid of radical unrest whether of the Qaddafi kind or of a less specific communist variety, the more they are worried about Europe, so strong in scientific achievement, so weak in its internal and external defenses. At times the worry is spiced with contempt: speaking of European deference to the Arabs on account of oil, a Singapore leader said: "For Europeans, the worst thing is to go without butter; for others, the worst thing is not to be able to eat for a second or third day." And for many Asian leaders there is the fear that a Europe further weakened or frightened could resort to protectionism, which would have the most deleterious consequences for East Asia.

Many of these countries have had direct or proximate experience of communist subversion; earlier they had the most painful experience of Japanese occupation. They are jealous of their independence. Afraid and relatively isolated, they have adopted repressive regimes; often enough, they fight terrorism with a preemptive terror of their own.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This is true of Indonesia and of Singapore, which was described to me as a "smiling dictatorship"; to opposition leaders in prison, the adjective may seem a travesty. It certainly is a cautious regime; the works of Mao are allowed in English, not in Chinese; Marxism-Leninism is not taught at the university. Even a prominent businessman *cum* diplomat had seen his son imprisoned as a dangerous radical; he thought the arrest a superzealous aberration in the necessary fight for stability.

As one discusses this problem in Indonesia and Singapore—and in Iran—the Carter Administration's concern for human rights hovers in the background; it will have—and already has had—a considerable impact in countries like Singapore and Indonesia. I could not avoid feeling that the concern should be accompanied by an informed solicitude about the special problems and achievements of the countries in question, and by a firmer demonstration of our concern for Third World economic conditions. Developing countries argue with some force that before human rights can be securely established, indigenous progress in other fields must be made, as was the case in Europe and America. More specifically, our often pious generalities about human rights need at the core a specific statement of the minimal conditions that we think should be universally binding—such as the abolition of torture. It is likely that by virtue of our new policy the prisons of our friends and dependents will become emptier and perhaps less brutal, while the prisons of our chief adversaries may become still more crowded and degraded.[4] The weak we can compel; the strong we affront.

VIII

I came to Japan in April, at a time when the Japanese had suddenly become conscious of their sharply deteriorating relations with Europe. For nearly a century before the Japanese surrendered to the Americans, the European influence in Japan had transformed that country. No country not of European stock had so completely adapted Western techniques—and to some extent, Western thought—as had the Japanese. The American occupation displaced the European hold and for the last 30 years America has been the preeminent presence; geographically much closer than Europe, it is also the guarantor of Japan's security. In those years, Europe became a remote, if important, trading partner; the principal connection for both Europe and Japan was America, but the

[4] These states may find that reducing the prison population can be functional. Various Indonesians remarked that "many more communists come out of detention camps than go in."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

connections *between* America's chief allies were weak. Trilateralism was an attempt to create a link that did not exist. America remains the hinge of the free world.

Japan suffered the Nixon shock of 1971 and the oil shock of 1973; both shocks made it more conscious of its vulnerabilities. Japan is totally dependent on Middle Eastern oil, even more than Western Europe. Shaken, Japan concentrated on what it could do best. The country that had audaciously exported cameras to Germany, watches to Switzerland, cars and TV's to America, ships to Britain, and textiles to all, now redoubled its efforts at exports—in order to earn in America and Europe the extra fare it had to pay in the Middle East. But the Japanese miracle threatened to boomerang; the industrial countries were unwilling to see Japan expand its exports at the expense of their own adverse balance of payments; this year the United States and the EEC are likely to run a deficit of $45 billion, while Japan is expected to earn a surplus.

Under pressure from abroad, and especially from the Europeans, the Japanese cut back. In unprecedented harshness, the EEC formally criticized Japanese commercial policies; the informal howl was even greater. The Japanese made some concessions and came to understand the fragility of the weakest European economies, such as Britain's and Italy's. They also understood the force of the European argument that Japan should divert some of its resources to building up its own infrastructure and cleaning up its own environment, physical and social.

But the Japanese resented the European clamor. Suddenly they thought that the Europeans were harking back to "the yellow peril," a slur that the Japanese are particularly sensitive to. They imagined that the world was again talking of the "ugly Japanese," and they minded the half-admiring, half-awed depiction that had suddenly become popular in the West—that of an island people tirelessly and a little unfairly working at Japan, Inc.

The Japanese rediscovered Europe at a moment of mutual anger; it was not an auspicious beginning to a new dialogue. The Japanese made what they thought were important concessions, both by cutting back on their exports and by easing the influx of European imports. They sponsored technical discussions and political conferences in order to build new bridges. But European grievances remain, as does Japan's capacity for exports. Even if restraints on exports to Europe continue, the competition in third markets will grow more intense. (The Europeans will also discover the full weight of competition from what have been called the mini-Japans, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Japanese are puzzled by this storm, perhaps more puzzled than they should be. They are not used to thinking of themselves as an economic giant, and the discrepancy between their achievement and their self-confidence remains extraordinarily great. It leads them to exaggerate European hostility; as one Japanese remarked, the Europeans would like our whole island to be submerged in the sea. It nurtures their own critical attitude toward the Europeans.

The Japanese have a nostalgia for European culture; they would like to reknit cultural ties that once were so close. But they are also exasperated by what they regard as Europe's decline into a museum of culture, into "an old men's home," whose inhabitants are content to live out their remaining days with whatever comfort they can find. They believe that the Europeans are morose, "dying spiritually and economically," unwilling to work, unwilling to compete or collaborate. Underneath the strictures remains the desire for good relations with Europe, for a better understanding with partners once considered inspiriting models.

The Japanese are uneasy about their economic future, worried about America's simultaneous retrenchment (the withdrawal from Korea) and renewed assertiveness (the veto on nuclear breeders). They are and feel isolated; America is remote and puzzling, Russia and China are close and ominous. The Europeans and the Americans may resort to ever greater crypto- or open protectionism, thus putting in jeopardy Japan's export markets. In East Asia, the Japanese still encounter residual resentment left over from the wartime days of the "co-prosperity sphere." Their own political structures are undergoing change, and they worry lest economic setbacks could tear their social fabric, as exemplified by the unique relations between industry and labor. In this mood of worried isolation, they wish to reach back to their own roots, to preserve and strengthen what is quintessentially Japanese in their culture.

IX

From afar, Europe is still perceived as a giant, if, to many observers, a wounded giant. It remains the world's principal market, with an immense capacity for technological and intellectual innovation that is a great potential resource to developing countries; its free, liberal institutions still hold and still retain their appeal. The very fact that the Nine have adopted common commercial codes, that they tend to speak with one voice in commercial matters, and with coordinated voices on political issues, gives Europe greater weight. In recent years, the Europeans have given

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more aid to the developing world than has the United States. The critics of Europe abroad—and there are many—do not doubt Europe's capacity; it is its political will and stability they question.

The legacy of European imperialism is far more ambiguous than official anti-imperialist rhetoric would lead one to expect. For the Europeans, it is at once an obstacle and an opportunity. Bitterness remains, but anti-imperialism as ideology may be stronger today in the lecture halls of Western universities than in the hearts of Indonesians or Indians. And as between Europe and the United States, it is the latter that is the focus of anti-imperialism today—however ironic that may seem when one recalls the record of U.S. pressures on Europe to decolonize.[5]

For the Europeans today, to find a proper stance and policy, both in private and official contacts, will not be an easy task. If the Europeans were to resume their habits of authority and arrogance, they would quickly reap a new harvest of hatred. But the past could become a bridge to a new future; there is a residue of mutual understanding that could become a striking asset in the world. A more balanced view of the imperial past might help to chart the proper course for the future. The Europeans committed atrocities in their empires, made easier by their conviction that these atrocites were visited on "lesser breeds." But there was more to imperialism than that, and the Europeans—and their American relations—would perhaps find their bearings today more easily if they had a more complicated sense of the past.

We live in a world without models; no nation today has the universal presumption that in earlier times power and ideological attractiveness conveyed. After 1945, the United States served as such a model, and thought of itself as playing that role. We lost our interest in that role and our self-confidence in the anguish of Vietnam and Watergate and in the revelations of injustice, corruption, waste and pollution in our own society. The U.S.S.R. lost its appeal a long time ago, and China is a model only for those observers who cherish the promise of equality and overlook the

[5] The other superpower suffers even more, I believe, from the worldwide suspicion of overwhelming power. Yet on my trip I found curiously little concern with the Soviet Union. As I encountered the occasional nostalgic note for the departed Europeans, I had to wonder whether, if the Soviets ever removed themselves from Eastern Europe, they would leave a similar legacy of benign memories.

The Russians play an important economic and military role in Algeria and India—in Egypt they were extruded—but their presence is a purely practical matter. The Soviet Union is nowhere regarded as a model. Repeatedly I heard that men trained in the U.S.S.R., while often returning with Soviet wives, had little liking for the Russian experience. An Indian journalist, aware of how important the Soviet Union was to India's foreign policy and economy, regretted that "since Kronstadt, the thugs have been in power." I found none who propounded a different view. Of East Europe, on the other hand, a good many people spoke more appreciatively.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reality of coercive uniformity. Nor have the developing nations found a model among themselves.

In such an eclectic and pragmatic world the Europeans, more accustomed to overseas roles than ourselves, may have a new role to play. There is today not only a universal search for economic betterment but for a kind of psychic and intellectual identity. People want the necessities of the modern era while retaining the values of their autonomous past. The Europeans will appear in the developing world as traders, perhaps as tutors of technology. But long acquaintance with formerly subject peoples may also give them a better appreciation of some of the spiritual longings that are astir today. They may develop that "understanding" which so many of the peoples of the world—or their educated leaders—seem to crave.

There is perhaps little reason to discriminate between European and American efforts in this endeavor—except one: the world distrusts superpowers. The Europeans have shrunk to the dimensions of some of their former dependencies; they are perceived to be less of a threat than the Americans. Put differently, the imperialism of the past causes less resentment today than the sway of American power.

Paradoxically, then, Europe's relative weakness may also be a source of strength. The Europeans may find that they have intangible as well as tangible assets in countries that for some time now they have neglected. If they do play a larger role in these countries—and there are some signs of that—they will be closely watched for signs of neo-imperialism by peoples jealous of their independence; in turn, the other powers, notably the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, will worry about too pronounced a European hold. Commercial rivalries in developing countries are bound to get much fiercer. The Europeans will encounter foreign criticism; in their cultural efforts they will be rebuffed by some indigenous groups. But a new European presence, larger in both material and cultural terms, is possible and would be consonant both with Europe's past and with the temper of the times. Despite and to some extent because of Europe's present disarray, its outward thrust is likely to grow stronger.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jahangir Amuzegar

A REQUIEM FOR THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFERENCE

In the early hours of June 3, 1977, the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) came to a battered and confused end—more than a hectic day behind its scheduled final ministerial meeting. An 18-month "dialogue" between the rich North and the poor South, which had begun with much enthusiasm and great hope in Paris, finished on a faint and joyless note. A hastily drafted, and uncommonly bland, report was presented for adoption to a glum and exhausted audience at the Conference's last plenary meeting.

The report, approved but unapplauded by the delegates, made a nostalgic reference in its stark preamble to the Conference's earlier resolve to create an "equitable and comprehensive program" for international economic cooperation.[1] It then proceeded to list, almost clinically, the issues and measures on which agreement had been reached as well as those which had failed to obtain a consensus. There were no ringing passages; no dramatic declarations; no grand design; not even much pious diplomatic platitude.

As could be expected, the reactions to the results of the Conference were mixed. While both sides made a feeble effort not to call their dialogue a failure, each insisted on having its own appraisal recorded separately in the final report. Thus, the "Group of 19" developing countries (which had come to Paris to implement the recommendations of the U.N. Seventh Special Session on Development and International Economic Cooperation) were visibly dejected; they found the CIEC's conclusions falling "short of the objectives envisaged for a comprehensive and equitable program of action" designed to create a new international economic order. They noted "with regret" that "most of the proposals for structural changes in the international economic system" and "certain proposals for urgent actions on pressing problems" had failed to receive the rich countries' support.

[1] *Communiqué of Meeting of Senior Officials* (CCEI-CP7), CIEC, Paris, July 10, 1976.

Jahangir Amuzegar is Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund and Iran's Ambassador-at-Large and Principal Resident Representative to the IMF and World Bank. He is the author of *Iran: An Economic Profile,* prepared for the Middle East Institute, and other works. The views expressed, especially in the concluding section, are those of the author personally.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The "Group of Eight" developed countries, in turn, "regretted" that the Conference had not found it possible to reach agreement on "some important areas of the dialogue such as certain aspects of energy cooperation." But they "welcomed" the cooperative spirit in which the Conference had taken place, and expressed their determination to maintain that "spirit" in their continued future dialogues with the Third World.

II

The principal areas of accord in the North-South dialogue are by now fully publicized. The Paris Conference produced—or, better, recorded—three concrete "bread and butter" results: first, the West undertook to contribute, subject to necessary legislative approval, one billion dollars in a Special Action Program to help meet the urgent needs of individual low-income countries "facing general problems of transfer of resources." This special aid (in which the U.S. share is to be $375 million, and the European Economic Community's contribution $385 million) is expected to be quickly transferable on highly concessional terms. Other participants, as well as other donors not represented at the Conference, are invited to make parallel contributions.

Second, the industrial nations agreed in principle to underwrite a "Common Fund" to finance buffer stocks for certain raw materials exported by the less-developed countries (LDCs). The new entity (whose specific purposes, objectives and provisions were left to be further negotiated in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) is to serve one of the main objectives of UNCTAD's Integrated Program for Commodities, i.e., protection of the LDCs against wild and disruptive fluctuations in commodity prices.

Third, the industrial donor countries pledged to increase their volume of official development assistance (ODA) "effectively and substantially" in real terms. The governments that had not yet accepted the U.N. target of 0.7 percent of GNP, as their annual aid figure, committed themselves to work toward that goal. Japan pledged to more than double its ODA over the next five years; Canada, in addition to canceling repayment of some of its existing loans, announced its intention to raise its annual contribution toward the 0.7 target. The U.S. delegation privately hinted that, Congress permitting, a doubling of bilateral and multilateral assistance within five years was their goal. On the record, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance promised to seek from the Congress "a substantial increase" in bilateral and multilateral aid programs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In effect, Western donors pledged to redouble their efforts to compensate for their past performance in relation to the ODA target. There was also general agreement that an increasing portion of official aid should be earmarked for the expansion of farm products in LDCs (with an annual growth target of four percent in food production); and that the minimum annual target for food aid of at least ten million tons of grain as recommended by the 1974 World Food Conference held in Rome (Resolution XVIII in U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 65/20) should be reached promptly.

In addition to these three concrete pledges (which the Group of 19 grudgingly accepted), CIEC also managed to reach a consensus on some other broad and less controversial issues in the agenda of each of the four commissions.

—In the Commission on *Energy,* the participants were able to agree on the importance of energy availability and supply "within a commercial sense" for world economic advancement; the depletable nature of oil and gas, and the urgency of transition from an oil-based energy mix to more permanent and renewable sources (whereby oil and gas would be reserved for non-energy uses); the need for conservation and increased efficiency of energy utilization; international cooperation in the energy field (e.g., improving access to energy-related technology, energy research and development, the diversification and development of energy resources in LDCs); and national action for the development of all forms of energy.

—On *raw materials and trade,* agreement was obtained on the principle of international cooperation in marketing and distribution of primary commodities; research and development and other measures to help natural products competing with synthetics; measures to assist LDCs to develop and diversify their indigenous natural resources; improving the Generalized System of Preferences system; and identifying areas for special and more favorable treatment for LDCs in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the so-called Tokyo Round still underway in Geneva.

—In the area of *development,* the Conference had a meeting of minds on stressing assistance for infrastructural development in the Third World—particularly in Africa; several aspects of the industrialization of LDCs contained in the Lima Declaration (including an increased share of the developing countries

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in total world trade in manufactures); implementation of relevant UNCTAD resolutions on the transfer of technology; some broad food and agricultural issues such as full implementation of the 22 resolutions adopted by the 1974 World Food Conference; and the need for other financial flows (e.g., World Bank loans and its "third window" assistance, International Development Association replenishments, the funding of the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and contributions to the U.N. Development Program).

—In the field of *money and finance,* consensus was reached on a number of non-controversial aspects of private foreign investment; LDCs' access to capital markets; and cooperation among developing countries.

These easy and somewhat innocuous accords were, however, outweighed and overshadowed by clear disagreements on most of the main and substantial issues that were confronting the Conference.

—On *energy,* for example, the gut issue of the relationship between the price of oil and its supply by OPEC members remained totally unresolved. The major oil exporters insisted on basing oil prices on "replacement costs," which President Carter had alluded to in his energy program; but the Group of Eight was not willing to accept this principle. Nor was there agreement on the maintenance of the purchasing power of oil export earnings; protection of the accumulated revenues and foreign investments of the OPEC members; financial assistance to bridge the external payments problems of oil-importing nations; and, most significantly, a new mechanism for continued discussion of energy problems between major oil exporters and consumers.

—On *raw materials and trade,* UNCTAD's Integrated Program for Commodities—approved at Nairobi in the spring of 1976—and the establishment of the six-billion-dollar Common Fund, which the LDCs considered an integral part of the "new international economic order," were largely sidestepped; the maintenance of the purchasing power of primary commodities exported by the LDCs (i.e., indexation) did not receive the necessary support of the industrial nations; measures relating to the LDCs' interests in world shipping rates and trade representation on commodity exchanges failed to obtain the rich

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries' backing; some issues related to compensatory financing, local processing, and diversification were hopelessly deadlocked; the matter of control over the production of synthetics met a complete impasse; the LDCs failed to obtain "differential and more favorable" treatment for their exports to the North, and therefore refused to grant "unimpaired" access by the industrial countries to their raw materials.

—On *development,* the negotiations stalled over the demand by some "most seriously affected" countries for an immediate and generalized debt relief; procedures for initiating a dialogue on debt reorganization; access by LDCs to Western markets for manufactured and semi-manufactured products; assistance measures for the industrialization of the Third World; and a code of conduct for "transnational" corporations.

—On *financial affairs,* no agreed text could be produced on measures against inflation; no special treatment could be devised to protect the financial assets of oil-exporting developing countries; and disagreement continued on some crucial aspects of foreign direct investments (e.g., the criteria for compensation in case of nationalization; the transferability of income and capital from the host country; and the jurisdiction and standards for the settlement of investment disputes).

III

An objective evaluation of CIEC's final report and its annexes is not easy. The judgment would be different depending on one's time horizon and magnitude of expectations from such a "planetary bargain."

Given the complex and deeply rooted character of the problems faced by CIEC—problems which had been in the making for decades, if not centuries—the results were not perhaps totally unexpected. Compared to the pre-CIEC situation in 1974 and 1975—where the international economic community was badly wracked by discord, and engulfed in mutual distrust, bitterness and frustrations—the Paris Conference was a relief, if not a breakthrough. Furthermore, the dialogue spotlighted the largely unrecognized, or cavalierly ignored, inequities and imbalances prevailing among nations since World War II and before.

The Conference helped focus world attention on the disparities

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of wealth and growing income gaps between the rich North and the poor South. The policymakers of the affluent nations received a thorough education in the mounting economic and educational needs of the Third World. The poor countries, in turn, began to realize that their legitimate hopes for catching up with their affluent neighbors could not materialize through simple formulae; nor could they be fulfilled by the sheer "political will" of the negotiators on the other side. The very fact also that neither side wished to call the Conference a failure, and that some modest advances could be identified in a number of limited but significant areas, clearly demonstrated that both sides saw a "modicum of progress" in their global bargain. From a long-term viewpoint, the salutary effects and conciliating implications of the Conference were thus wide-ranging and significant.

Yet, in the context of a "new world economic order," and measured against the Third World's aspirations, ambitions and needs, the CIEC's results were clearly minuscule. The issues on which agreement was reached by the long, slow-moving, and at times exasperating dialogue were indeed isolated, peripheral, and largely non-controversial. The few positive gestures shown by the Group of Eight were, in the assessment of the Group of 19, no match for the magnitude of the distressingly wide chasm existing between the rich and poor.[2] The developing country delegates who had come to Paris with the expectation of finding in a short time some durable solutions to their long-standing problems of development aid, raw materials export, and debts were clearly disappointed. Baffled and discouraged also were the industrial country representatives who had worked hard, and offered certain modest last-minute concessions in the expectation of obtaining certain pledges from LDCs in the areas of energy prices and supply, private foreign investment security, access to raw materials, and inflation.

Against the backdrop of these expectations on both sides, no historical watershed was certainly reached in Paris. No breakthroughs were achieved on the deadlocked issues. The "old" international economic order remained virtually as it was—with no

[2] Technically, even the Group of Eight's dollars-and-cents pledges on aid, the Common Fund, and the Special Action Program were not really the direct outcome of CIEC bargaining. All three, while not unrelated to the pressures by the LDCs during the 18-month dialogue, had already been announced by the North prior to the final ministerial meeting. In development aid, the Conference produced no substantive further "concessions" to the Third World beyond what had been announced by the summit conference of Western leaders in May 1977. In monetary matters too, CIEC did not go much beyond the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund's Interim Committee in April 1977. Or even beyond the endorsements of the Committee's Manila meeting in September 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

radical changes yet in the relationships between the developing and the developed nations.

The most obvious, and at the same time intriguing, questions that immediately emerge are: Why did CIEC not reach its principal objectives through its long and arduous negotiations? What went wrong? Who was to blame? How could the dialogue possibly have been conducted better to produce more concrete results?

It would be easy (and fundamentally correct) to side with the Group of 19 developing countries in attributing the Conference's unsuccessful negotiations to the lack of a meaningful "spirit of cooperation" and the absence of the necessary "political will" on the part of industrialized countries.[3] It would also be convenient (and not much wide of the mark) to sympathize with the Group of Eight's contention that the conferees needed "realism as well as good will" to cope with the scourges of world poverty, disease and hunger; and that a "just and equitable" international economic system could not be created in a short time, nor "without many painful adjustments, accommodations and sacrifices" by both the rich and the poor.[4]

Yet, in retrospect, any full evaluation of the dialogue's inability to come forth with more meaningful, more enduring, and more acceptable solutions must go beyond these general observations. To be sure, stronger "political will" and a more positive attitude on the part of the North, coupled with a keener sense of realism and a sharper accommodating spirit by the South, could have taken CIEC beyond the point it reached on June 3. But the Conference's lackluster performance could not be blamed totally on these unfavorable factors.

On closer examination, CIEC's paltry results can be traced to several critical flaws. First, there were some seemingly unbridgeable gaps in fundamental concepts, assumptions and interests between the two sides. Second, there were widely different and altogether too many expectations. Third, there were miscalculations of bargaining power and errors of strategy by both groups. Fourth, there was inadequate administrative direction and support given to the Conference's process of negotiations. And, finally, there was poor timing and bad luck. Much of what follows will concentrate on these shortcomings. But first a word about the Conference's chronological chain of events.

[3] *Statement of the Nineteen Developing Countries participating in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation,* Paris, May 5, 1977; and *Statement of Mr. M. Perez Guerrero on behalf of the Group of Nineteen Developing Countries participating in CIEC,* May 31, 1977.

[4] British Foreign Secretary David Owen, Speech at the Ministerial Meeting of CIEC, May 30, 1977; and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Address to CIEC, May 30, 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IV

The North-South dialogue began as a response to a proposal made in October 1974 by the French President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, to convene an international conference on energy among the members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, the industrial countries and the non-oil developing nations. To prepare the agenda for the Conference, a tripartite meeting was held in Paris in April 1975 among a small but representative group of countries.[5] However, this meeting failed to produce any agreement because the industrialized countries, led by the United States, wanted the dialogue to concentrate exclusively on energy problems while the Third World representatives, at OPEC's insistence, asked for a much broader agenda. The OPEC summit meeting in Algiers in March 1975 had welcomed Giscard's invitation on the condition that the Conference's agenda include the overall issues of raw materials and development rather than energy alone.

In the crucial months that followed, growing clamor by the LDCs within the United Nations led to the adoption by the Seventh Special Session in September 1975 of the Resolution on Development and International Economic Cooperation (Res. 3362-S-VII). By then the United States especially had moved to a more forthcoming position, expressed in Secretary Kissinger's address to the Special Session (delivered by Ambassador Moynihan—who then participated fully and usefully in framing the resolution).

Spurred by this resolution, the preparatory group reassembled in October 1975. The delegates from the industrial countries (with notable exceptions on some issues) were still mainly interested in the matters relating to energy supply and availability; they reluctantly and at best halfheartedly approached the discussion of raw materials and development; and they showed strong resistance to debating monetary and financial questions (on the ground that these issues fell within the jurisdiction of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). The interests of the OPEC participants and those of the other LDCs were, by contrast, in favor of negotiating on a comprehensive package of agreements.

The preparatory participants finally proposed certain guidelines for the convening of a 27-member conference, 19 from LDCs and eight from the developed countries.[6] They recommended that the

[5] These were the delegates from the European Economic Community, the United States and Japan plus those of Algeria, Brazil, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Zaïre.

[6] The Group of 19 consisted of Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaïre, Zambia. The Group of Eight included Australia, Canada, EEC (as one unit), Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conference should have two co-chairmen, one from the industrial and another from the developing countries. Four commissions were set up on energy, raw materials, development and financial affairs—each with 15 members (ten representing the South and five from the North) and two co-chairmen. An agenda for each commission was proposed in very broad and flexible terms so as to leave sufficient room for maneuvering. Since agreements on specifics remained unattainable, the conflicts between the motives and interests of the delegates in the objectives of each commission—real and substantial though they were—were artfully dodged, or diplomatically papered over. In the name of cooperation, and under the convenient guise of not "prejudging" any relevant issue, it was finally agreed that "any delegation may raise any subject relevant to the themes of the dialogue for discussion in the commission."[7]

On the basis of this tenuous and ambivalent compromise, the first ministerial meeting of the Conference was held in Paris in December 1975. The final communiqué of the 27 member-participants announced the ministers' decision to initiate an "intensified international dialogue" through the four commissions within the framework of the guidelines proposed by the final preparatory meeting. However, the ministerial meeting of December 1975 and further meetings of the two co-chairmen of the Conference and eight co-chairmen of the commissions in January 1976 failed to reach agreement on the specific areas of discussion in each commission, or on integrating the two lists of topics submitted, one by the United States and the other by the Group of 19, into a single document.[8]

Between the ministerial meeting of December 1975 and July 1976, the four designated commissions held five sessions of approximately ten days each where participants submitted and discussed position papers on the various items of the "agenda." In this "analytical phase" of the Conference (which coincided with the convening of the inconclusive UNCTAD IV in Nairobi) very little progress was achieved. Twice, in April and in June 1976, the Group of 19 issued statements expressing dissatisfaction with the Conference's slow pace, and disappointment with UNCTAD's limited results. Indeed, the Group of 19 maintained throughout the Conference that while they had offered "coherent, sound and realistic" proposals for negotiation, the Group of Eight produced no "bind-

[7] *Final Declaration of the Preparatory Meeting for the Conference on International Economic Cooperation* (Doc. RPII/12) CIEC, Paris, October 16, 1975.

[8] The U.S. list is Doc. RP II/11, CIEC, Paris, October 13, 1975, and the list of the Group of 19 is CCEI-CP, CIEC, Paris, January 26, 1976. The latter is based on the February 1975 "Manila Declaration and Program of Action" of the Group of 77.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing" papers and made few counterproposals.

Meeting on July 8–10, 1976, to take stock of the dialogue's progress and to give guidance to its further work, senior officials concluded that the second phase should be "action-oriented," and that the commissions should formulate "concrete proposals for action" to be submitted to the forthcoming ministerial meeting. But they themselves were still unable to agree on the specific areas of negotiation in any of the commissions. Nor did the commissions later succeed in drawing up their own timetables and priorities.

After extensive consultations by the Conference's co-chairmen, the commissions finally adopted a "Program of Work" in September 1976. The Group of 19 presented detailed papers on all major items in the work program, and left the choice of negotiations on any and all of them to the Group of Eight. The latter, however, was not able to agree among its members on a suitable package. Little progress was thus achieved in the ensuing three months except on a few subsidiary issues. Consequently, the ministerial meeting of December 1976 had to be postponed, and the commissions adjourned until April 1977.

Negotiations were resumed by contact groups between April 28 and May 14, 1977 (coinciding with the Western summit meeting). But, again, very little was agreed upon. The senior officials met once more on May 26–28 with the idea of drafting common texts on agreed proposals as well as identifying areas of impasse. A report of a limited nature was prepared on non-controversial issues; but almost all questions of substance were referred to the ministers for action. In the final meeting from May 31 to June 3, the ministers did an enormous amount of hard bargaining. But the positions had become too crusty to be softened by those last-minute deliberations. Here is why.

V

Conceptual differences between the two sides were by far the most inhibiting single set of factors responsible for CIEC's limited concrete results.

The Group of 19, emboldened by the sweeping (but still unimplemented) resolutions of the United Nations' Sixth Special Session of April 1974, wanted to negotiate on the whole range of international economic relationships in order to establish a new international economic order. Some of the industrial countries (and particularly the United States), however, harbored no particular affection for any such new order. The U.S. delegation (down to the last three days of the Conference) saw neither a need nor a purpose in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

such an order, and avoided its mention. In Secretary Vance's address to the closing ministerial meeting, there was a fleeting reference to the need for "a new international economic system" characterized by equity, growth, and justice. But the salient features of the new system and its modus operandi were not detailed.

Caught in the midst of this ideological tug-of-war between the supporters and the opponents of the status quo, the new international economic order was never defined within CIEC. For the purpose of identification, however, three distinct concepts, based on the proceedings of the Seventh Special Session, could be noted. At one end, there was the "radical" concept which attributed the present world malaise to some deep-rooted "structural imbalances," i.e., a lopsided (and disadvantageous) interdependence between the Third World and the North. Under this "asymmetrical" interdependence among "unequal partners," the bulk of value-added in world production, processing and marketing is supposed to go to the developed world, and only a small fraction to the developing nations. This trading disadvantage is presumably compounded by the arbitrary and inequitable operation of the international monetary system. The new world order must thus result from a complete institutional overhaul of the existing system. Such a bold and integral restructuring is to give the Third World a long-denied opportunity to enjoy "equal development" alongside the industrial countries—to cease being an appendage of the "West." Equal development opportunity, in turn, calls for a new and radically different long-term development strategy that rejects the "Western paradigm" and the integration into the "Western system." The major emphasis is placed on "self-reliance," i.e., on the restructuring of the domestic economy in order to create an agricultural basis for industry and modern services. In the short run, however, the strategy calls for significant pressures to be put on the industrial countries for meaningful and substantial concessions.[9]

At the other end of the spectrum, there was the "conservative" concept, which rejected the idea of a new order as unrealistic or impractical, but was willing to allow enough concessions to the developing world to satisfy their most urgent demands. According to this basic concept, the present order is to be improved gradually, in a step-by-step fashion, and on a "case-by-case" basis to bring about needed marginal adjustments. This concept offers LDCs a

[9] For an avowedly partisan account of this thesis see Geoffrey Barraclough, "The Haves and the Have-Nots," *The New York Review of Books,* May 13, 1976. For part of his thesis, Mr. Barraclough receives support from Professor W. Arthur Lewis, *Some Aspects of Economic Development,* London: Panther House, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

new "deal" instead of a new "order." And the deal consists of a marginal patchwork—the poor call it "incremental gadgetry"—on the *existing* system to compensate for some of the system's most glaring disadvantages. The conservative argument is that the salvation of the Third World lies, not in a "flight into worldwide bureaucratic *dirigism*," but in improving and strengthening the functioning of the existing free market and free trade system. The idea is to make the existing market system serve the world better instead of changing the world to create a new system.[10]

In between these two concepts was the "moderate" thesis which envisioned a clear need for some changes in the pattern of North-South economic relations, and for the establishment of a "more just and workable" world economic order. But such a new order, while rejecting "spheres of influence" and recognizing "greater respect for the equal rights of all members," focused its main emphasis on the "growing interdependence" between the North and South. The "moderate" approach calls for the creation of a "mutual survival pact" in which access by the developed countries to energy and other raw materials in the Third World is to be matched by the developing countries' access to Western markets, technology, management skills, and investment capital. The "new order" is to give the South also a fairer share of world income and a greater voice in international institutions.[11]

VI

The positions of the CIEC participants in the North-South dialogue reflected more or less the differences in these three concepts. The United States, Germany and Japan among the developed countries, up until the last phase of the Conference, behaved as though they believed the existing order was basically sound, and at worst only temporarily out of kilter. The "deficiencies" of the system to which the South made constant reference were aberrations that could be corrected by mutual accommodations. Underlying this attitude were certain key assumptions—that the developing countries were intricately dependent on Northern prosperity (and, by implication, generosity); that the LDCs' progress (and, by implication, salvation) was essentially a matter of their own domestic

[10] For a glimpse of this position see the assessment of the U.N. Seventh Special Session in *The Washington Post*, September 17, 1975, and *The New York Times*, September 19, 1975. For the verbatim report of the Seventh Special Session see U.N. Doc. A/PV 2326-2349.

[11] For various presentations of this basic thesis, see *A Turning Point in North-South Economic Relations*, New York: Trilateral Commission, 1974; *New Structures for Economic Interdependence*, Rensselaerville, New York: Institute of Man and Science, 1975; *The New International Economic Order*, Dutch National Advisory Council for Economic Cooperation, 1975; Jan Tinbergen, *Reshaping International Order*, New York: Dutton, 1976; and *Toward a New International Economic Order*, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy and responsibility; and that the external balance-of-payments problems of these countries could be helped only marginally by foreign assistance, mostly in the form of loans and private investments. In an even more "conservative" variant of these basic assumptions, the world consists of a number of divided and adversary camps in which only those who possess advanced technology have the power and possibility to call the shots. Since "no lasting challenge" to the existing order can be mobilized by the LDCs (because of their politico-economic impotence), helping the eternally poor or the technologically disadvantaged camps is a matter essentially of charity and not self-interest—a question of moral virtue and not one of obligation.[12]

By contrast, some of the smaller and more progressive countries in the Group of Eight (Holland, the Scandinavian countries, and Canada) had some irresistible sympathy for the other side on such issues as debt relief and increased official assistance.

Most of the developing countries' delegates started off with the assumption that their inherent weaknesses in technological know-how, industrial production, and military strength were the results of the Northern "head start" in a market system that had stacked the cards against them. They believed that market deficiencies were not temporary aberrations, but reflected structural shortcomings in the North-South relationship. They argued that Northern prosperity was dependent on a mutually beneficial trade relationship; and that the "trickle-down" theory had its counterpart in "pumping-up" possibilities. While admitting that an increasing proportion of their needs must be met by their own efforts, many among the LDCs accused the North of being guilty of past "exploitation" and continuing "discrimination." They regarded their own efforts as too meager to meet their basic growth requirements, and did not see the needed economic progress as possible without massive transfers of real wealth—through both aid and trade. In a word, they rejected the notion of technological power as the mainstay of world economic supremacy, and the inevitability of an adversary relationship as the foundation of international politics. To them, power rested in the final analysis just as much on the size of population and the possession of raw materials as on accumulated wealth and advanced technology.

These differences in assumptions and attitudes naturally produced widely different expectations. The Group of Eight confidently counted on obtaining worthwhile concessions from the

[12] For a critique of this last thesis, see Guy F. Erb, *Beyond Dependency: The Developing World Speaks Out*, Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1975.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LDCs in return for each privilege granted or assistance pledged. As part of this quid pro quo, key Northern countries intended and hoped to obtain LDCs' devotion to a market ideology, or at least to receive their gratitude, friendship, and alliance. The more idealistic in this camp wished also to press for internal reforms in the aid-receiving countries (human rights' observance, redistributive equity, anticorruption measures, population control, balanced growth, domestic self-help, etc.).[13]

More specifically, and in the context of CIEC, the North hoped, first and foremost, to get the other side's approval for setting up a new consultative forum on energy. Ostensibly, the idea was to conduct regular talks between oil-rich and oil-poor countries; but the intention of using the new forum as a counterweight to OPEC was too evident. Although such a purpose was emphatically denied by the Northern representatives, the energy dialogue was expected to make the oil issue one of international concern, and to put OPEC members in a "moral straitjacket" to moderate their future oil price decisions. In exchange for its pledge of assistance and cooperation, the North also hoped to obtain the LDCs' agreement on the principles of international arbitration for the settlement of investment disputes, as well as prompt and adequate compensation for its assets in the event of nationalization. Furthermore, some delegates in the Group of Eight, in line with their basic assumptions and interests, expected to be able to get some fresh "piece of the action" for their multinational private corporations in the area of world resources development.

The list of LDC expectations was understandably much longer. In general, they were asking for larger transfers of real resources; stable and remunerative prices for raw materials and agricultural goods; "generalized preferences" for their manufactured exports to the markets of industrial countries, and a bigger voice in the management of international financial institutions. The more advanced among them wanted a more rapid transfer of technology in their favor. The poorest asked for better loan terms, debt relief and debt reorganization. Some, in the words of a *New York Times* correspondent, "were grappling with global dreams and trying to set well-being, dignity and equity down in dollars and cents."

More specifically and within the purview of the dialogue, the moderate majority in the Group of 19 had an 11-point list of specific preferences. They called for the full adoption of UNCTAD's

[13] See R. L. Rothstein, "A Different Table for America's Third World Policy," *The New York Times*, January 27, 1977; and P. G. Peterson, "Helping Others—and Ourselves," *The New York Times*, May 13, 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Integrated Program for Commodities; energy conservation, energy development and energy finance; protection of the purchasing power of export earnings and assets; debt relief and reorganization; the adoption by the Group of Eight of the 0.7 percent ODA target by a specific date; access to capital markets of the developed world; infrastructural development particularly in Africa; full implementation of the Lima Declaration and Plan of Action (calling for increasing the percentage share of LDCs to at least 25 percent of total world industrial production by the year 2000); increased food production in LDCs, food security, and food aid; transfer of technology through private foreign investment under a code of "good citizenship" for the multinational companies; and international financial and monetary reforms (e.g., increases in IMF and World Bank resources, new allocations of Special Drawings Rights, and greater access by LDCs to these resources).

VII

Apart from the differences in concepts, assumptions and expectations, certain miscalculations of power on both sides, and some serious shortcomings in the negotiating process itself further militated against CIEC's success.

An overestimation by each group of its negotiating power was unmistakably one of the major reasons for the failure of the CIEC participants to reach affordable compromises on many agenda items. Throughout the negotiations, neither group wished to realize that its collective bargaining clout added up, ironically enough, to *less* than the sum total of each member's individual force. In other words, internal conflicts in each group badly reduced its total strength. And yet, while neither the Eight nor the 19 was a single homogeneous bloc, they both acted as though they were.

The Group of Eight, reflecting their previously contrasting positions during the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations, again had no shared views on energy, commodity agreements, debt relief or aid. Strong differences existed even within the European Economic Community. As the Conference moved from the speechmaking stage to hard bargaining, it became apparent that the industrial countries had no agreed common line or unified plan to respond to the Third World. On most issues, all that the Group of Eight could muster were some tactically improvised reactions—mostly negative—to the LDCs' demands. Despite their sharply conflicting interests, however, the Eight tried to throw their collective weight around. Assuming (erroneously) that together they had all the trump cards (productive capacity, advanced technology,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military strength and wealth), they steadfastly resisted the other side's pressures to compromise on any major issue. But their divergent (and poorly camouflaged) interests encouraged the 19 to remain adamant.

The developing countries, too, despite differences of interest (on such issues as the Common Fund, debt moratorium, price indexation, foreign private investment, seabed exploration, inflation, and monetary reforms) considered their solidarity with the oil-producers as an invincible force. They put too much faith in their collective action to rally world public opinion to their side. They counted inordinately on the North's presumed "guilty conscience" over past "exploitations," and relied too heavily on OPEC's power to exact concessions for them all. But the glue that helped them maintain a solid front was rather thin. OPEC members who were originally responsible for having all matters of interest to LDCs included in the North-South dialogue had, in the meantime, lost much of their clout due to continued recession in the industrial countries, and also because of some internal disagreements on oil pricing. At the same time the heterogeneity of national interests in the group as a whole remained unmanageable. Frequently, the open manifestation of these conflicts (not only in corridor talks but also in various position papers) betrayed the collective invincibility on which they had staked their rights; it also invited the North to maintain its intransigence.

To the miscalculations of bargaining power must be added some particular flaws in the negotiation process itself. To begin with, there were incompatible differences between the two groups in their bargaining strategies. The North's plan was to move fast on the Energy Commission, and maintain a holding position on other issues, particularly on monetary reforms. On energy itself, the essential tactic of the Eight was to emphasize access to supply; resist all overtures on oil indexation; stress, instead, the need for international consultation on oil pricing; and lure the non-oil developing countries to their side by promising them both controlled oil prices and cooperation for the development of new sources of energy. The fallback positions were to go slow on non-energy matters; pitch every concession, no matter how minimal, against a matching gain; and play a guessing game to the very end.[14]

By contrast, the strategy of the Group of 19 was to hammer out a whole "package" of agreements, and not to accept the other side's separate or incremental offers. Since the interests of the Group

[14] *The New York Times* candidly reported that the strategy of the Group of Eight vis-à-vis the LDCs was "to talk them to death." (September 19, 1975.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

varied, and the possibility of a split in the ranks was always present, they decided that unless they stood firm in getting something for everyone, they might end up getting nothing for anyone. A dominant thread running through the Group's thinking was the importance of solidarity at all costs. They were thus willing to trade off some partial short-run gains for a more comprehensive and lasting success.

The result of these implacable strategies was predictable: a long frustrating standstill. In many areas of negotiation, effective bargaining was thus largely preempted because the minimum demands of one party were more than the maximum concessions the other party was prepared to make. The "overlapping zone" was disappointingly limited.

The second handicap in the negotiation process was mutual mistrust. The Group of 19, rightly or wrongly, always suspected the true motives of the other side. They were never fully convinced that the Eight had any real intention of conducting a serious dialogue on anything but energy. They saw, for example, the American proposal for an "International Resources Bank" as another exploitative scheme by private U.S. companies to increase output of raw materials and drive down prices for the benefit of the North. They read into the North's refusal to discuss commodity agreements except on a "case-by-case" basis a clever ploy to pitch one Southern group against another. In short, they suspected that the other side wanted to use CIEC as a means of causing a split in the LDCs by highlighting differences between oil and non-oil countries, and to drive a wedge between some countries within OPEC itself. The North's delaying tactics and evasive behavior reinforced the 19's lingering suspicion that the other side was carefully and insidiously trying to prolong the Conference in order to underscore these conflicts.[15] The members of the Group of Eight, in turn going through a "crisis of confidence" in their own solidarity, were always wary of too close an association with the other side because they saw their lack of unanimity on major issues as a golden opportunity for exploitation by the 19.

The CIEC negotiators were in another uniquely inauspicious bargaining situation. Not only did they suspect each other's motives—which is normal in any bilateral negotiation—they lacked proper information about the limits of the other side's capability for making concessions, or altering demands. In domestic labor-

[15] The LDCs' suspicion was reinforced, rather unexpectedly, by the leak of an alleged U.S. State Department cablegram to the Group of Eight—advising them to concentrate on intensifying Third World restraints on the major oil exporters. (*The New York Times*, December 14, 1976.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

management negotiations, the size of corporate profits, the strength and elasticity of consumer demand, the union's strike fund and other such pertinent information is usually known to both sides. The "overlapping zone" is thus extensive enough for bargaining maneuvers. In CIEC, the negotiators were largely in the dark regarding each other's possibilities and tolerances. Thus, despite the "intelligence work," second-guessing, and poker playing that go with any bargaining process, CIEC participants had to do a lot of mind reading as well.

Finally, a most effective impediment to reaching a compromise turned out to be one of the noblest and least offensive "rules of procedures" adopted by the Conference, namely the "principle of consensus." According to this rule, decisions and recommendations of the commissions and the Conference were to be deemed approved when "no member delegation" had made "any objection." The strict observance of this principle by the co-chairmen of the four commissions meant, in effect, that any delegate from any country—whether or not directly involved in, or strongly affected by, a particular issue—could block the adoption of an important section or a paragraph, even through a largely editorial or language objection.

VIII

Poor timing, inadequate organization, and ineffective leadership were further responsible for blunting the Conference's progress.

By an unhappy coincidence, CIEC began its work at a most inopportune time. While the multitude of complex and diverse questions on the Conference's agenda would, in all probability, not have been wholly resolved in any other equal length of time, the dialogue's 18-month time frame coincided with certain inauspicious circumstances. First, for most of its time, CIEC faced the longest and the most damaging postwar recession in the industrial countries—making it difficult for them to accommodate the Third World's most persistent demands: increased aid and liberalization of trade. Second, in its first half, the Conference was overshadowed by four impending and uncertain national elections in Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States—making it impossible for the incumbent administrations to offer any credible long-term commitments. Third, throughout its existence, the dialogue encountered difficult and precarious political situations in the United Kingdom, France, Spain and even to some extent in Australia and Canada—keeping these countries from decisive moves on any crucial issue. And finally, the expectation of a change in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. Administration and the aftermath of the November elections turned the last half of the Conference's time into a period of agonizing and largely unfulfilled expectations.

The dialogue's hard luck in timing was aggravated also by inadequate headquarters support. The Conference's initiators, bent on taking "politics" out of the Secretariat, gave the latter "an exclusively administrative and technical function." The result was a bevy of exceedingly elaborate and unnecessarily detailed proposals tabled for discussion by individual delegates. There was virtually no sifting, analyzing, coordinating, and putting together of the many position papers for real negotiations. Instead, the Secretariat, not being able to obtain the reactions of the Group of Eight to any substantive issue, became a gigantic copying machine and a documents-distribution center—with no say on the number, quality, or relevance of the papers being circulated. A small professional secretariat, staffed by some bright men and women, could greatly have helped the co-chairmen of the Conference and the commissions to properly channel, and efficiently conduct, the business of the day. It might also have saved a great deal of wasted time and misdirected energy.

Lack of effective leadership and direction, both at the political and administrative levels, was another CIEC handicap. For reasons that cannot be rationally explained fully, it became an article of faith for all delegates soon after the beginning of the dialogue that without the United States' active interest, strong leadership, and enthusiastic hard work, the Conference's success was doomed. The European Economic Community and Japan seemed unwilling to offer any concessions to the 19 unless theirs were matched by the Americans. The other members of the Group of Eight, too, had no real alternative but to follow their bigger partners.

But the United States, beset at first by some ill-concealed philosophical and personality conflicts within its administration, and later preoccupied with election campaigns (and unsure of the continuity of its incumbent leadership) was in no position to exercise any such dynamic and effective leadership. The change in administration after the November elections made it impossible for the outgoing team to decide unsettled policy options before January 20, 1977.

While work resumed in April and May 1977 at the level of technicians and contact groups, real progress continued to be limited partly because of the timing of the CIEC sessions in relation to the forthcoming Western summit meeting in London on May 7-8, and partly due to the insufficiency of time for the Carter Ad-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ministration to come up with some attractive new proposals. Secretary Vance and his team tried to reassert leadership in the third and final phase of the Conference by taking a conciliatory and cooperative posture toward the Third World. But time ran out on them.

The Group of 19 had its own leadership vacuum. It had a larger membership than the other group; it represented a much wider constituency, i.e., the Group of 77; and it reflected a much greater heterogeneity in geographical size, population, stage of technological advancement, access to external markets, domestic political regimes, special affiliations with the industrial countries, and possibilities for rapid economic development. For these reasons, the Group was unable to follow any country's undisputed or permanent lead, although its solidarity remained astonishingly unaffected to the very end.[16]

The absence of a strong voice, capable of integrating the separate interests of the Group into a negotiable mold and bringing recalcitrant delegates into line, resulted in a good deal of time spent on rhetoric. It also gave a misbegotten opportunity to some young and passionate firebrands to lock their country's position into an irreversible gear, and to induce the other side to take an equally intransigent line. The time and talent that could have been mobilized by a strong leadership in search of possible compromises and solutions were, instead, used on prolonged and exhausting verbal gymnastics.

IX

What now?

As most delegates agreed, the North-South dialogue neither began nor ended in Paris. CIEC was the end of a beginning—the first step in a long and arduous journey to (one still hopes) a more peaceful, more prosperous, and more equitable future for all.

The Conference's 18-month try came to an expected end, but without much of the expected results. The alternatives now are to go back to square one, i.e., confrontation, or to continue the dialogue. A rational choice must obviously favor the second option. Confrontation would be dangerous, destructive and wasteful; cooperation could result in mutual benefits. The costs of pursuing a global collision course may be different for each side, but neither side is likely to emerge as a clear winner.

Despite its unmourned demise, CIEC's raison d'être is as valid

[16] It was, after all, the Foreign Minister of Jamaica—an energy-deficient, small island country—who, at the closing plenary meeting of the Conference, defended OPEC's position and priorities with great eloquence and unmistakable sincerity.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

today as it was in 1974 when it was conceived. World destiny is no less interdependent; the planet earth no less finite; the objective of a fully employed and inflation-free world for the troubled North still stubbornly elusive; and the goal of a just and equitable new life for the volcanic South still distressingly distant. Structural disequilibria in payments balances, the growing tendency toward neo-protectionism, grim energy prospects, commodity price gyrations, and the intolerable debt burdens for some LDCs still remorselessly threaten the fragile fabric of the existing order. The question is whether the establishment of a new order should be facilitated through cooperation or force-fed by confrontation.

Professor Leontieff's report on *The Future of the World Economy* issued by the United Nations in October 1976, provides a forthright and candid testimony to the truly herculean efforts needed to close the income disparity between the world's rich and poor. Vividly and clearly, the report reaffirms previous findings that (a) even the six percent growth target set by the International Development Strategy for the Second U.N. Development Decade will not be sufficient to narrow this disparity by the year 2000; (b) the principal limits to sustained economic growth in the world are social, political and institutional in character rather than physical; and (c) faster development by the Third World (compared to growth rates in the industrial countries) in the rest of this century will depend not only upon domestic socioeconomic reforms, but also upon significant changes in North-South relationships as perceived by the U.N. Declaration on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order.[17]

Thanks to the CIEC experience and the lessons learned from its critical inadequacies, the ground is now better than ever prepared for a serious pursuit of further consultations and cooperation between the North and South. Thanks also to some in-depth discussions of unresolved issues, the community of interest between the two groups has become too evident for leaders on either side to underestimate or ignore. But the mutual long-term advantages of such ongoing dialogues may not yet be understood and appreciated by the public at large.

A big hurdle now is the skeptical, if not indifferent, attitude of the electorate in Western democracies—an electorate which mistakenly equates North-South economic cooperation with its own immediate economic "sacrifices" in terms of jobs, incomes and standards of living. This attitude is, in turn, reinforced by a small but influential segment of the press and the public in the North

[17] See Jahangir Amuzegar, "The North-South Dialogue," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1976, p. 552.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

along two basic lines: first, by portraying the dialogues between North and South as an effort to change the rules by which "the wealth of the world is distributed"; and second, by depicting conciliation and compromise by the industrial countries as a sign of political timidity, economic weakness, and military incapacitation.

The first step toward finding a new basis for further fruitful dialogues is thus a change in public attitudes. The electorate in the affluent part of the world must be convinced that the present pattern of international economics is still based fundamentally on a system of colonial relationships with unequal partnership between the haves and the have-nots; that the North's growth and prosperity through its freedoms and initiatives are becoming increasingly dependent upon the resources of the Third World (so that its responsibility for the latter's growth and prosperity assumes new dimensions); that "human rights" embrace not only the right to free speech, assembly, and political association, but also the right to a decent life free from desperation, despair, disease, ignorance and idleness; that the North-South economic injustices and inequalities are as much a threat to global peace and prosperity as the East-West political conflicts; and that a more efficient use of world resources (and a larger all-around world production through a more effective transfer of technology) would make it possible for *everyone* to have more out of a larger pie instead of dividing a given pie into smaller pieces. In short, the public in the rich countries should be helped to realize that the achievement of fairer economic relationships with the Third World for the rest of this century is no less an act of enlightened self-interest than the Marshall Plan was for the United States in the immediate postwar period. The North might as well make a virtue out of necessity.

An equally significant obstacle to successful North-South negotiations is the (understandable) impatience of the masses in the Third World for an immediate improvement in their living and working conditions. Long suppressed aspirations and genuine frustrations resulting from past international dialogues (within UNCTAD and elsewhere) have made the public in the developing countries highly disillusioned. They want action. And their persistent demands are becoming increasingly difficult for their leaders to resist.

Of crucial importance to the progress of future talks between the North and South is, therefore, a proper understanding and appreciation of the process of change by the people in the LDCs. The public in the Third World must be helped to realize that age-old global injustices and inequities cannot be redressed in a few weeks

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or a few months. They ought to be convinced that a continued dialogue with the industrial countries is the safest and most assured – if not the most efficient or fastest – mechanism for building a better and healthier world.

X

Whether one likes it or not, mankind is now rowing a large, fragile and uneven boat. Those who are relatively more comfortably placed than others are obviously not interested in rocking it. But this short-sighted preference for stability over equity may end up giving them neither. The fatal flaw in unshared affluence is its tendency to sow the seeds of its own decay.

A continued dialogue between the industrial countries and the developing nations is thus a matter of global welfare, if not survival. An appropriate and convenient forum for such a dialogue is surely within the United Nations. Yet, in order for the United Nations to facilitate this task, there is need for a new, CIEC-type body or council. For the present extensive configuration of the U.N. agencies, satellites, and affiliates still lacks an effective mechanism for a "planetary bargain" at a high political level. General and special assemblies of the United Nations itself are too large and too unwieldy to accommodate meaningful give and take. Furthermore, the participants in the United Nations assemblies are, as a rule, foreign ministers and career diplomats who possess broad political vision, but do not usually carry the key to their nation's treasuries. By contrast, the annual meetings of the specialized and affiliated agencies are crowded with "technical" ministers and professional staff who generally take a rather parochial view of world problems related to their specialty. Even the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (and their Interim and Development Committees), which deal with broader world economic issues are generally governed by finance ministers and central bankers who are by law and nature primarily concerned with their country's fiscal accountability and *economic* strength. They shy away from sociopolitical issues.

What is missing, and badly needed, is a relatively *small* but sufficiently *representative* standing "council" of top officials from both the developed and the developing countries who could engage in a truly global, politico-economic dialogue. The membership of this mixed body, as in the case of CIEC, need not be limited to any one species, but could include ministers of foreign affairs, finance, development, or trade, as well as central bank governors, and others of similar rank, at the discretion of the member govern-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments. The task of the council would be to negotiate a whole range of economic relationships between the North and South—at the political level—and to issue recommendations to specialized agencies. The responsibility for translating political compromises into action, devising specific schemes and administering them would rest with existing agencies and institutions. The council would have no operational or technical functions, and would address itself only to broad political decisions. Occasional summit meetings between the heads of state of the council members might be held to crown the council's achievements, or to give it fresh direction.

Future dialogues in such a council need not necessarily have to produce a detailed blueprint of a brand new system. Rather, they could be expected to set in motion an effective machinery to cope with outstanding and emerging conflicts and contentions. The *new order* that may emanate from these dialogues might not favor sweeping changes at once, but would be receptive to evolving circumstances, and responsive to the challenge of new conditions.

The establishment of such an order, however, requires a far stonger political will, a greater cooperative spirit, more profound mutual trust, better negotiating skills, more vigorous leadership, and more stark realism than were shown in CIEC. It would probably also require much less exaggerated expectations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Frank Gibney

THE RIPPLE EFFECT IN KOREA

> I believe it will be possible to withdraw our ground forces from South Korea on a phased basis over a time span to be determined after consultation with both South Korea and Japan. At the same time, it should be made clear to the South Korean government that its internal oppression is repugnant to our people and undermines the support for our commitment there.
>
> —Jimmy Carter, June 23, 1976

When President Carter made this statement, he was still very much a candidate. He repeated it in the course of his campaign and had obviously given it a great deal of thought. Early this spring, after informing (if not quite "consulting") the governments of South Korea and Japan, he announced the phased withdrawal as one of the first major foreign policy moves in his Administration.

On its face the withdrawal is a prudent one. It will be staged over a five-year period for the laudable purpose of getting American troops out of an exposed overseas position. Given the general and persisting American disenchantment after Vietnam, a pullout from Korea would seem logical and necessary. After 30 years of American troops manning its borders, one might say, it is time for a nation to start defending itself. President Park Chung Hee's government, in addition, is objectionable to most Americans. Park has crudely abused the freedoms of many Koreans and persecuted and jailed leaders of the political opposition. Of late his regime's monumentally ham-handed attempts to win friends and influence Congressmen in Washington have had wide notoriety in the American press. So a pullout of troops, well-advertised, should be a good warning to him and his men.

Frank Gibney has lived in Japan off and on for many years and has visited South Korea frequently since 1950. He is the author of *Japan: The Fragile Superpower* and other works, and is currently Vice President of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At that, the troops to be withdrawn are only the 27,000 combat soldiers of the Second Infantry Division. Air Force and logistics units will remain. The armed forces of the Republic of Korea, 625,000 strong, are generally competent and well trained, larger than the communist armies of Kim Il Sung, the North Korean dictator, which oppose them on the truce-line border. If the South Koreans lack quantities of modern weapons—notably tanks and aircraft—these can be supplied in the form of new American equipment. And Administration spokesmen pointed out at the time of the announcement that the pace of the withdrawal could be slowed or even stopped if a threat of war seemed imminent. As *The New York Times* said in an approving editorial: "So the South Koreans will begin to kick their American habit . . . . But it won't be cold turkey . . . . " Any announced withdrawal of troops, it is argued, means an automatic lessening of tensions in an area—another sign, doubtless, that the bad days of the cold war are forever past.

So runs the persuasive logic of what we might call "The View from Here"—or at least, from Washington; and it is a perspective that many Americans would seem to share. But is the logic and rationality of this pullout announcement only superficial? Does it raise more questions than it settles? Does it, in fact, disturb a precarious *political* equilibrium far more than it solves a problem in military disposition? Even granting our national concern for human rights, now a policy matter, and a correct desire to cut foreign involvements where we can, are there not larger issues at stake here, which transcend the maintenance of one U.S. division across the invasion route north of Seoul?

I believe there are. We should consider them. We should consider Korea's position and its history. We should consider the Korean economic—and, yes—social achievement of the past 15 years, which makes it possibly the world's most striking case of an underdeveloped country working hard and making good. We should consider also the ripple effect of a round, shiny pebble from Washington suddenly tossed into a still Asian pond, causing undulations far beyond the point of impact. No one expects that the North Korean Army will now begin gassing up its tanks, prepared to head for the border tomorrow or the next day or the next year. But for a variety of reasons, the announcement of a new American pullout has increased tension instead of alleviating it. It has disturbed a balance of power which, however curious and offhand in its construction, has hitherto been quite secure in this area. That is "The View from There"—the view from Asia, where, in this case, the action is.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

II

Let us start with an obvious parallel. In Western Europe the United States maintains some 300,000 troops because we believe they are a necessary shield against Soviet pressure. The Seventh Army forces are tactical troops. The basis for their commitment is that the presence of American units in the immediate path of any incursion, able to defend in force, would presumably bring on war with the United States. Even though the Soviet Union, our adversary-partner in détente and arms control negotiations, has shown a sophisticated awareness of war risk and demonstrated a desire to avoid it, the presence of U.S. troops, on the ground and ready, is regarded in Washington as the only sure guarantor of the European status quo.

A mere token force we would regard as inadequate. There is a matter of public commitment and European morale, as we Americans sense it. There are the Germans to be considered. There is NATO. There is, we believe, the integrity of all Western Europe at stake.

In Korea, the total American troop commitment is little more than one-tenth of the American divisions in Europe. Yet, there has been almost a complete consensus about their value to the security of Asia as a whole. The people of South Korea, as the party most intimately affected, want American combat troops stationed north of Seoul, the vital, bursting capital of seven million people only 30 miles from the North Korean border. This goes for opposition partisans as well as government spokesmen. Koreans are disturbed as a people, not merely as a regime, by the pullout announcement, and in the light of past history, intensely worried by its implications.

The Japanese have always wanted an American presence in South Korea to continue, as a safeguard both against North Korean aggression, which they see as possible, and against rash political behavior on the border or within it, by the South Korean government of Park Chung Hee. If the American presence is withdrawn, the Japanese might have to think about backing up the Koreans militarily themselves. This they would be reluctant to do—Japan's military forces are small and under constant fire politically, even with their present limited defense missions. And the Koreans, still recalling vividly past Japanese rule and oppression, would surely be even more reluctant to permit it. Thus there arises the worst possible specter in the calculations of Japanese defense experts—a Republic of Korea worried, isolated and truculent enough to produce nuclear armaments on its own, the nonproliferation treaty notwithstanding. That is the one development

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that would surely drive Japan to do the same.

The same extrapolation may have been made in Peking, which may partially account for several significant invitations to Japanese Self-Defense Force officials to visit Peking in recent months, where they have been entertained most handsomely by the same bureaucracy that not so many years ago was denouncing Japanese militarist revanchist tendencies. Peking has been quite happy about the presence of the Second Division and nervous at its announced withdrawal. Concern about Kim Il Sung, the unpredictable Stalinist dictator of North Korea, is a prime factor. After oscillating between Peking and Moscow for many years, Kim has, since the death of Mao Tse-tung, tended to favor the Soviet Union. To the Chinese, who are almost paranoid on the subject of the Soviet threat, any removal of the American presence is a temptation to their old Russian allies to break the peace.

It does not follow, however, that the Russians are pleased by the prospect of an American withdrawal in Korea. On the contrary, the Soviet Union, as a veteran Japanese Russia-watcher put it, has been "not at all unhappy" over the continued presence of American troops. In an area where Russian and Chinese influence has been so closely balanced, an active American presence in Korea has kept the whole precarious house of cards in place. The Russians were certainly satisfied. One Korean War was enough for everybody and if there is anything the Brezhnev regime dislikes it is surprises. There have been notably few cries of joy in the Moscow press about the American withdrawal.

The only voice in favor of the American pullout in Korea comes from the North Korean regime in Pyongyang—whose proven irrationality is what the American military presence was supposed to nullify. Surely this is an odd situation. It is one thing to intervene where only a few oppose intervention or to pull out when many advise a pullout. In Korea we are announcing a removal of our presence from the one spot—in the invasion corridor north of Seoul—where all the Asian neighbors of Korea, not to mention other Asian countries farther south, wish us to remain.

III

It is true that the withdrawal is a "phased" one. This spring's announcement fell short of the original crisp intention set forth in President Carter's campaign, and since then it has been decided that only 6,000 men will be withdrawn in 1978; two combat brigades and the Second Division headquarters will not leave till 1981–82. Moreover, since the announcement was first made, explanation has followed upon explanation that the "military balance" will

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be kept up by additional tanks, aircraft and other useful staples for President Park's army. A program of two billion dollars worth of arms deliveries, mostly through sales, has been put before Congress. Looking at the world from Washington, one might wonder what the fuss was all about.

Perhaps in concrete military terms President Carter's advisors are right. But, of course, the problem is only secondarily a military one. Primarily it is political. It is not so much a question of military capability, to use the old Pentagon phrase, as it is a matter of political intention, of national will.

Here Asia is suspicious of us. It is ironic that a country whose dealings with Europe show generally constant consultation and feedback has shown in its Asian diplomacy a spasmodic jump-in and pull-back syndrome, a gross parody of Toynbee's classic challenge and response. Only months before the original North Korean invasion in 1950, both Dean Acheson and Douglas MacArthur, those antipodal spokesmen for U.S. policy, had omitted the Republic of Korea when stating the perimeter of American responsibility. Yet, we wondered why Stalin let his Korean surrogate Kim Il Sung make the quick armored gamble. After so many years of commitment to the engagement in Vietnam—our own voluntary re-creation of Athens' disastrous Sicilian expedition—the final American withdrawal in 1973, and then the debacle in 1975, had the shock of both the unexpected and the irresponsible. Before that an Administration led by the man who made his reputation abetting Senator Joseph McCarthy's persecution of, among others, the courageous American diplomats who had called it right on China, signaled its new relationship with the People's Republic of China by crudely bypassing its closest Asian ally, Japan, on the way to Peking. And the 1970s decade opened with the Nixon "shocks" visited on Japan and Korea in the form of sudden trade embargo threats, the hallmark of an economic adversary diplomacy. Although economic peace, with Japan at least, was declared during the Ford Administration, the image of the unpredictable American remained green.

Thus, however calm and reasoned the planning for the Carter pullback from Korea had been, to Asians the announcement was the thing. Here, at a vital point of potential trouble, the U.S. government was saying: no change in the commitment, just a few infantry troops taken out so the South Koreans can assume their own defense. But did this not really mean, in the context of past American performance: "We are getting out of Korea because we got out of Vietnam and because we don't like Park's government anyway. You had all better start working out your own arrange-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments"? Why else would a unilateral withdrawal be announced, with no concessions from the other side, by a country that had hitherto shown a great proclivity for tit-for-tat negotiations with the Soviet Union and its allies?

It is understandable that the Vietnam experience has colored American thinking so thoroughly that, having finally extricated ourselves from that war, a disaster almost solely of our own making, we now feel that any withdrawal of American troops anywhere in Asia is automatically a good thing. It may be, in the long run. But as I have tried to demonstrate, it is not so regarded by most Asians.

Let us look again at the Japanese, and at the roots of their reaction. In Japan today the Security Treaty with the United States, so long the focus of riots, protest marches, literary denunciations and steady opposition from the Left, is now almost universally accepted as part of the local furniture—a bit unsightly in spots, but better to have than not. Discouraged, among other things, by China's evident satisfaction with the American military presence in Japan, even the hard-line Marxists in the Socialist Party have ceased to use the Treaty as a big campaign issue. In private, communists too admit they are content with the status quo. Of the 46,000 members of the U.S. military stationed in Japan, 21,000 comprise the two-thirds of a Marine division, with an accompanying air wing, camping on some choice land in the crowded, poverty-ridden island of Okinawa. Agitation against removal of the American base there, once the talking-point that elected successive socialist-communist governors there, has died down.

To my own mind a pullback of the Marine regiments on Okinawa might have been a good substitute for withdrawal of the Second Division from Korea. A virtual division of troops is hardly necessary to provide backup for the contingency of occasional rescue operations in Asia, like that of the *Mayaguez*. I have heard very few Japanese, however, who shared this view. After Vietnam, the general feeling is that any further pullouts of American military force might be upsetting. The Marines are rightly regarded as backup for the force remaining in South Korea, another safeguard against trouble in Japan's closest neighbor.

But, perhaps most important, the Japanese have had more dealings than most with the government of Kim Il Sung in North Korea. Kim's unpredictability is well known to them.

There is no doubt that détente between the Soviet Union and the United States, as it has developed, has been worrisome to Kim's regime. The Chinese rapprochement with the Americans, as that progresses, causes Kim even greater concern. His suspicions of his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two communist senior partners seem to have been reciprocated in recent years. There is comparatively little supportive action for Pyongyang coming from either Russia or China; and one suspects that Kim had to work hard to arrange his last fraternal visit to Peking.

The announcement of an American withdrawal, however, has probably given Kim's personal rule a new lease on life. This is, after all, the moment he had been waiting for and predicting since the end of the Korean War, the first stage in his announced reunification of the Korean peninsula.

Kim, his ambitions and the vise in which he holds North Korea's 16 million people, were and are the best military argument for a continued American military presence in South Korea, on the ground. To Koreans especially, the promise of constant air and sea support is unconvincing. They remember that American air and sea power failed to deter the North in 1950—and that neither was used in the *Pueblo* incident of 1968.

The real nightmare—to which South Koreans return over and over again in conversation—is a North Korean lightning thrust directed against Seoul. Even granting that the South Korean Army is or could soon be superior to the North Koreans in arms as well as in numbers, a capital city just 30 miles from the border is a difficult commodity to insure. There is always the risk that it could be captured—or at least entered in a single surprise rush. With Seoul captured or in ruins, even a South Korean victory in a long drawn-out war would be worse than pyrrhic. South Korea would have to negotiate, and a cease-fire would probably be imposed. The odds would favor its being backed by the strength of China and the Soviet Union, with predictable results for a then-truncated South Korea.

IV

The second best reason for keeping an American division on the ground in South Korea is President Park Chung Hee. Since he abrogated the Korean constitution in 1972—tailoring a new model to allow himself continued autocratic rule—Park has been increasingly hard to deal with, increasingly less receptive to advice in political, as opposed to economic, matters. Able, ruthless and incorruptible himself, he is a zealot and a driver who sets little store by democratic debate. Although surrounded by cronies and yes-men—many of the bright people around him in Seoul's presidential Blue House have long since excused themselves and gone elsewhere—he is probably too smart and too concerned with long-range goals for the economy to think of adventuring north himself.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On this issue at least, he is a far different breed from Syngman Rhee, the old revolutionary patriot whose increasing bent for dictatorial rule in the late 1950s gave Park a recent, if unfortunate, precedent for assuming semi-dictatorial powers.

Park keeps his own counsel and runs his own country. Under the present arrangement, where U.S. troops are deployed north of Seoul, he does not, however, command his own armed forces in the event of conflict. An American four-star general is in charge, as U.N. commander in chief, a holdover from the Korean War days when the war was sanctioned as a United Nations effort. The value of such cautionary control is obvious. It is doubtful, however, whether this command function can be maintained, once we withdraw most of the combat troops. That is a fact that makes Asians extremely nervous. The Japanese, especially, understand and sympathize with Park's problem, facing an unpredictable and avowedly aggressive power on his frontiers. But they would sleep a bit easier if he were not left to handle it by himself.

V

The news about human rights in South Korea is not good. One cannot quarrel with President Carter's campaign statement that "the internal oppression" of the Korean people is repugnant. There should have been more support for political freedoms in Korea by past administrations, either publicly or in the form of pressure applied directly from Washington. The Korean people are watched; they are arrested; they are constantly called in for questioning by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, which has degenerated under Park's leadership into a combination Praetorian Guard and secret police. KCIA officers and agents have systematically harassed and intimidated Korean opponents of the Park regime, not only in Japan, but also in the United States and in Europe. And in 1973 the KCIA even abducted Kim Dae Jung, the opposition candidate in Korea's last free election, from his hotel in Tokyo, back to constant house arrest in Seoul.

It has not always been so. After leading the group of officers who took over the government in 1961, Park was elected in 1963. For most of his first two terms, he governed and was governed by democratic processes. In his earlier writings, he took pride in restoring a working democracy to Korea after the chaos and factionalism that accompanied Syngman Rhee's fall from power in 1960.

His own instincts, however, were and are authoritarian. When he came to power he set out with the intensity of a Puritan to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

modernize his country through sweeping economic development, putting his plans into effect the way an engineer works from blueprints. The more power Park acquired, the less he tolerated opposition, especially after Kim Dae Jung, then a relatively obscure young lawyer, almost beat him in the 1967 presidential election. Park suppressed demonstrations, closed down universities and harassed his opponents, manipulating the constitution to secure his election to a third term in 1971. And in the fall of 1972, he imposed martial law and drastically altered the constitution to make the Assembly a rubber stamp for his personal Executive. After his wife, one of the few softening "human" influences around him, was killed in 1974 in an assassination attempt on him, Park became even more inflexible.

Yet, for all the harassment, it must be said that some of the rubrics of democracy persist in the Republic of Korea. The forms have not been emptied of all their content. Most coercion continues to be backhanded, if effective—like the tactic of putting government pressure on business firms not to advertise in *Dong-A Il-Bo,* the respected Seoul newspaper, when its editors criticize the government overmuch. The bulk of Korea's citizens go about their business in freedom and are protected by the law. People criticize the government and discussions take place that would not be tolerated in a fully totalitarian country. In comparison to most socialist countries, including the shining lights of revisionism like Yugoslavia—and to the newly rightist countries like Chile—the degree of repression in Korea is small. The U.S. government could do a great deal by putting private pressure on Park, not to mention the business leaders and the strong Korean bureaucracy, which are developing independent power centers of their own.

While the Kennedy Administration did apply such pressures, much less was done during the Kissinger years. That period witnessed almost a public cynicism about human rights, which could only have served to confirm Park in his drift toward absolutism.

President Carter has changed all this. However much the announcement of troop withdrawal is pictured as a purely military decision, it clearly shows Washington's public concern over a bad human rights situation, which, in the President's words during his campaign, "undermines the support for our commitment." He has chosen to work from outside, rather than from within. Park Chung Hee has been put on public warning, so to speak. If he wants the support of the American people—and this is a people's government—he had better behave. This, at least, is "The View from Here."

How clear is that view? Looking at Korea again from an Asian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perspective, it would seem to be defective in several ways. The withdrawal announcement has hardly fostered self-confidence among the Korean people, most of whom, rightly or wrongly, see the word "abandonment" written in the fine print behind "withdrawal." Nor can we expect Park to heed the warning and to mitigate the severities of his rule as a reflex action. He may, but the opposite may also happen. Driven into a position of isolation, real or fancied, Park is likely to tighten his grip on authority, not loosen it. He and his government are still amenable to American influence. They must be. But much of this influence was squandered needlessly by publicly announcing that we are pulling out. In a sense, we have given away much of our bargaining power with Park and given it away in advance. In return we have done nothing yet for human rights in Korea but preach about them.

VI

The realities of Korea are complicated—"this free, authoritarian, democratic dictatorship," as wits in Seoul are wont to describe their country. In appraising the Koreans and their modern situation, we must remember that modern nations, despite the world's superficial unities of 747s, common communications networks, satellite TV and shared technology, continue to live in different historical time zones. Developing nations, in particular, are finding this truth a poignant one. The rush into modernity goes slower when you must carry your own past on your back.

Japan, Korea's close geographical and racial neighbor, was fortunate in accomplishing its modernization during the Meiji century, so-called, which began with the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The Meiji modernization was not without pain, but in the end, civil war, industrial revolution, democracy, socialism, colonialism, militarism, big business, mass education and a disastrous major war were all somehow digested to form the liberal affluent society of today. But the Japanese needed all the time they could get to synthesize the conflicting demands loosed by the Meiji reformers. Their history until the fatal China adventure and Pearl Harbor was one of constant conflict between authority, variously benevolent or ruthless, and an aroused sense of popular rights. At times, in the 1920s, democracy seemed to be winning. In the 1930s democracy lost. It took the shock of a disastrous war and the utterly unexpected beneficence of American military occupation to graft on to the roots of the Meiji reforms the vigorous and workable—if *sui generis*—democracy in Japan today.

In Korea, this century-plus of modernization has been squeezed into roughly 30 years' time, with just about everything happening

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at once. Park and his fellow officers of the 1961 military revolution are rough parallels to the young Meiji *samurai* of a century ago. Like them, they have found that goals of strength, democracy, popular education, prosperity and national self-respect often conflict—particularly if you have to achieve them all in a hurry. Worse off than the Meiji reformers, the Korean leadership has had the legacy of Japanese colonialism to deal with, not to mention the destruction of the Korean War. National leadership was stunted and suppressed for generations. Until liberation after World War II, there was no tradition of political democracy to build on. Few Koreans had ever really voted.

The concentration on economic growth and military strength that so impresses the visitor to Korea today is the product of necessity—like the *Fukoku Kyohei* syndrome ("a prosperous country and a strong army"), which the Meiji reformers turned into a slogan. But unlike the Meiji, the Korean reformers include people out of two eras, working in one. The generation of Korean technocrats in their forties, who are responsible for the extraordinary national growth rate, are justly compared to the Japanese 40-year-olds of the 1950s (accidentally thrust into power by the Occupation purge of their elders) who created the economic miracle. But their seniors, notably Park himself, seem spiritually closer to the original Meiji reformers of a century ago.

Park has made his own study of the world's contemporary national revolutions. In one of his widely circulated memoirs, *The Country, The Revolution and I* (copies of which can be found on every prudent businessman's office bookshelf), Park cites the Meiji Restoration, Sun Yat-sen's revolution in China, the Turkey of Atatürk and Nasser's Egypt as examples, each useful in a different way. Not surprisingly, in a man with a sophisticated grasp of modern industry and economics, he reserves most of his admiration for the "miracle on the Rhine" of postwar Germany.

Yet, business and economics aside, he runs his government in such a way as to justify the jibes of Japanese commentators that he is, politically speaking, a "born-again Confucianist." To justify his maddening paternalism, which is again far closer to the attitudes of the Japanese Meiji leaders than to those of most modern authoritarian leaders, he continually stresses the political weaknesses of Koreans, their almost incurable political factionalism and their consequent need for strong leadership. Many of his countrymen would agree with the thesis, but are nervous about Park's evident desire to stay with the job until he finishes it. "We need strong leadership," a prominent lawyer said to me recently, "at the moment, even a dictator. But when someone thinks he is the one in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dispensable man, that is dangerous."

VII

As yet Park's internal oppression has been selective and relatively sparing. Although it worries many Koreans, the prevailing mood in the country is the optimism of a business boom. The lot of the average citizen is vastly better than it was ten or even five years ago. The government is associated with the good times. Except for the city of Seoul, Park could probably carry most of the vote if a free election were held tomorrow. The realities of Seoul and the countryside around it, in fact, are different from the picture of tension generally given newspaper readers outside Korea. The military is in evidence, but hardly ubiquitous. The streets of Seoul are packed and traffic-ridden, with Korean-made cars now strikingly in evidence. New housing units are being built with great speed, but not fast enough to overtake demand. Seoul is a city of paradoxes and growing pains. In the city's central square a man walks precariously among the whizzing cars, seven fancy suitcases wrapped in cellophane stacked on an A-frame on his back. Even in a boom economy, A-frames and cars must coexist.

The disordered clatter of Seoul, the new power lines in the countryside, the rough-cut version of a Japanese or American freeway linking the capital with Pusan (a road which manages to serve almost two-thirds of Korea's concentrated, 60-percent urban population), the steel mills at Ulsan, the new technology villages of scientists and engineers pulled back to Korea on the brink of brain-drain to Europe or the United States, the *saemul* or new village movement in the subsidized countryside, the assembly lines of low-paid workers turning out calculators cheaper than Japan and shoes and tennis shirts cheaper than Hong Kong—all this, despite the apparent disorder of Korean living patterns, is part of a closely fitted economic plan for growth and national prosperity, which should be a model for every underdeveloped country.

In fact, South Korea can no longer be classed as such. The country, which counted itself lucky enough to export $41 million worth of merchandise in 1961, sent out to the world $7.8 billion worth in 1976—an annual increase of 35 percent per annum. Per capita income, less than $100 in 1961, now stands at more than $800. In the teeth of a worldwide recession, the economy has continued to grow by nine percent yearly. A country that had to import most of its staples in the early postwar years is now self-sufficient in rice and barley, symptoms of a newly healthy and balanced agricultural sector. As the report of a World Bank investigating mission summarized its conclusions earlier this year:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The sustained high rate of expansion in incomes over 15 years has transformed Korea from one of the poorest developing countries, with heavy dependence on agriculture and a weak balance of payments, financed almost entirely by foreign grants, to a semi-industrialized middle-income nation with an increasingly strong external payments position and the prospect of eliminating the current deficit in the next 5–10 years.

Part of the explanation for this success lies in the impressive abilities of the Koreans themselves. Widely regarded in both East and West as less disciplined reverse-images of their Japanese racial cousins, with an objectionable facility for saturating food with garlic, they are in fact just as competent and emotionally more relaxed. The Koreans are driven by the same urge to educate their children at all costs as the Japanese "education mamas" who drive their sons into tutoring schools and universities in Osaka and Tokyo on the other side of the Tsushima Straits. Both high school and university-level education have expanded spectacularly since their release from colonialism. (One-half of Korea's children now attend high school, while the literacy rate has risen to 92 percent.) Koreans are moved by a combination of patriotism and survival. They have lived with the same economy of scarcity as the Japanese.

Starting from scratch as an industrial power, Koreans have nothing but new plants. Their labor force works long and cheaply. The growth of labor unions has been rigidly suppressed under the Park government. And thanks to the bloodbath of 1950-53, which no one ever wants to repeat, the life of a garrison state is tolerated. Besides, benefits are seeping down to the people. Electrification, plumbing, housing are coming. The appetite for rising expectations, if growing, can still be controlled. So the labor productivity rate remains astonishingly high.

And the control of industry, since the first of the four Five-Year Plans began in 1962, has been openly coercive. Park himself is in personal control. He has set out to leave behind a healthy country, agriculturally and industrially sound. He does not brook slacking. The President's personal integrity has rarely been questioned. He has kept the machinery of the economy running remarkably straight and smooth. His economic and financial bureaucrats, many of them American-trained, have cheerfully taken leaves from Japan's book and guided Korea's new bumptious capitalists into efficient channels. At the same time, the Korean Finance Ministry has managed a swinging, high-risk game of international borrowing that might easily have led to disaster, but so far has not.

VIII

Against a background of boom times, internal oppression, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

considerable nervousness inside Korea and among its neighbors about a slide in the American commitment, the Carter Administration must now consider the consequences of its pullout announcement and learn to live with them. One must assume that the announcement itself is irreversible, in the absence of drastic new developments. By pledging American troops to a front-line position there, we had established a political quiet zone. We have endangered that. To restabilize matters, even partially, we must maintain an active, visible front-line diplomacy.

First, along with Japan, the United States should do everything within its power to assist and to help secure South Korea's extraordinary economic growth. This involves the welfare of the Korean people. It is also a necessary—though not a sufficient—condition for any easing of the regime's authoritarianism. To minimize economic pressures and to help young Korean managers bring on the consumer society of the 1980s can only help.

On the human rights front, it is doubtful if public denunciations of abuses will turn Park around and make him repent. Americans have rarely been successful with this tactic. It is far better to increase cultural and educational influences on Korea, on which this country has hitherto lavished little care, while applying constant, not sporadic pressure—firmly but privately—to expand political freedoms, with a promise, at least, of some return to a parliamentary government. Such unpublicized actions may have some effect. But we cannot win this game from the outside, any more than we can turn the Koreans overnight into responsible partisans and sophisticated independent voters.

The actual troop withdrawal should be slowed, as Washington has already indicated. And now that we have made the basic announcement, we must be careful that any subsequent incident from the North is met with more than normal vigor and severity. Kim Il Sung and his regime do not have a good record in reading American intentions accurately. Nor can we expect Kim to start his own little détente, in the hope of speeding the U. S. withdrawal. Pyongyang, to put it mildly, lacks the sophistication of Moscow and Peking. The fact that the North Koreans were almost civil when they returned the bodies of American airmen they had shot down recently over the demilitarized zone hardly seems a sufficient premise for predicting a new era of good feeling.

In Japan, however unconcerned the leadership may appear, the urge to examine the rearmament options will grow stronger. It already has. To the Japanese, Korea is within their defense perimeter. Although the possibility of a substantial Japanese rearmament is still not immediate, the withdrawal from Korea has cer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tainly opened the question, and many thoughtful politicians and bureaucrats in Tokyo will start reviewing their options. Already, a consensus may be forming.

Finally, there is the critical issue of stabilizing the Korean situation on a more lasting basis. Given the vast differences that 30 years of Kim Il Sung's brand of communism have created between the 16 million North Koreans and their 35 million relatives in the South, it is hard to see any true modus vivendi yet in prospect, and still less any reunification of the country. But talks between North and South, aborted since 1971, could open up personal and economic contacts over time. Tensions could also be eased if the Soviet Union and China were to recognize Seoul in return for American recognition of Pyongyang. Ultimately there must be some guarantee of the Korean situation by the four great powers most concerned: Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the United States. The very similar case of the two Germanies shows fairly precisely what might be done under all three headings.

It is in this diplomatic area that one must especially regret the unilateral character of the American withdrawal announcement, and the failure to make use of it, in private discussions, as leverage toward one or another of these three objectives. Perhaps the later decision not to withdraw most of the combat ground forces until 1981–82 still leaves the way open for some moves of this sort, although they will be less effective than if the situation had been dealt with as a whole from the outset. At any rate the prospect of American withdrawal now makes it more than ever urgent that all six interested parties—but especially the United States as the one with most effective contact among them—seek to break the present deadlock in the next year or two. Geography and ideology have combined to make Korea one of the major danger points in the world. It demands the most imaginative diplomacy that can be brought to bear.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bruce Hutchison

CANADA'S TIME OF TROUBLES

Foreigners must find it hard to believe that the Canadian people, among the richest and most fortunate on earth, should solemnly consider the destruction of their vast estate sprawling across half a continent. But the crisis now facing them in many forms—constitutional, political, economic and, above all, emotional—has deep roots and lessons for free peoples everywhere.

Canada became a nation, or its embryo, on July 1, 1867, when four weak, quarrelsome British colonies between the Atlantic and the Great Lakes, fearing the newly powerful American republic on their flank, were united by Queen Victoria and her Parliament at Westminster and allowed to govern themselves. The rudimentary union, whose survival looked dubious, to say the best of it, quickly spread to the Pacific and embraced the second largest national territory in the world.

After 110 years of growth, its population numbers some 23 million, basically divided into two separate communities of British and French descent, the former including about 44 and the latter about 28 percent of the total. Various smaller fractions make Canada a nation of racial minorities, always difficult to govern, simple, serene and rustic in tourist advertisements, complex, restive and urban in truth, but managed so successfully on the whole that it now stands with the Western world's Big Seven at their summit conferences.

Given such a record, which most nations would envy, why has Canada encountered a time of wrenching trouble? Why is Quebec's provincial government (but so far only a small minority of its voters) determined to withdraw from the union and dismember it?

As foreigners may see them, these threats have appeared suddenly, overnight, but their seeds were planted more than three centuries ago when, in 1608, Samuel de Champlain, the first recognizable Canadian, built his rude habitation on the banks of the St. Lawrence and unwittingly seized the central gateway to North America. His brutal raid on the Iroquois, beside the lake that still bears his name, roughly defined the later bisection of the continent. The 49th parallel of latitude, separating the French and English colonies, entered the power struggles of Europe and in

---

Bruce Hutchison is the Editorial Director of *The Vancouver Sun*, British Columbia, and the author of many historical works on Canada.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1763, under the Treaty of Paris, France ceded its North American territory to Britain.

But it was the American Revolution, more than anything else, that produced the modern Canadian state. To a handful of French colonists were added the exiles of the Revolution, the United Empire Royalists, who established their colonies east and west of Quebec. The boundary between Canada and the United States was not to be securely fixed until the middle of the nineteenth century, after the original English colonies had twice invaded Canada, in 1775 and 1812, without success. But the two nations, north and south of the line, emerged from different circumstances with different goals.

Within Canada, the legacy of the original separate French and English colonies remained. Whatever its destiny might bring, the future nation, then hardly imaginable, must live a double life. Its major components could never be amalgamated in more than constitutional terms and only under a flexible, constantly evolving federal system.

From the beginning, the Canadian state was an experiment in what is nowadays called bilingualism and biculturalism—a unique experiment of some consequence to mankind. Canada has found no Lincoln to declare its purposes (and happily no Gettysburg to commemorate a civil war) but it is testing whether a nation conceived in duality and dedicated to the proposition that two diverse communities must have equal rights in the same land, can long endure.

As most Canadian citizens see it, and as Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau assured the U.S. Congress in a notable speech this past spring, that question will be answered emphatically in the affirmative. The union will survive and flourish but not without some years, perhaps a full decade, of political tension, economic change and, more incalculable, a changed attitude of mind. For Canada, with all its wealth and the unexcelled freedom of its society, a long, arduous journey lies ahead. The experiment, however successful, is not yet complete, nor sufficiently understood even by the average Canadian, much less by foreigners.

II

Though it primarily concerns us, of course, Canada's future involves its next-door neighbor more deeply and directly than the American people have begun to understand. As the late Livingston Merchant, twice Washington's ambassador to Ottawa, often argued, Canada is closer and more vital to the United States than any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other foreign nation, and its old friendship should never be taken for granted. And as the late Dean Acheson observed, the reverse is equally true—Canada should not take the United States for granted either. The two nations, locked into a single continent, cannot escape the symbiotic life decreed by history, geography, language, common democratic ideals and daily bread-and-butter business. Across the U.S.-Canadian border moves the world's largest tide of international trade, investment and holiday travel. The United States buys about two-thirds of Canada's huge exports and supplies the same proportion of its imports. Americans in general have yet to realize that they sell far more to Canada than to any other foreign market (and even former President Richard Nixon showed his ignorance of these facts by saying, in a regrettable speech, that Japan was the United States' greatest trading partner).

Canada is also an unequaled importer of U.S. capital. American investors own a massive share of the Canadian economy, in some cases entire industries—another fact little understood south of the border and disturbing to the people north of it. Not only the United States but Japan, all members of the European Economic Community and nations of the Third World, possess valuable markets in Canada.

Even more imperative than the economic relationship is the fact of interdependent defense in a dangerous world. As Canada lacks the resources to defend itself against overseas attack, and finds its ultimate security under the American nuclear umbrella, so the United States must protect the strategic land mass between itself and possible European or Asiatic aggressors.

If the intimate economic, financial and military ties between the United States and Canada are necessary to both, they will never be easy nor automatic in an age of increasing complexity. For saying so, before an American audience, former Prime Minister Lester Pearson was misunderstood and bitterly criticized in the United States, but he had only stated the obvious in order to warn of difficulties ahead. These have appeared from time to time in clashes of specific interest, mostly commercial, but the "mad patches," as Mr. Pearson described them, were always smoothed out by quiet diplomacy and compromise because the supreme interest of the continent, its safety and prosperity, overrode them.

While the Trudeau government, in its so-called Third Option, is seeking closer ties with overseas nations to counterbalance its neighbor's oppressive weight, the United States will always be the paramount factor in Canada's foreign policy. American policy has much wider interests, responsibilities and risks throughout the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world, but Canadians sometimes fail to appreciate them, just as the American public has not fully grasped the importance of Canada in its own affairs.

For all these reasons the United States would instantly feel the shock waves of Canada's partition if it ever happened. After Quebec's departure, what would then be left of the Canadian union, its economic strength, its enormous market, its American-owned industries and its military cooperation? When President Carter remarked (in a studied understatement lest he be accused of meddling in the business of a friendly neighbor) that he preferred to see Canada undivided, he understood how profoundly the three remaining fragments of the union could affect the United States. Three because a sovereign Quebec nation must divide Canada not on the perimeter but in the middle, astride the international artery of the St. Lawrence. The four Atlantic provinces of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island would be separated from Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia by a constitutional and economic dam on the river that carries their goods and those of the American interior as well. Canada, in short, would split into a kind of East and West Pakistan, its single anatomy fractured beyond repair.

No thoughtful Canadian doubts the possible consequences foreseen by former Prime Minister Lester Pearson, who said that Canada was one thing or nothing. He rightly feared that the shattered fragments could not sustain a viable nationality. With their intricate economic organism dissolved, their political dwelling of three centuries in ruins, they might sooner or later seek entry into the American union, confirming the Manifest Destiny which the United States has forgotten and Canada has stubbornly resisted. No American government in its senses should accept with anything but horror pressures or results sure to compound its own domestic and foreign problems.

III

Outside North America, Canada's ongoing debate may not seem to have much significance. The world at large is little interested in the Canadian experiment, the willingness of distinct communities to dwell in one house, even if it is a marriage of convenience. But the same conduct of tolerance and mutual forgiveness must govern many other nations if humanity is to have any chance of peace and a decent life. Canada's ability to preserve such a marriage is the best justification of its identity in defiance of all visible logic.

The secret Canadian logic, felt more than it is expressed—a family instinct beyond expression—has overcome every attempt to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contradict it. Premier René Lévesque and his Quebec government, however, find no logic, visible or otherwise, in the mixed household. He has pictured it as a "hybrid bicultural monstrosity"—ignoring the fact that his own imagined republic of some six million inhabitants would include an English-speaking population of some 1.2 million. If Canada is monstrous in its differing breeds, so is Quebec. If Quebec has the right to separate "democratically" (Mr. Lévesque's word), can its non-French minority be denied the right to remain in the union? If Quebec remains a true democracy the unadmitted logic works both ways.

Mr. Lévesque's French Canadian ideals extend far beyond Quebec. There are minorities of his people, large and small, in all the provinces. But it is only in Quebec that separation from Canada has ever been a serious aspiration. It has appeared there from time to time, mostly as a vague sentiment, since the British conquest of 1759, a conquest in name, not in fact.

The French Canadians, then numbering about 60,000, have multiplied more than a hundredfold. They have maintained their own way of life, produced three of Canada's most distinguished prime ministers and always had the power to destroy the union, if they decided to use it, as they did not. The endurance, cohesion and unconquerable vitality of this great people have few equivalents in human history.

Despite all their successes, the French Canadians of Quebec, abandoned by their European motherland and frequently ignored by their compatriots, have a sense of isolation, injustice and fear for their language and culture. When an English-speaking continent surrounds them, like an ocean breaking on a solitary island, that fear is understandable. But its corollary should also be clear: Quebec needs the environment of a strong, sympathetic nation to resist the southward magnetic pull of the United States. Canada needs Quebec for the same reason.

All the inchoate yearnings of Mr. Lévesque's people found their first effective political instrument in his Parti Québécois. To the nation's amazement, and his own, he won the provincial election of November 15, 1976—not on the issue of separation, which was deliberately played down, but rather by playing up promises of honest government, economic growth and social reform. Though Mr. Lévesque's sincerity and high talents were respected, even outside Quebec, he could not have won—and then by only 41 percent of the vote—if a notoriously inept government had not defeated itself. Quebec did not vote for separation. It voted for a thorough and necessary housecleaning of its public business.

After the election, and until the present day, opinion polls,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

varying in detail, have found that about 20 percent of Quebec voters are prepared to separate themselves completely from Canada, but that a majority seems to favor a "special status," or semi-independence, for Quebec. The Canadian constitution allows no province to leave the union (though no civil war would be fought to keep Quebec within it), and Mr. Lévesque has no mandate to lead it out.

Admittedly Quebec appears to have the material assets to exist independently—an area, a population and a hoard of natural resources greater than those of most members of the United Nations. Independence would mean a reduced living standard, for a time anyhow, but the new leaders of the province, if not its people, are prepared to make that sacrifice for the more precious, non-economic gains of sovereignty, the full liberation of the French Canadian spirit.

Mr. Lévesque expects to work patiently to get a mandate for separation, according to a plan first disclosed to a world audience in this magazine when he was still a private citizen.[1] At a date not yet fixed he will submit a referendum on Quebec's future to the voters. If they reject his basic separatist policy, a second or even a third referendum will be submitted, the government meanwhile retaining office in disregard of parliamentary tradition and using all its influence, moral and legislative, to make the people change their minds.

At this writing the contents of the first referendum are unknown. It could be as meaningful or meaningless as its wording implied. It could offer the clear-cut choice of total separation or a variety of options, such as a Quebec state politically independent yet enjoying a common, free-trade market, and perhaps a common currency, with Canada.

Mr. Lévesque has repeatedly argued that a cooperative "economic association" is possible, desirable and ensured in advance. Of course there will always be an association of sorts since Canada is ready to do business with countries all over the world, but a common market, as Mr. Lévesque evidently conceives it, is quite impractical. Even if the dismembered Canadian fragments were willing to negotiate a generous bargain after the wrenching process of separation, they would never accept Quebec's right to veto their tariff policies and trading arrangements with other foreign nations. Nor would Quebec accept their veto.

Mainly for this reason the government of the largest province, Ontario, has flatly dismissed Mr. Lévesque's version of a common

[1] René Lévesque, "For an Independent Quebec," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1976, pp. 734–45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

market as an impossible substitute for the existing common market of Canada, which buys much of Quebec's industrial production. Since all the provinces sell massively to Quebec, they too must suffer if that market is lost or diminished. No region could avoid some loss. Quebec simply does not have the option of leaving Canada and continuing to share its benefits.

However Mr. Lévesque's still indistinct economic blueprint is viewed, he faces more than enough strictly provincial issues to require all the administrative capacities of his government. The barren heritage of his predecessors confronts him with acute problems of finance, unemployment, inflation, industrial strife and the need to attract large foreign investment.

These problems will not be easily or quickly solved, but Mr. Lévesque has moved rapidly to deal in his own way with a peculiarly sensitive and divisive problem, the use of the French or the English language in Quebec's public schools and private business. There his collision with the federal government, led by a fellow French Canadian, was foreseeable and inevitable.

The constitution vests control of education in the provinces and, until fairly recent times, many of them provided teaching only in English. To French Canadians that one-sided system appeared discriminatory and unfair, if legal, since Quebec's English-speaking minority has always been taught in its own language.

Gradually the other provinces have tried, in varying degrees, to remove an old and legitimate grievance by establishing classes in French where French-speaking minorities were sufficiently large to justify the cost. In 1969, Parliament passed the historic Official Languages Act, and the federal government undertook to provide its local services in French for French-speaking communities outside Quebec or in English for the Quebec anglophones. The Act was widely misunderstood in the other provinces and did nothing to placate the new Quebec government, which regarded it as mere window dressing.

When Mr. Lévesque then introduced a provincial language policy (candidly admitting his own doubts about some parts of it as approved by his cabinet), the federal government, and most of the nation, were shocked by its stringent provisions. It would maintain Quebec's present English schools but would permit only French teaching for children who enter the province from foreign countries or from Canada, unless at least one parent had been previously educated in English and in Quebec. The law would also compel Quebec industries, with minor exceptions, to use French as their language of management and work by 1983.

The Lévesque government hopes that these measures will per-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

manently safeguard French, both as a sacred symbol and a necessary tool, but they outrage the Quebec anglophones and deny Mr. Trudeau's doctrine that all Canadians, wherever they live, have the right to educate their children in either of the nation's two official languages.

Facing a direct and unprecedented challenge, the most critical in his experience, Mr. Trudeau has considered various options while hoping that the Quebec law would be amended to remove its objectionable clauses. If they are retained (in the debate proceeding as this article was being written), he could disallow the law by a constitutional device never used in modern times. But its use now would play straight into the hands of the Quebec government, which would accuse the Prime Minister of violating provincial jurisdiction, betraying his native province and truckling to the will of the national majority. Or, as he has indicated, the law may be referred to the courts for a test of its constitutionality, depending on its final draft.

Mr. Trudeau would prefer a constitutional amendment empowering the federal government to protect the educational privileges of minorities in all parts of the nation. While Quebec is unlikely to accept this proposal, Mr. Lévesque has offered to negotiate a "reciprocal" agreement with any province under which its childen, moving to Quebec, would receive English teaching if that province taught French-speaking children in their mother tongue. Mr. Trudeau has urged the English-speaking provinces to reject the offer because, he says, minority language rights in education are basic and non-negotiable.

The complicated legal argument is the lesser aspect of the bitter trial of strength under way between the two French Canadian leaders. Mr. Trudeau says that "the proper way to get rid of bad laws . . . is to get rid of bad government. I think the real recourse is to defeat the P.Q. [Parti Québécois] government and that's what they [the Quebec voters] should do if they don't like the government."

All the resources of the Liberal Party in Quebec will be mobilized to accomplish that defeat three or four years from now, possibly sooner. Before then Mr. Lévesque's referendum will intervene, with unpredictable results.

Meanwhile, the anglophone corporate managers of Quebec, both Canadian and American, protest that the school legislation would damage their industries because English is the language of international commerce. Besides, they say, it would be impossible to bring enough English-speaking experts to Quebec if their children must be educated in French.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Lévesque government is not impressed by the threat of some corporations to move their head offices out of Quebec, brushing it off as an empty bluff. Actually the government's leftist economic and social policies seem more alarming than its language law to most non-French businessmen.

IV

The latest dispute inherent in a dual society must be set against the background of one of the world's oldest written constitutions. It is a statute of the British Parliament, the British North America Act, which established Canadian self-government in 1867 (and, incidentally, foreshadowed the Commonwealth of the twentieth century). Though Canada has long been totally independent of Britain, with its own separate monarch who happens to reside in London, only the British Parliament can amend the constitution—and does so, automatically, on the formal request of the Canadian Parliament.

Over and over again Canadian governments, federal and provincial, have sought to remove this fictitious but humiliating relic of colonialism and shift the constitution from London to Ottawa. They have never succeeded because they could never agree on a method of future amendment. Twice in the present generation an amending formula was drafted, accepted by all the English-speaking provinces and, at the last moment, vetoed by Quebec. If John C. Calhoun's theory of concurrent majorities did not succeed in the United States, it has worked in Canada even if few Canadians have heard of it.

Mr. Trudeau's failure to bring the constitution home is the worst disappointment of his career as a lawyer. As a politician watching the crisis develop, and buying time to deal with it, he has adopted a Fabian strategy of postponement, compromise and conciliation. On the one hand, he reminds the English-speaking provinces that they have not been entirely just to the French Canadians nor have they relieved French Canadian grievances. On the other hand, he tells Quebec that it has every right to preserve its language as long as it treats its non-French minority justly. And he warns that, outside a robust national state, Quebec's language, culture and economy could not survive the pressure of an English-speaking continent.

In the nation's crisis his eloquent rhetoric and unequaled prestige are inadequate weapons. To them he has lately added a typical Canadian initiative, a kind of safety valve in the form of a new task force on national unity. This group is headed by two of the most respected men in Canada: John Robarts, the English-speaking

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

former Premier of Ontario, and Jean-Luc Pépin, a French Canadian who sat in Mr. Trudeau's cabinet before his retirement to private life. With less-known representatives from the nation's five distinct economic regions, this grand assize will study regional problems, sort out the possible solutions and propose some method of improving the federal system, perhaps a completely new constitution.

As the study begins, two facts are already evident: first, the angry, uncontrollable "English backlash" generally anticipated when the Lévesque government was elected has not yet occurred except within a thin extremist fringe outside Quebec (though it could be provoked by an unchanged provincial language law). Second, and most important, not only Quebec but all the provinces are demanding, and undoubtedly will secure in the end, a decentralization of power through constitutional revision or ad hoc arrangements. Mr. Trudeau, who is attacked by the opposition parties in Parliament for his supposed centralist and authoritarian tendencies, has agreed that more power may have to be transferred to the provinces, despite the fact that they are already more powerful—almost like ten baronies—than the American states. Probably the most difficult question before the Robarts-Pépin task force is how much power the federal government can afford to relinquish without losing not only essential revenue—always a point of contention—but also the ability to govern effectively at all.

V

At the same time that Canada is rethinking its internal balances of power, the country is in the throes of its most profound economic upheaval since World War II. Obviously, the two crises are not unrelated, with Mr. Lévesque conveniently blaming the "bicultural monstrosity" for Quebec's depleted treasury and high unemployment. Politics and economics move in a vicious circle.

The federal government is now trying to dismantle its system of direct controls over wages, profits and prices—a system that big business and big labor opposed from the start in 1975. But when the nationwide Canadian Labor Congress refused in mid-August of this year to accept any wage limits in collective bargaining after controls were removed, Mr. Trudeau said they would continue so long as inflation threatened to reach two-digit figures. Though he hopes that government, business and labor, given time for second thoughts, will agree on a consensus of future economic restraints, it is still no more than a hope. The opinion polls show that the public by a large majority want the controls maintained until the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

danger of a new cost-price explosion has passed. Even if it is avoided in the post-controls period, a still prosperous people will have to rethink their prospects and repair their mistakes.

Some crude figures will serve to outline the current state of the economy: a gross national product of $200 billion this year; a three to four percent real growth rate; a federal budget of about $45 billion with a deficit reckoned at six to seven billion dollars; merchandise exports last year of some $38 billion and imports of $37 billion but, with invisible items, a balance-of-payments deficit of $4.3 billion; an inflation rate of eight percent, or more, as against the official target of six percent; unemployment, on average, of eight percent; a dollar fallen from 103 cents in U.S. currency to about 93 cents within a year.[2]

The Canadian people may well possess the largest per capita raw resources in the world and the skills needed to utilize them. Blame for their misuse is shared by government, business, labor and a public beguiled by unreal expectations. Canada entered the World War in 1939 with a primitive economy, doubled its output and by 1945 was a sophisticated industrial power. It also became an influential secondary member of the United Nations, its peacekeeping efforts in foreign lands widely praised, its wealth envied. But three decades of boom, with short interruptions, led to wild extravagance in government, inflated production costs, a mood of euphoria and finally the hangover of an economic spree.

Up to now only the weak, unorganized groups have suffered any serious damage. Most Canadians enjoy one of the world's highest living standards without realizing that it exceeds Canada's immediate means and is too dependent on foreign borrowings, among the largest in the Western nations, to cover the exchange gap. When Mr. Trudeau says that the present demands on the economy must be reduced or it will "go down the drain," his belated warning is muffled by the sound of cash registers in the shopping centers, ignored by the holiday crowds in the airports. Donald MacDonald, the harassed Minister of Finance, tells the public that the next decade cannot be as rich as the last, and tries desperately to curb the government's own inflationary demands, but he is continually pressed to spend more money and stimulate business.

Basically, John A. MacDonald's ancient and little changed protective tariff of 1878 (called the National Policy) enabled Canada to build an economy as efficient as any in its processing of the products of its farms, forests, mines and fisheries. But under the

[2] For rough comparative purposes, the figures of production, expenditure and trade deficits should be multiplied by a factor of ten to show the American equivalents.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

protection of the tariff many manufacturing industries, concentrated in Ontario and Quebec, became soft and non-competitive in the world market and accumulated a frightening trade deficit of ten billion dollars last year. Their earlier advantage from a lower Canadian wage scale relative to that of the United States has recently been eroded, in some cases canceled, by labor's insistence on continental wage parity or superiority. Soaring production costs, not scarcity of resources and technical expertise, distorted the economic structure and now make drastic readjustments unavoidable, in the short or medium term at least. For the longer term, Canada must decide if it should shrink its weak industries by tariff reductions and sharper competition, at the risk of temporarily worsened unemployment, in order to expand the strong—a decision soon to face it in the Tokyo Round of GATT and, in terms of domestic politics, a nightmare for any government.

Another formidable necessity cannot be evaded. In the next decade Canada plans to spend $800 billion on public and private investment. Unable to raise all this money from domestic savings, it will continue to borrow heavily abroad, thus increasing foreign economic penetration (the nightmare of every "nationalist") and raising the already burdensome cost of external debt.

VI

Until the Parti Québécois came to office the Trudeau government, as gauged by public opinion polls, appeared to have no hope of reelection, despite its victory in 1974. The subsequent election of a Conservative government, under a newly chosen young leader, Joseph Clark, was foreseen. But then the whole political climate changed. Ironically, Mr. Lévesque's triumph revived Mr. Trudeau's fortunes, because the Prime Minister looked more able than his competitor to resolve the crisis. Trudeau's party won four Quebec by-elections last spring, the opposition lost an apparently safe seat in Prince Edward Island, and two of its elected members crossed the floor of Parliament to join the Liberals.

Assuming that the polls are roughly accurate and that the climate does not change again, Mr. Trudeau could easily win the next election. When an election is called, Mr. Clark will face the reality of his party's virtually total exclusion from French Canada during much of the present century. Apart from his inexperience and bad luck, Mr. Clark is the victim of a history for which he is not in the least responsible. Once strongly Conservative in politics and Catholic in religion, a furious Quebec turned to the Liberal Party when, in 1885, the Conservative government of John A. MacDonald

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prosecuted, convicted, and rejoiced at the execution of Louis Riel, a deranged French Canadian, following his small abortive rebellion in Saskatchewan.

MacDonald, more than any other man, was the nation's architect and is still its unrivaled folk hero, but since his death the Conservative Party has never fully recovered in Quebec from his fatal mistake. Indeed, the illustrious Liberal career of Wilfrid Laurier, Canada's first French Canadian Prime Minister and Quebec's idol, was launched by the backlash against the Conservatives. His success heralded a period of relative harmony between Quebec and the English-speaking provinces. Then, however, in the course of two world wars, Quebec resisted the military conscription enforced by the national English-speaking majority, and old wounds were reopened.

Today only three Quebec members sit with Mr. Clark in the House of Commons, and the vagaries and injustice of politics do not alter the fact that no government can govern Canada effectively, or for long, without a minimal beachhead in Quebec, even if it has a majority drawn from the other provinces. No substantial Conservative gains are in sight in Quebec, however. The region from the Great Lakes to the Pacific, on the other hand, has recently elected few Liberals. Thus, Canada lacks, for the time being, a national party of the historic model.

Both parties, Liberal and Conservative, have always been uneasy coalitions of conflicting interests like their American counterparts, and so they must be in a diverse nation. Of the two, the Liberal Party has been the more successful thanks to better management, discipline and luck. Since Wilfrid Laurier's arrival in 1896, the Party has held office for 60 years, sometimes with a minority in Parliament. It was founded, early in the nineteenth century, on a creed of laissez-faire, free trade, unrestricted private enterprise and the Darwinian economics imported from Britain's Manchester School. Under Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who won his first national election in 1921, its philosophy was quietly and smoothly reversed to make its long-lived governments the agencies of social reform in bland, unadmitted imitation of the New Deal in the United States. Eventually the Canadian welfare system, replete with Keynesian machinery, was to go further and cost proportionately more than the original plan devised by President Franklin Roosevelt (whom King described as a great man but an economic illiterate).

The Conservative Party, at its beginning, stood for the partnership of government and business in MacDonald's National Policy of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tariff protection, loyalty to the British Empire and resistance to American influence. Later the Conservative Party too became a party of reform and now indicts liberalism not for its reforming zeal but for grossly mismanaging and stunting the nation's economy.

The ideological gap is narrow, but Liberal governments always make sure that they stand slightly to the left of the Conservative opposition and to the right of the minor socialist New Democratic Party. The Liberal Party's expandable Gladstone bag can hold any ambitious politician if he supports its vaguely defined principles and votes for the government in the Commons. Mr. Trudeau thus inherited a political apparatus so broad, eclectic and pliable that he could recently take into his cabinet, with no questions asked, the leading Conservative of Alberta, John Horner, of unimpeachable right-wing credentials and an opponent of the Official Languages Act.

To Mr. Trudeau pragmatism is the essence and natural operating method of democracy. "The only constant factor to be found in my thinking over the years," he once explained in print, "has been opposition to accepted opinions. Had I applied this principle to the stock market I might have made a fortune. I chose to apply it to politics and it led me to power—a result I had not really desired, or even expected."

After more than nine years in office he relishes power and despite his many admitted blunders and false starts, is deft, often ruthless, in its use—a lonely, enigmatic creature, friendly or truculent as his humor fluctuates, *sui generis* among Canadian statesmen, past and present. The nation does not understand nor particularly like him, but it admires and has usually supported an intellect without equal in Canadian politics.

His reputation abroad is higher than at home where his flaws are more apparent, his brilliance less esteemed. The son of a rich French Canadian father and a Scottish mother, the youthful socialist and world traveler, the Quebec anti-conscriptionist who did not choose to fight in the Second World War, the outdoor athlete of reckless physical courage, the scholar of history, the brooding philosopher and bold gambler in politics has deeply impressed foreign governments and sometimes is painted larger than life in the news media. Strangest of all in this variegated record, he has made himself probably the most influential figure, as the honest broker between whites and blacks, in the Commonwealth.

Nevertheless, the great pragmatist has yet to solve any of Canada's basic problems and has frequently misconstrued them. In the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

summer of 1976, for example, he asserted that French Canadian separatism was "dead" and four months later the separatist Quebec government was elected. He barely escaped defeat in the federal election of 1972 and governed with a minority until 1974. Then he recaptured his majority by denouncing the Conservative policy of compulsory wage-profit-price controls, which in the following year he himself imposed after inflation had passed the two-digit level. Fascinated by John Kenneth Galbraith's books, he said on television that the market system no longer worked and, shortly afterwards, seeking to calm the frightened business community, declared the government's faith in it. As an economic and financial housekeeper his performance has been lamentable, and he knows it.

VII

All things considered and all mistakes admitted, given the fact that Canada is the only major nation in the Western world that lacks either an adequate home market, or a joint market like that of Europe, its economic record is something of a prodigy. It reflects the people who made it, their three centuries of work, thrift and common sense, their inarticulate but fierce native pride.

Behind today's economic issues and the crisis of politics there looms a momentous human question, and the answer made to it will show whether the unique experiment in duality can long endure. Has the nation's character been permanently changed, or briefly diverted by sudden affluence from the true facts of life in a hard northern land? Do we still have those quiet ancestral virtues that mastered the half continent and fashioned, against the accepted canons of logic, a society blessed with as much freedom and fair opportunity as the world has yet found anywhere?

Mr. Trudeau gives his own answer to the final question: the virtues remain, the crisis will reinvoke them and Canada "is greatly strengthened by the very forces which seek to disrupt its unity"—because the separatist challenge has brought a decisive response after the years of indecision. He has often been wrong about daily affairs. But at a time to try men's souls he is right about Canada's goodly future. Our young nation will not close the book of its life when merely the opening chapters have been read and end a pursuit of happiness only well begun.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stanley Meisler

SPAIN'S NEW DEMOCRACY

On June 15, 1977, just a year and a half after the death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spaniards elected a new, bicameral Cortes with the authority to write a constitution for Spain. It was the first freely contested parliamentary election in Spain since February 15, 1936, and it produced scenes that Franco would have abhorred: Communists brazenly waving red banners, chanting slogans, and singing the *Internationale*; the young, dynamic leader of the Socialist Workers Party entering rallies with his left hand in a clenched fist salute, his right signaling V for *victoria*; politicians exhorting Basques in Euskera, Catalans in Catalan, Galicians in Gallego, all forbidden languages a few years before; and newspapers belittling their government and its leader.

Following four decades of repression and fear, more than 18 million Spaniards voted in a peaceful campaign that presented all points of view, no matter how repulsive to the king, the government or the memory of Franco. Taking advantage of a system weighted against the Left, Premier Adolfo Suárez led the Union of the Democratic Center, with 35 percent of the votes, to a near majority of seats in the Congress of Deputies. The results promised stability and a budding two-party system and produced a new and attractive political figure, 35-year-old Felipe González, the First Secretary of the Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), who has time now to persuade Spaniards that he is the obvious alternative to Suárez should the Premier falter.

The election, however, fulfilled only part of the promise that King Juan Carlos had made in his speech to the U. S. Congress on June 2, 1976: "the monarchy will ensure, under the principles of democracy . . . the orderly access to power of distinct political alternatives, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people." There was little, if any, chance of the king allowing "orderly access to power" to the Socialist Workers Party or any other leftist party if it had won. The possibility of a socialist victory was not even considered by the government or the socialists and such a victory would have caused a crisis had it occurred. Democracy in Spain was too fragile and unformed for such a step.

Stanley Meisler is a foreign correspondent for the *Los Angeles Times*, currently stationed in Madrid, Spain.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The election ended the first phase of democratic reform in post-Franco Spain—the tearing down of the most obvious fascist institutions bequeathed by the *Caudillo*. Most Spaniards are probably surprised and surely pleased at how easily this has been done. But the next phase will probably be more troublesome and dangerous. The system must mature enough to allow "orderly access to power" to more than just the heirs of Franco—to become, in effect, fully democratic. This kind of change will be difficult and delicate, for there are still powerful forces in Spanish society, most notably the Army, working against the king's promise.

II

By the time of his death, the 82-year-old Franco and his 36-year-old fascist-like state were long out of date. He ruled Spain in the 1960s and 1970s with a morality, political philosophy, and fierce nationalism molded in the 1930s. Fear, repression, the prosperity of the privileged, the dread of another civil war, and apathy kept him in power.

Spain had changed while he had not. It had become an urban, industrializing society where some sons were finding better jobs than their fathers and some Catholics, especially the young, especially priests, were questioning their faith. In 1950, only 30 percent of Spaniards lived in towns of more than 20,000. By 1970, the percentage climbed to 49 percent, and to more than half by the end of the Franco era. Rigid class lines, in turn, were relaxing. According to careful studies, a third of those working had better jobs in pay and prestige than their fathers and 19 percent of those who were laborers at age 24 had better jobs at age 40. Although the children of managers and professionals still dominated the universities, the rate of illiteracy dropped from 19 percent to nine percent in 30 years and the numbers of students in higher education tripled in 15 years.[1]

The excitement in the arts that followed the death of Franco added more evidence that his people had long ago left him and his tastes behind. Censors remained at their desks but could no longer withstand the pressures to allow Spaniards to enjoy almost as much freedom as the rest of Western Europe. Dowagers in fur coats and leftist intellectuals rushed to theaters to see plays by Federico García Lorca, Rafael Alberti, Ramón del Valle-Inclán, and Fernando Arrabal. One playwright complained that impresarios were

[1] *Estudios sociológicos sobre la situación social de España 1975*, Fundacion FOESSA. Madrid: Euramerica, 1976.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ignoring his best play because it never had been banned by Franco's censors. Spanish movies caught up with the sex and nudity of movies elsewhere. Long lines formed to see Luis Buñuel's *Viridiana* and Charlie Chaplin's *The Great Dictator*; the first had been too irreverent toward God, the second too irreverent toward dictators to be shown while Franco was alive.

The political system of Franco—with its repression of dissent, its fascist labor syndicates, its phony elections, its feeble Cortes, its adulation of a remote, cold leader—no longer felt comfortable. Modern Spaniards could no longer be excited by fears of the red hordes or by the spiritual joy of defending the Church in a crusade. Young, educated, pragmatic Spaniards wanted something new. The barrenness of the old arguments was shown by the crushing defeat of those politicians who invoked them in the elections.

But the dominant vision was not a revolutionary one. The bureaucrats, the industrialists, the professionals, the journalists, even the socialists envisaged a state ruled by a modern, conservative, Christian party with the Left in weak opposition. The people would vote, but their votes were not expected to destroy the basic structures of power and privilege. Power would be taken from the dictatorial, old-fashioned, inflexible Francoists and given to the modern heirs of Franco, not to his opponents.

III

The first phase of democratic reform was directed by King Juan Carlos and Premier Adolfo Suárez, two young men who never showed any zeal for reform while Franco was alive. Yet, as king, Juan Carlos surprised doubters by his commitment to democracy. This commitment, of course, was reinforced by his desire to secure the restoration of the monarchy. And the best hopes for a secure restoration lay in a respected, democratic constitutional monarchy.

The king's appointment of Suárez as Premier in July 1976 caused consternation among Spaniards hoping for democracy. Suárez was the minister in charge of the National Movement, Franco's fascist-like single party. He was a conservative man, suspicious of the Left, uncomfortable with regionalists like the Basques, overly respectful toward reactionary generals. His understanding of democracy seemed limited.

Yet he also incarnated the modern Spaniard, who was ready to turn his back on the old-fashioned dictatorial Franco state and make Spain acceptable to Western Europe. Intelligent, pragmatic, and loyal, Suárez was ready to serve the king and democracy as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

steadfastly as he once served Franco and fascism. In short, he was an articulate, charming, energetic heir of Franco smart enough to know that Franco belonged to the past.

The most significant achievement of the king and Suárez was their success in pushing the Political Reform Act through the last Cortes of Franco, a largely appointed body made up mainly of those who could see little wrong with the dictatorship. The opposition—those parties that had actively opposed Franco during the regime—had insisted it could not be done and had urged the king to abolish the Cortes by decree and convoke elections for a constituent assembly that would write a democratic constitution for Spain. But the king and Suárez refused.

The Act convoked elections for a new bicameral Cortes that would have the authority, though not the obligation, to write a constitution. The Cortes would have a Congress of Deputies of 350 members elected by proportional representation, with the number of deputies assigned to provinces in accordance with population, and a Senate of 207 members elected by plurality, with all but three of the 50 provinces having four senators each. In addition, 41 senators would be appointed by the king. The Congress of Deputies would be the more important body of the Cortes, but the Senate would have delaying power on ordinary legislation and significant blocking power on constitutional reforms.

Approved overwhelmingly in a national referendum, the Act was the most significant attempt to change the Franco state, but it was not the only one. All in all, through referendum, legislation and decree in the 11 months between the appointment of Suárez and the elections, the government abolished the National Movement, legalized political parties including the Communist Party, legalized trade unions, abolished the largely appointed parliament, allowed freedom of speech and assembly in an electoral campaign, and convoked partisan elections.

IV

In their early conception of the new Cortes, some Spanish politicians envisioned a body of deputies from many different political parties, representing all shades of political opinion, that would be mainly concerned with writing a constitution. This vision was shattered by the adoption of an electoral system that made it possible for one party to dominate the Cortes, and by the decision of Suárez, with all the advantages of office, to lead a party in the elections.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Suárez promulgated the electoral law by decree in March, basing it on the Political Reform Act, after meeting many times with leaders of leftist and centrist parties. Though the law had an obvious bias, the opposition, anxious for elections, made no protest. In the elections for the Congress of Deputies, the law provided that every province, no matter how small, had a minimum of three deputies. This greatly favored rural, conservative areas and penalized industrial, leftist areas. Thus, the 15 smallest provinces of the country, with a total population of 3.4 million, had a total of 53 seats in the Congress, while the largest province, Barcelona, with a population of four and a half million, had only 33 seats.

The law also provided that the deputies would be elected from each province under a proportional representation system that gave the leading parties a higher percentage of seats than their percentage of votes.

In the Senate, the smallest province, Soria, was given a senator for every 25,000 people, while the largest province, Barcelona, had a senator for every 1.1 million people. In addition, the law provided for plurality election with each elector voting for three candidates. This meant that a party with a plurality, though less than a majority, could still win three out of the four seats in a province.

At the time of the promulgation of the electoral law, only one party seemed strong enough to take advantage of the system. That was the Popular Alliance of seven former ministers of Franco led by Manuel Fraga, Minister of Information under Franco and Minister of Interior in the first post-Franco government of Premier Carlos Arias. The rhetoric of Fraga and the nature of his support convinced many Spaniards that he represented an attempt to keep Francoism alive.

Fraga boasted that he would win at least 35 percent of the vote, a percentage that would have permitted his party, a prime beneficiary under the electoral system, to dominate the new Cortes. Since Fraga insisted that it was only necessary to amend a few of Franco's Fundamental Laws, there would be little chance of a democratic constitution coming out of such a Cortes. To counter this threat the politicians of the Center, who called themselves liberals, christian democrats, and social democrats, turned to Suárez.

In early May, Suárez announced that he would run for the Congress of Deputies as an "independent" candidate joined to a coalition of Center parties called the Union of the Democratic Center. In effect, the UDC allied young bureaucrats of Franco with politicians who had grumbled about Franco but had never

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

actively opposed him.[2] In several cases, the politicians had cooperated with the Franco regime or even worked for it. The party had little ideology beyond a commitment to Suárez and his promise of democracy. It is probably best to describe the Suárez party as Center-Right. Indeed, there is strong circumstantial evidence that Suárez had intended for many months to lead a Center party in the election. There was no other way for him and the king to ensure control of the process of constitutional change. The electoral law that Suárez promulgated was tailor-made to fit the kind of party that he finally led. Moreover, by exaggerating the strength of Fraga (whose party finally garnered only eight percent of the vote in June), Suárez provided himself with an immediate excuse for entering the lists. Also, Suárez, before announcing his candidacy, pressured the Center into dropping its most important leader, former Foreign Minister José María de Areilza. That was a strange maneuver for a Premier who claimed he wanted to strengthen the Center against Fraga; Areilza, however, was a potential rival for Premier.

The main opposition to Suárez actually was on the Left. There he faced the Socialist Workers Party of Felipe González; the Popular Socialist Party led by Tierno Galvan, who had a professional appeal to those socialist intellectuals who found González too young and too brash; and the Communist Party which, under the Eurocommunist Santiago Carrillo, had announced that it accepted the monarchy and rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Suárez ran a muted campaign, designed both to take advantage of his office and to blunt criticism that he was doing so unfairly. The government, which wanted the election accepted by Western Europe and the United States, was sensitive on this issue. The Union of the Democratic Center staged no mass rallies. Suárez spoke at no public meetings. But his party plastered Spain with photographs of him and the slogan, "To vote for the Center is to vote for Suárez." Suárez spoke on behalf of his party during the time allotted to it on national television. He also sent a letter of appeal to every Spanish voter. On top of this, Suárez had the advantage of appearing on television and on the front pages of newspapers whenever he made news.

In some ways, the Suárez campaign was patterned after the Franco referendums. He evidently believed that the appeal from the top would be decisive in a country conditioned after four

[2] In fact, Suárez took over the Center, assigned his Minister of Public Works, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, to run the party, and imposed his associates as one fourth of the Center's candidates. Most of these associates were men like Suárez who had served as bureaucrats in the Franco regime.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decades to take orders from above. Suárez obviously expected to win a majority of seats in both houses of the Cortes and a large enough plurality of the popular vote to make it clear that he was the dominant political figure of Spain. But, after a fair electoral campaign, in which all parties had the right to present their views and even to attack Suárez, many Spaniards broke old habits of obedience and voted for the Left. Suárez fell short of his goal.

SPANISH ELECTION RETURNS, JUNE 1977

CONGRESS OF DEPUTIES

(97.43 percent of 18,232,049 votes counted)

Party	*Popular vote*	*(%)*	*Seats*	*(%)*
Union of the Democratic Center	6,220,889	34.71	165	47.14
Socialist Workers Party	5,240,464	29.24	118	33.71
Communist Party	1,655,744	9.24	20	5.71
Popular Alliance	1,503,376	8.39	16	4.57
Popular Socialist Party	804,382	4.48	6	1.71

NOTE: The remainder of the vote and the 25 other seats divided by regional and splinter parties.

SENATE

Party	*Seats*
Union of the Democratic Center	106
Socialist Workers Party	48
Senators for Democracy[1]	19
Others	34
Appointed by the king	41

NOTE: The government has not released any national popular vote totals for the Senate.

[1] Senators for Democracy were supported by the Christian Democrats, the Socialist Workers Party, and the Communists as joint candidates in some provinces.

SOURCE: These tables were released in July 1977 by the Spanish government.

V

In the number of seats won in the Congress of Deputies, the Union of the Democratic Center was far ahead of the only other party that made a significant showing, the Socialist Workers Party. Yet the PSOE captured almost 30 percent of the popular vote and 34 percent of the seats in the Congress. Since the Union of the Democratic Center's plurality in the popular vote was so slight, the government-run television news programs stopped reporting the popular vote a day after the election and talked only of seats won, describing the election as "an overwhelming victory for the Union of the Democratic Center."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Suárez party won large pluralities in most rural areas and small towns, managed a bare plurality in Madrid, did better than expected in the Basque areas and Catalonia, and lost the three large cities of Barcelona, Valencia and Sevilla to the socialists. The Socialist Workers Party, led by an Andalusian, swept Andalusia, dominated three of the country's four largest cities and almost won Madrid as well, shared the bulk of the regional vote with the regionalist parties, and scored a strong second almost everywhere else.

The results were probably the best possible for Spain at this stage of its democratic development. While Suárez will now control the writing of the constitution, his position is not strong enough to let him ignore the demands of the socialists. On the other hand, the Suárez victory also averted a crisis. Faced with a victory by the Socialist Workers Party, the king would have been forced into a confrontation with the army. In this circumstance, he might have invoked the Fundamental Laws of Franco and insisted that the premier was responsible to him, not to the Cortes, or he might have tried to persuade Felipe González to join a coalition as a junior partner to Suárez or to some other non-Left premier. Either maneuver would have made Spanish democracy and the king's commitment to it suspect in the eyes of outsiders and most Spaniards.

For its part, the Socialist Workers Party also is satisfied with the results. While the geographic distribution of seats, with its rural bias, hurt the socialists, the electoral system of proportional representation benefited them and established the Socialist Workers Party as the second party of Spain in what could become a virtual two-party system. During the campaign, González only asked the voters to make the Socialist Workers "the democratic alternative" to the present government. The voters did that in a way that probably surprised the Socialist Workers.

The Socialist Workers were in no position to run Spain even if they had won. Most colleagues of González are no older than he. They lack administrative and legislative experience, not surprising after four decades of dictatorship that excluded the Left from government. The socialists do not even have the experience of acting like an opposition. The closeness of the election returns forced the Socialist Workers to realize that democracy means more than a system that tolerates leftists like themselves in opposition and that responsibility and power thus might fall on them uncomfortably soon. Power, however, is seductive, and there is little doubt that González now feels that he would be ready for the job of premier after the next parliamentary elections.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The election may have settled the problem of unity among the socialists. Several socialist groups, including Galvan's Popular Socialist Party, refused to ally with the Socialist Workers Party before the election. Personality and ambition probably caused more of the problem than shades of ideology. The election returns have made the position of the splinter socialists untenable. A socialist intellectual may feel more comfortable with the pedantic Galvan than with the energetic González. But he also knows that he has a chance to oust the government in the next election if he votes for the party of González and will probably waste his vote if he votes for Galvan. Such is the nature of a budding two-party system. Several of the smaller splinter groups already have opened negotiations for union with the Socialist Workers. Galvan is stubbornly holding out, but it is doubtful that he can survive another election as a separate socialist leader.

The internal unity of the Socialist Workers Party also was strengthened by the returns. The party is an amalgam of socialists ranging from social democrats in the Willy Brandt mold to Marxists not much different from Santiago Carrillo. The left wing of the party was not too pleased with an election platform that made no demand for nationalization of industry and promised only to end the excesses of what it called Spain's "plundering capitalism." Yet it is hard to argue with success. The vote for the Socialist Workers Party probably stemmed from its long tradition in Spanish politics (it won the most seats, though far short of a majority, in the 1936 election), the appeal of the dynamic González, and the moderate, unthreatening leftism of its platform. The socialists will not come to power if they upset this formula, and the obvious vote-getting appeal of González puts him in a commanding position in the party.

Another possible problem is that many members of the Socialist Workers Party are more concerned about regional autonomy than about national power or, in fact, socialism. In Barcelona, González forged an alliance with the Catalan Socialist Party to contest the election. Any major disagreement between González and the Catalan socialists over autonomy could destroy that coalition. In fact, little disagreement is expected. In pre-Civil War days, the Socialist Workers accepted autonomy of the regions only with great misgivings, but Franco's repression of the Catalans and the Basques has made the demand for autonomy so urgent and inevitable that the socialists have abandoned their doubts about it. However, workable autonomy in Catalonia depends on an understanding between Catalan nationalists and the Andalusian immigrants to Catalonia who voted for the Socialist Workers only because González was the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

party leader. A breakdown of the socialist alliance in that region would weaken popular support for the regional movement within Catalonia. In the Basque provinces the Socialist Workers' vote came mainly from non-Basques, not from regionalists.

The election also buried Francoism as a political appeal in Spain. The voters will accept an heir of Franco, like Suárez or his associates, as long as he promises a democratic future and keeps quiet about the past. But the poor showing of Fraga's Popular Alliance made it clear that the voters cannot be moved by appeals to the past; even former Premier Carlos Arias failed to win a Senate seat from Madrid. The overtly fascist parties did even worse than the Popular Alliance. The fascists campaigned the way Franco would have wanted them to campaign, with yokes and arrows and fascist salutes and chants of "Franco, Franco, Franco, Franco." But they failed to win a single seat in the Congress of Deputies or the Senate.

The Communist Party, with only nine percent of the vote, probably did worse than it had expected. Party leader Santiago Carrillo ran a moderate campaign in which he struck out at Fraga but never criticized Suárez or the government. The campaign was aimed at making the Communists seem respectable after four decades of the dictatorship painting it as the heinous enemy. The Communists, legalized only two months before the election, probably achieved that respectability. But without its relatively strong showing in Catalonia the Party would have been shattered. It may have been hurt by the presence of figures from the Spanish Civil War—Carrillo himself and Dolores Ibárruri, better known as La Pasionaria, the 81-year-old honorary president of the Party, who returned from exile in the Soviet Union only a month before the election.

Carrillo was bolstered somewhat after the election by an acrimonious personal attack from the Soviet Union's official publication, *New Times,* which denounced him for his criticism of the Soviet dictatorship in his new book, *Eurocommunism and the State,* probably the most extreme statement of Eurocommunist doctrine yet published. Carrillo relished the attack and called a news conference to describe himself as a victim of the Soviet inquisition—lamenting, with a grin, that the Soviet Union had failed to attack him before election day. The Russians obviously waited to make sure he would gain no electoral dividends from them.

The Communist strategy is now obvious. Carrillo, with his respectability, waits in hope both that Suárez will falter and that González will lose his luster as "the democratic alternative." Should

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

both happen, the Communists will have to weigh two very different strategies. They might seek, in the Italian way, to replace the socialists as the main opposition in Spain or, in the French way, make the socialists dependent upon them for a leftist victory. But they start a long way from either objective.

VI

Spain now enters the second phase of its democratic reform with some enormous problems left behind by Franco. In their desire to move through the first phase smoothly, the king and Premier Suárez tried to do no more than tinker with these problems. But they must be faced squarely if Spain is to become fully democratic.

The most obvious problem is the armed forces, which regard themselves as the arbiter of politics and the guarantor of stability. The Fundamental Laws of Franco, still in force, state: "The Armed Forces . . . guarantee the unity and independence of the country, the integrity of her territory, national security, and the defense of the institutional system." This role is reinforced by history, for Spain has experienced a century and a half of coups, mutinies, and *pronunciamientos* culminating in the uprising of the generals in 1936 that led to the Spanish Civil War.

With 302,300 officers and men (220,000 in the army, 46,600 in the navy, and 35,700 in the air force), the armed forces are disorganized, weak in logistics, poorly equipped, poorly paid, and top-heavy with aged generals and admirals, almost all of whom fought with Franco in the crusade against the Republic. Conservatism runs beyond these Civil War veterans, and many officers are disturbed by the ease with which Premier Suárez has dismantled the institutions of Franco.

The commanders showed this when Premier Suárez legalized the Communist Party on April 9, 1977. Suárez had little choice, for he wanted to make the elections seem democratic to the outside world, to avoid leftist street rioting during the campaign, and to keep down the socialist vote. He probably expected a good deal of adverse reaction from the military, but not as much as he got.

The Minister of the Navy, an admiral, resigned over the issue, and the Supreme Council of the Army proclaimed its repulsion over the legalization. This was probably the greatest crisis of the post-Franco era. In its public statement, the Supreme Council of the Army said, "The legalization of the Communist Party produced a general repulsion in all units of the army. Nevertheless, in view of the national interests of a higher order, the accomplished

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fact is accepted in a disciplined way. The Council deems it necessary to inform the government that the army, unanimously united, considers it an undeniable duty to defend the unity of the nation, its flag, the integrity of its institutions, and the good name of the armed forces." In short, the army was saying, it accepted legalization out of patriotism but still considered itself a superior political force empowered to monitor decisions of the government and to intervene in some way.

There are a number of troubling and unanswered questions. No one is sure what the army would have done if it had decided not to accept "the accomplished fact." A coup is the obvious answer. But some analysts, both Spanish and foreign, believe the army would have done no more than make a united demand to the king that he dismiss Premier Suárez. On top of this, it is generally believed that lack of coordination between military units and a general shortage of fuel and ammunition—precautions taken by Franco to prevent an anti-Franco coup—make it difficult to launch a coup swiftly. The doubts over the military's will and ability to stage a coup, however, are probably less important than the fact that Spanish politicians act as if one were possible.

The king and Premier have been nudging the armed forces toward a modern defense mission that would take it out of the business of internal politics. The 1976 treaty that continues U. S. bases in Spain also sets up institutions for joint U.S.-Spanish military planning that parallel the institutions of NATO, thus making a possible entry into NATO easier some day. If Spain were part of NATO, in the view of some diplomats, its armed forces would become professional enough to leave politics to the politicians. But there has been a good deal of resistance to NATO in Spain. The generals and admirals do not feel comfortable with the idea of restructuring their commands at their advanced age. Some fear that a modernized NATO system would lead to close civilian control over the armed forces. The government itself is worried about the cost of modernizing the armed services; government officials believe it is possible only if the United States pays much of the bill.

In September 1976, the king and Premier removed a hard-line Francoist as vice premier in charge of defense and replaced him with Lieutenant General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, a sophisticated professional who accepts change. But most Spanish generals and admirals in high positions remain bastions of Francoism. Premier Suárez has shown that he can cross them as he did when he legalized the Communist Party. But, in general, Suárez shows a deference to the armed forces, perhaps out of fear of a coup,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perhaps out of habit formed in the Franco era.

VII

Spain is trying to create a representative system while maintaining a civil service, including the police, trained under fascism. King Juan Carlos and Premier Suárez dismantled those institutions that made the Spanish state seem clearly fascistic. But the government apparatus remained the same. The men who banned books or clubbed leftists under Franco have kept their jobs.

The police are the most obvious problem. There are 63,000 *Guardia Civil,* the traditional paramilitary rural force; 34,000 *Policía Armada,* the city riot police; and 10,000 plainclothesmen who mainly ferret out leftist subversion. The uniformed police carry submachine guns, and their constant vigil on city street corners still gives much of Spain the look of a police state.

In the year and a half since Franco's death, the *Guardia Civil* and *Policía Armada* have kept busy putting down leftist and regional demonstrations. They have done so with brutality. Not content with simply preventing a demonstration, they have then set upon any group of civilians nearby, whether sympathizers or just bystanders. Moreover, there is a strong suspicion that off-duty policemen have joined roving gangs of toughs that have terrorized towns in the Basque area.

It has become a cliché for diplomats and journalists to say that the Suárez government does not have its police under control. But the problem goes deeper. It is, after all, the Suárez government that banned the demonstrations put down by the police. A government cannot control its police by unleashing them upon its citizens. A more refined police force might club fewer heads and might be more restrained in firing bullets and rubber pellets. But the orders to club and to fire still come from government officials, including Premier Suárez, who were molded during the Franco era.

After the death of Franco, the Cortes, at the request of the Arias government, approved a freedom of assembly law. While proclaiming the right to assemble, the law required Spaniards to apply for a license to do so. As a result, the government has full administrative power to prohibit any meeting it does not want. Using the law, the Suárez government has banned far more meetings than it has allowed. In fact, most of the political deaths in Spain in the post-Franco era have come in police suppression of defiant Spaniards trying to go through with a banned rally.

Premier Suárez appears to see assembly not as a right but as a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

privilege granted by the government only when convenient. The government banned labor union rallies last May Day, even though it knew the bans would foment violence by the police. The spectacle of red flags flaunted freely in football stadiums on May 1st might have irritated powerful rightists and army generals, and Suárez decided that the avoidance of irritation was more important than the privilege to assemble.

VIII

Another major problem is posed by the regional demands for autonomy and the government's reaction to them. The strongest claim for an ethnic identity probably comes from Catalonia, but the most trouble has come from the Basque provinces of the north.

With deep Francoist and Castilian roots, Suárez and his ministers have shown extraordinary insensitivity about the feelings of Basques, whose homeland was treated by Franco for four decades as occupied enemy territory. Almost every Basque attempt to demonstrate against government policy has been suppressed by a non-Basque police force. In the period from the death of Franco to the parliamentary elections, 22 Basques died in confrontations with the police. Basque terrorists have not helped matters either, murdering 21 police and other government officials during the same period.

The overall problem is a legacy of Franco. Infused with fascist ideas about the glorification of the national state, intent on punishing the two regions that opposed him most steadfastly in the Civil War, Franco, a Galician himself, was determined to stamp out Basque and Catalan nationalism and culture. He banned all publications and education in the regional languages. Non-Castilian books were taken out of public libraries and burned. The government demanded that all Spaniards write even their private letters in Castilian. Posters admonished Catalans and Basques, "Speak the language of the empire," or, "Speak Christian," or, "Speak well. Be patriotic. Don't be a barbarian." Parents had to register the names of their new babies in Castilian Spanish. Catalan and Basque street signs were torn down. Celebrations of historical dates in regional history were suppressed by the police. Much of the nationalist fervor in the provinces now has burst out of the fury against Franco.

The Basques and Catalans are demanding what Franco took away from them. The Second Republic allowed some autonomy for both Catalonia and the Basque region during the 1930s. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Catalan Statute of Autonomy, except for allowing Catalan as a second official language, gave Catalonia fewer rights than an American state. The Basques had more autonomy but only because they were separated from Madrid by Franco's armies during the Civil War.

Basque and Catalan nationalists have interpreted the election results as proof of the popular demand for autonomy. The right-wing opponents of autonomy were soundly defeated. The regionalist parties, however, had to share victory in the regions with the Socialist Workers Party. While the Socialist Workers are pledged to support autonomy, they obviously attracted the votes of many immigrants frightened by the stridency of the Basque and Catalan nationalists. The Socialist Workers will probably only support the kind of autonomy that also protects immigrants from other provinces from discrimination. Some Basques, in their present mood, envisage an autonomous Basque state that would be as intolerant of non-Basques as the Franco state was intolerant of Basques.

The strong anti-Madrid feelings of the regionalists are an obvious danger to democracy. If the new Cortes does not settle the issue, the Basques and Catalans could take themselves out of the system, refusing to vote, join the government, or work in the central administration. They could turn their backs on a supposedly democratic Madrid the way they once turned their backs on Franco. Madrid would then have to govern with the enmity of its two richest regions. Moreover, continued frustration raises the possibility of continued and even more intense violence, especially in the Basque provinces. Peace probably depends on Spain permitting at least as much autonomy as Catalonia and the Basque region had under the Second Republic. But some Spaniards, trained by Franco to revere the unity of the national state, may have difficulty accepting this kind of solution.

IX

The success of the democratic experiment in Spain probably depends on the commitment and abilities of three men—the king, the Premier, and the socialist leader. There is little doubt that González has the commitment, for only democracy offers him hope of power, but little is known about his political ability beyond his popular appeal. The king and Premier probably have the political skill to surmount most problems, but there is some doubt about the nature of their commitment and of their understanding of democracy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

González will have to play a delicate role. He must show enough responsibility to seem like a conceivable alternative as premier while persuading his working-class supporters that he has not betrayed them. This will be especially difficult in a period when most of the labor force is still unorganized and Communists will be fighting Socialist Workers for control of new unions.

Under a pre-election royal decree, workers no longer are required to join the government-run syndicates, probably the most fascistic of Franco's institutions. Even before the decree, labor was being organized by the formerly illegal trade unions. The four largest unions claim a total of only 1.2 million members out of a work force of more than 13 million, and their claims are probably exaggerated. It is obvious that recruitment is just beginning, and that the General Union of Workers, allied to the Socialist Workers Party, will be helped or hurt by how workers feel González is representing their interests in the Cortes.

Moreover, the Socialist Workers Party can never be a party of mild reform like the Social Democrats of Germany. The problems of Spain, with its great poverty, increasing unemployment, and enormous gap between rich and poor, are simply too great for that. The demand for radical solutions is strong, and the Socialist Workers, under González, will have to try to meet it. Yet, in dealing with economic issues, González will have to maneuver deftly if he wants both to shore up his responsibility in the electorate as a whole and to avoid losing ground on the Left to the Communists. The road to full democracy would be blocked if González struck the electorate as irresponsible or Communists seemed to be overtaking the Socialist Workers. Power to the Left would seem as inconceivable as ever to the military and other pillars of the establishment in Spain.

The role of King Juan Carlos and Premier Suárez will be even more important in determining just how far Spain will move toward full democracy. It is obvious that the closeness of the popular vote disturbed them and alerted them to the possibility of a socialist victory either in the municipal or parliamentary elections. No date has been set for municipal elections, but they are expected before the end of this year or early next year. Legally, the new Cortes could last for four years, but Spaniards expect it to disband after finishing its job of writing a democratic constitution, perhaps in two years. If the voting trends of June 15 hold, the socialists could take control of almost every major city in the country in municipal elections. Such momentum could lead to a parliamentary victory later, especially if the new constitution elim-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inates some of the rural bias from the electoral system.

The present strategy of the king and Premier is to embrace some socialist positions as their own, and so to dominate the Center. In his first news conference after the elections, Premier Suárez said, "The Union of the Democratic Center will have a center-left philosophy and will advocate profound changes in the economic, social, cultural and political fields." He has told several interviewers that he now regards himself at heart as "a social democrat." On top of this, spokesmen for Suárez have promised that the Premier will not be inhibited in any future election from campaigning up and down the country and using the advantage of incumbency to the fullest. The gloves will be off, they have said, and Suárez will be a formidable campaigner.

The government strategy will be played out against the three main issues in the new Cortes: strengthening the economy, writing the constitution, and granting regional autonomy. With an inflation rate of 30 percent, unemployment approaching one million, an enormous gap in the balance of trade, and standstill growth, the economic issue is the most sensitive and difficult. A few weeks after the elections, the new Suárez government devalued the peseta and announced a new fiscal program that would tax wealth and would end the scandalous evasion of income tax by the middle and upper classes. The revenues generated by this program would be used to alleviate unemployment through public works and social security. In exchange, the government wanted a "social pact" from labor, i.e., acceptance by the trade unions of wage restraint. The Suárez fiscal and unemployment programs are taken almost completely from the Socialist Workers Party's platform, and it will be difficult for the socialists and the trade unions to refuse wage restraint if the government fulfills its promises about taxing the rich to help the poor.

On the issue of the constitution, Suárez has promised that it will be approved by consensus, not simply by majority vote. In short, he intends to bargain over clauses rather than ram them through the Cortes. He will probably accept the principle of direct responsibility of the Premier to the Cortes and the elimination of some of the rural bias in the electoral system. In turn, the Left will probably accept a constitutional monarchy and the bias toward large parties in the electoral system. The net result would be to eliminate the constitution as an election issue.

Suárez also has read the election returns carefully on the issue of regional autonomy and has promised to support some form of autonomy to those regions that want it. In the euphoria over

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gaining what Franco denied them so brutally for so long, the regionalists may look more closely at the form of autonomy than the substance. In any case, they themselves are confused over how much autonomy they really want. Suárez could eliminate autonomy as an election issue by granting the regions little more than the idea of autonomy. He could even campaign as the statesman who gave the Catalans and Basques what Franco took away.

The strategy of the king and Suárez could fail. It will be easier for the Suárez government to describe itself as a social democratic government than to act like one. The new cabinet chosen by Suárez after the elections reflects the problem. Most of the key posts were filled by men like Suárez who served the Franco regime as middle-level bureaucrats. Most of the others are businessmen and financiers who took up politics after Franco died. No matter what the will of Suárez and the men around him, it is doubtful that their experience gives them any understanding of the problems of poverty of Spain or the enormous gap between the rich and poor. Unlike the socialists, the politicians of the Union of the Democratic Center did not even mix with working class Spaniards at mass rallies during the campaign.

X

What if the strategy does fail? Would the king, army and establishment then allow power to pass to the Socialist Workers Party? Would Spain so quickly reach the phase of democracy where opposition is not only tolerated but recognized as the logical alternative to the government? There are no answers to these questions yet. Much depends on the commitment of the king and Suárez to democracy, and there are disquieting signs that they now feel the job has been done, that Spain has moved as far toward democracy as it need go. Throughout the first phase of democratic development, both the king and Premier seemed very concerned about forging a system that the Western world would accept. It was no accident that the king made his promise of democracy to the U.S. Congress instead of the Spanish people. Government officials talked earnestly of joining the European Common Market. Journalists were told this was one way the king could use outside pressure to help him democraticize Spain. Now, the tide of talk has changed.

C. L. Sulzberger, after meeting with the king and Premier Suárez in June, reported that Spain, although it is going through the formality of applying, no longer is so keen about join-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing the Common Market.[3] Sulzberger may have met the king and Suárez while they were in a testy mood. They have been having difficulty negotiating agreements lately with the Common Market, and it is obvious that the Common Market countries, especially France and Italy, with their worries about competition from Spanish agricultural products, do not want Spain in the Market soon. Spanish industrialists themselves are beginning to worry whether their products can compete. But, more important, the recent Spanish hesitation about the Common Market probably reflects a feeling by the king and Suárez that outside pressure is no longer vital for their country; Spain, in their view, has achieved democracy.

Yet the king and Suárez have surprised both outsiders and foreigners before, pushing Spain in directions that were inconceivable a short while ago, accepting democratic doctrines which contradict everything they were taught by their mentors in the Franco era. They could surprise everyone again. Moreover, the king and Suárez may have unleashed democratic forces that they can no longer control. No matter how unpalatable, the prospect of a socialist government may seem more acceptable to them next time around than the alternatives of falsifying the electoral returns or burying democracy by encouraging the army to take over. Spain may have gone too far now to turn back, and circumstances may force the king and Suárez into the role of trying to make the unleashed democratic forces acceptable, especially to the army, rather than the role they now have of controlling these forces.

Spain has changed in countless ways since the death of Franco. There is a good deal of relief there over the ease of that change so far and a good deal of optimism that Spaniards can achieve meaningful democracy. But there are still many ambiguities and unknowns. All an outsider can state with certainty is that Spain has not yet achieved full democracy and doing so will be a much more difficult task than the king and Premier like to admit.

[3] C. L. Sulzberger "No More Room in The Garage," *International Herald Tribune*, June 20, 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peter Osnos

THE POLISH ROAD TO COMMUNISM

On Novy Swiat, a main downtown street in Warsaw, there is a women's lingerie store called Bardotka, a diminutive for the surname of the celebrated French actress. To a Western resident of Moscow (or most other East European capitals) where such establishments tend to have names like Wearing Apparel Store Number Six, the Polish whimsy is remarkable. The observation, however, is not nearly so lighthearted as it may seem at first. There is a growing divergence between the Soviet Union and its largest ally that is understandably a matter of the utmost sensitivity for both countries. Profound differences in the way Poles and Soviets order their worlds in the 1970s start with superficial points of style, but they extend increasingly to fundamental issues of politics, economics and ideology.

Official Poles prefer not to discuss the subject openly with outsiders, but they do acknowledge that for all their supposed commitment to Soviet ideals, Poland today is in certain key respects much as it might have been had the communists failed in their takeover bid three decades ago. The Catholic Church has as strong a hold on the national spirit as ever, despite the regime's concerted antagonism. The Polish Church, with about 30 million adherents in a country of some 35 million people according to accepted estimates, represents the most formidable organized opposition force anywhere in Eastern Europe. Nearly 75 percent of the country's agriculture remains in private hands with no prospect of widespread collectivization. There are, by recent count, 188,000 privately owned businesses and small manufacturers employing about 400,000 people. And the numbers are rising.

Not that Poland is about to break away from the Soviet orbit. No one encountered there, including the most disenchanted intellectuals, seriously thinks such a thing is possible or even worth considering, given that the consequences would almost surely be catastrophic: memories of Czechoslovakia 1968; Hungary 1956; indeed, Poland 1830 when Nicholas I crushed a popular rebellion and then

---

Peter Osnos is the Foreign Editor of *The Washington Post*. From 1974 until this June, he served as *The Post's* Moscow correspondent and traveled frequently to report on Poland, most recently this past spring.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

told assembled Polish noblemen, "I am, praise God, Emperor of Russia and by virtue of this title you belong to me."

Rather, the developments in Poland are taking place within parameters set by the Kremlin for the classically imperial purpose of assuring Moscow's leaders the security and allegiance they demand as the price of Warsaw's independence. The result is a system formally patterned after the Soviet model, guaranteed to support the Soviet Union in the international arena, a staunch and unquestioning ally in the Warsaw Pact and COMECON.

The official structure remains today as derivative of Russian authoritarianism and doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism as, say, Bulgaria's. Party leader Edward Gierek presides over a self-perpetuating Politburo and Central Committee backed by a powerful police and internal security *apparat*. To understand the strength of Moscow's grip, one has only to witness an event like the recent dedication by Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin of a massive new steelworks at Katowice. The new plant features a special rail line to the Soviet frontier which eliminates the time-consuming job of switching wagon-gauges there—an important aid, as any Pole will tell you, to invading Red Army troops in a crisis. Gierek's fawning manner on such occasions is indistinguishable from that of Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov or East Germany's Erich Honecker.

Yet the realities of Polish life today are a great deal more complicated than genuflection to the Kremlin would indicate. Behind the totalitarian front, government actions and policies reflect a wide array of competing influences, many overtly hostile to the Communist Party, that can neither be suppressed nor ignored. The phenomenon is not a new one in Poland, but it is becoming more evident as time passes.

A Soviet satellite with politics that are so much its own is plainly difficult for most Americans to fathom. When Gerald Ford, for example, made his famous gaffe in the second television debate with Jimmy Carter last fall, asserting that Poland was not under Soviet domination, he was certainly confused. In an important sense, though, he was not altogether wrong. Speaking only a short period after the Polish worker riots of June 25, 1976 forced the regime to rescind steep food price increases overnight, Mr. Ford doubtless had in mind to indicate that the Polish people can affect what their government does. He was correct in suggesting, however obliquely, that Poles in that regard are better off than their Russian "big brothers."

From as far back as the turmoil in October 1956 that brought Wladislaw Gomulka to power, down to the Gdansk docker riots in December 1970 that toppled him, and most recently the continuing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tensions in the wake of the June 1976 disturbances, events in Poland demonstrate why the Party leadership has to accede to public sentiment: the alternative is upheaval. The Kremlin has clearly been persuaded that it is not worth the ignominy of a direct intervention to suppress these outbursts. Thus, the Soviets have to tolerate in Poland a degree of open defiance that would be intolerable in the Soviet Union itself. Even Western hard-liners would concede that a population that has the initiative and courage to act on its grievances cannot be considered wholly subjugated. As one senior diplomat in Warsaw explained it in an interview, Poland has developed a kind of "negative democracy"—a people's veto.

II

In sorting out the intricate and delicate relationship between the regime and the people in Poland and how both relate to the Soviets, two points need to be stressed:

—The forms of protest in Poland that are probably best known to foreigners, such as the worker strikes, are actually part of a broader climate of ferment in the country, encompassing the great bulk of the people in one way or another.

—The response of the leadership to these challenges has been flexible, even conciliatory, definitely far more responsive than the Kremlin would be, based on its record.

The Bardotka shop is symbolic in a way of Poland's deceptive bolshevism. Poles are still as different in manner and custom from Russians—witness the quaintly polite use, for instance, of *Pan* and *Pani,* roughly Sir and Madam—as Americans are from the French. Western visitors, especially those who have been elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, are invariably struck by how chic many younger Poles are, how many have traveled extensively in the West, how stunning much of their modern art and design is, how adventurous their theater and films can be, including material imported from abroad in strikingly large amounts. In Warsaw one week not long ago, there were 17 movie houses showing Polish films, 15 featuring American films, nine showing French films, nine with other Western films, and only two with Soviet attractions.

Long after most other East European avant-garde directors who emerged in the thaw of the Khrushchev era have given up in frustration and emigrated to the West, outstanding Polish talents like Andrzej Wajda and Krzysztof Zanussi are as exciting as ever, perhaps even more so.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These are not merely trivial nuances of style. There can hardly have been a more provocative film made *anywhere* in the past year than Wajda's *Man of Marble*. The movie is about the cynical exploitation of a Stakhanovite hero laborer in the early 1950s as uncovered by a young woman preparing a documentary about him in a Polish film school. The laborer is eventually jailed because his integrity has made him a political nuisance, and dies, we are led to believe, in the 1970 Gdansk riots. Cool portrayals of Stalinist types such as a secret police agent transformed 20 years later into the manager of a Warsaw striptease club are gripping. But most important is the strong suggestion that, while contemporary behavior is more sophisticated than its crude antecedents, it is little better.

As the movie ends, the director of the film school is telling the student that her documentary is too sensitive and will not be accepted. For all his well-tailored suits, his ascots, his French sunglasses, his well-traveled urbanity, the director is still a frightened person. The really remarkable fact, of course, is that with so sharp a message, *Man of Marble* was ever released.

When the film opened in Warsaw in March, huge crowds gathered out of curiosity and because there were rumors that it would be quickly withdrawn. Officials insisted that no such plans existed. Western correspondents were told that censors had wanted to delete only one scene in which the laborer is being prepared for his heroic feats with enormous platters of ham and pork. Meat shortages being one of the most contentious issues in the country, it was thought better to remove that moment. Wajda protested and the scene was left in. There was probably a good deal more to the story than that, a round of high-level deliberations at least. Reliable reports circulated that Gierek himself had finally authorized release and approved distribution of the film throughout the country. Months later it was still playing.

Reviews in the official press were generally circumlocuitous, but Wajda spoke pointedly enough in an interview with a literary weekly when he observed that films in Poland lately "say something other than just what a fine artist one is." He said his next film, "though I don't know what it will be about, will certainly be a continuation of the way of showing things . . . applied in my last film." A man like Andrzej Wajda could survive within the system in the Soviet Union. But he could not flourish.

In a sense, a film like *Man of Marble* can be viewed as strictly a cultural event. Poles manage, however, to extend searching examination of their situation into purely political debates also. One of the most important in recent years concerned the country's constitution. Little attention was paid abroad to the debate because it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

took place in the winter and early spring of 1976, before the worker riots of June reminded foreigners of the potential significance of Polish public opinion.

At issue were several amendments evidently intended to bring Poland's 1952 constitution into line with others in the Soviet bloc. These would have sanctioned the Communist Party as "the leading political force in the country," stressed Poland's "inseparable and unbreakable" ties with the Soviet Union, and declared that "citizens' rights are inseparably linked with honest fulfillment of their duties to the socialist motherland"—which the Church saw as an infringement on religious liberty.

Open opposition came initially from scores of prominent intellectuals, figures like the much loved (now deceased) poet Antoni Slonimski and the writer Jerzy Andrzejewski, author of *Ashes and Diamonds*. These were not "internal emigrants" or outcasts in the way so many Soviet dissidents tend to be, people whose outspokenness has already cost them their place in society. Indeed, one signatory on an early petition was the wife of a leading Central Committee member. Their argument was broad, implicitly an attack on communist autocracy, but its essense was that making permanent bonds to the Soviet Union a constitutional principle threatened Poland's national sovereignty.

Next came a formidable attack from Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski. The aged primate of Poland's Catholics declared that these "seemingly insignificant alterations" would create "further divisions between the Party and non-Party Catholics." He particularly condemned a provision that prescribed criminal penalties for using "religion for political ends"—the sort of generality that Wyszynski well knew could mean greater suppression.

Publicly, official spokesmen played down the objections, although any acknowledgment of dissatisfaction is a concession in itself. The Warsaw newspaper *Zycie Warszawy* reported that the "overwhelming majority" of letters it was receiving "generally accept the proposed amendments. Some . . . proposed certain changes and suggestions. There is also a very thin margin—one in every thousand—of people critical of the draft constitution, people who are never satisfied with anything."

But privately negotiations were underway both within the Party itself and between the Party and the Church. The principal mediator for the process was Konstanty Lubienski, a scholarly, elderly member of the Znak Circle, a small Catholic group in the National Assembly that is a representative of Church interests in state affairs, to the limited degree possible. Gradually, the Cardinal eased his opposition. The intellectuals did not have direct discourse with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the leadership but their complaints (eventually hundreds of people had signed various petitions) clearly had some impact.

As presented to the National Assembly in February 1976, the constitution described the Party as "a guiding political force in the construction of socialism," substantially less than the leading role originally envisioned. The reference to "inseparable and unbreakable" ties to the Soviet Union was omitted. The section on citizens' rights merely asserted that people should "honestly fulfill their duties toward the motherland." Criminal provisions that offended Wyszynski were also gone.

Obviously the leadership had the power to push through the amendments without regard to objections. ("Why did we need a new constitution?" Poles joked at the time. "The old one had never been used.") But Gierek and his colleagues plainly recognized that to do so risked exacerbating relations with the Church and the intelligentsia on a basically rhetorical issue. Because, however it may be phrased, the Party runs the state. Nonetheless, the ability of the Church and establishment intellectuals to deter the doctrinal Sovietization of Poland does preserve for Poles some sense of determining their own destiny.

The point is particularly striking when the constitution affair in Poland is contrasted with the "debate" just ending over a new constitution in the Soviet Union. While a great deal of verbiage has been generated in praise of that document, put forth last spring to replace the charter compromised by Stalinist abuses, not a single substantive item is likely to be modified. Certainly there will be no changes in sections pertaining to the supremacy of the Party or the definition of citizens' rights.

What happened in Poland—in effect a bargaining process between the state and opposition elements—would be inconceivable under current circumstances in the Soviet Union. Criticism there is considered ipso facto evidence of disloyalty and disqualifies the dissenter from any meaningful role in internal affairs. Whereas Poles frequently employ overt forms of pressure on the leadership, Russians, except for the scattered few prepared to risk severe punishments, dare not.

Yet another recent instance of Poland's "dialogue" (a pessimist would probably describe it more as a test of wills) concerns the country's private farmers. With the strongest peasant class in Eastern Europe, a bastion of traditionalism and religion, Gierek faces a problem that puts him virtually outside socialist norms: feeding a population with the fruits of private enterprise. (It is fascinating for an outsider to watch the richest of Poland's *kulaks* drive up to luxury hotels in their Mercedes-Benzes and flash thick wads of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

zlotys in the most expensive restaurants.)

A sharp drop in meat output in the mid-1970s, an economic calamity of the first order, was caused as much by a belief among farmers that their holdings were threatened by the government as by bad weather. Despite official assurances that no major changes would be made, several purportedly technical adjustments in the agricultural laws alarmed the farmers, whose suspicion of Party moves is considerable in any event. In 1974 it was decided to stop selling land to farmers through state-run land banks although conventional hand-to-hand sales were permitted. Farmers reacted accordingly. In 1973 they bought 225,000 acres, in 1975 only 40,000—a sign of how their confidence had been jolted.

Then a law was announced in the spring of 1976 that would have enabled the state to take over farms that were demonstrably unproductive. Landowners were alarmed and investments continued to drop sharply. Some smaller farmers (almost 60 percent of the country's farms are smaller than 12 acres) held back their produce altogether. Local officials were ordered into the fields to find out what needed to be done to turn matters around.

In January 1977, a special Central Committee plenum was convened and Gierek pledged again that the Party's attitude toward private farming was positive, "long-term and stable." The takeover law was abandoned. Land banks resumed regular transactions. For the first time, farmers bequeathing land to their heirs were eligible for state pensions. Previously the only way to get a pension was to give up the land to authorities. Farmers, the plenum declared, would be encouraged to purchase capital equipment and reach an optimum size of 30–40 acres per farm. A disparity between urban and rural incomes still exists at just under 20 percent. But on that score the regime is pretty well stuck, as it was an effort to boost retail prices, which would have provided higher payments to farmers, that set off the June 1976 disorders.

III

To an extent the leadership's reactions in all these disparate cases—a politically probing film, a controversy over constitutional semantics and conditions for private farmers—are determined by purely practical considerations. Gierek, after all, came to power in 1971 precisely because Gomulka had proven so remote, insensitive, clumsy and repressive toward the end. For several years the new administration made the right moves: staple food prices remained frozen; incomes rose at over ten percent a year; investment capital was poured into a modernized industrial plant largely purchased in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the West; consumer output was increased; cadres led by the Party chief himself were directed to stay in touch with popular sentiment.

Gierek's gamble was that the payoff would come in good will, a public understanding of why food prices needed to be raised, and an increase in productivity that would enable Poland to amortize its billions of dollars in debts to the West. In effect, he hoped that prosperity would follow once the economy had been suitably stimulated and that Poles would be satisfied with prosperity.

Gierek was wrong. Occasional meetings with selected miners in Katowice, his old comrades, tended to substitute for genuine consultations with the people. Despite a beneficial overhaul in the country's administrative structure, bureaucratic rigidity and the ingrained dogmatism of corporate communists could not be overcome. There were poor harvests to complicate the agricultural shortages (Poles are convinced their best produce is shipped to the Soviets). Instead of gradually introducing higher prices, the whole package was announced at once, for an average boost of about 60 percent. Incredibly, the high-handed approach was the same one used by Gomulka in announcing price increases six years earlier, which led to his downfall. Gierek's goodwill, such as it was, was spent in repeating his predecessor's mistakes.

Yet Gierek and his advisers have also shown a capacity to assume the blame for their errors and take steps to rectify them. "Our work," said the Party paper *Trybuna Ludu,* summing up the events of 1976, "is not easy and nobody says that it is free . . . of subjective errors and mistakes. Poland has been created not by robots, but by human beings [who] . . . sometimes want to achieve their beautiful social and personal life goals more quickly than calculated caution indicates . . . ."

Just as the leadership had understood the need to modify its initial stand on the constitution, it was prepared to backtrack in the prices showdown. Commissions were formed to study the issue while the old prices stayed. Economic plans were hastily revised to reduce expensive new investments without any sacrifice to consumers. There were also the benefits to farmers discussed earlier. The country's private sector was given additional room to expand. Moscow was persuaded to provide substantial extra aid in goods, raw materials and credits. Meat exports, according to government figures, were drastically curtailed (although the supply in shops continues to be mystifyingly small). "We are trying to find untapped resources and propose new solutions," asserted *Trybuna Ludu.*

In short, the purely tactical choice was to mollify the population

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rather than face the certain bloodshed and bitterness of a tougher stance, although in economic terms that might have proved more practical.

But the actions of the Polish leadership could well have a deeper motivation, so subtle that it may not be explicitly recognized by ordinary Poles themselves. This is the possibility that the sheer tenacity of Poland's adherence to certain institutions and mores—the Church, private agriculture, Western habits and styles—is producing a society more inherently liberal (in our terms) than had seemed likely before. Quite simply, the regime views its internal order differently than the Russians do theirs. And after the upheavals of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets have finally accepted that a Poland wholly in Russia's image is impossible. "We understand how complicated" is the molding of Poland as a "socialist society," Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev told Gierek in Moscow in November 1976, "and we know of the difficult problems you must decide." Poland may now be licensed, therefore, to fashion an image of its own, less doctrinaire than the Soviets yet nominally just as socialist.

There was a fascinating hint of that in an article last winter by Mieczyslaw Rakowski, editor-in-chief of the leading Polish weekly *Polityka* and an influential member of the Central Committee. He wrote:

> The creators of Poland's socialist system were the generation of interwar communists, who at the turn of 1945 had only one experience to fall back on: the Soviet one. At present, in the more than 30 years that have elapsed since the end of the Second World War, there exists a world socialist system; there exist powerful communist parties with diverse views as to what socialism should be. The wealth of forms and ways of resolving various economic and social problems used by the individual socialist and communist countries cannot help but encourage a successor generation of Polish Communists to conduct a creative search. That is in line with human nature as well as the ambitions of Poles. Perhaps not everyone is aware of the fact so it bears repeating that creative searching and a restless spirit have occupied an important place in the tradition of the Polish Communist movement. It wouldn't hurt for those who criticize our system from the Right and from outside our Party to bear this fact in mind.

One should not exaggerate. The Poland of Edward Gierek is still a very long way from Eurocommunist pledges of pluralist democracy or even Alexander Dubcek's espousal of "socialism with a human face." Developments in Poland (to repeat) must always take place within the context of ultimate Kremlin hegemony. There cannot be, as there were in Czechoslovakia in 1968, indications that relations with Moscow should be changed somehow to lessen Soviet primacy. There is always what Jacek Kuron, spokesman for the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dissident Workers Defense Committee (established to support workers jailed during the June 1976 disorders) calls "the Soviet tank factor." And it is accepted by everyone in Poland. In an interview with the National Broadcasting Company in Warsaw in May, Kuron put the issue this way:

> There are two models of Soviet intervention. One was used in Hungary, the other in Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian model involves intervention in the face of an explosive situation . . . in reality an uprising which reaches the pinnacle of power. . . . The prime tenet of Polish policy ought, in my opinion, to aim at checking such an explosion, acting to stem its progress and stop it from happening. The other model of Soviet intervention is the Czechoslovakian one. Here intervention takes place as a result of reforms made at the top. And here the Moscow leadership has considerable leeway in that it can choose the moment when these reforms reach such a stage as to endanger the [Soviet] empire. In Czechoslovakia only very little was required to bring in the tanks. However, that should not suggest that the line is a rigid one or that one might go only as far as the Czechoslovaks.

Such factors as Soviet interest in East-West détente and the prospect of armed resistance from Poles, Kuron argues, "would not be taken lightly at the Kremlin" in deciding whether to intervene:

> Therefore I think the possibilities for reform in Poland are very promising . . . at the same time I think that for the present [it is necessary] to maintain a totalitarian facade. Our [the dissenters'] program must be to create a pluralist society beneath this totalitarian facade without disturbing it, to create unofficial social institutions representative of the people's aspirations.

From what are very clearly dissimilar perspectives, Rakowski, the official, and Kuron, the radical, are approaching a similar conclusion: Poland can continue to differentiate itself from the Soviet Union to serve the special needs and demands of the Polish people without posing any anti-socialist challenge to Moscow. Obviously that sort of distinction will never be in the Party platform. It also seems highly doubtful that Gierek will ever tell the Russians, even in the greatest secrecy, that his popular standing, indeed his own survival as the events of June 1976 show, requires that he follow domestic policies specifically less autocratic than the Kremlin's. But that is the situation.

IV

Given the prospect sooner or later of a Eurocommunist government somewhere in Western Europe, it would seem to Soviet advantage to allow Poland the leeway it seeks. The Kremlin would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

almost certainly find it easier to cope with the impact of communist parties participating in the governments of France or Italy, committed to free elections and human rights, if it devises a way now to accommodate to "liberal" tendencies among the satellites.

To a degree, of course, that is already the case with Poland and Hungary as well. Romania has successfully maintained its maverick status in international affairs for more than a decade by knowing exactly the moment to reassure Moscow of its loyalty. In handling last winter's flare-up of dissent throughout the bloc—Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, Romania's Paul Goma, the Kuron group in Poland, writers in East Germany protesting the exile of singer-poet Wolf Biermann—the Soviets plainly gave each of the regimes wide latitude to be firm or lenient, so long as the strategy was effective in quieting things down.

The question remains, however, how far the Soviets are prepared to go along in allowing challenges to State supremacy that are far more basic than the complaints of intellectuals. At what point does the Kremlin start to regard the tremendous vitality of the Polish Church as a threat? Can a private sector permanently be allowed to thrive? Will capitulation to worker demands simply produce a chain reaction of new ones? Does Moscow fear that liberalism abroad inevitably means trouble at home?

Kuron and others optimistically suggest that the Soviets would swallow a great deal more than they did in Czechoslovakia because the only way to stop reforms would be brutally, and that the Gierek regime cannot afford. These Poles contend that so long as what happens in Poland is not presented as a direct affront to Moscow, a deliberate break from Soviet ways declared as such by the leadership, the Kremlin will do no more than grumble.

Polish officials are not so certain. It makes them extremely nervous to have Westerners take note of how much less repressive the country is than the Soviet Union. Comparisons to the Soviet Union are only useful to Poland, they say, if they favor the Soviets.

In other words, Gierek must try to keep some sort of balance between increasing Polish public assertiveness and the evolving limits of Soviet tolerance. The crisis would come if the former starts to far outstrip the latter.

A scenario for such a crisis was played out in May when a young student in Krakow, a supporter of the Workers Defense Committee, was found dead in the stairwell of the tenement where he lived. Fellow students and dissidents claimed he had been beaten to death by security police. A requiem mass and nighttime march through the Krakow streets attracted thousands of people. Masses were held in Warsaw and other cities. Official spokesmen

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countered that the student had been drinking and had fallen. Kuron and a number of other WDC activists were jailed to prevent them from taking part in the demonstrations and to punish them. But police made no further effort to break up the gatherings in Krakow or elsewhere. Church officials then permitted a week-long hunger strike in a Warsaw cathedral. The moment was extremely tense. Yet all sides remained reasonably cool, fearing that an outbreak of violence might prove uncontrollable. In July the arrested dissidents were released and charges against them dropped.

No one expects Gierek to announce any code of civil rights relaxing political and ideological restrictiveness or to dismantle the state's security system. But it is possible that the tendencies toward official responsiveness, tolerance of public voices, private economic initiative and cultural innovation will be accepted as immutable. It is possible that Poland will go further toward respect of personal liberties—as far, in fact, as the Soviets will allow. In that case, there has to be a continuous process of testing and tension to find those Soviet limits. In the process, if Gierek cannot maintain the equilibrium between his constituencies in Poland and Moscow, he will fall.

So long as the Poles have to contend with what they wryly call their "Wild East," American influence in Poland will be limited and subject to the vagaries of U.S.-Soviet ties. Poland nonetheless maintains a special relationship with the United States. It was the first of the Warsaw Pact countries to get most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status. It sends more than five times as many students to U.S. universities as the Soviets do. Polish-Americans, whose sentimental attachment to the Old County is very strong, visit each year in large numbers and several thousand have settled there in retirement. (By contrast, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have no MFN status, few students in the United States and relatively little American tourism.) The Carter Administration's best hope for encouraging the liberalizing instincts in the Polish leadership is to broaden the existing relationship—which may prove easier than in the recent past. Good ties with the United States are extremely popular among Poles, and more than any other regime in Eastern Europe, the one in Poland feels a need to muster all the popularity it can.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

MIDDLE EAST PEACE

To the Editor:

During the years of my involvement in foreign policy matters, I have often had the opportunity of checking my conclusions against those of my good friend George Ball. We have generally been on the same side, both as to analysis of a particular problem and as to the conclusions one should reach with regard to American policy. It is for that reason that I have for some time been wondering why he and I don't seem to see things the same way with regard to the problems of the Middle East. The initial intense reactions here to the recent elections in Israel, followed by what appears to have been a "successful" visit to this country by Prime Minister Begin, lead me to air that concern.

Mr. Ball's article in the April 1977 issue of *Foreign Affairs,* entitled "How to Save Israel in Spite of Herself," illustrates our points of difference. It appears to be a disagreement in our analyses of the underlying problem.

The critical issue of difference is a simple one. It is, in fact, so simple that I often wonder why so many people who write on the Middle East fail to place this point where it belongs: right up front. If there are to be peace negotiations, if there is going to be a peace conference, the parties that come to that conference must come prepared to make peace.

When I use the word "peace," I don't mean a state of armed truce. I mean the word that describes the state of affairs that people normally have in mind when they use the word "peace," whatever the language may be that they speak. The Arab language has two different words that can be translated into the word "peace." The concept that I have in mind is what the Arabs call "*sulch.*" In the context of the Middle East, President Carter has spelled out the first prerequisite of *sulch*:

> the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel's right to exist, Israel's right to exist permanently, Israel's right to exist in peace. That means that over a period of months or years that the borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt must be opened to travel, to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries, the people themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and death that have afflicted that region so long.[1]

As a matter of fact, George Ball does offer a very similar definition of peace in his article. His "comprehensive plan of settlement" would:

> establish as a firm precondition that Israel's neighbors explicitly recognize her as a Jewish sovereign state, and that they commit themselves unequivocally to respect freedom of navigation in the waterways of the area for Israeli ships as well as cargoes, permit free movement of peoples and trade, and take other specified measures to assure full political, economic and cultural intercourse.

[1] The remarks of the President at Clinton, Mass., on March 16, 1977. Text reproduced in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,* Vol. 13, No. 12, p. 361, March 21, 1977.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He goes on to suggest that the Arabs:

> must accept arrangements through leasehold or otherwise to provide Israel control over access to the Gulf of Aqaba by the maintenance of an adequate garrison at Sharm El Sheikh, accept the demilitarization of the Golan Heights, and agree to the injection of neutral forces into that area and into other appropriate buffer zones on a basis such that they cannot be withdrawn without the agreement of both sides.

He also appears to favor linking a West Bank Palestinian Arab state formally to Jordan.

Where the problem arises is in the article's suggestion that the principal obstacle standing in the way of achieving such a settlement is Israeli intransigence. Israel, it says, prevents "possible progress toward peace" because "she refuses to give up the territorial gains from her 1967 conquest." The reason why the parties are not negotiating, the author believes, is that the Israelis "are insisting that the retention of substantial areas of their post-1967 territories is essential to their security" and that the Arabs are "not offering unequivocal assurances of full recognition of Israel." Neither side, he says, is thus prepared to make the first move.

I have followed Middle Eastern developments closely ever since I first came to the Senate in 1949. I have been in touch with the situation ever since, have visited all the lands in question, and have talked to a great many interested persons, both Arabs and Israelis. I simply don't see the cause-and-effect relationships in the same way.

Some of the writers critical of Israel have argued that demanding full recognition constitutes insistence on an unnecessary legalism. I have also heard it said that Israel is insisting on "political concessions" as a precondition to negotiations.

These criticisms obscure the central key word: peace. The necessary first moves to solve the Middle Eastern problem must be, as I see it, a commitment by both sides to an effort to reach an agreement that will result in peace—*sulch*. Israel has, I believe, made such a commitment. The Arabs have apparently not yet done so.

This stark and simple fact becomes clear when we examine even the most recent statement of so moderate and intelligent an Arab leader as Egyptian President Sadat. As late as April 6, 1977, in the same month George Ball's article appeared, he insisted he was not offering Israel anything other than that "the state of belligerency will end." President Assad of Syria has recently reasserted his declarations of enmity against Israel in an interview with Danish journalists.

How can we expect Israel to announce prior to any negotiations that she is willing to give up large areas of territory, to move to a militarily more vulnerable position, if the other side, instead of committing itself to peace, merely suggests that it might consider moving to what is, in effect, a state of nonbelligerence? I am not sure to what extent such a state of nonbelligerence differs from what we have now. Israel has every right to believe, until effectively shown otherwise, that what the Arabs are offering is a nonbelligerence signifying merely that they will not be fighting them today, but are leaving their options open for tomorrow.

What George Ball's article stresses is that if Israel fails to withdraw from the areas occupied in 1967, another bloody war will ensue in which Israel's losses will be great. I believe that Israel's leaders in all of its major political groupings are aware of the fact that this is so and are deeply concerned. But they firmly believe that if Israel withdraws from the occupied territories and makes herself more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vulnerable militarily without an Arab commitment to peace, another war will be just as inevitable and Israel's losses will be even greater. Such a concern is by no means an unreasonable one.

The experience of 1957, when President Eisenhower and Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion confronted each other, an experience which George Ball cites with strong approval, is a case in point. We forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula without obtaining a commitment to peace from Egypt. All we offered Israel was our private commitment to preserve Israeli access to her port of Eilat. Ten years later, years of continuing strife, Nasser established his blockade of Eilat and we did nothing tangible about it. The result was the Six Day War. It is the memory of the consequences of the 1957 withdrawal from the Sinai that causes so much of the Israeli leadership and general public to refuse to endorse the surrender of territories in the absence of an Arab commitment to peace.

The United States helped draft and negotiate U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 at the end of the Six Day War because we knew that the only assurance of peace in the area was direct negotiation, leading to a formal peace treaty between the parties. Israel accepted the Resolution on that assumption. The Resolution, reaffirmed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 after the 1973 war, did not and does not require Israel to withdraw from all the territory acquired through the 1967 war. Secure and recognized borders are to be arrived at through direct negotiations. And we must remember that the pre-1967 borders brought all of inhabited Israel within range of Arab artillery.

The recent Israeli election outcome and the statements of Menahem Begin, the leader of the Likud party, have caused concern among many who fear an adverse effect on peace possibilities for the Middle East. But there is absolutely no basis for believing that if the Arabs sincerely seek peace, Israel will not be sufficiently forthcoming for peace to be concluded. Mr. Begin has reaffirmed Israel's commitment to U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and has publicly asserted a desire to enter face-to-face negotiations with Israel's neighboring Arab states on all open questions in dispute.

We in the United States have had enough experience with elections, and I personally believe I understand Israeli politics well enough, not to read any profound implications into the May 17 results. With all the domestic troubles that Israel has had in the last few years, inflation, strikes, charges of corruption in government, it is not surprising that there was a shift in public opinion from the "ins" to the "outs." There was also an unease about foreign policy, particularly in the light of what then appeared to be confusing signals from Washington.

The new government is led by the Likud party, which is itself a coalition of political groups. All the partners in that coalition appear to agree to Israel's willingness to negotiate with her Arab neighbors pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This is also the position of the Labor Party and the Democratic Movement for Change, the remaining major political groupings in Israel.

What I find truly inspiring about the spirit of the people of Israel is that 29 years after the creation of their state, 29 years in which the other side has been unwilling to make peace, in which Israel has been both under military attack and under terrorist attack against her civilian population, the vast majority continues to offer the hand of peace and friendship. It is time that that hand be clasped.

Ultimately, in a peace settlement, Israel will be expected to give up significant portions of the areas she occupied in 1967. Secure border adjustments are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

necessary and Jerusalem requires special attention. That, however, must understandably come from negotiations and for peace.

Majority consensus in support of such a withdrawal can be reached in that democratic little country. The government in Israel, whether Likud, Labor, or third party, can only make those decisions that the people are ready to accept. That consensus would, I believe, be forthcoming if there is concrete assurance that peace will at last be established.

What we need in order to obtain a Middle East settlement is a commitment by both sides that when such a settlement is negotiated and agreed upon, both sides will indeed be committed to peace.

What we also need on the part of the United States is a continued commitment to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. An imposed solution, supported by the threat of sanctions, as is suggested by the article, is not consistent with that commitment to international law or to our moral and historic commitment to Israel, the only democracy in the Middle East.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
Senator from Minnesota

Mr. Ball replies:

As Senator Humphrey makes clear, he and I are in accord that no settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is possible unless the Arabs agree to a real peace—what he refers to as "*sulch.*" It would be irresponsible to settle for anything else.

But I seriously doubt that this requirement is the most formidable obstacle to a settlement. Though the Arab leaders have so far refrained from any explicit acceptance of a full peace, they show some signs of moving in that direction and would, as I see it, be likely to agree as part of a total bargain. Of course, if they did not agree, no bargain would be possible. But they are certainly not going to give an explicit commitment until assured that that will result in the return of the territories that Israel seized in 1967—territories that include the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Unhappily, the recent categorical statements of Prime Minister Begin have put the Israeli government on record as rejecting such a concession, which compels us to reexamine our own evolving predicament. How long can American taxpayers be expected to subsidize an Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that has already lasted for a decade? How long can we do so without making nonsense of our insistence on morality in foreign policy, which, if it means anything, must include the central principle of self-determination for the million Arabs now living in those territories?

To answer this question one must first understand the full nature of the Israeli dilemma. Israel now treats the million Arabs presently living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as foreigners over whom she exercises military domination. Even if she were permitted to annex the territories—as Prime Minister Begin would apparently like to do—she would have to continue treating the inhabitants as colonial dependents or expel most of them. She could not risk giving the present inhabitants full Israeli citizenship since (taking account of the 450,000 now living in Israel) the Arabs would then constitute one-third of the Israeli population. Not only would that high proportion undercut the fundamental concept of an independent Jewish state, but the Jewish majority would progressively shrink as the Arabs outbreed the Israelis.

Yet in spite of the fact that colonialism is an obsolete institution, Prime Minister Begin apparently still believes that Israel can continue to hang on to these territories while relegating the Arab inhabitants to second-class status.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moreover, he seems to take it for granted that the United States will indefinitely continue the massive subsidy of Israel's economy and armed forces that enabled her to retain her 1967 conquests.

To be sure, he asserts defiantly that, even if American aid were to dry up, Israel would still maintain her present unyielding position, but I do not find that realistic. Israel's economy is in appalling shape, with her gross national product only slightly exceeding her national budget. Without the two billion dollars the United States is annually providing out of public funds and the nearly one billion dollars the American Jewish community generously furnishes, Israel could continue as a garrison state only at drastic cost to her standard of living. Since the hardships resulting from her present overstretched economy have already resulted in emigrants outnumbering immigrants, I cannot regard that as a plausible alternative

How then to break the impasse? Certainly not by trying to drag the parties kicking and screaming to a Geneva conference that would merely freeze positions and lead to a shouting match. President Carter, Secretary Vance and even President Sadat are quite right in seeking some reasonable measure of agreement before risking a formal confrontation.

To narrow the gap will not be easy. Clearly, we must continue to insist that a settlement is possible only if the Arabs agree to a real peace – on that point there is no room for ambiguity. But at the same time we must make clear to the Israeli government that, if we are to be faithful to our own principles and obligations, we cannot continue to provide her with a blank check. America also has interests in the area and a responsibility for world peace that far transcends the parochial politics of the Middle East.

Though identifying with commendable clarity the elements required for a settlement, the Carter Administration has so far failed to make that point effectively; indeed it has sometimes given the wrong signals. But it is not too late for plain speaking.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

Edward L. Morse

POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION. By Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977, 273 pp. $11.95 (Paper, $5.95).

Two pioneering researchers push forward their analysis of the politics of economic and societal interdependence and the modes by which international "regimes" change. A theoretical discussion is buttressed with case studies on international monetary relations, oceans politics, and U.S. relations with Canada and Australia.

THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS. By Hedley Bull. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 335 pp. $20.00.

A masterful analysis of the problem of international order in contemporary society and of the feasibility of such alternative models as disarmament, global organization, a highly proliferated world, and radical redistribution of wealth and power. Bull rejects these models and argues that the state system can provide order, peace and justice.

MICROSTATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS: POLICY PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS. By Elmer Plischke. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977, 153 pp. $3.00 (Paper).

MINI-STATES AND MACRO-COOPERATION: THE CARIBBEAN AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC. By Herbert Corkran. Washington: North American International, 1976, 229 pp. $10.00.

Microstates pose dilemmas for the management of international relationships that are too often disregarded and that will pose increasingly serious difficulties, especially within international organizations. Professor Plischke argues that unless new forms of international participation are developed, the rule of sovereign equality will incapacitate international organizations. Already, a majority of U.N. member nations have fewer people than the state of North Carolina, and this majority could be increased by an additional 50 to 100 members unless proposals like Plischke's are adopted. Many of these mini-states are in the Caribbean and South Pacific; Dr. Corkran explores the history and potential for regional cooperation among them as means to assure their survival and economic growth.

THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT. By Theodor Meron. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1977, 208 pp. $19.00.

Combining his insights as a scholar and career diplomat, Meron assesses historical trends in the development of the international civil services. He argues

---

NOTE—BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE MCGRAW-HILL BOOKSTORE, READERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAY OBTAIN NEARLY ANY BOOK PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES AT THE PUBLISHER'S REGULAR LIST PRICE. WITHIN THE U.S., PLEASE ADD 45¢ PER BOOK FOR POSTAGE PLUS APPROPRIATE SALES TAX. IF OUTSIDE, PLEASE ADD $1.50 PER BOOK FOR POSTAGE AND 95¢ PER ORDER FOR REGISTRATION. SEND ORDERS WITH CHECK OR MONEY ORDER TO: THE MCGRAW-HILL BOOKSTORE, 1221 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10020.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that politicization of the processes of appointment and promotion has paralleled the admission of a majority of members from the less developed world; unless reversed, this process will continue to erode the efficiency and objectivity of the Secretariat.

TO KEEP THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTION. By William W. Orbach. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977, 155 pp. $13.75.

Three case studies in the use of condemnatory resolutions form the basis of an examination of the politics behind U.N. resolutions and of the role of the U.N. in fostering international standards of legitimacy. The author concludes that while the United Nations is more of a microcosm of the world political arena than an independent actor in it, much can be done to improve its performance by restricting the use of condemnatory resolutions and bolstering mechanisms for settling disputes.

THE SUPERPOWERS AND THEIR SPHERES OF INFLUENCE. By Edy Kaufman. New York: St. Martin's 1977, 208 pp. $16.95.

A systematic examination of Soviet and U.S. relationships with their neighbors in Eastern Europe and Latin America, this book takes an essentially broad view. The author deliberately minimizes the role of domestic factors in determining foreign policy. While the book deals with recent as well as past events, it has a somewhat static quality, as fits the author's mode of analysis.

THE IMPACT OF THE COLD WAR: RECONSIDERATIONS. Edited by Joseph M. Siracusa and Glen St. John Barclay. Port Washington (N.Y.): Kennikat Press, 1977, 207 pp. $12.50 (Paper, $6.95).

Nine authors from five countries reflect on the impact of the cold war upon the societies, politics and foreign policies of 11 nations. The book as a whole sheds light on aspects of comparative foreign policy usually ignored in American writings.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL REALITIES AND EUROPEAN UNIFICATION. By Werner J. Feld and John K. Wildgen. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1977, 177 pp. $16.60.

DECISION MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. By Christoph Sasse and others. New York: Praeger, 1977, 352 pp.

These two volumes focus on different aspects of the current political paralysis in the Community. Feld and Wildgen analyze survey data on mass public and elite attitudes toward European unification and the current "politics of rejection." Sasse and his colleagues come to similar conclusions based on case studies of Community decision-making, but they imply that reforms in Commission procedures and in the European Parliament can create greater legitimacy and authority for European institutions.

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Surya P. Sharma. Bombay: Tripathi, 1976, 323 pp. Rs. 55.

A useful handbook on the positive law in what is perhaps the most traditional subject of international conflict. The author expends much energy cataloguing cases and too little on major policy issues of contemporary relevance, such as the conceptualization of future types of disputes, or prospects for bilateral settlement or third party mediation.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE. By A. H. Robertson. Manchester (U.K.): Manchester University Press, 1977, 329 pp. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, distributor, $20.00).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe is unique as a region in which international procedures and mechanisms have been created to ensure the maintenance of fundamental human rights. Professor Robertson, the former Director of Human Rights at the Council of Europe, traces the history of the European Convention on Human Rights and analyzes and evaluates the mechanisms by which these rights are guaranteed. An eminently readable text and source book.

General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

ENERGY: GLOBAL PROSPECTS 1985-2000. Report of the Workshop on Alternate Energy Strategies. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977, 291 pp. $6.95 (Paper). SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE. By Amory B. Lovins. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1977, 256 pp. $15.00 (Paper, $6.95).

The first work is the final report of an important two-year multinational effort, under the guidance of Carroll L. Wilson of M.I.T., to assess world energy demand and supply. The report concludes that oil supplies will run short of demand sooner than is generally expected, probably between 1985 and 1995, and that there is an urgent need to prepare now for the coming oil shortage with alternate fuels. Apart from its substance, this report serves as a model of private international collaboration in studying a critical global problem. Amory B. Lovins continues here his provocative and iconoclastic approach, arguing that we can rely on less energy supply than is usually assumed and taking a more optimistic view than does the Wilson study of "soft energy" options, such as solar, in part because his analysis extends beyond the year 2000.

THE ENERGY SYNDROME: COMPARING NATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE ENERGY CRISIS. Edited by Leon N. Lindberg. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1977, 384 pp. $14.00.

A retrospective analysis of energy policy and policymaking in seven countries, with the editor's comparative chapters the most valuable. They suggest that fundamental reforms of a political nature must be undertaken if policy lags and institutional rigidities are to be overcome.

TECHNOLOGY, WORLD POLITICS AND AMERICAN POLICY. By Victor Basiuk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 400 pp. $17.50.

As the title implies, this is a wide-ranging and ambitious work of synthesis, the product of many years of reflection and writing. Rather than seeking to impress the reader with a single "message," Basiuk has chosen to offer a cornucopia of insights and observations which are likely to weather the test of time.

MANKIND AND THE YEAR 2000. By V. Kosolapov. Moscow: Progress, 1976, 236 pp. (Chicago: Imported Publications, distributor, $2.50).

Of interest chiefly because of its Russian source, this volume exemplifies the difficulty in mixing ideology with futurology. According to the cover, the author "demonstrates the fundamental difference between the Marxist-Leninist prevision of the future and bourgeois futurology, and shows the close connection between the scientific and technological revolution and the Communist remaking of the world"; nevertheless, there are some interesting insights to be gained here.

DEFENDING AMERICA: TOWARD A NEW ROLE IN THE POST-DETENTE WORLD. By Theodore Draper and others. New York: Basic Books, 1977, 255 pp. $13.95.

Thirteen well-known authors, including James R. Schlesinger, Paul Nitze, Eugene Rostow, Albert Wohlstetter and Walter Laqueur, with a common purpose: to point out the failures and inadequacies of the policy of détente as practiced in the time of Henry Kissinger. As is to be expected, the authors are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deeply concerned over the growth of Soviet military power, as they perceive it, and its political implications.

THE COUNTERINSURGENCY ERA: U.S. DOCTRINE AND PERFORMANCE—1950 TO THE PRESENT. By Douglas S. Blaufarb. New York: Free Press, 1977, 341 pp. $10.95.

Although it deals with counterinsurgency from the Philippines to Latin America, the bulk of this work is about the American experience in Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam. Writing from the vantage point of a Washington insider during the 1960s, Blaufarb examines in considerable and interesting detail the enthusiasm for counterinsurgency of the early Kennedy era, the pacification program, Phoenix and CORDS. This book is impressive as an historical study, admitting mistakes of policy and fair in its overall judgments. The reader will be struck once again by the difficulty of matching lofty intentions with bureaucratic procedures and local realities.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN MODERN TIMES. By Amos Perlmutter. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, 335 pp. $15.00.

A major and surely lasting contribution to the growing literature on civil-military relations. Building upon his past analyses of the military in Israel and Egypt, Perlmutter enlarges his scope to the entire globe, boldly presenting typologies and concepts which will form the basis of new interpretations and intellectual controversies.

THE ARMS BAZAAR: FROM LEBANON TO LOCKHEED. By Anthony Sampson. New York: Viking, 1977, 352 pp. $12.95.

This well-written tour of the burgeoning arms trade by a veteran British journalist takes the reader into the world of Western arms dealers, purchasing sheiks, and corporate bribery. Long on fascinating details but short on policy prescriptions.

BEYOND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: NEW AIMS, NEW ARMS. Edited by Johan J. Holst and Uwe Nerlich. New York: Crane, Russak, 1977, 320 pp. $16.50.

An unusually well-integrated collection of essays, based on the correct assumption that new military technologies and changed political perceptions are altering the strategic environment at the Soviet-American and European levels. The result of a European-American workshop, the book maintains a consistently high level of analysis throughout.

ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. By J. I. Coffey. New York: Praeger (for the International Institute for Strategic Studies), 1977, 255 pp. $18.50.

This book is now the best and most comprehensive work on the complex issues of security and arms control in Europe. Coffey synthesizes with balance and skill the diplomatic negotiations and the literature on the problem of the past decade and develops his own imaginative yet realistic proposals for the future.

INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR NUCLEAR FUEL PROCESSING. Edited by Abram Chayes and W. Bennett Lewis. Cambridge: Ballinger (for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences), 1977, 251 pp.

The question of creating a multinational framework for nuclear reprocessing is once again at the forefront, given the European determination to proceed with the breeder reactor and reprocessing despite the Carter Administration's decision to place a moratorium on civilian reprocessing. This important contribution to the current debate examines the range of problems that would be involved in setting up such an international institution, and does so with dispassionate analysis rather than advocacy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES AND AGREEMENTS. Edited by John H. Barton and Lawrence D. Weiler. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977, 444 pp. $12.95.

The result of a special effort of the Stanford Arms Control Group to write a work for the non-specialist, this is a balanced, comprehensive, and knowledgeable work on a subject which is less arcane and more political than is often assumed.

PROBLEM Y ZAPRESHEHENIIA ISPYTANII I HASPROSTRAN ENIIA YADERNOGO ORNZHIIA. By A. N. Kaliadin. Moscow: "Nanka," 1976, 348 pp. Rubles 1.37.

The record of agreements and disagreements on the banning of nuclear tests and on the proliferation of nuclear weapons from the mid-1950s to the present. Although mainly a summary of known proposals put forward in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, with the Soviets on the side of virtue and U.S. imperialism on the side of evil, the book is noteworthy as a comprehensive account by one of the leading Soviet experts on disarmament.

J.C.C.

SOVIET NAVAL INFLUENCE: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN DIMENSIONS. Edited by Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell. New York: Praeger, 1977, 657 pp. $27.50.

This thick volume, encompassing 30 chapters by almost as many authors, is a companion piece to two earlier symposia on the Soviet Navy. Although the emphasis is intended to be on the political role of the Soviet Navy, on which there is some good writing here, too much extraneous material must be waded through.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

STORM OVER THE MULTINATIONALS: THE REAL ISSUES. By Raymond Vernon. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, 260 pp. $12.50.

Long the leading authority on multinationals, Professor Vernon of Harvard has now provided a synthesis of the present state of knowledge and argument that is as concise and clear as it is comprehensive. He quietly jettisons folklore and shibboleths about the nature of the conflicts between sovereigns and companies. Confusion about the real issues plus conflicting national actions threaten serious damage to the world economy. To build an acceptable international regime for the multinational enterprise is extremely difficult, especially when "it is hard to detect among the leaders of government and of business any disposition to begin serious work."

A HISTORY OF THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION. By Fritz Machlup. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 323 pp. $20.00.

The relatively recent use of "integration" as a word of power in international relations permits one of the deans of American economics to perform extraordinary acrobatics in this entertaining and valuable volume. Detective work on first use is followed by a brilliantly compact and lucid exposition of the essentials of international economics. Then come an annotated bibliography and biographical dictionary which are a bit idiosyncratic in the choice of entries—but who has a better right? One wishes more attention could have been given to how the word passed into policy in the 1940s as something between "cooperation" and "unification."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH. By Fred Hirsch. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (for the Twentieth Century Fund), 1976, 224 pp. $10.00.

This highly original book makes a compelling argument that affluence, by creating a kind of congestion (much more than simple crowding), limits the welfare attainable by society as a whole. The choices that the market offers the individual never embody the real alternatives that result from everyone's wanting more or less the same thing. Ingenious arguments about public and private consumption, "positional" goods, the national accounts and even sex make for stimulating reading and challenge some fundamental elements of standard liberal thought.

THE MINING INDUSTRY AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. By Rex Bosson and Bension Varon. New York: Oxford University Press (for the World Bank), 1977, 292 pp.

This is an excellent account of how the world mining industry operates, some of the changes it is going through and the related conflicts between private business and national governments. Advice is offered to all parties on how best to get what they really want.

THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER: A STUDY OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT. By Fred L. Block. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 294 pp. $14.00.

A sociologist who aims to demystify money by relating it to power, Professor Block has dug deep into postwar history, with mixed results. Some useful corrections of commonly accepted views are combined with acceptance of other common distortions of American policy. Military spending is given proper emphasis as a factor in bringing down the dollar. But some good ideas—"national capitalism" as the main enemy of economic internationalism at the end of the war—are left disappointingly undeveloped.

DIE OSTBEZIEHUNGEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT. Edited by Eberhard Schulz. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1977, 272 pp.

Neither a history nor a detailed analysis of current issues, this valuable book emphasizes basic factors shaping East-West relations in Europe and especially those influencing the way the members of the European Community act, separately or in common. The English, French, American and German authors go off in various directions but are pulled together by the editor in an excellent conclusion.

EMPLOYMENT, GROWTH AND BASIC NEEDS: A ONE-WORLD PROBLEM. Prepared by the International Labour Organization. New York: Praeger (for the ODC and the ILO), 1977, 223 pp. $3.95 (Paper).

When reports by international economic organizations are commercially published, something must be going on. In this case it is the new popularity of "basic human needs" as the objective of development strategies and foreign aid, for which this ILO report on employment is a basic document.

ENERGY FOR EUROPE: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. By Guy de Carmoy. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977, 120 pp. $3.25 (Paper).

An attractively succinct survey of Europe's oil dependency, alternative energy sources, divergent national policies and relations with the superpowers. Depending on the U.S. to lead, failing to make economic adjustments and lacking the will to act in common leave Europe in a highly uncertain position.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ENERGY POLICIES OF THE WORLD: VOL. II. Edited by Gerard J. Mangone. New York: Elsevier, 1977, 320 pp. $17.50.

Three very different cases—Indonesia, the North Sea countries, and the Soviet Union—are examined by highly competent people. Vol. I was reviewed in *Foreign Affairs,* April 1977.

WORLDWIDE INFLATION: THEORY AND RECENT EXPERIENCE. Edited by Lawrence B. Krause and Walter S. Salant. Washington: Brookings, 1977, 686 pp. $19.95 (Paper, $9.95).

Eight country studies, five other papers and comments on them make up the first installment of a valuable Brookings study that stresses the global aspects of inflation.

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: CONFRONTATION OR COOPERATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH? Edited by Karl P. Sauvant and Hajo Hasenpflug. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1977, 474 pp.

A well-put-together combination of documents and public statements with specially prepared commentaries, mostly by young American and German scholars, makes a comprehensive and thoughtful review of major issues.

POLICYMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. Edited by Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Carole Webb. New York: Wiley, 1977, 341 pp. $21.95.

Case studies by English and American scholars of taxes, money, competition, industrial policy, regional development, energy, sugar and several other subjects. In telling what happened and why, they give a realistic picture of how the Community manages to do some things and not others.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES. By Xenophon Zolotas. Athens: The Bank of Greece, 1977, 503 pp.

Thirty years of papers written by the distinguished Governor of the Bank of Greece who has long been a prominent figure in international affairs.

AGRICULTURE AND THE STATE: BRITISH POLICY IN A WORLD CONTEXT. Edited by Brian Davey, T. E. Josling and Alister McFarquhar. London and Toronto: Macmillan (for the Trade Policy Research Centre), 1976, $37.50.

Estimates of the effect on British agriculture of entering the European Community were thrown out of focus by world food prices so that some of the elaborate calculations in this volume lose their impact. The key contention, however, remains sound: that farm products cannot be insulated from other trade negotiations.

JUSTICE ÉCONOMIQUE INTERNATIONALE. By Kurt Waldheim and others. Paris: Gallimard, 1976, 292 pp. Fr. 36.

Essays by Mexican and European economists—Romeo Flores Caballero, André Fontaine, Barbara Ward among them—celebrating the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States.

S. SH. A.: GOSUDARSTVO I EKONOMIKA: MEKHANIZM GOSUDARSTVENNO-MONOPOLISTICHESKOGO REGULIROVANIIA EKONOMIKE. Edited by Yu. I. Bobrakov and V. A. Fedorovich. Moscow: "Nanka", 1976, 590 pp. Rubles 2.20.

S. SH. A.: VNESHNE-EKONOMICHESKAIA STRATEGIIA. Edited by M. I. Zakhmatov. Moscow: "Nanka", 1976, 495 pp.

Soviet economic expertise on the United States is exceeding its norm. The first of these books is a handbook for Soviet readers on how the U.S. economy is "regulated." The second and more important, relying on Marx, Lenin and a multitude of U.S. statistics, describes U.S. foreign economic policy largely in terms of expansion at the expense of Europe and the Third World.

J.C.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SELECTED READINGS ON INTERNATIONAL PAYOFFS. Edited by Yerachmiel Kugel and Gladys W. Gruenberg. Lexington (Mass): Lexington Books, 1977, 181 pp. $16.50.

A variety of views on a newsy subject.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

THE UNMAKING OF A PRESIDENT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND VIETNAM: By Herbert Y. Schandler. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, 419 pp. $16.50.

This study, informed by new data from interviews and recently available documents, focuses on the Tet offensive and President Johnson's decision not to run for reelection. The author assigns principal responsibility for the shift in American policy to Clark Clifford, then Secretary of Defense. Colonel Schandler served in the Defense Department in the 1960s and was a compiler of the Pentagon Papers.

BIG STORY: HOW THE AMERICAN PRESS AND TELEVISION REPORTED AND INTERPRETED THE CRISIS OF TET 1968 IN VIETNAM AND WASHINGTON. By Peter Braestrup. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press (for Freedom House), 1977, 2 vols. $50.00.

A staggeringly detailed analysis of American press coverage of the Tet offensive. Braestrup, at the time chief of *The Washington Post's* Saigon bureau, contends that serious procedural and structural flaws caused the press to present a North Vietnamese military defeat as a victory. Volume II consists of tabulations of stories and pictures carried by major dailies, news weeklies, wire services and networks.

HOOVER, ROOSEVELT, AND THE BRAINS TRUST. By Elliot A. Rosen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 446 pp. $16.95.

A leading scholar dissents from recent efforts to depict Herbert Hoover as an innovator and reemphasizes Raymond Moley's importance as a progenitor of the New Deal.

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND WORLD POWER. By Robert A. Isaak. New York: St. Martin's, 1977, 216 pp. $12.95.

A neo-Wilsonian appeal to the United States to be true to New World humanitarian ideals and to steer clear of Old World cynicism. The author exaggerates the dichotomy.

TOMORROW'S AMERICAN. Edited by Samuel Sandmel. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, 188 pp. $7.95.

Eight lectures prepared for a general audience. The most thoughtful are by the late Alastair Buchan (on U.S. foreign policy) and the theologian Martin Marty.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: Third Edition. By Henry A. Kissinger. New York: Norton, 1977, 445 pp. $9.95 (Paper, $4.95).

Fifteen of the author's major speeches as Secretary of State plus the pre-1969 essays from the first edition. Ordinarily, old speeches by a former Secretary of State make dreary reading, but this material remains interesting and cogent.

TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by William P. Bundy. New York: New York University Press, 1977, 251 pp. $15.00.

These bicentennial essays appeared originally in *Foreign Affairs*. The authors are Felix Gilbert, Alastair Buchan, Gordon A. Craig, John Paton Davies, George F. Kennan, Abraham F. Lowenthal and Charles P. Kindleberger.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE MASTER ARCHITECTS: BUILDING THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN SERVICE 1890–1913. By Richard Hume Werking. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977, 330 pp. $18.75.

A close study of reforms in the consular service, the foreign service, and the State Department. The author maintains that the reorganization precipitated by two world wars was based on foundations laid earlier.

CONGRESS – KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT. By Morris P. Fiorina. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, 105 pp. $8.50 (Paper, $2.95).

A stimulating indictment of the role of Congress in perpetuating a triangle of self-interest: constituents want benefits at someone else's expense; Congressmen, seeking reelection, try to oblige; bureaucrats want growth for their agencies and accordingly provide favors for Congressmen. The general welfare is ill-served.

THE MEDIA ARE AMERICAN: ANGLO-AMERICAN MEDIA IN THE WORLD. By Jeremy Tunstall. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 352 pp. $14.95.

A jumbled, often overstated, but nonetheless fascinating account of the direct and indirect (through imitation) influence of American print, film and broadcasting. Less systematic than Read's *America's Mass Media Merchants* (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1977).

THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN. New York: Doubleday, 1977, 394 pp. $12.95.

This bland and genial autobiography, nearly complete when Warren died in 1974, contains few surprises except for some hard jabs at President Eisenhower for privately opposing the Warren Court's decisions on civil rights and school desegregation.

THE COMMON LAW ZONE IN PANAMA: A CASE STUDY IN RECEPTION. By Wayne D. Bray. San Juan (P.R.): Inter American University Press, 1977, 150 pp. $20.00

An erudite and witty discussion of the introduction and application of American common law to the Panama Canal Zone. The footnotes march waist-high through the text in the best law review tradition, but the content sparkles with insight. Essential reading for those who wish to understand the roots of current U.S.-Panamanian negotiations.

IMPERIAL BRAIN TRUST: THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. By Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977, 334 pp. $17.50.

Avowedly Marxian in its viewpoint, this study draws on a wealth of research, and carries the account right up to the present. It tends to mix the "soft" evidence of the actions of individuals who were, or later became, members of the Council with the relatively "hard" evidence of what Council-sponsored groups and individuals actually wrote and said, and the relation of this to policy. And there are curious omissions – almost nothing on the position of Council members toward Hitler and cooperation with Russia in the 1930s, or on the variety of views (including communist ones) that have appeared in this magazine from its earliest days. The picture of the Council that emerges bears a striking resemblance to that often painted on the Far Right. In its high degree of selectivity, it may seem remote from reality to anyone associated, for example, with the current 1980s Project, or to anyone who (like this reviewer) has experienced the individualism of the Council's membership.

W.P.B.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

THE RISE OF THE PARTI QUÉBÉCOIS 1967–1976. By John Saywell. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, 174 pp. $12.50 (Paper, $5.95).

A useful contemporary history composed of the author's yearly paragraphs on the subject in the *Canadian Annual Review*.

G.S.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE ANDEAN REPUBLICS: PERU, BOLIVIA, AND ECUADOR. By Fredrick B. Pike. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, 493 pp. $25.00.

We are given here a work of unusual breadth and insight, encompassing political and cultural history, myth, socio-biology, dependency relationships, ideology, Mammon, the human spirit, and a score of other fascinations, brought together in the grand manner. The author's views on the difficulties that the U.S. may encounter in the post-modern era, in comparison with the possibly greater ease of Andean adjustment, will leave many readers unpersuaded; but this is unlikely to lessen the pleasure of immersion in so unusual and stimulating a book.

FOUR MEN: LIVING THE REVOLUTION/AN ORAL HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY CUBA. By Oscar Lewis, Ruth M. Lewis and Susan M. Rigdon. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977, 538 pp. $15.00.

Intimate and gossipy in the unique Oscar Lewis tradition, his final work explores the texture of life within a revolutionary society, but on levels far below the plane upon which public and official discourse takes place. Forms change, institutions flower and die, but the earthy realities of daily existence retain their marvelous powers of self-perpetuation.

THE BRITISH CARIBBEAN: FROM THE DECLINE OF COLONIALISM TO THE END OF FEDERATION. By Elizabeth Wallace. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, 274 pp. $17.50.

This is the most detailed and complete account yet available of the political aspects of the Federal movement in the British Caribbean from the turn of the century to the demise of Federation in 1962. Its shattering collapse is attributed here to the triumph of insular over national loyalties and to "a lack of any positive fellow-feeling among its scattered people."

FREEDOM IN THE CARIBBEAN: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. By Sir Fred Phillips. Dobbs Ferry (N.Y.): Oceana, 1977, 737 pp. $40.00.

The juridical background of independence movements in the Commonwealth Caribbean is traced here, including constitutional milestones en route to the termination of "Whitehall Overlordship." An immense appendix provides more than 500 pages of treaties, constitutions, Orders and agreements.

VIOLENCE AND POLITICS IN JAMAICA 1960–70: INTERNAL SECURITY IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY. By Terry Lacey. London: Cass, 1977, 184 pp. (Totowa, N. J.: Biblio, distributor, $22.50.)

An analysis of the causes and manifestations of internal frustration and violence, and the countervailing role of the security forces and the government in attempting to contain disorder.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERUVIAN DEMOCRACY UNDER ECONOMIC STRESS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE BELAUNDE ADMINISTRATION, 1963–1968. By Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, 308 pp. $16.50.

A former economic advisor to the Peruvian government and manager of the Central Reserve Bank analyzes developmental, tax and fiscal problems in the pre-Velasco decade. The treatment is competent, the style civilized and entertaining, the prose mercifully free of jargon.

TERMS OF CONFLICT: IDEOLOGY IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS. Edited by Morris J. Blachman and Ronald G. Hellman. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977, 275 pp. $8.95.

Published as part of a series sponsored by the Center for Inter-American Relations, this is a useful collection of essays exploring ideology in its various national manifestations, in Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile, as well as in a general Latin American overview. One interesting study is devoted to the ideological content of U.S. hemispheric policy.

AUTHORITARIANISM IN MEXICO. Edited by José Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977, 241 pp. $11.50.

The central theme of these nine papers—also in the Center for Inter-American Relations series—is the relationship of the political, economic and social pattern of Mexican life to the development of bureaucratic-authoritarian, or corporatist, politics in South America (particularly in Brazil and Argentina). The essays suffer the inevitable variation in readability, but the scholarship is uniformly competent.

CORONELISMO: THE MUNICIPALITY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN BRAZIL. By Victor Nunes Leal. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 237 pp. $16.95.

This is the first appearance in English of a classic Brazilian study, published in 1948 and long out of print. Its subject is the consequences of "the superimposition of structured forms, evolved through the representative process, on an inadequate social and economic structure."

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

THE TOTALITARIAN TEMPTATION. By Jean-François Revel. New York: Doubleday, 1977, 311 pp. $8.95.

Another hard-hitting tract by a well-known French writer who has little patience for what he considers left-wing softness on Stalinism. He sees communists playing on liberal gullibility and criticizes the benign or relaxed view of Eurocommunism. A controversial, timely book.

LES SOCIALISTES, LES COMMUNISTES ET LES AUTRES. By Jean-Pierre Chevènement. Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1977, 352 pp. Fr. 42.

A left-wing Socialist interprets Socialist-Communist relations, past and present, and his radical picture of class struggle in France leads him to be an ardent exponent of a staunchly leftist position.

RÉVOLUTIONNAIRES DE LA S.F.I.O. By Jean-Paul Joubert. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977, 304 pp. Fr. 95.

Essentially a study of Marceau Pivert, a revolutionary Socialist who during the Popular Front period broke with Blum and founded his own radical workers' party. Written by an academic and a passionate partisan of his subject, always with an eye to the present opportunity for militant socialism.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE IN FRANCE, 1940–1944. By John F. Sweets. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976, 272 pp. $12.50.

An absorbing account of the cooperation and activities of the three major Resistance groups in southern France, based on a good deal of archival material, including some recently declassified OSS reports of the time.

L'INTELLECTUEL CONTRE L'EUROPE. By André Reszler. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1976, 161 pp.

A very slight essay on a grand theme: the roots of the anti-Europeanism that is now fashionable among European intellectuals. The author sees Sartre as the Kipling of decolonialization.

VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA PYATOI RESPUBLIKE. By I. A. Koloskov. Moscow: "Nanka," 1976, 303 pp.

This Soviet interpretation of de Gaulle's foreign policy dwells on the contradictions between Gaullism's pursuit of "the national interest," leading to greater independence from the United States and closer relations with the socialist countries and the Third World, and its class character, leading France in the opposite direction. Extensive treatment of Franco-Soviet relations.

J.C.C.

BETWEEN CENTER AND PERIPHERY: GRASSROOTS POLITICIANS IN ITALY AND FRANCE. By Sidney Tarrow. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, 272 pp. $15.00.

A fine work on the relations of the center of French and Italian political power to outlying regions, largely done through interviews of mayors in selected locations. A well-known political scientist specializing in Italian and French affairs, the author strikes a successful balance between contemporary theory and empirical results.

ANTONIO GRAMSCI AND THE REVOLUTION THAT FAILED. By Martin Clark. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, 255 pp. $15.00.

A suggestive work on Gramsci's role in trying to set up factory councils in Turin. A relatively narrow subject enlivened by general observations on Gramsci's thought, Italian politics and the development of Italian Communism.

SURVIVING WITHOUT GOVERNING: THE ITALIAN PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT. By Giuseppe Di Palma. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 315 pp. $14.00.

An American political scientist examines the functioning of the Italian parliament in a scholarly fashion but without masking his deep concern about the future of Italian politics.

THE FIRST DUCE: D'ANNUNZIO AT FIUME. By Michael A. Ledeen. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1977, 225 pp. $13.50.

A highly readable account of the warrior-poet's exploits in 1919–1920, with an overly strong emphasis on the prototypical character of his rule. Here was born, the argument runs, the new politics, the blending of the religious and the profane into a fascist-type movement.

INTERPRETATIONS OF FASCISM. By Renzo De Felice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, 288 pp. $15.00.

A useful review of some of the literature on fascism, both European and Italian, by a well-known, if controversial, specialist on Mussolini's regime. A thoughtful introduction by an American scholar, Charles F. Delzell, enhances the value of the work.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: VOL. V, THE PROPHET OF TRUTH 1922–1939. By Martin Gilbert. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, 1167 pp. $30.00.

The magisterial recital continues: the central theme of this volume is Churchill's realization from the moment of Hitler's assumption of power that Germany would go to war and that Britain was in grave danger. The story is told largely through Churchill's words, though the author's own efforts are worthy of the subject. Important and engrossing.

THE FUTURE THAT DOESN'T WORK: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY'S FAILURE IN BRITAIN. Edited by R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr. New York: Doubleday, 1977, 206 pp. $6.95.

A collection of provocative essays on various aspects of Britain's decline by British and American publicists and academics, for many of whom socialism in theory and practice is the culprit. Some essays are particularly informative, such as James Wilson's on "Crime and Punishment in England."

NATIONALISM AND SOCIALISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY IRELAND. By E. Rumpf and A. C. Hepburn. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1977, 275 pp. $26.60.

A revised and updated version of a German dissertation written in 1959, this is a sociological-geographical analysis of Irish politics, radicalism and the labor movement since the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921.

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE STATE. By Peter Paret. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976, 467 pp. $18.95.

A well-wrought, lucid and penetrating analysis of perhaps the greatest military thinker of modern times, set against the background of Clausewitz's personal and intellectual development. An exemplary study that cuts across conventional lines of inquiry, as did its subject.

IRON AND STEEL IN THE GERMAN INFLATION 1916–1923. By Gerald D. Feldman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, 518 pp. $26.50.

A major scholarly effort, based on private business records and public archives, to assess the manner in which heavy industry survived and indeed benefited from the turmoil of defeat and long-term inflation. An important contribution to German history in the interwar period and to the relation of inflation to politics.

INNEN-UND AUSSENPOLITIK UNTER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHER BEDROHUNG. Edited by Erhard Forndran and others. Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1977, 361 pp. DM. 49.

A collection of scholarly essays on the relations between Nazi Germany and its most important foreign partners, with particular emphasis on the reciprocal connections between domestic and foreign politics in all countries. The basic intent is admirable, the execution uneven and a bit superficial.

CORPORATISM AND DEVELOPMENT: THE PORTUGUESE EXPERIENCE. By Howard J. Wiarda. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977, 464 pp. $20.00.

A far-ranging, stimulating study of the theory and practice of Portuguese corporatism which the author, an American scholar versed in Latin American studies, views as a socio-political form of governance that continues to have important implications for the present.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

STALINISM: ESSAYS IN HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION. Edited by Robert C. Tucker. New York: Norton, 1977, 332 pp. $19.95.

Taken individually or as a whole, these essays mark an advance in our knowledge of the phenomenon of Stalinism. There is no clear conclusion, as Tucker notes in his preface, least of all in the question of whether Stalinism is an inevitable result of Marxism in action.

THE POLITICS OF SOVIET POLICY FORMATION: KHRUSHCHEV'S INNOVATIVE POLICIES IN EDUCATION AND AGRICULTURE. By James B. Bruce. Denver: University of Denver Graduate School of International Affairs, 1976, 138 pp.

Applying parallel patterns to two key policies of the Khrushchev period, the author brings out some interesting points though with no more than marginal success in illuminating the policymaking process.

OBSHCHESTVENNOCT'I PROBLEMY VOINY I MIRA. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia, 1976, 319 pp.

Leading lights of the Soviet institutes of international affairs (Inozemtsev, Arbatov, Primakov, Zhurkin, et. al.) elaborate Soviet foreign policy in the context of "the world movement of peace-loving forces."

THE UNKNOWN WAR WITH RUSSIA: WILSON'S SIBERIAN INTERVENTION. By Robert J. Maddox. San Rafael (Calif.): Presidio Press, 1977, 151 pp.

A short and well-organized historical study which focuses on Wilson's motives and the dichotomy between his public statements and his actions. But is this episode so unknown, and was it really a "war with Russia"?

SSSR-SShA: EKONOMICHESKIE OTNOSHENIIA: PROBLEMY I VOZMOZHNOSTI. Edited by E. S. Shershnev. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1976, 416 pp.

The most extensive and sophisticated presentation so far of Soviet views on bilateral economic relations with the U. S., containing a long discussion of developments since 1972 and of forms, and problems, of future cooperation.

DÉTENTE AFTER BREZHNEV: THE DOMESTIC ROOTS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. By Alexander Yanov. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1977, 87 pp.

This relatively brief "policy paper" is worth serious attention as a contribution to the current debate in the West on détente with the U.S.S.R. It is a rare account by a Soviet former historian and journalist on how factions and interest groups within the Soviet establishment affect and are affected by foreign policy, and how a sophisticated Western strategy can influence long-run trends to the benefit of the West and of the Russian future.

TO BE PRESERVED FOREVER. By Lev Kopelev. New York: Lippincott, 1977, 268 pp. $12.50.

An abridged English edition of the personal memoir of a Russian Jewish writer who spent over a decade in Stalin's prisons and labor camps and now lives, a known dissident, in Moscow. The account is calm, factual, and intensely human.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN COMMUNIST STATES. Edited by Archie Brown and Jack Gray. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977, 286 pp. $24.00.

Authors and editors with an excellent command of their material have made a heroic and partially successful effort to give unity to this book on seven communist countries (USSR, three in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, China, Cuba) through the concept of political culture and the comparative method. Hard going for the general reader.

DIE DDR ZWISCHEN OST UND WEST: VON 1961 BIS 1976. By Peter C. Ludz. Munich: Beck, 1977, 367 pp. DM. 19.80.

A West German expert on East Germany, who knows the subject nearly as well as Erich Honecker, discusses its policies and problems, internal and external. The analysis of "inner-German" relations is superb.

RUSSIAN REALIST ART: THE STATE AND SOCIETY. By Elizabeth Valkenier. Ann Arbor (Mich.): Ardis, 1977, 251 pp. $7.50 (Paper).

While the greater part of this book is 19th century Russian cultural history, its later chapters deal with art and politics after the Revolution and with questions that still confront the Soviet government and Russian artists today.

TWENTIETH CENTURY CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE MEANING OF ITS HISTORY. By Josef Korbel. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 346 pp. $14.95.

POLAND IN THE 20TH CENTURY. By M.K. Dziewanowski. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 309 pp. $14.95.

Korbel's historical narrative, while done with skill and often sharp judgment (for example, on the role of Beneš), is subordinated to his search for the meaning of the nation's history in the recurring experiences of the quest for freedom and justice and the acceptance of their denial. Dziewanowski's book, though a summary and somewhat simplified history for English-speaking readers to whom Poland "still remains an enigma," covers the main lines with competence, understanding, and a touch of romantic nationalism.

WARTIME. By Milovan Djilas. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977, 470 pp. $16.95.

The third volume of Djilas's memoirs is the story of the Partisan war as only he could tell it, with fascinating details on the military action, personalities (especially Tito, and Djilas himself), and dealings with allies and enemies. As in his other works his prose captures the drama of the times.

THE ALBANIANS: EUROPE'S FORGOTTEN SURVIVORS. By Anton Logoreci. London: Gollancz, 1977, 230 pp. £8.50.

Anton Logoreci, for years associated with the BBC's Albanian broadcasts, is well qualified to present Albanian history and politics to Western readers, though his book is all too brief. His characterization of the Hoxha regime is merciless: the country is "an enclosed camp where Mao's totalitarian doctrines, interlaced with local Stalinist practices, have been tried out under perfect laboratory . . . conditions."

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

ARAB STRATEGIES AND ISRAEL'S RESPONSE. By Yehoshafat Harkabi. New York: Free Press, 1977, 194 pp. $10.00.

General Harkabi, one of Israel's foremost experts on the Arabs, indicates some change in his earlier estimates of Arab thought and strategy, and some in his own thinking. He suggests, *inter alia*, that Israel should announce its

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

readiness to offer territorial concessions and to negotiate with the PLO, forcing the Arabs to articulate their own objectives.

TERROR OUT OF ZION. By J. Bowyer Bell. New York: St. Martin's, 1977, 374 pp. $13.95.

Bowyer Bell, who has a deserved reputation as an authority on terrorists and guerrillas, outdoes himself in this colorful history of the Irgun and the "Stern Gang" in the days of the British Mandate and the war of 1948. The words and acts of Menachem Begin, which are prominent in the story, take on added interest in the light of current events in Israel.

ON EAGLES' WINGS: THE PERSONAL STORY OF THE LEADING COMMANDER OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE. By Ezer Weizman. New York: Macmillan, 1977, 302 pp. $8.95.

Since writing this breezy book, which tells much about the Israeli Air Force and more about the author's personality, Weizman has become Minister of Defense in the government of Menachem Begin.

WAR AND PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE EXPERIENCES AND VIEWS OF A U.N. OBSERVER. By Odd Bull. London: Leo Cooper/Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1977, 205 pp. $14.00.

General Bull of the Norwegian Air Force served the U.N. in Lebanon in 1958 and as Chief of Staff of UNTSO from 1963 to 1970. His straightforward account of his experience testifies to his neutrality and his integrity, which won the respect of both sides. Although but a minor contribution to history, it is valuable for its lessons on the role of U.N. observation and peacekeeping forces.

LEBANON IN STRIFE: STUDENT PRELUDES TO THE CIVIL WAR. By Halim Barakat. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977, 242 pp. $14.95.

A sociologist's study of Lebanon, with particular attention to the students as a political motor and vanguard of change. In a brief epilogue the author relates the recent civil war to the main study and gives his own pessimistic views on the present state of Lebanese—and Arab—society.

HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY. VOL. II: REFORM, REVOLUTION AND REPUBLIC: THE RISE OF MODERN TURKEY, 1808–1975. By Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 518 pp.

The second volume of a monumental history of the Ottoman Empire. The authors use a wealth of hitherto buried material from the archives in Istanbul where Stanford Shaw has been a pioneer scholar. The book is at its best in covering the 19th century, as the republican period gets but a short conventional summary.

THE MIND OF A MONARCH. By R. K. Karanjia. London: Allen & Unwin, 1977, 265 pp.

The Shah of Iran speaks his piece in a series of interviews with an Indian journalist. The questions are not very demanding—from the start Karanjia regards the Shah as Plato's ideal philosopher-king—but the answers help one to understand the Shah's view of himself and his mission.

IRAN: AN ECONOMIC PROFILE. By Jahangir Amuzegar. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1977, 280 pp. $12.95.

The profile takes the form of a handbook containing much useful information, an almost colorless discussion of policies, and an official glimpse into the future. The author is Iran's Principal Resident Representative to the IMF and World Bank.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IN THE DIRECTION OF THE GULF: THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PERSIAN GULF. By A. Yodfat and M. Abir. London: Cass, 1977, 167 pp. (Totowa, N.J.: Biblio, distributor, $19.50).

This book demonstrates the competence and thorough knowledge of the published material one would expect from these authors and also the extraordinary interest Israeli scholars have taken in Soviet policy and in making known to the West their views on the subject.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

"TWO BILLION PEOPLE: A SURVEY OF ASIA." By Norman Macrae. London: *The Economist,* May 7, 1977.

The deputy editor of *The Economist* has written a stunning tour de force on Asian economic development. Its major theme is that, in the past decade and a half, after many centuries during which the real problem of poverty in Asia has been rural underemployment, two different sorts of societies have begun to break through to creating full employment in the countryside. One of them is communist China, which has been following a policy which Macrae calls "rural Keynesianism." The others are "capitalist roaders" such as South Korea and Taiwan, following the trail blazed by Japan.

On the mostly authoritarian governments in Asia, Macrae has some heretical conclusions that will pain Western liberals and conservatives alike. Of the 16 non-communist governments in the area, he says, there are only two for which he could in no circumstance vote. Of the seven communist countries in the area, only two have a really rotten ruling system. Most Asian leaders, opines Macrae, are in politics because they have a genuine desire to see their peoples advance in income and happiness.

Although such a broad scope and such sweeping conclusions may bring upon him scholarly wrath, Macrae has done what desperately needed to be done—to look upon East Asia as a whole, to identify the major problems and the most successful responses, and to put it all into an historical and cultural framework. No one could fail to profit from this essay.

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR IN ASIA. Edited by Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, 448 pp. $20.00.

A useful collection of Japanese, British and American views on the genesis of the cold war in Asia. Among the most interesting essays are Nakajima's on the Sino-Soviet split, Slusser's on Soviet policy in Korea (which hypothesizes that Stalin aimed during World War II and immediately thereafter at obtaining a warm-water port on the Korean peninsula), and D. C. Watt's on British wartime policy in the Far East. Watt describes the contempt with which Far Eastern specialists in the British Foreign Office viewed American naiveté. The British presciently feared that American expectations for democracy in China would eventually fuel cynicism and disillusionment great enough to overturn the course of events in the Far East. It could be argued that the United States had similarly unrealistic expectations about other Asian countries and that these excessive expectations will fuel a new disillusionment with the American presence in Asia.

CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: 1949 TO THE PRESENT. By Stephen Andors. New York: Pantheon, 1977, 344 pp. $17.95 (Paper, $6.95)

A substantial and original account of industrial organization in China which is, however, seriously flawed by the author's ideological biases. Most questionable are his views that China has discovered a new path to modernization without relying on a technocratic or bureaucratic elite and that China is the harbinger of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a "new global socialist civilization." In fact, since the end of the Cultural Revolution, as Andors himself makes clear, there has been "far greater stress . . . on the importance of control, discipline and leadership, and much less emphasis on worker innovation and spontaneity. It is also clear that the technical personnel who had been so thoroughly criticized during the Cultural Revolution were once again wielding significant authority in many factories, and that great importance was placed on statistics, on efficient and productive quotas and norms. . . . and on technical controls in general."

CHINA AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. By Jürgen Domes. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, 293 pp. $15.00.
CHINESE POLITICS AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. By Byung-joon Ahn. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977, 406 pp. $15.00.
LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE. Edited by Victor H. Li. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977, 488 pp. $20.00.

Domes' book is a very competent analysis of Chinese politics between 1969 and 1973. Ahn focuses on the period between 1958 and 1966. Li's book consists of papers presented at a conference in 1971, some of which have been updated to 1972 or 1973. But, as Li himself notes, some very important changes took place in China's foreign trade patterns between 1973 and 1976. (For those developments the reader should see the annual survey of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*.)

CHINA'S ECONOMIC REVOLUTION. By Alexander Eckstein. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977, 340 pp. $19.95 (Paper, $6.95).

The last work of a brilliant pioneer in the study of the Chinese economy. Eckstein concludes that, barring a repetition of the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, or similar inanities, China should be able to sustain a six percent rate of growth to the end of this century. This would quadruple the gross domestic product and make China one of the five largest economies in the world.

DIMENSIONS OF CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS. Edited by Chun-tu Hsueh. New York: Praeger, 1977, 293 pp.

The two best essays in this uneven collection are A.M. Halpern on Sino-Japanese relations since normalization and Steven Levine on Soviet-American rivalry in Manchuria between 1945 and 1949.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STRUCTURE IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. By Paul W. Kuznets. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977, 238 pp. $16.50.
KOREAN PHEONIX: A NATION FROM THE ASHES. By Michael Keon. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1977, 234 pp.

Kuznets is scholarly, cautious and detached. Keon is an Australian journalist enraged at what he considers to be the superficial American reporting on South Korea, and he has written a hard-hitting brief for the Park government which deserves to be widely read. He paints a vivid picture of the South Korean president who sounds more like a puritan than a fascist and whose model seems to be the Meiji emperors of Japan, not Charles I. Kuznets, the son of the famous development economist, points out that the South Korean growth rates under the present regime have been among the world's highest. Also, as others have observed, growth in South Korea has been unusually equitable.

WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS FROM KOREA? AEI Defense Review, No. 2. Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977, 28 pp. $1.50.

A good statement of the issues involved in the projected U.S. withdrawal from Korea. Senator George McGovern defends the policy; General Richard Stilwell, recently retired as commander of the U.N. forces in Korea, presents the case for maintaining the status quo.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PAKISTAN: THE LONG VIEW. Edited by Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti, and W. Howard Wriggins. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1977, 485 pp. $19.75.

An excellent collection of essays on Pakistan. Ziring's introduction is particularly thoughtful. He points to "a significant limitation of Pakistan's leaders," namely their "tendency to provoke but not control sub-national ethnic, regional and religious group controversy." Others also point to the failure of national integration. In a refreshingly candid appraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy, William Barnds notes how surprising it is that so poor a country should have sought security through confrontation rather than accommodation with a neighbor several times its size.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967–1970. By John J. Stremlau. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, 418 pp. $25.00.

Since the initial spate of reportage on Nigeria's civil war subsided, the author of this study has evidently been gathering and assimilating a mass of hitherto unpublished material. The result is what now seems the definitive analysis of the international aspects of the Nigerian civil war, which is at the same time an engrossing narrative account of the internal conflict.

MODERN NIGERIA. By Guy Arnold. New York: Longman, 1977, 192 pp. $13.50 (Paper, $6.50).

This comprehensive exposition on Nigerian political and economic evolution since the war is also superb; focusing on the post-Gowon period, the author brings to bear an impressive range of information and analysis on current Nigerian planning, administration and prospects.

INTERPRETERS FOR NIGERIA: THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS. By Morris Davis. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977, 197 pp. $10.00.

Hardly the far-reaching analysis implied by the subtitle, this monograph is essentially a straightforward account of the competitive public relations efforts carried out on behalf of Nigeria and Biafra during the civil war.

SOUTHERN AFRICA IN CRISIS. Edited by Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977, 277 pp. $12.50.

The editors have produced an informative and up-to-date (through autumn 1976) survey for the student or general reader, distinguished by contributions from Colin Legum and John Marcum, as well as a particularly illuminating essay on post-independence Mozambique by Tony Hodges.

BRITAIN, RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA 1900-1945. By Martin Chanock. London: Cass, 1977, 289 pp. (Totowa, N.J.: Biblio, distributor, $22.50).

This intelligent study points up an often overlooked aspect of British policy with regard to the establishment of the settler regime in Rhodesia: the function of Rhodesia as first and foremost an element in British policy toward South Africa, and only later as an important actor itself in the imperial drama.

STRATEGIC HIGHWAYS OF AFRICA. By Guy Arnold and Ruth Weiss. London: Julian Friedmann/New York: St. Martin's, 1977, 178 pp. $12.95.

Politics more than economics has determined the pattern of African transportation systems; as this lucid and carefully detailed book shows, neither political nor economic pressures for regional or continental integration have proven strong enough to produce significant links between the old colonial networks.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Janet Rigney

SOURCE MATERIAL

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org.* and *Food and Agric. Org.:* Unipub, Inc., P.O. Box 433, New York 10016. *Int. Labor Office:* 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *European Communities:* 2100 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:* 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 95th Congress, 1st Session. New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

La Charte nationale algérienne (27 juin 1976), by Nicole Grimaud. Paris, La Documentation Française, 1976. 106 pp. (Notes et Études Documentaires, 4348-50.) Fr. 14.00.

The Rhodesian Sanctions Bill. Hearing, Subcommittees on Africa and International Organization, Committee on International Relations, House, on H.R. 1746, Feb. 24, 1977. Washington, 1977. 68 pp. 85¢.

Agriculture

UNRISD Studies on the "Green Revolution." Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1976. $2.50 each.

14. Some social and economic aspects of the introduction of new varieties of paddy in Malaysia, by U.N. Bhati. 192 pp. *15.* The new rice in Indonesia, by Ingrid Palmer. 198 pp.

Asia and the Pacific Ocean

Decolonization in East Timor. Jakarta, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1976. v.p.

Japan's economy and Economic Planning Agency. Tokyo, Japanese Government, 1977. 73 pp.

Kuomintang—key to China's future. Taipei, Department of Overseas Affairs, Central Committee, Kuomintang, 1976. 112 pp.

Atomic Power

International cooperation to curb nuclear proliferation. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S. Res. 94, Feb. 21, 1977. Washington, 1977. 4 pp. (S. Rept. 95-103.)

Commercial Policy and Trade

A Common interest in a common fund: proposals for new structures in international commodity markets, by Helen O'Neill. N.Y., 1977. 48 pp. (An UNCTAD publication.)

Export administration amendments of 1977. Report, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senate, to accompany S.69, Feb. 21, 1977. Washington, 1977. 82 pp. (S. Rept. 95-104.)

——. Report, Committee on International Relations, House, on H.R. 5840, Apr. 6, 1977. Washington, 1977. 58 pp. (H. Rept. 95-190.)

——. Conference report, Committee of Conference, House, to accompany H.R. 5840, May 18, 1977. Washington, 1977. 29 pp. (H. Rept. 95-354.)

——. Act, approved June 22, 1977. Washington, 1977. n.p. (95-52-H.R. 5840.)

New directions and new structures for trade and development: report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to UNCTAD IV. N.Y., 1977. 76 pp. (E.77.II.D.1.) $5.00.

Disarmament

Analysis of arms control impact statements submitted in connection with the fiscal year 1978 budget request. Prepared for Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, and Committee on International Relations, House, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Apr. 1977. Washington, 1977. 414 pp.

Arms Control and Disarmament Act amendments of 1977. Report, Committee on International Relations, House, to accompany H.R. 6179, Apr. 25, 1977. Washington, 1977. 17 pp. (H. Rept. 95-219.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany H.R. 6179, May 16, 1977. Washington, 1977. 70 pp. (S. Rept. 95-193.)

REDUCTION of military budgets: measurement and international reporting of military expenditures; report prepared by the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets. Report of the Secretary-General. N.Y., 1977. 60 pp. (E.77.I.6.) $4.00.

EASTERN EUROPE

THE SOVIET Union and the Third World: a watershed in great power policy? Report to the Committee on International Relations, House, by the Senior Specialists Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, May 8, 1977. Washington, 1977. 186 pp.

VNESHNIAIA politika Sovetskogo Soiuza i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia: sbornik dokumentov 1975 god, ed. by I.A. Kirilin and others. Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia," 1976. 207 pp. 75 kop.

ECONOMIC POLICY

HUMAN settlements performance standards. Report of an expert group meeting, United Nations Headquarters, 15-19 December 1975. N.Y., 1977. 83 pp. (E.77.IV.7.) $6.00.

ISSUES at the summit. Report, Joint Economic Committee, Congress, May 4, 1977. Washington 1977. 51 pp. (Jt. Com. Print.)

POLICIES for innovation in the service factor: identification and structure of relevant factors. Paris, OECD, 1977. 235 pp. $11.25.

TOWARDS a new international economic order: a final report by a Commonwealth Experts' Group. London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1977. 104 pp.

TOWARDS full employment and price stability: summary of a report to the OECD by a group of independent experts. Paris, OECD, 1977. 52 pp. $4.50.

ENVIRONMENT

ENVIRONMENTAL policy in Sweden. Paris, OECD, 1977. 144 pp. $6.25.

STATE of the environment: first report. Luxembourg, Commission of the European Communities, 1977. 261 pp. $12.50.

UNITED Nations Environment Programme: 1975 annual review, by the Executive Director. N.Y., 1976. 50 pp.

FINANCIAL POLICY

THE EURO-CURRENCY markets and the international activities of Canadian banks, by E.W. Clendenning. Ottawa, Economic Council of Canada, 1976. 150 pp. $4.80.

INTERNATIONAL financial institutions. Hearings, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S. 871 and S. 872, Mar. 9-10, 1977. Washington, 1977. 122 pp.

FOREIGN AID

IDA: International Development Association. Washington, World Bank, 1977. 48 pp.

INTERNATIONAL Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977. Report, Committee on International Relations, House, on H.R. 6714, May 3, 1977. Washington, 1977. 87 pp. (H. Rept. 95-240.)

INTERNATIONAL development institutions authorizations—1977. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House, on H.R. 5262, Mar. 22-24, 1977. Washington, 1977. 411 pp.

THEY know how . . . an experiment in development assistance, by the Inter-American Foundation. Washington, G.P.O., 1977. 159 pp.

MIDDLE EAST

ARAB boycott. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Finance, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Senate, on S. 69 and S. 92, Feb. 21-Mar. 15, 1977. Washington, 1977. 616 pp.

COMPARATIVE study of development plans of Arab states. N.Y., 1976. 268 pp. (ID/167.)

POPULATION

AN ADDRESS on the population problem, by Robert S. McNamara. Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1977. 57 pp. (One of a series of lectures at MIT on "World Change and World Security.")

FERTILITY and family planning in Europe around 1970: a comparative study of twelve national surveys. N.Y., 1976. 180 pp. (E.76.XIII.2.) $10.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LEVELS and trends of fertility throughout the world, 1950-1970. N.Y., 1977. 361 pp. (E.77.XIII.2.) $19.00.

LE NOUVELLE politique de l'immigration. Paris, Secrétariat d'État aux Travailleurs Immigrés, n.d. 164 pp.

WORLD population prospects as assessed in 1973. N.Y., 1977. 183 pp. (E.76.XIII.4.) (Population Studies, No. 60.) $12.00.

RAW MATERIALS AND ENERGY RESOURCES

ALTERNATIVE long-range energy strategies. Jt. hearing, Select Committee on Small Business and Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., Dec. 9, 1976. Washington, 1977. 650 pp.

GEOPOLITICS of energy, by Melvin A. Conant. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Senate, Jan. 1977. Washington, 1977. 151 pp. (Com. Print: Energy Publication No. 95-1.) $1.65.

ENERGY balances of OECD countries 1973/1975. Paris, OECD. 1977. 129 pp. $10.00.

PETROLEUM co-operation among developing countries. Proceedings of the United Nations Meeting on Co-operation among Developing Countries in Petroleum, Geneva, 10 to 20 November 1975. N.Y., 1977. 144 pp. (E.77.II.A.3.) $9.00.

UNITED NATIONS

THE UNITED Nations and outer space. N.Y., 1977. 41 pp. (E.77.I.9.) $2.50.

UNITED STATES

AUTHORIZING appropriations for fiscal year 1978 for military procurement, research and development, active duty, selected reserve, and civilian personnel strengths, civil defense, and for other purposes. Report, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, to accompany H.R. 5970, May 9, 1977. Washington, 1977. 163 pp. (S. Rept. 95-129.)

DEPARTMENTS of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, fiscal year 1978. Report, Committee on Appropriations, House, to accompany H.R. 7556, June 2, 1977. Washington, 1977. 64 pp. (H. Rept. 95-382.)

EXTENDING and amending the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. Report, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House, to accompany H.R. 6415, May 2, 1977. Washington, 1977. 22 pp. (H. Rept. 95-235.)

FOREIGN Relations Authorization Act, fiscal year 1978. Report, Committee on International Relations, House, to accompany H.R. 6689, Apr. 29, 1977. Washington, 1977. 58 pp. (H. Rept. 95-231.)

——. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany H.R. 6689, May 16, 1977. Washington, 1977. 59 pp. (S. Rept. 95-194.)

FOREIGN Relations of the United States. Washington, 1976.

1949. Vol. VII. The Far East and Australasia. Part 2. pp. 601-1220. $9.30.

INTERNATIONAL Security Assistance Act of 1977. Report, Committee on International Relations, House, on H.R. 6884, May 9, 1977. Washington, 1977. 52 pp. (H. Rept. 95-274.)

THE INTERNATIONAL Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1977. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany S. 1160, May 16, 1977. Washington, 1977. 62 pp. (S. Rept. 95-195.)

SUPPLEMENTAL State Department authorization for fiscal year 1977. Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, to accompany H.R. 5040, Feb. 21, 1977. Washington, 1977. 13 pp. (S. Rept. 95-99.)

U.S. economic growth from 1976 to 1986: prospects, problems and patterns. Studies prepared for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress. Washington, 1977. (Jt. Com. Prints.)

9. Technological change. 61 pp. (94th Cong.) *10.* The quality of economic growth. 41 pp. *11.* Human capital. 153 pp. *12.* Economic growth in the international context. 61 pp.

WESTERN EUROPE

DIE ENTWICKLUNG der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1969-1976: Bericht und Dokumentation. Bonn, Bundesministerium für Innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 1977. 266 pp.

MANPOWER policy in Finland. Paris, OECD, 1977. 155 pp. (OECD Reviews of Manpower and Social Policies, 17.) $8.00.

TEXTS relating to the European political co-operation. Bonn, Press and Information Office, 2nd ed., 1977. 176 pp.

To authorize supplemental military assistance to Portugal for fiscal year 1977. Hearing and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

markup, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Committee on International Relations, House, on H.R. 3976, Mar. 1, 1977. Washington, 1977. 45 pp.

Western Hemisphere

Conference of Plenipotentiaries for the Amendment of Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, San José, Costa Rica, July 16-26, 1975: final act. Washington, General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, 1975. 13 pp. $2.00.

Guide to Latin American business information sources. Washington, Department of Publications, General Secretariat, Organization of American States, 1977. 29 pp. (Documentation and Information Series, 1.) $1.00.

Meeting of the Juridical Sub-Commission of the International Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile, Berlin, German Democratic Republic, 6 February 1977: documents. Berlin, International Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile, 1977. 41 pp.

Modernizing Mexican agriculture: socioeconomic implications of technological change 1940-1970, by Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara. Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1976. 350 pp. (Report No. 76.5.)

U.S. economic relations with Latin America. Hearings, Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships, Joint Economic Committee, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 28-Aug. 12, 1976. Washington, 1977.

Women

Eighteenth Assembly of the Inter-American Commission of Women, Miami, Florida, 27 July-5 August 1976: final act. Washington, General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, 1977. 128 pp. $4.00.

World War II

Cassino to the Alps, by Ernest F. Fisher, Jr. Washington, Center of Military History, United States Army, 1977. 584 pp. (United States Army in World War II, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 4.) $17.00.

II. OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Acta Baltica 1976. Königstein im Taunus, Institutum Balticum, 1977. 290 pp. (Liber Annalis Instituti Baltici, XVI.)

Adelphi Papers. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977. $1.50 each. *130*. Nuclear power and weapons proliferation, by Ted Greenwood and others. 51 pp. *131*. The Soviet Union and the PLO, by Galia Golan. 34 pp.

Administration for Development: A Comparative Perspective on the Middle East and Latin America, ed. by Jack W. Hopkins. Bloomington, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, 1976. 69 pp. (Occasional Paper.)

Die agrare Grundbesitzverfassung im Raume Surakarta: Untersuchungen zur Agar- und Sozialstruktur Zentral-Javas, by Werner Röll. Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz (for the Institut für Asienkunde, Hamburg), 1976. 127 pp.

The Agricultural Development of the Republic of China. Taipei, Secretariat of the 10th WACL and 23rd APACL Conferences, 1977. 92 pp.

The American Diplomatic Revolution: A Documentary History of the Cold War 1941-1947, ed. by J.M. Siracusa. Port Washington, N.Y., Kennikat Press, 1977. 263 pp. $12.95.

The American Journey: A Theology in the Americas, by Joe Holland. N.Y., IDOC/North America (in cooperation with Center of Concern, Washington), 1976. 110 pp. $2.50.

America's Oil and Energy Goals: The International Economic Implications; A Preliminary Appraisal. Washington, International Economic Policy Association, 1977. 45 pp.

Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945-1950. Erster Teil: 1945-1947, by Walter Lipgens. Stuttgart, Ernst Klett Verlag, 1977. 674 pp. DM. 88.00.

The Appeal that was Never Made: The Allies, Scandinavia and the Finnish Winter War, 1939-1940, by Jukka Nevakivi. Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976. 225 pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ARBEITEN AUS DER ABTEILUNG ENTWICKLUNGSLÄNDERFORSCHUNG. Bonn, Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1977.
47. Zambia: Reflexionen zu Partei und Gesellschaft im Entwicklungsstaat, by Erfried Adam. 40 pp. *48*. Brasilien: Rolle der Gewerkschaften in der Sozialpolitik, by Arno Dreschers. 47 pp. *49*. Appropriate Technology: Hebel der Entwicklungspolitik, by Bernd Balkenhol. 38 pp. *50*. Gemeinwesenentwicklung: kritische Reflexionen und Perspektiven, by Reinhold Meyer. 32 pp. *51*. Venezuela: Gewerkschaftspolitik, by Michael Zink. 42 pp. *52*. Chile: Gewerkschaften: aktuelle Entwicklungen und neue Strukturen, by Günter Zenk. 10 pp.

THE ATLANTIC PAPERS. Paris, The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977. $4.00 each.
4, 1976. International monetary relations after Jamaica, ed. by Fabio Basagni. 82 pp.

BEHIND THE HEADLINES. Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1977. 75¢ each.
Vol. XXXV. No. 5. In defence of multinationals: the myths, the realities, and the future, by E. Hugh Roach. 33 pp. *No. 6*. Strategic aspects of the polar regions, by G.R. Lindsey. 24 pp. *Vol. XXXVI. No. 1*. Non-alignment: the dynamics of a movement, by Ernest Corea. 23 pp.

DER BEITRAG NEUTRALER STAATEN ZUR FRIEDENSSICHERUNG, UNTERSUCHT AM BEISPIEL ÖSTERREICHS UND DER SCHWEIZ, by Alfred Aebi. Zürich, Schweizerischer Aufklärungs-Dienst (for the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, Genève), 1976. 236 pp. (Thèse No. 286.)

BERICHTE. Cologne, Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 1977.
1. Der Kampf um Maos Vermächtnis. Teil 1: Vom Sturz Teng Hsiao-p'ings zum Sieg Hua Kuo-fengs, by Thomas Scharping. 30 pp. *2*. Das sowjetisch-syrische Verhältnis vor dem Hintergrund der Libanon-Krise, by Gerd Linde. 40 pp. *3*. Der öffentliche Haushalt in der DDR, by Gert Leptin. 45 pp. *4*. Das Staatshaushaltssystem Polens nach 1945, by Reinhard Peterhoff. 78 pp. *5*. Jugendprobleme in Jugoslawien, by Wolf Oschlies. 52 pp. *6*. Rentner als Arbeitskräfte in der sowjetischen Wirtschaft, by Maria Elisabeth Ruban. 26 pp. *7*. Die Folgen der KSZE aus östlicher Sicht, by Gerhard Wettig. 44 pp. *8*. Zum Start ins 10. Planjahrfünft: die sowjetische Wirtschaft 1976/77, by Hans-Hermann Höhmann and Gertraud Seidenstecher. 32 pp. *9*. Moskau und der europäische Kommunismus nach der Gipfelkonferenz von Ost-Berlin, by Heinz Timmermann. 53 pp. *10*. Die Schlussakte der KSZE und die seitherige östliche Politik in der Frage der Informationsverbreitung, by Gerhard Wettig. 29 pp. *11*. Argumentationslinien der UdSSR und der DDR im Blick auf die Verwirklichung ihrer KSZE-Verpflichtungen, by Gerhard Wettig. 44 pp. *12*. Die Bukarester WPO-Erklärung und die KSZE-Thematik, by Christian Meier. 34 pp. *13*. Konsum und Wirtschaftsplanung in der UdSSR, by Hans-Herman Höhmann and Gertraud Seidenstecher. 53 pp. 14. Literatur aus der Bundesrepublik in der UdSSR und sowjetische Literatur in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1974-1976, by Peter Hübner. 55 pp. *15*. Psychology in Czechoslovakia: background, bibliographies, current topics, and perspectives for the future, by Josef Brožek. 53 pp. *16*. Zur Auseinandersetzung mit dem Eurokommunismus in der UdSSR, by Borys Lewytzkyj. 40 pp. *17*. Aktivitäten im Gebiet der Baikalsee-Amur-Eisenbahn. Teil I, by Bernd Knabe. 39 pp. *18*. Aktivitäten im Gebiet der Baikalsee-Amur-Eisenbahn. Teil II, by Bernd Knabe. 74 pp. *19*. Aktivitäten im Gebiet der Baikalsee-Amur-Eisenbahn. Teil III, by Bernd Knabe. 116 pp. *23*. Die SED der 80er Jahre: das neue Programm und Statut der Partei, by Eberhard Schneider. 121 pp. *24*. Entwurf eines neuen Arbeitsgesetzbuchs für die DDR, by Karin Schmid. 33 pp.

BEYOND THE NEW MYTHOLOGY: THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE MID-SEVENTIES. Wayne, N.Y., Cyanamid, 1977. 27 pp.

THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE AND SOUTH AFRICA, by Jan du Plessis. Arcadia, Pretoria, Foreign Affairs Association, 1977. 18 pp. (Study Reports, 5.)

BRITAIN IN EUROPE—THE FIRST FOUR YEARS AND THE FUTURE, by George Thomson. London, The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, 1976. 8 pp. (Annual Memorial Lectures, 9th.) 50 p.

COUDENHOVE-KALERGI, by Jerzy Lukaszewski. Lausanne, Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1977. 18 pp. Sw. Fr. 11.50.

LA CRISE DES PAIEMENTS INTERNATIONAUX ET LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DU COMMERCE EST-OUEST. Brussels, Établissements Émile Bruylant (for the Bibliothèque de la Fondation Paul-Henry Spaak), 1976. 160 pp.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, by Jaroslav Nykryn and Karel Štěpán. Leiden, Sijthoff (for the Groupe d'Étude sur les Relations Est-Ouest, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, Genève), 1977. 104 pp. (La Coopération Économique des Pays de l'Est avec la Suisse, 5.)

DANMARK MELLEM SUPERMAGTERNE: DE KOMMENDE ÅRS SIKKERHEDSPOLITISKE MILJØ, by Erling Bjøl and others. Albertslund, Det Danske Forlag, 1976. 140 pp.

DENMARK BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS, by members of the Danish Strategic Study Group. Copenhagen, Danish Foreign Policy Society, n.d. 40 pp.

A DISCUSSION WITH HERBERT GIERSCH: CURRENT PROBLEMS OF THE WEST GERMAN ECONOMY, 1976-1977. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. 30 pp. $2.25.

DAS DRITTE REICH UND LATEINAMERIKA: DIE DEUTSCHE POLITIK GEGENÜBER SÜD- UND MITTELAMERIKA, 1939-1942, by Reiner Pommerin. Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag, 1977. 377 pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LE DROIT DE LA MER: PROBLÈMES ÉCONOMIQUES ET STRATÉGIQUES, by Henri Labrousse. Paris, Fondation pour les Études de Défense Nationale, 1977. 148 pp. (Les Cahiers, 7.) Fr. 35.00.

THE ECONOMIC ADVISORY COUNCIL, 1930-1939: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC ADVICE DURING DEPRESSION AND RECOVERY, by Susan Howson and Donald Winch. N.Y., Cambridge University Press, 1977. 424 pp.

ECONOMIC COMPARISON BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA. Seoul, Korea Development Institute, 1976. 58 pp.

ECONOMICS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS, by Dennis E. Logue and Richard James Sweeney. Ottawa, Ill., Green Hill Publishers (for the International Institute for Economic Research), 1977. 35 pp. (Original Papers, 6.) $1.25.

ENTWICKLUNG UND FRIEDEN: WISSENSCHAFTLICHE REIHE. Munich, Chr. Kaiser Verlag; Mainz, Matthias Grünewald-Verlag (for the Wissenschaftliche Kommission des Katholischen Arbeitskreises Entwicklung und Frieden), 1977.

11. Südafrika in der Politik Grossbritanniens und der USA, by Franz Ansprenger and E.-O. Czempiel. 164 pp.

ETHNIC STUDIES BIBLIOGRAPHY. VOL. I.: 1975. Pittsburgh, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, in conjunction with the Pennsylvania Ethnic Heritage Center, 1977. 273 pp.

FILLING THE FAMILY PLANNING GAP, by Bruce Stokes. Washington, Worldwatch Institute, 1977. 54 pp. (Worldwatch Papers, 12.) $2.00.

FROM PROTEST TO CHALLENGE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AFRICAN POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1882-1964, ed. by Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter. Stanford, Ca., Hoover Institution Press, 1977.

Vol. 3. Challenge and violence, 1953-1964, by Thomas Karis and Gail M. Gerhart. 825 pp. *Vol. 4*. Political profiles, 1882-1964, by Gail M. Gerhart and Thomas Karis. 178 pp.

GRAIN TRADE: THE KEY TO WORLD POWER AND HUMAN SURVIVAL, by John Freivalds. N.Y., Stein and Day, 1976. 248 pp. $10.95.

HEADLINE SERIES. N.Y., Foreign Policy Association, 1977. $1.40 each.

235. China and America: past and future, by Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam. 80 pp.

IMAGES OF DÉTENTE AND THE SOVIET POLITICAL ORDER, by Kenneth Jowitt. Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1977. 26 pp. $2.00.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES: ALTERNATIVES, APPROACHES, PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE, by Mary Francis Lowe. Geneva, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1976. 219 pp.

JAMAICA AND THE PAR-VALUE SYSTEM, by George N. Halm. Princeton, International Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1977. 25 pp. (Essays in International Finance, 120.) $1.00.

JOSEPH BECH, by Gaston Thorn. Lausanne, Centre de Recherches Européennes, 1977. 16 pp.

KEY ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY, by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development, 1977. 29 pp. (A Statement on National Policy.)

THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: UNSEPARATING THE POWERS, by John R. Bolton. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. 50 pp. (Studies in Legal Policy.) $2.25.

LESOTHO'S EXPENSIVE BORDER HOAX, by D.S. Prinsloo. Arcadia, Pretoria, Foreign Affairs Association, 1977. 14 pp. (Focus, 6.)

MANAGING INTERDEPENDENCE: RESTRUCTURING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, by Robert H. Johnson. Washington, Overseas Development Council, 1977. 25 pp. (Development Papers, 23.)

MEXICAN POLITICAL BIOGRAPHIES, 1935-1975, by Roderic Ai Camp. Tucson, Ariz., The University of Arizona Press, 1976. 468 pp.

DIE NEUE VERFASSUNG DER UNION VON BIRMA: VORGESCHICHTE, INHALTE, WIRKLICHKEIT, by Klaus Fleischmann. Hamburg, Institut für Asienkunde, 1976. 538 pp. (Mitteilungen, 82.) DM. 29.00.

A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN AFRICA? by William Epstein; NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES: THE SOUTH PACIFIC PROPOSAL, by Roderic Alley. Muscatine, Iowa, The Stanley Foundation, 1977. 52 pp. (Occasional Papers, 14.)

NUPI NOTAT. Oslo, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1977.

134. Forsvaret av Europa og Norges Plass, by John Sanness. 13 pp. *135*. The population trends of East African history: a critical review, by Helge Kjekshus. 11 pp. *136*. Forhandlinger om prisstabilisering av råvarer, by Arne Jon Isachsen. 13 pp.

NUPI RAPPORT. Oslo, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1977.

32. Overføring av allierte styrker til Norge, by Gullow Gjeseth. 137 pp.

DET NY EUROPA-PARLAMENT—VALG OG BEFØJELSER, by P.L. Vesterdorf. Albertslund, Det Danske Forlag, 1977. 149 pp.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS. Braamfontein, The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1976-77. Rhodesia's constitutional problems, by R.H. Christie. 11 pp. The Kremlin, the world revolutionary process and African "National Liberation Movements," by Dirk Kunert. 18 pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE OIL COMPANIES AND OPEC: NO CASE FOR COLLUSION; A REVIEW OF OIL PRICE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE RISE OF OPEC. Stamford, Conn., Continental Oil Company, n.d. 14 pp.

OIL, DIVESTITURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, ed. by Frank N. Trager. N.Y., Crane, Russak & Co. (for the National Strategy Information Center), 1977. 135 pp. $4.95.

OSTEUROPA: EINE EINFÜHRUNG IN SEINE GESCHICHTE, by Klaus Zernack. Munich, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1977. 167 pp.

PAMPHLETS. Taipei, Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, 1977.

195. A case study of Chinese Communist subversive activity in Africa: relations between Red China and Ghana (1964-1966), by Kuan Chung. 37 pp. 50¢. *196*. The strategical importance of Taiwan in the new anti-communist situation, by Yao Jen-tien. 29 pp. 50¢. *197*. Rhodesia – target for international communist intrigue, by Hsia Chung-mou. 30 pp. 50¢. *199*. A critique of Mao's character, by Hsiang Nai-kuang. 38 pp. 50¢. *200*. The Soviet-Chinese Communist conflict and communist poly-centric expansion; by Lin Kuo-hsiung. 71 pp. 70¢. *201*. A study of measures to counter communist infiltration and subversion, by Chuang Hsin-tien. 44 pp. 50¢.

PEACE ENDANGERED: THE REALITY OF DÉTENTE, by R.J. Rummel. Beverly Hills, Ca., 1976. 189 pp. $10.00.

PERSIAN GULF OIL IN MIDDLE EAST AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, by Mordechai Abir. Jerusalem, The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1976. 35 pp. (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, 20.) $1.00.

PERSPEKTIV FOR FORSKNING, by Leif Holbaek-Hanssen. Bergen, A.S. John Griegs Boktrykkeri (for Chr. Michelsens Institutt), 1976. 17 pp.

LE PHÉNOMÈNE DES TRANSFERTS INDIRECTS DE BÉNÉFICES ENTRE SOCIÉTES APPARENTEES ET LES CONDITIONS D'APPLICATION DE DIFFERENTES RÉGLEMENTATIONS NATIONALES EN LA MATIÈRE (CH, FR, RFA, UK, USA), by Edmond Tavernier. Geneva, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1977. 139 pp.

THE PLACE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN DEVELOPMENTAL PLANNING, by Hardy Wickwar. N.Y., New York University Press, 1977. 130 pp. (Monographs of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Section.)

THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND LABOR CLIMATE IN BRAZIL, by J.L. Schlagheck. Philadelphia, Industrial Research Unit, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1977. 116 pp. (Multinational Industrial Relations Series, 4.) $7.50.

LA POLITIQUE NORD-CORÉENNE A L'EGARD DE L'ONU. Seoul, Institut Coréen d'Études Est-Asiatiques, n.d. 94 pp.

PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT: PROGRESS, PROSPECTS, and the PUBLIC VIEW, by Gladwin Hill and others. Washington, Potomac Associates, 1977. 48 pp. (A Policy Perspective.) $2.50.

REPORT FROM JERUSALEM: CITY AT THE CROSSROADS, by J. Robert Moskin. N.Y., The American Jewish Committee, 1977. 54 pp. $1.50.

DIE RUSSISCHE FEBRUARREVOLUTION 1917 UND DIE SOZIALISTISCHE FRIEDENSPOLITIK, by Jürgen Stillig. Cologne, Böhlau, 1977. 331 pp. (Dissertationen zur neueren Geschichte, 2.)

SOCIO-CULTURAL COMPARISON BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA. Seoul, Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1976. 67 pp.

LES SOURCES DE LA NEUTRALITÉ ÉCONOMIQUE SUISSE, by Pierre Luciri. Geneva, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1976. 335 pp. (Thèse No. 259.)

SOVIET AND CHINESE NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR: THE WESTERN VIEW, by Louis J. Samelson. Beverly Hills, Ca., 1976. 62 pp. (Sage Professional Papers in International Studies, Vol. 4, No. 02-048.) $3.00.

SOVIET NUCLEAR PLANNING: A POINT OF VIEW ON SALT, by L.A. Frank. Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. 63 pp. $3.00.

STRATEGIC STUDIES REFERENCE GUIDE. VOL. I: 1975. Pittsburgh, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, in conjunction with the Center for Arms Control and International Security Studies, 1977, 232 pp.

THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A GUIDE TO INFORMATION SOURCES, by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Detroit, Gale Research Co., 1977. 155 pp. (International Relations Information Guide Series, 5.)

THE THIRD TRY AT WORLD ORDER: U.S. POLICY FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD, by Harlan Cleveland. Palo Alto, Ca., Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies (for the Bicentennial Era Interdependence Program of the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia), 1976. 119 pp. $3.95.

LE III[e] REICH ET LE PÉTROLE ROUMAIN, 1938-1940: CONTRIBUTION À L'ÉTUDE DE LA PÉNÉTRATION ÉCONOMIQUE ALLEMANDE DANS LES BALKANS À LA VEILLE ET AU DÉBUT DE LA SECONDE GUERRE MONDIALE, by Philippe Marguerat. Leiden, Sijthoff (for the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, Genève), 1977. 231 pp. (Collection de Relations Internationales, 6.)

"TWO-NESS" IN TRADE THEORY: COSTS AND BENEFITS, by Ronald W. Jones. Princeton, International

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finance Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1977. 47 pp. (Special Papers in International Economics, 12.) $2.00.

U.S. Foreign Policy: Principles for Defining the National Interest: A Public Agenda Foundation Report. N.Y., The Public Agenda Foundation, in association with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1976. 117 pp.

United States National Security Policy and Aid to the Thailand Police, by Thomas Lobe. Denver, Col., Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, n.d. 161 pp. (Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 14, Book 2.)

Världspolitikens Dagsfrågor. Stockholm, Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1977. Kr. 7.50 each. *1*. Indien under 70-talet, by K.R. Haellquist and I. Sondén-Haellquist. 36 pp. *2*. Västtyskland i världspolitiken, by Karl E. Birnbaum. 27 pp. *3*. USA:s nya politiska karta, by Per Jönsson. 32 pp.

Wandel im Ordnungsgefüge der peruanischen Wirtschaft unter der Revolutionsregierung 1968-1974, by Othmar Wyss. Bern, Verlag Paul Haupt (for the Lateinamerikanisches Institut an der Hochschule St. Gallen für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften), 1976. 237 pp. (Veröffentlichungen, 9.)

Wars of National Liberation, the Superpowers and the Afro-Asian Ocean Region, by Dirk Kunert. Braamfontein, The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1977. 68 pp. (Special Study.)

Was ist Kommunismus? Wandlungen einer Ideologie, by Wolfgang Leonhard. Munich, C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1976. 269 pp.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED